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Abstract 
 
Although the First World War has been characterized as a formative event in 
Canadian History, little attention has been paid to a neglected and often forgotten arm of 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the Cavalry.  The vast majority of Great War 
historians have ignored the presence of mounted troops on the Western Front, or have 
written off the entire cavalry arm with a single word – ‘obsolete.’  However, the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the Canadian Light Horse remained on the Western Front 
throughout the Great War because cavalry still had a role to play in modern warfare.   
 This thesis addresses the expected role of Cavalry in the Great War, and the role 
that Canadian Cavalry was able to play on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918.   
Cavalry was an arm of exploitation and protection.  The primary responsibilities assigned 
to the mounted arm were reconnaissance, shock, and pursuit. Cavalry was never expected 
to perform mass charges through entrenchments.  Rather, it was expected to use its 
superior mobility to perform reconnaissance, delaying actions, and pursue the retreating 
enemy.  Cavalry also had several important roles to play in rear areas, such as traffic 
control, escort duties, mounted police work, and any duties that required the mobility of a 
mounted force. 
A thorough examination of the role of cavalry in operations and in reserve reveals 
that Canadian Cavalry was able to perform as expected on the Western Front according to 
prewar doctrine.  When mobility was possible, Cavalry was tactically effective on a local 
scale, conducting pursuit, delay, and reconnaissance with great effect.  When the Front 
was stagnant, cavalry was still capable of fulfilling its intended role in rear areas.  
 iii
Cavalry was valuable on the Western Front because of its superior mobility, as mounted 
troops were capable of arriving at a decisive point of action quickly without exhausting 
men or resources, and could advance where other vehicles could not.  Despite conditions 
on the modern battlefield, Canadian Cavalry still had a role to play on the Western Front. 
 
Key Words:  
Canadian Cavalry, Western Front, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Canadian Light Horse, 
Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, Fort Garry Horse, 1st Hussars, 19th 
Alberta Dragoons, 16th Light Horse. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
Introduction and Historiography 
 
Introduction 
“In front of us was not a line but a fortress position, twenty miles deep, 
entrenched and fortified, defended by masses of machine-gun posts and thousands of 
guns in a wide arc. No chance for cavalry!”1  British journalist Philip Gibbs’ firsthand 
description of the Somme on 1 July 1916 is characteristic of the imagery associated with 
the Western Front.  This theatre remained stagnant and heavily entrenched for the 
majority of the Great War, conditions hardly associated with the employment of cavalry.  
As an arm of exploitation, cavalry was often required to wait in reserve for an appropriate 
time to advance.  As William R. Jones of the Royal Canadian Dragoons remarked, the 
Canadian Cavalry had little choice but to “Smile, and Carry On,”2 and await their chance 
for mounted action.  Consequently, the presence of Canadian Cavalry on the Western 
Front has often been forgotten, ignored, or written off with a single word – ‘obsolete.’  
However, an examination of role of Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front reveals that 
cavalry was far from obsolete in the Great War.  When employed according to doctrine, 
cavalry was able to operate as expected on the Western Front in reconnaissance, pursuit, 
and delay.  Even on the Western Front, the primary asset of the mounted arm was 
mobility. 
 
                                                          
1 Philip Gibbs quoted in Stephen Weir, History’s Worst Decisions and the People Who Made Them 
(Murdoch Books: Millers Point N.S.W., 2005), 123. 
2 William R. Jones, Fighting the Hun From Saddle to Trench (Albany, NY: Aiken Book Company, 1918), 
129. 
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Background 
Despite the seemingly limited role available for cavalry, the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF)3 employed a full Cavalry Corps comprised of five Cavalry Divisions on the 
Western Front.  Additional squadrons of “Divisional Cavalry” were attached to each 
British Infantry Division to fulfill any role that required mobility for the infantry, 
including reconnaissance, traffic control, dispatch riding, and escort duties.  The 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) employed both Independent and Divisional Cavalry 
on the Western Front.4  The Canadian Cavalry Brigade (CCB) was designated to fulfill 
the Independent role, and spent the war majority of the Great War as part of the British 
Cavalry Corps and largely supported British operations.  The CCB was comprised of the 
Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), Lord Strathcona’s Horse (LSH), and the Fort Garry 
Horse (FGH).  Squadrons of Divisional Cavalry embarked for the front with the 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd Canadian Divisions to support the Canadian Infantry.  The 19th Alberta Dragoons 
(19AD) became the 1st Divisional Cavalry Squadron in 1914, the 1st Hussars (1H) 
became the 2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron in 1915, and the 16th Light Horse (16LH) 
became the 3rd Divisional Cavalry Squadron in 1916.  In June 1916, these three 
Divisional Cavalry squadrons were amalgamated into one regiment called the Canadian 
Corps Cavalry Regiment (CCCR).  In March 1917, the Regiment was renamed the 
Canadian Light Horse (CLH). 
Historiography 
The considerable achievements of cavalry on the Western Front have been 
obscured by the popular images associated with the nature of that battlefield, and by 
                                                          
3 Employed exclusively on the Western Front. 
4 See Chapter 2 for full definition of Independent and Divisional Cavalry. 
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Great War historiography.  Because many members of the British High Command were 
cavalrymen, there is a prominent tendency to equate their belief in the tactical value of 
cavalry with military incompetence.  John French5 and Douglas Haig6 have long been 
portrayed as butchers who threw away countless lives in a war of attrition.  Consequently, 
many historians have come to associate the mounted arm with the general 
mismanagement of the war. The longevity of cavalry through the Great War has been 
attributed to military conservatism within the British Army, or to misguided 
sentimentality that bread ignorance of the implications of modern technology.  It is well 
established in historical tradition that cavalrymen such as Haig and French profoundly 
misunderstood the nature of modern warfare and weaponry, and clung desperately to the 
outmoded doctrine of the l’arme blanche, or “cold steel” cavalry charge.  The debate over 
retaining l’arme blanche has painted French and Haig as conservative reactionaries, 
committed to the cavalry charge above all else.7   For example, Basil Liddell Hart argued 
that both French and Haig held firm to the belief that “so long as the cavalry charge was 
maintained all would be well with the conduct of the war.”8  However, as early as 1890, 
Haig wrote that cavalry had to be prepared to fight dismounted or it would be useless.9 
The majority of Haig’s defenders have attempted to minimize his commitment to 
the mounted arm, as support for the employment of cavalry is considered a mark of a 
traditionalist and a major flaw in a twentieth century general.  For example, in Douglas 
                                                          
5 Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Force from 4 August 1914 to 18 December 1915. 
6 Replaced French as Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary on 18 December 1915 and kept this 
position for the remainder of the Great War. 
7 Gervase Phillips, “Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone History,” The Journal of 
Military History, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 2007, 56-57.   
8 Basil Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Pan, 1972), 35. 
9 Haig Papers, 15 November 1890, Quoted Stephen Badsey, “The Boer War (1899-1902) and British 
Cavalry Doctrine: A Re-Evaluation” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No.1, January 2007, 85;  
Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 56. 
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Haig, The Educated Soldier, John Terraine argued that Haig was an “educated soldier” 
despite the fact he was a cavalryman, stating “Not even the cavalry itself could be said to 
have commanded his full allegiance…to call him a ‘Cavalry General’…is to miss a main 
truth.”10  Conversely, Haig’s devotion to the mounted arm has been used as fodder by his 
harshest critics.  For example, in Gerard De Groot’s article “Educated Soldier or Cavalry 
Officer?  Contradictions in the pre-1914 Career of Douglas Haig,” the presumption of a 
dichotomy between the two characteristics is established in the very title of the article.  
De Groot argued “Haig’s devotion to the cavalry often nullified the advantages of his 
‘educated’ nature,”11 and portrayed Haig’s desire to preserve l’arme blanche tactics as a 
“paranoid obsession.”12  De Groot made no mention of Haig’s equal support for the 
adoption of the rifle, but praised Frederick Sleigh Roberts13 and Erskine Childers14 for 
their promotion of mounted infantry reform, and Horatio Herbert Kitchener15 for 
advocating a combination of rifle and shock tactics with l’arme blanche.16   
The dismissal of cavalry as antiquated and obsolete began soon after the Great 
War.  In 1920, tank commander and architect of the 1917 Battle of Cambrai J.F.C. Fuller 
began advocating the abolition of the mounted arm in favour of full mechanization.  
Although many have agreed with Fuller on this point, it is noteworthy that he also 
believed tank technology would soon make infantry obsolete as well, stating, “The doom 
                                                          
10 John Terraine, Douglas Haig, The Educated Soldier (Toronto: Hutchinson & Co, 1963), 7. 
11 Gerard J. De Groot, “Educated Soldier or Cavalry Officer?  Contradictions in the pre-1914 Career of 
Douglas Haig,” War & Society Volume 4, No. 2, September 1986, 52. 
12 De Groot, 62. 
13 Celebrated nineteenth century British General.  Commander in Chief of the British Forces 1900-1904. 
14 British Boer War veteran and military theorist.  Childers was critical of British cavalry tactics and 
advocated the abolition of l’arme blanche and the exclusive adoption of the rifle.   
15 Celebrated nineteenth century British General.  British Chief of Staff in 1900, and Secretary of State for 
War August 1914-1916. 
16 De Groot, Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 68. 
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of all muscular warfare has been sealed.”17  David Lloyd George18 perpetuated the notion 
that cavalry had no place on the modern battlefield, and painted the evocative and tragic 
picture of the doomed cavalry charge wherein mounted troops were rapidly cut down by 
machine gun fire and their objective later captured by the infantry.19  Similarly, Liddell 
Hart’s 1930 History of the World War deemed the mounted arm’s impact on the course of 
the Great War trivial at best, and portrayed the cavalry commanders as incompetent 
reactionaries.20  Liddell Hart’s work had far-reaching and significant consequences for 
the legacy of cavalry in the Great War because it permanently associated the mounted 
arm with the poor management of the Western Front.21  His famous statement that forage 
for the cavalry accounted for the single largest commodity shipped overseas during the 
Great War was not discredited until John Singleton and The Marquess of Anglesey’s 
publications on Great War cavalry in the 1990’s.22 
After the triumph of mechanization in the Second World War, any serious 
discussion of the contribution of cavalry in the Great War was silenced, and any 
arguments in favour of the tactical effectiveness of the mounted arm were dismissed as 
ignorance of the realities of modern warfare, or misguided sentimentalism.23  For many, 
cavalry was the arm that could not understand the implications of modern technology on 
                                                          
17 J.F.C. Fuller, “Tanks and Cavalry Tactics” The Cavalry Journal, 1920, 527. 
18 British Prime Minister 1916-1922. 
19 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 58. 
20 Liddell Hart, 62. 
21 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 57. 
22 Liddell Hart, 62.  John Singleton’s research has shown that the British Army employed over 368,000 
horses on the Western Front by 1917.  However, the vast majority of these were not cavalry horses, but 
draught or pack animals.  As Anglesey has revealed, the cavalry accounted for a mere 7.72% of the British 
Expeditionary Force in 1914.  By 1915, the number had been reduced by more than half to 3.20%.  In 1916, 
it declined further to 2.55%, then 2.15% in 1917, and 1.11% on 1 March 1918.  On the day of the 
Armistice, the cavalry accounted for a scant 1.01% of the BEF and employed only 6% of its horses.  See 
John Singleton, “Britain’s Military Use of Horses 1914-1918” Past and Present No.139, May 1993, 178, 
190-191, 195; The Marquess of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, 1816-1919: Vol. VIII, The 
Western Front, 1915-1918 (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), 288-289. 
23 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 59. 
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the battlefield in 1914, or simply resisted change and technological advancements 
because it would mean their obsolescence.  As De Groot claimed, “Very few cavalrymen 
were prepared to accept the inevitable decline of their arm.  They correctly perceived 
progress as a threat to their existence, and therefore actively resisted its implications.”24  
Similarly, William Taylor stated “Cavalrymen could not bring themselves to admit that 
the new weapons and machines being introduced were far superior to horse cavalry.  This 
fear of change was one of the greatest obstacles to the cavalry.”25  In the British Official 
History of the Great War, Edmonds perpetuated the myth that any cavalry charge would 
be impossible until the last machine gun was captured.26  These assumptions have helped 
create the false imagery of cavalrymen charging unknowingly to their doom across the 
Western Front, and have been used to substantiate claims that the mounted arm 
contributed nothing to the Western Front.27 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, few works were devoted exclusively to 
cavalry in the Great War, as the mounted arm’s obsolescence prior to the Great War had 
become axiomatic.  William Taylor, Brian Bond, and Edward Spiers all produced similar 
indictments of Great War cavalry in articles, arguing that modern weapons had made the 
cavalry charge obsolete, and mounted rifle tactics should have been adopted exclusively.  
The typical picture of the indoctrinated and sentimental cavalryman was painted in each 
                                                          
24 De Groot, 52. 
25 William M. Taylor, “The Debate Over Changing Cavalry Tactics and Weapons, 1900-1914” Military 
Affairs, Vol. 28 No.4, Winter 1964-1965, 173. 
26 J.E. Edmonds, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Military Operations in France 
and Belgium 1918 Vol. V, 26 September-11 November: The Advance to Victory (London: HMSO, 1947), 
197. 
27 David Kenyon, “The Indian Cavalry Divisions in Somme: 1916” in The Indian Army in Two World 
Wars, ed. Kaushik Roy (Boston: Brill, 2011), 43; John Terraine, To Win a War: 1918, The Year of Victory 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), 190; John Terraine, White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-1918 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982), 317. 
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volume.28  Those who did write books on the subject of cavalry produced general 
histories of mounted warfare that gave little attention to the role of cavalry in the Great 
War, and did not write favourably of it.  For example, John Ellis’ general history of 
cavalry dismissed the effect of the mounted arm past the mid-nineteenth century due to 
the effects of modern firepower.29  Similarly, Leonard Cooper’s volume on cavalry ended 
in 1914 with the author noting the obsolescence of the mounted arm in the Great War 
while championing mechanization.30  In The British Cavalry, Philip Warner argued that 
by 1915, it was obvious that the only job for the cavalry on the Western Front was to 
serve as mounted infantry.31  More recently, Roman Jarymowycz argued that although 
the mounted arm was still useful for reconnaissance, the Great War proved to be the 
downfall of cavalry.  He argued that the mounted arm did not participate in any 
significant engagements on the Western Front because modern artillery and machine 
guns quickly defeated cavalry actions, and saw the tank as cavalry’s natural successor.32 
It was not until the late twentieth century that some historians began to revise 
their attitudes towards cavalry in the Great War.  For example, Bidwell and Graham 
noted that the British cavalry had embraced reform and modern weapons prior to the 
1914, and understood that the use of l’arme blanche would be increasingly rare in future 
wars.33  Similarly, Paddy Griffith wrote favourably of pre-war Cavalry reform and 
praised the mounted arm’s ability to adapt to conditions on the Western Front.  Griffith 
                                                          
28 See Taylor; Brian Bond, “Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry 1870-1914” in The Theory and 
Practice of War: Essays Presented to Capitan B.H. Liddell Hart, ed. Michael Howard (London: Cassell, 
1965); Edward M. Spiers, “The British Cavalry, 1902-1914,” Journal for the Society of Army Historical 
Research Vol. 75, 1979. 
29 John Ellis, Cavalry: The History of Mounted Warfare (North Vancouver BC: Westbridge Books, 1978). 
30 Leonard Cooper, British Regular Cavalry, 1644-1914 (London: Chapman and Hall, 1965), 11, 195-208. 
31 Philip Warner, The British Cavalry (London: J.M. Dent, 1984), 127-198. 
32 Roman Jarymowycz, Cavalry from Hoof to Track (Praeger Security International: 2007),119-153, 228. 
33 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 
1904-1945 (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 32-34. 
 8
defended Haig’s continued emphasis on the mobility of cavalry in anticipation of a return 
to open warfare, and addressed some of the myths surrounding the success of tanks and 
armoured vehicles in the Great War.34  Finally, Antulio Echevarria has given substantial 
attention to the mobility and versatility that the mounted arm still had to offer in the Great 
War, and noted the commitment to combining firepower with shock action.35  Stephen 
Badsey’s excellent works on British cavalry doctrine between 1880 and 1914 have helped 
to dispel popular myths surrounding the attitudes and intentions of cavalry generals.36   
Recent works dedicated to British Cavalry on the Western Front have done much 
to redress the previous injustice done to the cavalry of the Great War.  The Marquess of 
Anglesey wrote a detailed eight-volume narrative on the British Cavalry from 1816 to 
1919 that culminated in two final volumes on the Western Front.  Anglesey argued that 
Haig was correct to keep cavalry on the Western Front because there was no more mobile 
alternative.37  Gervase Phillips has written several articles on development of nineteenth 
century cavalry doctrine and reform in Europe, and provided an excellent historiography 
of cavalry writing in the twentieth century.  Phillips argued that contemporaries and 
historians alike have unfairly dismissed the cavalry as anachronistic and steeped in 
traditionalism, completely ignorant of the material realities of modern warfare.  
According to Phillips, “The arm has served as a convenient scapegoat for military 
                                                          
34 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 159-
169. 
35 Antulio Echevarria, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2000); Antulio Echevarria, “Combining Firepower and Versatility: Rethinking 
the ‘Arm of Decision’ before the Great War,” Royal United Services Institute Journal Vol. 147, 2002. 
36 Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880-1918 (Burlington VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2008); Badsey, Boer War. 
37 See The Marquess of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, 1816-1919: Vol. VII, The Curragh 
Incident and the Western Front 1914 (London: Leo Cooper, 1996); Anglesey, Vol. VIII. 
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setbacks in wartime and soldiers’ alleged reactionary impulses in peacetime.”38  Like 
Badsey, Phillips has drawn considerable attention to prewar reforms that helped prepare 
the British Cavalry for the Great War.39   
Some recent academic scholarship has been devoted to British Cavalry in 
operations on the Western Front.  In 2000, Richard Lee Bowes devoted his Master’s 
thesis to the subject, focusing on the Somme on 14 July 1916, Cambrai on 20 November 
1917, and Amiens on 8 August 1918.  Bowes argued that cavalry was not obsolete and 
was capable of advance on the Western Front, but could not achieve a “breakthrough” 
because they were held back by a centralized command structure and the slowness of 
communication, both of which kept the cavalry from advancing quickly and at the 
appropriate time.40  Similarly, in 2008, David Kenyon completed a thorough and well-
researched PhD dissertation titled British Cavalry on the Western Front 1916-1918, in 
which he assessed the tactical effect of the British Cavalry Corps.  Kenyon focused on 
four major Allied offensives, the Somme in 1916, Arras and Cambrai in 1917, and the 
final “Hundred Days” beginning at Amiens in 1918.  He argued that cavalry was capable 
of being tactically effective on the Western Front beginning in 1916, and that the nature 
of the Western Front and the character of operations did not fundamentally change in 
1918.  Rather, it was issues of command and communication that held the cavalry back in 
1916 and 1917.  Like Bowes, Kenyon concluded that the cavalry was not obsolete and 
might have proved decisive at the operational level if not for the failures of leadership.41 
                                                          
38 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 37. 
39 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 37-74; Gervase Phillips, “‘Who Shall Say That the Days of Cavalry Are Over?’ 
The Revival of the Mounted Arm in Europe, 1853-1914,” War In History Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, 5-32. 
40 Richard Lee Bowes, “Waiting for the 'G': A Re-evaluation of the Role of the British Cavalry on the 
Western Front, 1915-1918” (MA diss., Royal Military College of Canada 2000), i, 3-7, 135-137. 
41 David Kenyon, “British Cavalry on the Western Front 1916-1918,” (PhD diss., Cranfield University, 
2008), iii, 288-306. 
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While recent attention has been given to the British Cavalry in the Great War, no 
complete account has been provided for the Canadian Cavalry.  While Gerald Nicholson 
gave the actions of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the Canadian Light Horse some 
attention in his Official History, these accounts were not thorough and no time was spent 
examining the value of cavalry reconnaissance.  Like so many others, Nicholson felt that 
“In assessing the work of the cavalry it must be recognized that the greatest contribution 
was that made by those squadrons which served dismounted in the trenches.”42 
The majority of sources on Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front are regimental 
histories.  Many of these were written in the post-Second World War era.  Like most 
sources from the period, they spend little time addressing the role of cavalry in the Great 
War.  For example, J.M. McAvity’s 1947 history of Lord Strathcona’s Horse and Foster 
Stark’s 1951 account of the 1st Hussars are heavily focused on the Second World War, 
and give no more than a few paragraphs to the Great War.43  Although Brereton 
Greenhous provided a thorough account of the Royal Canadian Dragoons experience in 
the Great War in 1983, he was highly critical of the employment and performance of 
cavalry on the Western Front and argued in favour of mechanization and aerial 
reconnaissance.44  The regimental histories that do address the role of Canadian Cavalry 
on the Western Front are focused exclusively on individual regiments and are largely 
                                                          
42 Gerald W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian 
Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Roger Duhamel, Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 
1962), 465. 
43 J.M. McAvity, Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians): A Record of Achievement (Toronto: 
Brigdens Limited, 1947); Foster M. Stark, A History of the First Hussars Regiment, 1856-1945 (London 
ON: Hunter Printing London Limited, 1951), 1-6. 
44 Brereton Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1883-1983 
(Belleville ON: Guild of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983). 
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brief narrative histories based on the war diaries.45  No regimental histories exist for the 
now disbanded 19th Alberta Dragoons and 16th Light Horse.   
The few articles that have been published on Canadian Cavalry in the Great War 
are about the charge of Lord Strathcona’s Horse at Moreuil Wood in March 1918, as 
many have regarded this action as the only valuable contribution cavalry was able to 
make on the Western Front.46  A notable exception includes Michael McNorgan’s recent 
work on the Canadian Light Horse at Iwuy in October 1918, although this article is 
focused on Canadian Cavalry in a combined arms action and also gives attention to the 
Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade (CMMGB).47   
Although the role of cavalry in the Great War has finally been given some 
attention, clear gaps remain in the existing scholarship on Canadian Cavalry on the 
Western Front.  The majority of recent works are generally focused on the British 
experience as opposed to the Canadian.  While Anglesey summarized some of the actions 
of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, his work is broadly focused and is largely a narrative as 
opposed to an analytical history.  Similarly, while Kenyon covered some of the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade’s operations, his account was devoted to the entire British Cavalry 
                                                          
45 See R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, A Short History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (Toronto: Southam Press, 
1932); Larry Worthington, The ‘Spur and the Sprocket’: The Story of the Royal Canadian Dragoons 
(Kitchener: Reeve Press, 1968); G.T. Service and J.K. Marteinson, The Gate: A History of the Fort Garry 
Horse (Calgary: Commercial Printers Limited, 1971); W.B. Fraser, Always a Strathcona (Calgary: 
Comprint Publishing, 1976); Richard Cunniffe, The Story of a Regiment: Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal 
Canadians) (Calgary: Lord Strathcona’s Horse Regimental Society, 1995); Michael R. McNorgan, The 
Gallant Hussars: A History of the 1st Hussars Regiment, 1856-2004 (London ON: The 1st Hussars Cavalry 
Fund, 2004). 
46 Brereton Greenhous, “‘The position was desperate, if not fatal’: The Canadian Cavalry Brigade at 
Moreuil Wood, 30 March 1918,” Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1988), 40-48; John 
R. Grodzinski, The Battle of Moreuil Wood. (Calgary, 1993); John R. Grodzinski and Michael R. 
McNorgan, “‘It’s a charge, boys, it’s a charge!’: Cavalry Action at Moreuil Wood, 30 March 1918” in 
Fighting for Canada: Seven Battles, 1758-1945, ed. Donald E. Graves (Toronto: Robin Brass Studios, 
2000), 241-274. 
47 Michael R. McNorgan, “‘My God, look at them houses moving!’ Combined Arms Action at Iwuy, 10-11 
October 1918” in More Fighting for Canada: Five Battles, 1760-1944 ed. Donald E. Graves (Toronto: 
Robin Brass Studio, 2004), 203-233. 
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Corps on the Western Front.  As Kenyon’s work was focused exclusively on British 
Cavalry in operations, little attention was given to cavalry training, prewar cavalry 
doctrine, or the importance of cavalry reconnaissance, particularly in rear areas.  
Conversely, Badsey’s works are not focused on cavalry operations, but British Cavalry 
doctrine between 1880 and 1914.   
No complete account has been provided that addresses the role and experience of 
Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front throughout the Great War, from recruitment to 
demobilization.  While some attention has been given to the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
particularly through one specific operation,48 almost no historical account has been 
provided for the role of the Canadian Light Horse in the Great War (again, with the 
notable exception of McNorgan’s works).  Little attention has been given to the 
importance of cavalry reconnaissance in the Great War, particularly in rear areas.  The 
overwhelming tendency to view cavalry purely as an arm of exploitation has led most to 
ignore its other vital role as a protective force.  Finally, no account has synthesized 
prewar cavalry doctrine with an analysis of cavalry operations on the Western Front to 
determine whether or not the mounted arm fulfilled its intended role in the Great War.  
Traditional historiography has branded the mounted arm obsolete because there was no 
mass cavalry charge through the trenches on the Western Front, and revisionists have yet 
to state that this was not the intended role of cavalry.  The inability to employ a single 
tactic in this particular theatre49 does not prove the obsolescence of the entire arm, thus an 
examination of the intended role of cavalry and the actual role it carried out on the 
Western Front is necessary to fill these significant gaps in historiography.   
                                                          
48 At Moreuil Wood. 
49 The mounted charge was of clear value in the Eastern theatres throughout the Great War. 
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Research Questions and Methodology 
The experience of both the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the Canadian Light 
Horse have to be addressed in operations and in reserve to provide a full picture of 
Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front.  The approach is chronological, with the 
experience of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and Canadian Light Horse considered 
separately.  Conclusions are largely drawn from primary sources such as Operational 
Orders, War Diaries, and Officers reports, the majority of which can be found at Library 
and Archives Canada, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, the Directorate of 
History and Heritage, and various archives across Canada.   
If we are to appreciate the contribution of Canadian Cavalry on the Western 
Front, three main questions need to be addressed:   
1. What was the intended role of cavalry on the Western Front?   
Before the performance of Canadian Cavalry can be assessed, it is necessary to 
address expectations, particularly because of the popular but incorrect assumptions that 
French and Haig had no understanding of the implications of modern technology, or that 
they intended to send the cavalry charging against enemy trench lines on the Western 
Front. It is also necessary to determine what the primary responsibilities of the mounted 
arm had always been, and how tactics and armament had been adapted to fit with the 
realities of modern weaponry.   
This question must be approached from a British and Canadian context, as the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade was attached to the British Cavalry Corps on the Western 
Front, and the Canadian Expeditionary Force was an extension of the British Army, and 
utilized the same training manuals and doctrine throughout the Great War.  This question 
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will be addressed through an examination of prewar cavalry doctrine, largely found in 
training manuals such as Cavalry Training and Field Service Regulations.  The influence 
of the Boer War and ensuing debates over reform is also essential for determining the 
intended role of cavalry in the twentieth century.  An examination of training is also 
necessary.  Finally, attention to the unique history and recruitment of Canadian Cavalry 
will establish the expectations and experience of the mounted arm in a Canadian context. 
2. How was Cavalry employed on the Western Front? 
To do justice the history of Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front, it is 
necessary to address the way that cavalry was employed in operations and reserve, while 
fighting mounted, dismounted, and while serving in rear areas.  The static nature of the 
battlefield and the lack of mounted action in 1915 and 1916 have created the false 
assumption that cavalry had no place on the Western Front, and the perception of 
cavalry’s idleness in this theatre has been used to condemn the mounted arm.  However, 
the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the Canadian Light Horse were far from idle and had a 
wide range of experiences throughout the Great War.   
Appropriate attention must also be given to the impact of modern weapons and 
technology, and the ways in which cavalry adapted to conditions on the Western Front.  
Particular attention will be given to support for cavalry operations from machine guns 
and horse artillery, and to the employment of cavalry in combined arms operations, as the 
advent of tank technology has often been used to prove the mounted arm’s obsolescence.  
3. Was Cavalry able to fulfill its intended role on the Western Front? 
To assess the value of Cavalry on the Western Front, it is necessary to examine 
the role of cavalry throughout the campaign, both in operations and in reserve, to 
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determine whether or not the mounted arm was able to perform according to prewar 
expectations.  Because the role of cavalry became greater in the later years of the war, 
more attention is given to the Canadian Cavalry in 1917 and 1918.  All operations in 
which the Canadian Cavalry regiments were intended to participate are considered, with 
particular attention to the Somme in 1916, the German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line in 
March 1917, Vimy Ridge in April 1917, the German Spring Offensive in March 1918, 
and the final “Hundred Days” of the Great War beginning in August 1918.  An 
assessment of the mounted arm’s contribution is necessary for determining its value on 
the Western Front. 
Thesis 
It will be demonstrated that the expected role of cavalry did not fundamentally 
change between 1914 and 1918 despite conditions on the Western Front.  What did 
change was the anticipated scale of cavalry action.  In 1916, the understanding that a 
mass cavalry “breakthrough” would not be possible was beginning to be understood.  
Cavalry exploitation on a smaller and more localized scale was beginning to be 
anticipated and planned for.   
While cavalry could not perform the same exploitation manoeuvres in 1915 as 
they had a century before, Canadian Cavalry was tactically effective when mobility was 
possible on the Western Front.  Mobility enabled cavalry to get to a decisive point of 
action quickly without exhausting men or resources.  The mounted arm was able to take 
advantage of local successes in pursuit and perform delaying actions, as prewar cavalry 
reforms ensured that cavalry was properly organized and armed for modern warfare.  By 
1917, cavalry was capable of pursuit on the Western Front, a traditional role best 
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performed by a mobile force.  The mounted roles of pursuit and delay continued into 
1918, as mobility proved a valuable asset at the end of the Great War.  Finally, 
reconnaissance was always considered to be the most important role cavalry had to play.  
Cavalry was able to perform this function throughout the Great War. 
The experience of Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front indicates that cavalry 
was capable of fulfilling its intended role when employed correctly and according to 
doctrine.  While the mounted arm was not capable of participating in actions against 
entrenchments, cavalry was tactically effective on a local scale when open warfare 
returned to the Western Front.  When mobility was possible, the Canadian Cavalry 
conducted pursuit, delay, and reconnaissance with great effect.  When the front was 
stagnant, cavalry was still capable of fulfilling its intended role in rear areas.  Cavalry 
was valuable on the Western Front because of its mobility. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Cavalry Doctrine and Reform, 1900-1914 
 
Introduction 
Between 1900 and 1914, the future role of cavalry was one of the most 
contentious issues in the British Army.1  All European nations were deeply concerned 
with the impact that modern technology would have on the nature of the battlefield, and 
the ways in which the mounted arm would adapt to these new realities.  Although the 
debate over the future of cavalry due to increased firepower predated the Boer War by 
nearly half a century,2 conflicting interpretations of the mounted arm’s performance in 
South Africa served as a catalyst for sweeping reforms and endless debates that attracted 
the attention of the most influential military personalities of the day.3   
The crux of the cavalry debate was centred on armament, as the weapons of the 
mounted arm would determine cavalry doctrine, tactics, and the future role of cavalry on 
the battlefield.  While cavalry was expected to carry on with the traditional roles of 
reconnaissance and pursuit, the continuation of the mounted charge necessitated the 
preservation of l’arme blanche.4  Arguments ensued over the abolition of the lance and 
the adoption of the rifle as the primary weapon of cavalry.  After the Boer War, reforms 
to the British Cavalry and cavalry doctrine led to the creation of a versatile mounted arm 
                                                          
1 Note that this debate was centred on how the mounted arm should be employed, not whether the mounted 
arm should be retained.   
2 Publications on the mounted arm’s potential obsolescence began circulating in the 1860’s and continued 
through to the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899.  See Badsey, Boer War, 80-81. 
3 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 38; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 143-190. 
4 Bladed weapons, such as the sword and the lance. 
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capable of fighting as traditional cavalry or mounted rifles.5  The mounted rifle tradition 
was particularly pervasive in Canada.  Reforms and the adoption of modern firepower 
helped to prepare the mounted arm for twentieth century warfare and adapt to 
circumstances on the Western Front.  
Pre-Boer War Cavalry Doctrine 
  
Although the prevailing opinion remains that cavalry entered the Boer War 
steadfastly devoted to anachronistic l’arme blanche cavalry tactics, attention had been 
paid to the impact of modern weaponry for nearly fifty years.  Through the 1860s and 
1870s, efforts were made to increase the speed of the mounted charge to escape the 
effects of enemy fire.  The adoption of firearms was widely supported, and all British 
Cavalry regiments were equipped with carbines by the 1880’s.6  Supporting firepower 
was also increased.  Theorists Wilkinson Shaw and E.S. May advocated the principle of 
employing machine guns with the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA)7 in the late nineteenth 
century.8  Similarly, John French and Douglas Haig began advocating the use of machine 
gun support with artillery, and practiced dismounted cavalry actions as early as 1892.9  
According to Badsey, by the late nineteenth century “the squadron attack supported by 
dismounted fire, artillery, and machine guns, had become one of the most fashionable 
new ideas in the British Army.”10   
                                                          
5 Mounted Rifles were trained cavalrymen and skilled horsemen, armed with rifles as their primary 
weapon.  Conversely, Mounted Infantry were infantrymen and were mounted only for mobility.  As 
unskilled horsemen, they were often mounted on ponies, mules, or camels and were not trained to fight on 
horseback or gallop to a decisive point of action.  For details on the evolution of these terms in the British 
Army, see Badsey, Boer War, 82-84; Phillips, Revival of the Mounted Arm, 13. 
6 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 1-2, 5-6. 
7 The Royal Horse Artillery was established in 1793. 
8 Wilkinson Shaw, The Elements of Modern Tactics, 8th Edition (London: Kegan Paul, 1894), 319-320; 
E.S. May, Guns and Cavalry: Their Performance in the Past and their Prospects in the Future (London: 
Sampson Low, 1896). 
9 Badsey, Boer War, 85. 
10 Badsey, Boer War, 85. 
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century, conflict arose over the question of 
adopting the rifle.  While all agreed the rifle was essential for the future of cavalry, none 
could agree on the proper doctrine for employing this weapon with a mounted force.  
Some suggested firing a rifle from the saddle could improve the effect of cavalry action, 
while others encouraged the cavalry to adopt “mounted rifle” doctrine, wherein they 
would ride to a decisive point of action quickly and dismount to fight with a rifle.  In 
1867, Sir Henry Marshman Havelock-Allan advocated the adoption of a “hybrid” cavalry 
doctrine in which cavalry would be trained in both shock and mounted rifle tactics, 
capable of fighting mounted with an edged weapon or dismounting and fighting on foot 
with a rifle as circumstances dictated.  This doctrine was heavily influenced by the highly 
successful mounted tactics employed in the American Civil War, wherein cavalrymen 
were equipped with a sabre, rifle, and a revolver, and trained to fight mounted or 
dismounted when necessary.11  British Colonel Frederick Chenevix Trench and Douglas 
Haig were also strong advocates of hybrid cavalry doctrine both before and after the Boer 
War.12   
While the creation of a hybrid cavalry arm seemed an elegant solution to some, 
many British officers believed that cavalrymen were incapable of fighting equally well in 
two roles.  For example, Sir Evelyn Wood agreed with Jomini that it was exceedingly 
difficult to train cavalrymen to fight with equal proficiency on foot and on horseback, and 
argued that cavalry should never be encouraged to fight dismounted.13  In 1874, Wood 
                                                          
11 Sir Henry M. Havelock, Three Main Military Questions of the Day (London: Longman, 1867), 78-79, 
99-100. 
12 F. Chenevix Trench, Cavalry in Modern War (London: Keegan Paul, 1884); Haig Papers, 15 November 
1890, Quoted in Badsey, Boer War, 85; Phillips, Revival of the Mounted Arm, 12-13. 
13 However, the French Army continued to employ Mounted Rifles or gendarmes. 
Sir Evelyn Wood, Achievements of Cavalry with a Chapter on Mounted Infantry (London: George Bell & 
Sons, 1897), 241-250. 
 20
promoted the establishment of a separate mounted infantry corps to act as scouts for the 
infantry and support the cavalry in operations.14  Similarly, Canadian cavalryman and 
theorist George Denison advocated the creation of two separate mounted arms in 1877, 
with a body of traditional cavalry retained for rare shock actions, and a second arm of 
mounted rifles that would fill the reconnaissance role and fight dismounted with modern 
firepower and offer support to the traditional cavalry when necessary.  Denison argued 
that traditional cavalry armed with edged weapons should represent approximately one-
quarter of the entire mounted force due to its much reduced role on the modern 
battlefield.  He felt the reconnaissance work performed by mounted rifles would be of the 
greatest value.15  Similar opinions persisted after the Boer War, as Major A.W. Andrew 
also advocated two separate mounted arms, with mounted rifles outnumbering traditional 
cavalry by a ratio of three to one.16 
Post-Boer War Reforms – Reconnaissance and Horsemastership 
The Boer War began notoriously badly for the British Army.  After three British 
defeats at Magersfontein, Colenso, and Stormberg during “Black Week” in December 
1899, Major General Redvers Buller found himself replaced by Field Marshal Sir 
Frederick Sleigh Roberts as Commander in Chief of the British Forces in January 1900.  
Roberts had greater success, advancing to Bloemfontein and Pretoria by June.  September 
brought the guerrilla phase, which lasted for the remainder of the war.17  According to 
Badsey, Roberts blamed Major General John French18 for the poor “horsemastership”19 
                                                          
14 Wood, 241-250. 
15 George T. Denison, A History of Cavalry From the Earliest Times with Lessons for the Future, 2nd ed. 
(1877, reprint London: Macmillan, 1913), 421-433. 
16 A.W. Andrew, Cavalry Tactics of Today (Bombay: Thacker, 1903), 109; Badesy, 151. 
17 Badsey, Boer War, 79, 89. 
18 Major General Commanding Cavalry Forces in South Africa. 
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of the cavalry and terrible condition of the horses, particularly after French’s delay at 
Poplar Grove in March 1900.  Here, French was forced to break twice to rest his 
exhausted and starved horses en route to the battle due to supply line failures, so his 
cavalry was not in position when the infantry advance began.20  Tensions grew between 
Roberts and the mounted arm that continued into the post-war years and intensified the 
debate over the future role of cavalry.21   
As Spencer Jones and Stephen Badsey have argued, it was largely reconnaissance 
and horsemastership that required reform after the Boer War.  British Cavalry was poorly 
trained in scouting throughout the late nineteenth century despite the fact that 
reconnaissance was considered to be the primary responsibility of the mounted arm.  The 
lack of preparedness could be attributed to inexperience and lack of proper doctrine, as 
cavalry reconnaissance in colonial campaigns was largely carried out in small numbers, 
often by mounted infantry or detachments from the Indian Army, and always across a 
variety of different terrain.  Commanders such as John French exacerbated the problem 
by insisting that cavalry was responsible for destroying the enemy’s mounted force 
before reconnaissance could be carried out, and did not train British Cavalry to carry out 
reconnaissance in the face of enemy resistance.  In fact, very little time was allocated to 
reconnaissance training in the first place.  According to Spencer Jones, a thirty-eight-day 
cavalry exercise in 1897 devoted only three days to scouting.  The British Cavalry 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 British Cavalry term for the proper care and maintenance of horses, and an understanding of their 
limitations. 
20 See Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 108-111. 
21 Report of His Majesty’s Commissioners Appointed to Inquire Into the Military Preparations and Other 
Matters Connected With the War in South Africa (London: HMSO, 1903), 51; Badsey, Boer War, 91. 
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embarked for the Boer War completely unprepared to perform their primary 
responsibility across the vast and open South African landscape.22   
Jones and Badesy have drawn attention to the enormous workload imposed on the 
limited number of cavalry troops available in South Africa.  Horses suffered terrible 
casualties throughout the war, as they were made to carry as much a 300 pounds and 
expected to travel long distances over rough ground with limited forage.  For example, 
while advancing to Kimberly in February 1900, horses went two days without feed before 
limited supplies arrived and afforded them a mere six pounds of rations each for a further 
four days.  The official ration remained ten pounds of oats, twelve pounds of hay, and 
eight pounds of straw each day.23  Many horses were lost to starvation and overwork, a 
problem exacerbated by poor horsemastership among the cavalry recruits, many of whom 
were “improvised mounted men,” with limited experience in horse management.24  
Consequently, nearly sixty-seven percent of the horses employed by the British Cavalry 
in South Africa died.25  The Elgin Commission26 confirmed that “the chief cause of the 
loss of horses in the War was that they were brought from distant countries, submitted to 
a long and deteriorating sea voyage, when landed [sic] sent into the field without time for 
recuperation, and there put to hard and continuous work on short rations.”27  As horse 
health continued to deteriorate, the strength of the British Cavalry steadily declined and 
                                                          
22 Spencer Jones, “Scouting for Soldiers: Reconnaissance and the British Cavalry, 1899-1914” War In 
History Vol. 18 No. 4 2011, 495-499; Badsey, Boer War, 88. 
23 S. Jones, 500-502; Badsey, Boer War, 88. 
24 Report of His Majesty’s Commissioners, 1903, 98. 
25 Badsey, Boer War, 92.   
Official figures were given in the Elgin Commission report, which stated that of the 518,794 horses 
employed by the British Army in South Africa, 347,007 were “expended,” (66.88%), and a further 13,144 
horses died during their voyage.  There were a further 150,781 mules and donkeys employed by the British 
Army in South Africa, 53,330 of whom were “expended” and a further 2,816 died during their voyage.  See   
Report of His Majesty’s Commissioners, 1903, 97. 
26Appointed to investigate the British Army’s conduct and preparedness for the Boer War. 
27 Report of His Majesty’s Commissioners, 1903, 98. 
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the mounted force was nearly incapable of performing effective reconnaissance or 
cavalry actions in South Africa. 
The need for drastic reforms to reconnaissance and horsemastership were obvious 
after the Boer War.  Doctrine was finally established to provide a framework for efficient 
training.  Reconnaissance missions were defined as strategical, tactical, or protective in 
nature.  Strategic missions were to be undertaken before armies were within range of 
each other for the purpose of locating the enemy and assessing their resources.  Tactical 
reconnaissance was performed when enemy armies were within battle range to determine 
their position and potential strategy, and during battle to determine enemy movements. 
Protective reconnaissance wherein the cavalry acted as advanced, rear, or flank guards 
and performed outpost duties28 was required to ensure the safety of the army at all stages 
of operations.29   
Although every cavalryman was to be thoroughly trained in reconnaissance 
duties, those with a particular affinity for reconnaissance were trained to become 
specialized scouts or dispatch riders.  In 1904, Inspector-General of Cavalry Robert 
Baden-Powell created an individually trained reconnaissance force comprised of 
specially trained cavalry scouts that would work in advance of regular cavalry patrols.30  
By 1907, each regiment was equipped with a minimum of one officer scout leader, one 
                                                          
28 A chain of guards stationed at various observation posts in front and/or behind the main body, dedicated 
to observing the enemy in case of sudden attack. Smaller parties called “pickets” were detached from each 
outpost to cover all approaches to the central outpost chain.  From each picket, “sentries” or guards were 
detached to protect each outlying picket.  Patrols and dispatch riders were to be sent out from each outlying 
position as needed.  Though outpost forces were comprised of all arms, Cavalry was specifically 
responsible for observing the enemy in patrols at a distance from the outpost line and sending out scouting 
patrols.  See Field Service Pocketbook, 1914 (London: HMSO, 1914), 76-78; Field Service Regulations 
Part I: Operations, 1909 (London: HMSO, 1909), 104-105; George T. Denison, Manual of Outpost Duties 
(Toronto: Rollo & Adam, 1866), 11-13. 
29 Cavalry Training, 1907 (London: HMSO, 1907), 174-175. 
30 The National Archives, United Kingdom (TNA) WO 163/10.  Inspector General of Forces Report, 1904, 
301-302; S. Jones 504-506. 
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sergeant scout, eight regimental scouts,31 and sixteen squadron scouts.32  Each squadron 
also required at least four specially trained dispatch riders for communication and orderly 
duties. These specialized reconnaissance scouts complemented the patrol work carried 
out by the remainder of the mounted arm by advancing ahead of them during patrols.33   
In addition to the formulation of appropriate doctrine, proper attention was finally 
given to reconnaissance in training.  Reconnaissance drills ranged from small-scale patrol 
exercises with captured flags and navigational drills to fifty-mile cross-country rides with 
full follow-up reports.34  In 1904, General Officer Commanding (GOC) the 3rd Cavalry 
Brigade Michael Rimington35 devoted his training exercises exclusively to 
reconnaissance and horsemastership, with bodies of cavalry scouting infantry and 
drafting reports on their positions, defences, and the nature of the terrain.36  Rimington 
continued in this vein in 1905 during training exercises with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 
wherein one cavalry force was ordered to move an object through enemy territory while a 
second mounted force attempt to capture the object.37  At the 1909 divisional cavalry 
exercises, the majority of training was devoted to tactical reconnaissance and pursuit at 
the divisional level.38  Large scale reconnaissance training took place at the 1912 and 
1913 Army Manoeuvres, wherein cavalry scouts were able to conduct effective 
reconnaissance without detection a half a mile from the enemy force.39  As a result of 
                                                          
31 Or “first class scouts.” 
32 Or “second class scouts.” 
33 Cavalry Training, 1907, 177. 
34 Cavalry Training, 1912 (London: HMSO, 1912), 215-217. 
35 Boer War commander of Rimington’s Guides (a light horse troop of mounted scouts) from 1899 to 1901, 
and commander of the 6th Dragoons in 1901.  In 1903, he was appointed GOC the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.   
36 TNA WO 27/503.  Cavalry Training: The Ulster Scheme and Wicklow Raid, 1904; S. Jones, 507. 
37 TNA WO 279/516.  3rd Cavalry Brigade Training: The Treasure Hunt Scheme, 1905; S. Jones, 508. 
38 TNA WO 279/30.  Report on the Cavalry Divisional Training 1909. 
39 TNA WO 279/47. Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1912; TNA WO 279/52. Report on Army Manoeuvres, 
1913; S. Jones, 509-510. 
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these efforts, the cavalry was well prepared to carry out their primary responsibility in 
1914. 
Proper attention to horsemastership and animal health and welfare were evident in 
the Great War.  Despite the lethal nature of modern warfare, the mortality rate of horses 
and animals in the Great War was relatively minimal, particularly when compared to the 
abysmal wastage of British Army horses in South Africa.  John Singleton’s research has 
shown that on average, fifteen percent of all animals employed by the British Army died 
annually during the Great War.  On the Western Front, that figure was only slightly 
higher at seventeen percent each year.  These figures were comparable to the annual 
mortality rate of animals employed in civilian industry, and were not far off the ten 
percent annual loss of British Army horses in peacetime.40   
Several factors contributed to the improvements to animal life expectancy in the 
Great War.  The practical need for economy as well as lobbying on behalf of the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) resulted in careful efforts to 
prevent animal exhaustion and to provide adequate fodder for animals at the front.  The 
Western Front was also much closer to Great Britain than South Africa and the front lines 
were stationary, which lessened shipping and supply line problems.  The efficiency of the 
Royal Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC) was a substantial factor in the improvements to 
animal welfare.41  A major veterinary hospital was established at the British 
Expeditionary Force’s headquarters in Saint Omer, although cavalry horses were often 
cared for at veterinary sections and mobile veterinary sections and detachments.  Horses 
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on the march were evacuated at “sick horse halts,” and non-mobile mounts were 
evacuated by Corps Mobile Veterinary Detachments.42  
Although Great War cavalry actions often produced terrible horse casualties, the 
mounted arm accounted for such a small number of the British Expeditionary Force and 
mounted actions took place so infrequently that the cavalry was not responsible for a high 
proportion of horse wastage.  However, proper training and attention to horsemastership 
was a major factor in the improvements to animal life expectancy in the mounted arm.  
Beyond proper training in horse management for all ranks, commanders were expected to 
understand the limitations of their mounts and never over-work them during an advance.  
The expected pace of an advance was set at four miles per hour at a walk, eight miles per 
hour at a trot, and fifteen miles per hour at a gallop.  Cavalry units were trained to keep to 
these paces by marking a quarter mile of distance during drills, and consistently 
advancing at a regular rate and dismounting whenever possible so as to prevent over-
taxing the horses.43   
Debating Armament, 1902-1904 
Not so easy to solve was the question of armament and thus the future role of 
cavalry on the battlefield.  Throughout the Boer War, the British Cavalry had much 
success charging an enemy position and then dismounting to hold it, just as the American 
Civil War Cavalry had done.  The cavalry had also been successful in charges against 
rifle-armed troops.  For example, French’s successful charge at Klip Drift on 15 February 
1900 was a decisive victory, wherein 8,000 British cavalrymen charged through a gap in 
a low hillside defended by 2,000 Mauser-armed Boers.  British casualties were 
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negligible, numbering between four and twenty men killed.  Two days later, French’s 
cavalry changed tactics and fought as mounted rifles, dismounting at Paardeberg Drift 
and surrounding 4,000 Boers for a ten-day siege.44  These successes made a lasting 
impression on French and Haig.45   
While French and Haig fully supported the official adoption of the rifle after the 
Boer War, they believed it should be used in tandem with l’arme blanche.  As Haig 
informed the Elgin Commission, “The ideal cavalry is one which can attack on foot, and 
fight on horseback.”46  Other supporters of hybrid cavalry doctrine include G.F.R. 
Henderson.47  In a 1902 paper on the tactical employment of cavalry, Henderson argued 
for the British adoption of American Civil War cavalry doctrine, which “struck the true 
balance between shock and dismounted tactics.”48  Similarly, the majority of American 
theorists such as Alonzo Gray, Theodore Rodenbough, and Lincoln Andrews fully 
supported the adoption of the hybrid cavalry model in the years leading up to the Great 
War.49  
Nonetheless, the continued practicality of shock tactics was called into question in 
the post war years.50  While there were some successful British cavalry charges in South 
Africa, the British cavalry force consisted almost entirely of mounted rifles in the latter 
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part of the war, having dispensed with the sword and the lance after the first year.51  
While some theorists argued that it was a mistake to compromise the versatility of the 
mounted arm by discarding l’arme blanche, others such as Sir Charles Knox argued for 
the permanent conversion of the cavalry into mounted rifles.52  Ian Hamilton was more 
blunt, asserting before the Elgin Commission that “compared to the modern rifle, the 
sword or lance can only be regarded as a mediaeval toy.”53  The future armament and 
therefore the future role of cavalry was called into question, and there was no consensus 
among British commanders over which armament or doctrine was suitable for twentieth 
century cavalry, or in which combination.   
The debate became heated in March 1903 when Roberts issued Army Order No. 
39, in which he stated that cavalry would be armed with the rifle and the sword, but the 
rifle was to be considered the mounted arm’s “principal weapon.”54  Roberts’ statements 
regarding the primacy of the rifle were also the central point of his introduction to Haig’s 
1904 Cavalry Training manual, in which Roberts argued that “the change which has 
taken place in cavalry is as great as that which occurred to the infantry when the cross-
bow and pike were replaced by the rifle and bayonet.”55  While none objected to the 
adoption of the rifle and all agreed with the remainder of the principles outlined in the 
manual,56 French, Haig, Scobell, Grenfell, Wood, Rimington, and Bruce Hamilton agreed 
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that it would be a “fatal mistake” to allow the rifle to become the primary weapon of 
cavalry and opposed the inclusion of Roberts’ preface to Cavalry Training, 1904.57  
Reactions were exacerbated by Roberts’ inclusion of the abolition of the lance in 
Army Order No. 39.  Roberts felt the lance had no place on the modern battlefield due to 
its limited potential for use and impracticality for scouting and skirmishes.  According to 
the Order, the lance would only be retained for ceremonial purposes.58  As Roberts wrote 
to Haig, “I knew that I should incur considerable odium by abolishing the Lance, but I 
was satisfied that, in these days of long-ranging weapons, it is a useless weapon.”59  
Ironically, French at least partially agreed with the abolition of the lance.  In 1900, he 
went so far as to say that the sword or the lance should be kept, but not both.60   By 1904, 
French argued that the use of the lance be restored to the six Lancer cavalry regiments, 
but no others.61  Similarly, Haig argued before the Elgin Commission that future 
cavalrymen should be armed with the rifle and either a sword or lance, as l’arme blanche 
enabled the mounted arm to quickly take the offensive and charge.62   
It is worth noting that all understood that cavalry charges against infantry and 
artillery were incredibly rare and insisted on the preservation of l’arme blanche largely 
because it was necessary for actions against enemy cavalry.  Dissenters feared that 
promoting the primacy of the rifle would encourage cavalry commanders to resort to 
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dismounted tactics when a mounted action was more appropriate, specifically, while 
facing other cavalry.63  For example, French vehemently opposed Roberts’ statement 
because he believed it would diminish “cavalry spirit,” or the role of cavalry in shock 
actions, leaving the British Army vulnerable to attack from the skilled cavalry of the 
Great Powers.  French argued “[Cavalry] spirit can never be created in a body of troops 
whose first idea is to abandon their horses and lie down under cover in the face of a 
swiftly-charging mass of horsemen.”64  French believed that cavalry could not carry out 
their primary responsibilities, namely reconnaissance, flanking, and pursuit, without 
encountering enemy cavalry.65  According to French, the real value of cavalry would be 
most apparent after the enemy’s cavalry was defeated, and the mounted arm was free to 
perform its other roles, often acting as mounted rifles.66  Evelyn Wood echoed French’s 
sentiment in 1904: “if we teach our Cavalry soldiers to resort to dismounted action where 
there is a reasonable chance of a charge being successful, the result may be that when 
they encounter Continental trained Cavalry they will be ridden over and badly beaten.”67  
Haig made a similar statement before the Elgin Commission: “horsemen armed with 
firearms only…cannot cope successfully with Cavalry either in attack or defence.”68 
Roberts’ hard-line approach forced the Army Council to decide whether the rifle 
or l’arme blanche was to be the “principal weapon” of cavalry, when in essence Roberts’ 
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views were not far off those of Douglas Haig.  While Roberts argued for the primacy of 
the rifle, he also believed that the retention of l’arme blanche was necessary for small 
surprise shock actions against enemy cavalry.  He stated “It is just as important that every 
Cavalry Officer should be a skilled swordsman as that every Infantry Officer should be a 
marksman.”69  He believed that well trained cavalry could perform in both roles 
admirably just as the American Cavalry had done during the Civil War.  To clarify his 
position on the l’arme blanche controversy, Roberts wrote, 
 In America…the Cavalry leaders very early recognized the increase of 
power to be gained by arming their men with a rifle in addition to the 
sabre.  The tactics against both Cavalry and Infantry were a combination 
of fire and shock, and their achievements were far more brilliant than 
those of the Germans in 1870.  The Cavalry was not only employed to 
capture and hold strategic positions, to cover flank marches, to delay wide 
turning movements, and to cut the communications in far reaching raids, 
but as rear-guards and advance-guards.70   
 
Roberts cited Philip Sheridan’s success against Jubal Early at Shenandoah in 1864 and 
Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in 1865 as examples of cavalry’s success in 
pursuit with the support of horse artillery and the use of the rifle as their primary weapon.  
Roberts argued that the American Civil War proved that cavalry could be trained to fight 
effectively as both cavalry and infantry, and advocated a versatile and adaptable hybrid 
mounted arm.71  As he wrote to Ian Hamilton, “in my opinion cavalry will be more useful 
than ever in war.  What I contend is that the rifle, and not the sword or lance, is the 
weapon on which cavalry will mainly depend.”72  Although Roberts placed more 
emphasis on the rifle than Haig, they were arguing for essentially the same cavalry 
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doctrine.  Haig agreed with Roberts in principle, he simply felt that Roberts had “gone 
too far in opposing thorough training for shock action.”73   
Similarities extended beyond Roberts and Haig’s Civil War doctrine.  For 
example, although French took issue with Roberts’ notion that cavalry in future wars 
would generally act dismounted, he reached a similar conclusion.74  While French 
continued to emphasize the importance of l’arme blanche and “cavalry spirit,” in the 
years leading up to the Great War, he recognized that future opportunities for shock 
action would be rare and stressed the importance of firearms and dismounted training.  In 
his 1914 introduction to the English translation of Bernhardi’s Cavalry in War and 
Peace, French stated, “when the enemy’s cavalry is overthrown, our cavalry will find 
more opportunities of using the rifle than the cold steel, and that dismounted attacks will 
be more frequent than charges with the l’arme blanche.”75  Similarly, in 1912 Rimington 
argued that although a cavalry charge with l’arme blanche was the “ideal,” he recognized 
that dismounted action with a carbine or rifle would more often be appropriate.76   
Clearly, the opinions of Roberts and the so-called “conservatives” were not at all 
far apart.  Most were primarily concerned with the mounted charge in cavalry versus 
cavalry actions, and Haig advocated Roberts’ exact model of “hybrid” cavalry on the 
American Civil War model.  The controversy seemed to stem from Roberts’ outright 
statement that the rifle should be regarded as cavalry’s “principal weapon,” and his 
attempt to abolish the use of the lance.  This forced a reaction on behalf of the cavalry 
commanders, who feared that Roberts’ true intention was the abolition of l’arme blanche 
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and the conversion of all cavalry into mounted rifles.77  Tension was also a doubtless 
symptom of snobbery on behalf of Haig and French and their allies, as all were members 
of the British Army while Roberts was an Officer of the Indian Army.   
Nonetheless, by overplaying his hand, Roberts made a clear definition of the 
“principal weapon” of cavalry necessary, and his points on the usefulness of l’arme 
blanche and his advocacy of the hybrid model were overshadowed in his own time and in 
historiography.  For example, in his biography on John French, historian George Cassar 
perpetuated the belief that the 1904 Cavalry Training manual was crafted under the 
direction of Lord Roberts and was a testament to the reformist spirit with emphasis on the 
rifle, although the manual itself was largely written by Douglas Haig.  Meanwhile, Cassar 
argued that “French wanted to keep the cavalry as unchanged as possible…His belief in 
the l’arme blanche was a religious mystique, blinding him to its future war potential in 
the face of rapidly increasing firepower…the British cavalry entered the First World War 
still wedded to shock tactics.”78  In reality, it seemed that Haig and French did not 
disagree with many of Roberts’ principles, but with the implication that cavalry could 
become mounted rifles without l’arme blanche and thus vulnerable to enemy cavalry.  It 
is unfair to brand Haig and French as conservative tactical reactionaries while hailing 
Roberts as a tactical visionary.  The difference in opinion was simply a question of which 
weapon should be considered the “principal weapon” of cavalry.79 
Ultimately, it was Haig and French’s version of the hybrid that won.  The Elgin 
Commission concluded that l’arme blanche was to be retained, but greater emphasis was 
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to be placed on mounted rifle and dismounted tactics in the future.80  Roberts resigned in 
February following the Esher Report’s recommendation that the position of Commander 
in Chief be abolished and the Army Council be created in its place.  Roberts served as a 
member of the Committee of Imperial Defence for a short time, but resigned in 1905 to 
promote conscription.81   
Cavalry Doctrine and the Role of Cavalry, 1907-1914 
The resolution of the question of cavalry armament finally allowed the official 
affirmation of cavalry doctrine.  Haig re-wrote the official manual Cavalry Training in 
1907.  The new manual kept much of the same material from Cavalry Training 1904,82 
although Roberts’ controversial preface was omitted.83  Cavalry Training 1907 was 
devoted to establishing a hybrid cavalry arm on the American Civil War model.  When 
defining the principles for the employment of cavalry, the manual stated: 
Thorough efficiency in the use of the rifle and in dismounted tactics is an 
absolute necessity.  At the same time the essence of the cavalry spirit lies 
in holding the balance correctly between fire power and shock action, and 
while training for the former they must not be allowed to lose confidence 
in the latter.84   
 
All Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and section commanders were expected to be 
experts in riding, swordsmanship, rifle shooting, distance judging, and scouting.85  By 
1908, British Cavalry was armed entirely with Short Magazine Lee Enfield Rifles instead 
of the carbine employed by their continental counterparts.86   
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Prewar cavalry training reflected this balance between traditional cavalry and 
mounted rifle doctrine.  Musketry training and rifle care were an integral part of daily 
cavalry training, and mounted drills were always carried out in conjunction with 
dismounted training.87  Mounted rifle action was practiced by riding quickly to a specific 
location and dismounting, leaving horses in the care of designated companies from each 
section.  When acting as mounted rifles, troops were expected to advance mounted for as 
long as possible to maintain mobility.88  Instructions regarding the appropriate 
circumstances for both mounted and dismounted action were reiterated and practiced at 
prewar divisional exercises.89  The annual training report for 1913 noted there had been 
great efforts to increase attention to dismounted action since the Boer War, with heavy 
concentration on marksmanship.90  
Similarly, Maxim machine gun squadrons had been employed with all cavalry 
units in South Africa, and their successful coordination with cavalry actions led to further 
developments before the Great War.91  Prewar cavalry doctrine emphasized the 
importance of combined arms actions.   As 1909 Field Service Regulations made clear,  
Mounted troops are at a great disadvantage, unless accompanied by horse 
artillery, which assists them to combine shock action with fire…It is then 
essential…that every force which takes the field against an organized 
enemy should be composed of all arms; that every detached force of 
infantry should be accompanied by a proportion of mounted men and, 
generally, of engineers and guns; that artillery and engineers should be 
attached to all large bodies of cavalry.92 
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Proper attention was given to coordinating cavalry actions with artillery and machine gun 
support in training.93  In 1913, particular emphasis was placed on combined arms cavalry 
training, as cavalry regiments were attached to artillery and infantry during their battalion 
and brigade training exercises.  Inter-divisional manoeuvres allowed the mounted arm to 
coordinate movements and reconnaissance with infantry and artillery.94   
Beyond officially establishing cavalry doctrine, Cavalry Training 1907 and Field 
Service Regulations 1909 clearly defined the role of the mounted arm.  Just as before, the 
official role of cavalry was defined as threefold – reconnaissance, shock, and pursuit.95  
The strategic and tactical functions of cavalry on the battlefield were further subdivided 
into three categories – Independent Cavalry, Protective Cavalry, and Divisional Cavalry.  
Independent cavalry was designated for the strategic role of reconnaissance and defeating 
enemy cavalry.  Protective Cavalry was assigned the defensive role of performing 
advanced rear, and flank guarding duties for the Independent Cavalry, for supporting 
Independent Cavalry operations, and were assigned the tactical role of pursuit of the 
retreating enemy.  Finally, Divisional Cavalry was to be attached to the infantry, 
designated to perform reconnaissance, escorts duties, outpost work, dispatch riding, and 
advanced, rear, and flank guard duties for the infantry.96  While Divisional Cavalry was a 
permanent force within an infantry division, Independent and Protective cavalry units 
were to be assigned to the remaining roles according to circumstances on the battlefield.97  
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Essentially, cavalry was defined as an “arm of opportunity”98 that would serve as an 
exploitation force in operations and a protective force in campaigns.   
These exploitation and protective duties were assigned to cavalry because 
mobility was mounted arm’s primary asset.  As Field Service Regulations 1909 made 
clear, “When co-operating with other arms, [the] mobility [of cavalry] enables a 
commander to transfer them rapidly from one portion of the field to another, and thus to 
turn to account opportunities which he would be unable to otherwise to seize.”99  Cavalry 
was employed in pursuit because a mounted force was mobile enough to keep contact 
with the retreating enemy force, harassing rear guards and preventing a counterattack.100  
Cavalry was also expected to perform delaying actions, particularly if the army was 
forced to retreat after an enemy attack.  The mobility of the mounted force would allow 
them to arrive at a point of action quickly to stall an enemy advance and restore critical 
situations.101  It followed that cavalry should be employed in reconnaissance work 
because mounted troops were able to patrol long distances efficiently.  As reconnaissance 
troops, cavalry would serve as a screen for the advancing infantry by scouting enemy 
positions and reporting their location and strength, along with the conditions of roads, 
ground, availability of bridges, the occupation of villages, and the location of water 
sources.102   
The utility of cavalry as a mobile force extended beyond the front line battlefield.   
Cavalry was intended to carry out any rear area duties that required the mobility and 
efficiency of the mounted arm.  For example, effective reconnaissance and mapping was 
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essential in rear areas to verify the location of secure routes and passable roads to the 
front lines.  Mounted troops were also required to perform escort services in rear areas, 
guiding the infantry along appropriate routes to the front line and locating troops that had 
been separated from their regiments.  Mounted troops were efficient traffic controllers 
and were responsible for keeping roads free of congestion during campaigns.  The 
mobility of the mounted arm was also essential for communications, as dispatch riders 
could be employed where telephone and wireless communications were not possible.  
Mounted orderlies could be sent to fulfill any roles that required mobility in rear areas.103   
Cavalry was only meant to participate in “transitional” operations, namely 
advance and pursuit, so cavalry was required to spend much of its time in rear areas 
awaiting orders to advance.  During each battle, “As large a body of cavalry as possible 
should be concentrated under the cavalry commander, whose duty it is to keep touch with 
the course of the battle and seize opportunities as they arise for carrying out the 
commander-in-chief’s instructions.”104  As an exploitation force, cavalry was required to 
wait for the appropriate moment before a mounted advance would be possible.  These 
calls to action did not come until other arms had made sufficient progress.  It was 
expected that cavalry would wait in reserve until it was possible to advance.  Meanwhile, 
cavalry was intended to perform rear-area duties that required mobility, or would supply 
labour drafts until mounted action was possible.    
Prewar Battlefield Visualization  
Despite valiant efforts to modernize cavalry for twentieth century warfare, the 
nature of the imagined future battlefield was vastly different than the one that 
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materialized on the Western Front.  However, it is important to note that pre-war theorists 
were not ignorant of the possibility of trench warfare.  As Henderson made clear in 1902, 
“Entrenchments play as great a part in modern campaigns as in those of 1861-65 or 1877-
78, and entrenchments are all in favour of the force that awaits attack.” 105  It was 
understood that cavalry was essentially an arm of offence, and that a cavalry charge could 
not advance across trenches, deep mud and shell-shocked ground.  Cavalry Training 
1907 explicitly stated, “The employment of mounted action is, for example, precluded 
against an enemy posted behind entrenchments or occupying intersected or broken 
ground.”106  However, it was assumed that cavalry would carry on with rear-area duties 
and perform reconnaissance and protective manoeuvres in such conditions.  According to 
Henderson,  
Antidotes [to trench warfare] exist, such as surprise, the sudden seizure of 
tactical points which have been left unoccupied, outflanking manoeuvres, 
and movements against the line of retreat.  Now the effect of each of these 
operations depends, broadly speaking, on rapidity and secrecy…the 
cavalry is the arm which best fulfils the required conditions.107 
 
Evidently, while the possibility of trench warfare was understood, none expected this 
style of fighting to engulf the entire Western Front.   
Like many of his contemporaries, Haig believed the next European war would be 
one of movement, not stagnation, in which the role of cavalry would continue to increase.  
For example, in his 1907 publication Cavalry Studies, he outlined various cavalry 
manoeuvres with hypothetical landscapes and scenarios based on terrain suited to open 
warfare, describing shallow rivers, flat grounds, good roads, and passable valleys.108  
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Haig envisioned a war of movement wherein the cavalry would act as an advance guard 
to the infantry, performing reconnaissance, maintaining contact with the enemy at all 
times, pursuing a retreating enemy force, and fighting and destroying enemy cavalry if 
the opportunity presented itself.109  He depicted decisive offensives in which cavalry 
assumed the dual role of strategic reconnaissance in small isolated groups, and fighting 
en masse in a charge against enemy cavalry, performing flanking manoeuvres against 
smaller bodies of enemy cavalry under covering fire from the infantry.110   
While incorrect about the nature of the Western Front and fights against enemy 
cavalry, Haig’s illustration of cavalry advancing in pursuit of the retreating enemy force 
was similar to cavalry actions on the Western Front when mobility was possible.  For 
example, Haig devoted one scenario almost exclusively to pursuit in which the cavalry 
was to maintain contact with the retreating force while preventing escape, clear enemy 
rearguards, and reconnoiter a safe route of advance for the infantry.111  Haig envisioned 
sending a limited number of cavalry squadrons forward to keep contact with the 
retreating enemy, while the remainder would advance with artillery support to “seize a 
position on the enemy’s line of retreat, whence to attack him both by mounted and 
dismounted action.”112  The mounted arm was able to perform these actions in pursuit on 
the Western Front.  Cavalrymen also proved invaluable as reconnaissance troops, both in 
the front lines and in rear areas.  While battlefield visualization was incorrect, the 
mounted arm did have a role to play in pursuit when mobility was possible, and as 
reconnaissance troops.   
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Unfortunately, no member of the British Expeditionary Force had any experience 
with a modern European army of the size, organization, and armament of the German 
Army in 1914.  No tactically appropriate doctrine was in place to manage the conditions 
on the Western Front.113  As Travers has argued, Haig attempted to apply the Victorian 
military principles learned during his time at the Army Staff College at Camberley 
between 1896 and 1897 to twentieth century warfare.  From his experience and 
education, Haig believed that victory could be achieved by concentrating a superior force 
against a specific objective, wearing out the enemy force, and then launching a decisive 
attack and exploiting success.114  According to Travers, Haig formed the understanding 
that “normal” warfare was conducted as a series of structured offensives against a 
decisive objective with distinct phases – manoeuvre, wearing out, attack, and pursuit.  
The infantry was the principal arm and the artillery their support.  Cavalry was 
responsible for the exploitation of success by pursuing the defeated enemy force, thus 
achieving the necessary decisive victory.115   
The planning and objectives of British offensives between 1914 and 1918 reflect 
this understanding of strategy, although it did not fit well with the realities of the Western 
Front, as the “wearing out” phase lasted for much of the war.  This can be seen in Haig’s 
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own admission in his final dispatch, where he likened the entire war on the Western Front 
to one “Single Great Battle,”116 
The huge numbers of men engaged on either side, whereby a continuous 
battle front was rapidly established from Switzerland to the sea, 
outflanking was made impossible and manoeuvre very difficult, 
necessitated the delivery of frontal attacks.  This factor, combined with the 
strength of the defensive under modern conditions, rendered a protracted 
wearing out battle unavoidable before the enemy’s power of resistance 
could be overcome.117 
 
Haig defined the race to the sea as the manoeuvre phase, the wearing-out to be the battles 
fought in 1916 and 1917, the attack commencing on 21 March 1918 with the German 
Spring Offensive, and lasting four months until the final exploitation and pursuit 
began.118  This was a clear attempt to make outmoded principles fit where they did not, as 
tactics had not yet caught up to technology on the Western Front.  As Travers argued, the 
Western Front represented a continuous struggle to overcome the material realities of  “a 
war that had escaped its pre-ordained boundaries and structures.”119  New doctrine, 
tactics, and technology were required, but took four years to develop.120  Meanwhile, the 
mounted arm was expected to carry out their expected role in rear areas during the 
“wearing out” phase and participate in front-line reconnaissance and pursuit when 
mobility returned to the battlefield. 
Canadian Cavalry, 1870-1914 
 While some Canadian Cavalry regiments fought with the British Cavalry in the 
Great War, their history was quite different.  Canadian Cavalry, particularly in the west, 
was born out of a Mounted Rifle tradition.  When the vast territories of Rupert’s Land 
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and the North-Western Territories were bought from the Hudson’s Bay Company by the 
Dominion Government between 1869 and 1870, Metis rebellion ensued in Fort Garry.121  
With no rapid means of traveling west besides horseback, Colonel Garnet Wolseley122 led 
a body of mounted rifles on the Red River Expedition in 1870 and quelled the rebellion.  
However, as Sir Samuel Steele123 assured, the territories further west remained “lawless” 
even after the rebellion was put down due to lack of governing authority beyond 
Manitoba.  Quarrels between American traders moving in from the south and Aboriginal 
bands were a constant source of crime and violence.  As Steele described it,  
The territory had not even a justice of the peace, nor dared one set foot in 
that region…along the south branch of the Saskatchewan it was necessary 
to travel with an escort of armed men... Murder was common and the 
perpetrators stalked abroad in open day without slightest fear of arrest.124   
 
Consequently, a mobile force of mounted rifles was recommended to patrol the lawless 
prairies and establish order in the west.  The North West Mounted Police (NWMP) was 
established in 1873, which Steele referred to as more a “first-class cavalry regiment” than 
an “ordinary rural police force.”125   
A mounted force was essential in the west, as the vast territory had neither rail nor 
rivers for transportation.  After the “March West” from Fort Dufferin, Manitoba to Fort 
McLeod, Alberta, posts were established to stop the whisky trade, and settlement began 
in the west.  Horse transport remained indispensable for patrolling settlements across a 
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wide area.  The mounted police force kept order during the construction of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway between 1881 and 1885, and carried on with law enforcement after its 
completion, as settlement grew exponentially in the west.  The size of the NWMP was 
increased in 1885 to keep pace with immigration and offer adequate protection to the new 
settlers.  Steele and his fellow officers spent the next fifteen years policing the west as 
mounted rifles, quelling civil unrest, uprisings, and the 1885 North West Rebellion. 
Steele took command of the NWMP in the Yukon during the Klondike Gold Rush of the 
1890’s, keeping order among ambitious prospectors.126  While the NWMP devoted much 
time and energy to horsemanship, no part of its training was devoted to traditional l’arme 
blanche cavalry shock tactics.  The NWMP relied exclusively on the rifle, and its training 
manual was devoted entirely to firearms.127   
The Canadian mounted rifle tradition continued in South Africa, as all Canadian 
cavalry contingents were required to fight as mounted rifles in the Boer War.128  In 
December 1899, the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Canadian Mounted Rifles (CMR) 
sent small contingents to the front, the former recruited in eastern Canada, the latter in the 
rural western provinces.  The NWMP’s long involvement in various skirmishes and its 
experience with long-distance riding, patrol work, and horse management made recruits 
from this organization ideal candidates for participation.129  Seventy-six percent of all 
Canadian cavalry recruits had previous military experience, the majority of which came 
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from the NWMP.130  The NWMP was responsible for recruiting and leading 352 
members for the CMR battalion in the west.  Thirteen of its nineteen officers were 
enlisted members of the NWMP.131  
Although Steele was originally given command of the 1st Canadian Mounted 
Rifles, he was soon commissioned by Lord Strathcona132 to return to Ottawa to raise and 
command a troop of mounted rifles for duty in South Africa.133  The newly formed Lord 
Strathcona’s Horse sent a third Canadian Cavalry contingent to South Africa in March 
1900.  Steele gave explicit instructions that LSH troops were to be recruited exclusively 
from the Prairies and British Columbia, with preference given to “good riders and good 
shots…None but men of the most respectable character to be taken, such as could pass 
into the North West Mounted Police.”134  Steele led the 500-man Strathcona contingent 
and appointed ten RCMP officers to the twenty-nine available positions, while current 
and former NWMP officers formed the majority of NCOs.  Steele led several successful 
mounted rifle raids with the LSH, most notably at Good Hope Farm on 3 December 
1900, wherein a squadron was sent to charge and capture the farm while smaller parties 
captured the surrounding kopje defences.135   
The Canadian mounted rifle contingents participated in the guerrilla phase of the 
war with great success.  The Canadian cavalrymen took part in several raids on Boer rail 
and telegraph lines.  Their patrol experience as NWMP officers proved invaluable while 
performing advance guard duties and scouting Boer locations for the advancing 
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infantry.136  They participated in several battles and skirmishes similar to the actions that 
cavalry would experience in the Great War.  For example, in late May 1900 the CMR 
seized and held Boer defences in advance of the main body at Klipriversberg Ridge while 
under heavy enemy fire.  At Liliefontein on 1 November, thirty-five Canadian mounted 
riflemen galloped to a ridge, capturing and occupying it until reinforcements arrived and 
allowed them to continue their advance.137  The mounted arm was able to act in a similar 
fashion on the Western Front. 
Beyond the Boer War, cavalry reforms at home reflected the Canadian mounted 
rifle tradition.  In 1902, Lord Roberts appointed Boer War cavalry veteran Lord 
Dundonald as General Officer Commanding the Militia of Canada.138  Dundonald 
believed the future role of cavalry would be more prominent than ever before because of 
its superior mobility, but believed that all future cavalry engagements would be fought 
with a rifle.139  As he affirmed in his autobiography,  
Mounted riflemen will be more generally useful to the Empire that the 
man trained to consider the sword as his principal weapon.  The 
Cavalryman of the future should be a first-class rifle shot, a first-class 
walker, and trained in reconnoitering and outpost work to the highest 
degree of efficiency.140   
 
In September, Dundonald officially made the Canadian cavalry into mounted rifles by 
abolishing the sword and instructing the mounted militia to adopt the rifle exclusively.141   
In 1904, Dundonald released his own manual, Cavalry Training Canada, which 
was devoted entirely to mounted rifle doctrine.142  He made his position on the necessity 
                                                          
136 Grad, 69. 
137 Grad, 65-66. 
138 The Earl of Dundonald, My Army Life (London: Edward Arnold & Co, 1926), 188. 
139 Dundonald, Preface to Cavalry Training Canada, 1904 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1904), 2-
11. 
140 Dundonald, My Army Life, 181. 
141 Dundonald, My Army Life, 194. 
 47
of retaining l’arme blanche in cavalry-versus-cavalry actions abundantly clear in the 
preface to this volume: 
For all practical purposes the profitable employment of cold steel is 
over...when [our Cavalry] see the enemy preparing to charge with sabre or 
lance, will coolly dismount, form up, and, when he gets within range, pour 
in such a withering fire as will in five minutes kill as many of the enemy 
as the same enemy with sword or lance would kill in five years of active 
service.143 
 
Dundonald recommended that cavalry train to act much in the same way as it would in 
the Great War – performing reconnaissance, riding to a decisive point of action, and 
dismounting to hold captured positions until relieved.  He also suggested that cavalrymen 
should have through knowledge of entrenchments.144  Dundonald sent the manual to 
Britain for review in April and received praise from Viscount Wolseley and Lord 
Roberts, but scathing criticism from cavalry officers during the height of the l’arme 
blanche debate.145  Dundonald was dismissed in June 1904 due to ongoing disputes with 
Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier’s government, but his legacy was firmly 
established with the 1904 Militia Act in November, and his promotion of mounted rifle 
tactics endured beyond his dismissal.146   
Although mounted rifles remained the primary Canadian cavalry tradition, the 
hybrid model also became part of Canadian cavalry doctrine.  This can be seen in a 1909 
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version of Haig’s Cavalry Training issued by Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Gwynne, 
Commanding Officer of the 16th Light Horse.147  With Colonel Steele’s approval, 
Gwynne wrote his own preface to this edition in which he affirmed Haig’s principles 
regarding the primacy of mounted action, stating “Whilst thorough efficiency in the use 
of the rifle is all important for cavalry, it is also absolutely necessary that they be able to 
pass rapidly from one formation to another as occasion demands…a cavalry soldier’s first 
weapon is his horse.”148  Although Gwynne made no statement of his own regarding the 
continued use of steel weapons, he agreed completely with Haig’s doctrine for the 
combined use of the sword and firearms, as he quoted these sections of Cavalry Training 
1907 directly and insisted all ranks of the 16th Light Horse commit them to memory.149  
However, Gwynne also envisioned a unique role for Canadian Cavalry troops, and 
encouraged all ranks to practice shooting while mounted as much as possible.  He felt 
that “If well handled, the revolver might be a most effective weapon for shock action, if 
the opportunity occurred, especially in the hands of our Western men.”150  All ranks were 
encouraged to practice accurate shooting from the saddle at home to gain greater 
proficiency in this practice before attending cavalry training camp.151  While the hybrid 
cavalry model was accepted and taught, emphasis remained predominantly on firearms, 
particularly in western Canada.   
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Canadian emphasis on mounted rifle training continued in annual ten-day western 
cavalry training camps held each June from 1911 to 1915.152  Musketry training153 took 
place daily, and tactical exercises were devoted almost exclusively to mounted rifle 
tactics.  Exercises begin with reconnaissance to locate the enemy, followed by a rapid 
mounted advance and swift dismount and hand-off of horses.  Target practice would take 
place from this position to simulate the defence and occupation of a captured position.  
Only one tactical exercise was devoted to a cavalry-versus-cavalry charge with steel 
weapons and support from artillery and infantry.154  Although western camp drills were 
obviously influenced by tactics employed in the Boer War, they were well suited to 
training for the cavalry actions of the Great War, as the British and Canadian Cavalry 
would fight in a similar style on the Western Front.   
Other camp activities were similarly appropriate for preparing the mounted arm 
for cavalry duties on the Western Front, as many exercises were focused on 
reconnaissance, scouting, conducting protective and foraging patrols, delivering field 
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messages, and drafting reconnaissance reports.  Similarly, field manoeuvres held over a 
three-day period combined all elements of training, with attention given to rifle practice, 
coordinating mounted rifle actions with supporting artillery, dispatch riding, 
reconnaissance, and transmitting orders.  Additional training included advanced, flank, 
and rear-guard duties and outpost work, all of which were essential on the Western Front.  
Western cavalry regiments were also given a unique skill set that would often become 
part of Divisional Cavalry work on Western Front.  Beginning in 1911, Medical officers 
were instructed to designate a stretcher-bearer section of each cavalry unit.  By 1913, 
stretcher drills took place daily, and two cavalry troops per squadron were being trained 
in stretcher-bearing duties.155  The mounted rifle influence created a unique tradition for 
the Canadian Cavalry regiments that prepared them more thoroughly for their 
experiences on the Western Front, as they were less committed to traditionalism than 
their British counterparts.156 
Conclusion 
Between 1900 and 1914, there was almost universal agreement that the role of 
cavalry was reconnaissance and pursuit, but there was no agreement on whether shock 
action was still relevant.  Similarly, none could agree on how best to carry out these 
duties, which actions would occur most often, or which role should be the focus of 
training and which armaments would be best suited to the task. Although French and 
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Haig envisioned a future war of movement and were committed to some outmoded 
tactics, they were not blind to the implications of modern firepower.  They readily 
accepted the necessity of rifle training and the importance of utilizing firepower in 
support of mounted action, and argued for the preservation of shock tactics with support 
from modern firepower.157  The adoption of the hybrid cavalry model led to the creation 
of a versatile and flexible mounted arm capable of adapting to circumstance and fighting 
in whichever style was tactically relevant.  This placed the British Cavalry well ahead of 
other European cavalry arms.  The Canadian Cavalry was particularly well prepared 
because of their well-established mounted rifle tradition.  The British Cavalry did not 
enter the Great War insistent on shock tactics above all else.  None intended to send the 
mounted arm charging against an enemy infantry line, much less a trench line.  Rather, 
cavalry was expected to carry out its traditional roles of reconnaissance, shock, delay and 
pursuit.  As the most mobile arm of any military force, cavalry was also meant to perform 
any duties in rear areas that required the mobility of a mounted force, or else supplying 
drafts of labour during the “wearing out” phase of battle.  These were the duties that had 
always been expected of cavalry, and were still expected in the twentieth century.  
Although military tactics had not kept pace with technology on the Western Front, the 
mounted arm still had a role to play in twentieth century warfare, and was able to perform 
exactly as expected and according to doctrine.   
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CHAPTER 3: 
The Outbreak of the Great War, 1914-1915 
Cavalry Recruitment, Training, and Embarking for the Front 
 
Introduction 
 The Great War officially began for Great Britain and Canada on 4 August 1914.  
Both nations faced mobilization challenges, and neither was certain how to handle the 
mounted arm.  Nonetheless, Canadian Cavalry Regiments embarked for the Western 
Front in autumn 1914 as both Independent and Divisional Cavalry.  As Permanent Force 
Cavalry Regiments, Lord Strathcona’s Horse and the Royal Canadian Dragoons were 
sent overseas as Independent Cavalry, forming the Canadian Cavalry Brigade by 
December.  The 19th Alberta Dragoons was selected to perform the Divisional Cavalry 
role for the 1st Canadian Division.  In 1915, the 1st Hussars became the Divisional 
Cavalry Squadron for the 2nd Canadian Division.  Although most Canadian Cavalry 
recruits had not participated in active military service, an examination of recruitment 
helps to reveal their influences and previous military experience.  Attention to Cavalry 
training is essential for establishing the expected role of the mounted arm on the Western 
Front.  Between recruitment at Valcartier and embarking for the Western Front, Canadian 
Cavalry Regiments were trained in a style consistent with the Cavalry doctrine laid out in 
the prewar editions of Cavalry Training and Field Service Regulations 1909.  The 
primary focus of training was patrol work, equitation, and musketry.  Mounted rifle 
tactics were more heavily emphasized than l’arme blanche charges, and tactical drills 
were focused on the traditional roles intended for Cavalry – reconnaissance, pursuit, and 
delaying actions.   
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Early Challenges 
When the Great War began in 1914, the British Army faced expansion on an 
unprecedented scale.  Initially, the British Expeditionary Force was comprised of only six 
Infantry Divisions, and one Cavalry Division.  No Cavalry formation larger than a 
Division had ever existed in the British Army, and no British Cavalry commander had 
ever led a mounted force larger than a Brigade.  A new command structure had to be 
improvised despite prewar reforms to Cavalry doctrine.  In 1914, the 1st British Cavalry 
Division was comprised of four Brigades1 for a total of fifteen Regiments.  Two 
additional Divisional Cavalry Regiments were attached to the Infantry.  Major General 
Edmund Allenby was given command of the 1st British Cavalry Division, and was left to 
appoint commanders at his own discretion.  By December 1914, the 1st British Cavalry 
Division was split into two separate Divisions, and a third Division was added.  Two 
Indian Cavalry Divisions arrived at the front for a total force of five Cavalry Divisions 
with approximately 20,000 Cavalrymen in forty-five Regiments.2   
The British Cavalry also faced doctrinal challenges in 1914.  Although the pre-
war editions of Cavalry Training and Field Service Regulations defined tactical doctrine 
for the various roles of Cavalry, there was no established operational doctrine for the use 
of such a large force of Cavalry in battle, nor was there any definition of a Cavalry 
Officer’s duties beyond the Regimental level.  Similarly, while Haig emphasized the 
importance of holding Divisional Cavalry manoeuvres in Cavalry Studies, there was no 
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established doctrine for Cavalry training at the Divisional level.3  Strategy for the use of 
five Cavalry Divisions had to be introduced while offensives were being planned on the 
Western Front.4  The inexperience of the British Cavalry with operations at the Divisional 
level was evident during the “Great Retreat” on the Western Front from August to 
September 1914, when the 1st Cavalry Division struggled to function as a cohesive unit 
amidst a myriad of communication and command problems.5 
Organizational and doctrinal difficulties were compounded by tensions between 
Cavalry commanders after the Curragh Incident in Kildare Ireland on 20 March 1914.  In 
the spring of 1914, the British government attempted to use the British Army to enforce 
“Home Rule6” against Unionist7 opposition in Ireland.  Commander in Chief of the 
British Army in Ireland Sir Arthur Paget was ordered to take his troops to Ulster to quell 
any violent resistance.  Secretary of State for War John Edward Bernard (J.E.B.) Seely 
had issued an “Ultimatum” to all British Officers serving in Ireland, stating that any 
officer who refused to enforce the Home Rule legislation would be forced to resign, or be 
dismissed from the British Army.8  Many British officers felt that they were forced to 
choose between losing their commission and shooting down Unionists determined to 
preserve the British Empire, a principle that the Army itself was intended to uphold.  
                                                          
3 See Field Service Regulations, 1909 ; Cavalry Training, 1907; Cavalry Training, 1912; Douglas Haig, 
Cavalry Studies; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 27. 
4 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 27. 
5 For full details, see Nikolas Gardner, “Command and Control in the ‘Great Retreat’ of 1914: The 
Disintegration of the British Cavalry Division” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 
1999. 
6 The creation of an autonomous Irish Parliament. 
7 Unionists advocated preserving the union between Great Britain and Ireland, and thus rejected the Home 
Rule bill. 
8 With the notable exception of men who lived in Ulster, who were not obligated to participate, and would 
later be reinstated without penalty. 
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Consequently, fifty-seven of the seventy officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade resigned,9 led 
by their Commanding Officer, General Hubert Gough.10  Although Gough and the other 
officers were later reinstated,11 considerable tension lingered between British cavalry 
commanders over the incident.12  Seely resigned from his position, and later became 
commander of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade despite the tension between himself and 
other British cavalry officers.  This tension was often reflected in officer reports on Seely 
throughout the Great War.  Ultimately, the Curragh Incident created suspicion between 
political and military leaders that adversely affected planning and operations throughout 
the Great War.    
The Outbreak of the Great War and Mobilization in Canada 
According to Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, the Canadian government was aware 
of the strong possibility of the outbreak of war, and took precautions to ensure Canada 
would be ready to contribute.  Prime Minister Robert Borden began devising a plan for 
coordinated action with England as early as 1911.  Chief of the General Staff C.J. 
Mackenzie commissioned British General Staff Officer Colonel W.G. Gwatkin to devise 
a mobilization plan for Canada in case war should break out.  This plan was created 
between July and October 1911, and was completed one week before Colonel Sam 
Hughes13 took office as Minister of Militia and Defence.  Gwatkin’s scheme called for 
                                                          
9 Including Major Edmund Allenby, future commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in the Great 
War. 
10 Gough would command the Fifth British Army in the Great War.  For full details on the Curragh 
Incident, see Ian F.W. Beckett, The Army and the Curragh Incident, 1914 (London: Bodley Head for the 
Army Records Society, 1986). 
11 It was possible to reinstate Gough and the other Officers because they were not guilty of “mutiny,” as 
they had resigned their posts instead of refusing orders. 
12 For full details, see Anglesey, Vol. VII. 
13 Hughes was appointed Minister of Militia and Defence when Borden’s Conservative government took 
power in October 1911.  Hughes had served as a Member of Parliament since 1892, and had been a 
member of the 45th Regiment since the age of sixteen.  His military service record included participation in 
defending Canada against the Fenian Raid of 1870, and the Boer War.  Always an advocate of military 
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the mobilization of an overseas force of one infantry division of 22,154 men, and one 
mounted brigade of 2,198 troops.  Each of the six divisional areas in Canada was to 
contribute men for service, each providing a number of troops proportional to the size of 
the area’s military force.  Troops were to be selected and trained locally, and thereafter 
assemble in Petawawa before embarking for the front.14   
When Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on 28 June 1914, Canadian 
Parliament was not in session.  Borden and other key ministers returned to Ottawa after 
Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July, as all of Europe appeared to be on the brink of 
war.15  On 30 July 1914, Hughes held an emergency meeting of the Militia Council to 
organize a contingent of between 20,000 and 25,000 troops for the Imperial Forces.16  
Hughes scrapped the 1911 mobilization plan on 31 July 1914.  Instead, he sent 
memorandums to each individual district commander requesting that they “consider what 
procedure you would adopt on receiving orders that troops were to be raised in your 
command for service overseas,” and instructed them to ignore the previous plan.17  On 6 
August, Hughes sent 226 individual telegrams to each unit commander in the Canadian 
Militia instructing them to compile lists of promising volunteers18 from their units 
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and forward them to Militia Headquarters by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
preparedness, Hughes increased military spending from seven and a half million dollars in 1912 to eleven 
million in 1913 due to the potential of war with Germany.  By 29 July 1913, the steps that needed to be 
taken in the event of war had been outlined, and a defence scheme had been put in place.  See A. Fortescue 
Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, Vol. I Part I (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 
1938), 1-2. 
14 Appendix 11, “Memorandum C. 1209: Overseas Mobilization Scheme 1911-1912.” in Official History of 
the Canadian Forces in the Great War, Vol. I Part II, A. Fortescue Duguid ed. (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 
1938), 11; Duguid, Vol. I Part I, 3. 
15 Duguid, Vol. I Part I, 2. 
16 Duguid, Vol. I Part I, 5. 
17 Appendix 10, “Secret Order from Adjutant-General Canadian Militia V.A.S Williams to The Officer 
Commanding 1st Division, 31 July 1914.” in Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, Vol. 
I Part II, A. Fortescue Duguid ed. (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 1938), 10. 
18 Potential recruits were expected to be proficient in modern military training and meet physical 
requirements. 
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12 August.19  Instead of the originally prescribed regional mobilization, Valcartier was 
designated on 20 August to be the transit and mobilization camp for the entire CEF.20  
Brereton Greenhous argued that this operation was very poorly organized, and that 
Hughes’ unpredictable behaviour made the mobilization process unnecessarily 
complicated.21  However, Terry Copp has argued that the Canadian forces were not 
prepared for war in 1914, and Hughes should be commended for instituting a more 
realistic training program and for modernizing the Canadian artillery.22  
Recruitment 
The Canadian Army was vastly under strength in 1914, as the number of 
Permanent Force troops in the Canada in April totalled 3,110 all ranks, including two 
cavalry regiments23 with 346 members and 265 horses between them.  The Non-
Permanent Active Militia totalled 74,213 men, including 12,146 cavalrymen with 10,615 
horses.24  However, the Permanent Force was not called upon to perform any significant 
role in mobilization, as there were no plans to send it overseas.25  Similarly, regular 
cavalry regiments were not initially called to mobilize.  Members of existing cavalry 
units had to enlist as infantrymen if they wished to serve in the Great War.26  However, 
the two regular Canadian cavalry regiments, Lord Strathcona’s Horse and the Royal 
                                                          
19 Nicholson, 18. 
20 Nicholson, 20. 
21 According to Greenhous, Hughes despised regular soldiers, and this plan was created by members of the 
regular army.  See Greenhous, 171-172. 
22 Terry Copp, “The Military Effort, 1914-1918” in Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of 
Robert Craig Brown, ed. David MacKenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 37. 
23 The RCD and the LSH. 
24 Nicholson, 12. 
25 Nicholson, 23. 
26 For example, McNorgan stated that three Officers and sixty-three other ranks of the 1st Hussars joined the 
1st Battalion.  However, only eighteen of these original recruits survived without being killed or wounded 
after the Second Battle of Ypres.  See McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 28. 
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Canadian Dragoons, were both sent to Valcartier in August 1914.27  As regiments of the 
Permanent Force, they were required at Valcartier to keep order, train recruits, and help 
set up the new military camp.28  Colonel Victor Williams of the RCD served as the Camp 
Commandant.29   
The first volunteers arrived at Valcartier on 18 August, with 32,665 troops present 
by 8 September.30  Although this massive force assembled quickly, the entire camp still 
had to be constructed from the ground up.31  As William R. Jones32 of the RCD remarked 
when he arrived at Valcartier, “The train passed on through miles and miles of tents…All 
was activity.  Everyone was busy.  Wooden houses were being built, roads 
constructed…to provide a place to receive and quarter the soldiers.”33  Jones concluded 
that the investment of time and resources in establishing the training base meant that the 
war would last at least a year.34   
Members of the Permanent Force Cavalry were incredibly frustrated with their 
minimal role in mobilization, and felt that they should be serving their intended purpose, 
as the “spearhead” of the Canadian Army.35  On 7 August, the War Office decided to 
                                                          
27 When the war began, the RCD was scattered across the province.  “B” Squadron was stationed at 
headquarters in Toronto, and “A” Squadron was in St. Jean.  See Greenhous, 171. 
28 Nicholson, 23. 
29 Greenhous, 172. 
30 Nicholson, 20. 
31 Jones, 18-19. 
32 William R. Jones was born in Scotland, and resided in the United States.  He was employed as a rail 
worker in Amsterdam, New York.  He chose to sign up for service despite his residence, nationality, and 
having to leave his wife and thirteen-month-old son in New York.  When the Great War broke out, he 
boarded a train for Montreal and then proceeded to Valcartier to enlist with the RCD. He was placed in the 
machine gun section of “B” Squadron, and went on to become a squadron Sergeant Major.  His private 
diary detailing his experience in the Great War with the RCD and CCB was published in 1918.  See Jones, 
2-5; and Greenhous, 173. 
33 Jones, 6. 
34 Jones, 6. 
35 Greenhous, 172. 
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send one “composite”36 cavalry regiment overseas with the First Contingent.  Hughes 
supported this decision, but requested that the Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord 
Strathcona’s Horse be sent to the front as full regiments.  Borden approved Hughes’ 
proposal on 14 September, and the Canadian cavalry regiments were to be sent overseas 
after they completed their role as instructors at Valcartier.37  The Director of Veterinary 
Services was in charge of drafting horses for services with the Cavalry units.  According 
to Greenhous, 7,264 mounts were required, and each horse had to stand at least fifteen 
hands high and weigh between 1,000 and 1,400 pounds.  All colours were acceptable, 
except greys.38 
Both of the Permanent Force Canadian cavalry regiments recruited their overseas 
forces at Valcartier.  Some historians have suggested that the Canadian cavalry regiments 
were largely comprised of former mounted policemen, Boer War Veterans, or members 
of the British Yeomanry.  However, 1914 Nominal Rolls revealed that only eight recruits 
had mounted police experience, either with the North West Mounted Police or the South 
African constabulary.  Only fifteen recruits had served in the Boer War, and only twenty-
two had Yeomanry experience.  The majority of LSH recruits had previous military 
experience, while approximately thirty-five percent of RCD recruits had prior service.  
However, only eleven percent of these recruits were already members of their respective 
regiments.39 
                                                          
36 To be comprised of members of the LSH and RCD and formed into one single unit. 
37 Along with the 19th Alberta Dragoons, who were selected as the Divisional Cavalry Squadron for the 1st 
Canadian Division under the command of Colonel Frederick Charles Jamieson. 
38 Greenhous, 174. 
39 For full graph of recruitment statistics, see Appendix I. 
Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary Force: Royal Canadian Dragoons: 
Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915; 
Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary Force: Lord Strathcona’s Horse: 
Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915. 
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The influence of Canadian Cavalry tradition was still evident in mounted 
recruitment despite the relatively low number of existing enlisted RCD and LSH 
members and the virtual absence of NWMP recruits.  Although nearly half of Canadian 
Cavalry recruits were born in England and less than thirty percent were born in Canada, a 
greater proportion of enlisted men had been members of a Canadian cavalry regiment as 
opposed to having previous experience in the British Cavalry.  This was particularly true 
of the Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers.  For example, nearly half of the 
RCD Commissioned Officers (COs) were members of a Canadian cavalry regiment,40 
compared with less than three and a half percent from the British Cavalry.  Similarly, 
nearly sixty percent of the LSH NCOs had Canadian Cavalry experience41 compared to 
approximately ten percent British Cavalry experience.42  The officers responsible for 
training and leading the Canadian cavalry regiments in the Great War were 
predominantly Canadian cavalrymen, which insured the influence of the Canadian 
mounted rifle tradition combined with twentieth century British Cavalry doctrine.  This 
was particularly true of LSH, as their officers taught as instructors at the annual western 
cavalry training camp from 1911 onwards, where mounted rifle tactics and 
reconnaissance work were the focus of training.43 
                                                          
40 The majority of these from the RCD itself. 
41 The majority of these from the LSH itself, but a substantial minority from various Western militia 
cavalry regiments. 
42 Note that the LSH Nominal Roll did not include any information on the previous enlistment of all 28 
Commissioned Officers.  It is probable that the majority were existing members of the LSH, but their 
previous experience was not disclosed and thus not included in these statistics. 
43 For full graph of recruitment statistics, see Appendix I.  For details on the Western Cavalry training 
camp, see Chapter 2.  GMA 19th Alberta Dragoon Fonds, Series 2, M-1961-70.  Camp, Brigade, and 
Regimental Orders, 1911-1915; Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force: Royal Canadian Dragoons: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued 
with Militia Orders 1915; Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary Force: 
Lord Strathcona’s Horse: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with 
Militia Orders 1915. 
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Few details are available on the RCD and LSH time in training at Valcartier; most 
of the information is only available through private diaries that offer little information on 
training, and focus more heavily on the experience of daily life at camp.  For example, 
William R. Jones offered only vague details, explaining that training included breaking in 
horses, equitation, formations, weaponry, and parades.  He described the training 
program as intensive, stating that he was “too busy to really feel [homesick]…While in 
camp I never had a sleepless night.”44  However, details on everyday life are more 
forthcoming.  In a letter to his uncle, Jones described the sleeping conditions at 
Valcartier, stating “When you go to bed to-night just think of me with my two blankets 
and waterproof sheet and sleeping on the ground.”45  Despite the rough conditions, Jones 
maintained that the RCD enjoyed their training at Valcartier, although they were 
impatient and anxious for action.  Some entertainment was provided for the men in 
training.  Jones described a “moving picture establishment” that charged ten cents for 
admission.46  Before embarking for England, Jones noted the speed with which the First 
Canadian Contingent was mobilized, as the process took only six weeks.47  Orders for the 
cavalry to embark for England finally came in late September 1914. 
1st Divisional Cavalry – 19th Alberta Dragoons 
While the Permanent Force cavalry regiments had a delayed call to action, the 
19th Alberta Dragoons received their mobilization orders on 5 August 1914.  Officially, 
the 19th Alberta Dragoons went overseas with the First Contingent as a “Special Service 
Squadron” to fill the Divisional Cavalry role for the 1st Canadian Division.  Divisional 
                                                          
44 Jones, 10-11. 
45 Jones, 10. 
46 Jones, 13-14. 
47 Jones, 11-18. 
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Cavalry, or “Corps Cavalry,” was meant to perform duties that required mobility for the 
infantry.  Reconnaissance and patrol work were their primary responsibilities, along with 
dispatch riding, escort duties, advanced, flank, and rear guard duties, and outpost work.  
Mounted troops were required to perform this work because these tasks required speed 
and mobility to be performed efficiently and without exhaustion.  Divisional Cavalry was 
also expected to offer mounted support to the infantry in battle when possible, although 
this role was almost secondary to their other duties.48    
The 19AD were largely recruited in Edmonton and the surrounding area.49  
Unlike the RCD and LSH, nearly half of the 19AD overseas forces were already 
members regiment, and all but twenty-seven men had pervious military experience. 
Similarly, seven of the nine 19AD COs were existing members, as were over half the 
NCOs.  Therefore, the 19AD was trained and led by the men responsible for organizing 
the annual western cavalry training camp beginning in 1911, which focused almost 
exclusively on mounted rifle and reconnaissance training.50  Nearly half the regiment was 
likely to have participated in these annual camps before the Great War, giving them 
substantial experience with cavalry training and a better understanding of the expected 
role of cavalry.51  The 19AD were also responsible for supplying their own horses.  They 
                                                          
48 Don Bondy, “Canadian Light Horse,” Canadian Expeditionary Force Study Group 
http://cefresearch.com/matrix/Army%20Troops/1st%20Echelon/Cavalry/lighthorse.htm; Cavalry Training, 1912, 
237-238. 
49 Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) Edwin Pye Fonds, 74/672 Series VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, 
File 1.  1st Canadian Divisional Cavalry, 19th Alberta Dragoons, Special Service Squadron. 
50 Participating regiments included the 19th Alberta Dragoons, the 15th Light Horse, the 21st Alberta 
Hussars, the 23rd Alberta Rangers.  Training courses were taught by the Commanding Officers of each 
regiment and the LSH. 
51 For full graph of recruitment statistics, see Appendix II.  For details on the Western Cavalry training 
camp, see Chapter 2.  Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary Force: 19th 
Alberta Dragoons: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia 
Orders 1915; GMA 19th Alberta Dragoons Fonds, Series 2, M-1961-70.  Camp, Brigade, and Regimental 
Orders, 1911-1915; Major F.W.W. Fane, “19th Alberta Dragoons to Mobilize.” Vegreville Observer, 5 
August 1914. 
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printed a public notice in the Vegreville Observer stating that Divisional Cavalry horses 
were required for purchase.52  After finishing their local recruitment, the regiment 
departed for Valcartier on 27 August, while 100 horses53 followed them on 9 
September.54 
While training at Valcartier, the 19AD spent the majority of their time 
participating in mounted drills and parades.  Some time was spent on horsemanship, 
sword training, and reconnaissance patrol work.55  In November, more attention was 
given to navigation and tactical exercises.  For example, a night attack was practiced on 
20 November.  Unfortunately, their initial training efforts were hindered by bad weather.  
According to a letter from Lieutenant H.M. Dawson56 dated 8 September 1914, the troops 
experienced “rain continuously since we arrived.”57  Rain and cold made training 
particularly difficult, as it led to illness among the horses and often delayed important 
mounted exercises.58   
Like the RCD and LSH, the members of the 19AD grew frustrated with the 
minimal role assigned to the cavalry.  As Dawson wrote in a letter home, “As to our 
being selected as Divisional Cavalry.  We are left absolutely alone and have no camp 
duties of any description.  We are like the LSH and the RCD, except we have no 
patrols…We expect to leave about the first of October as the bloody Infantry is holding 
                                                          
52 Each horse had to be between five and eight years old, stand at least fifteen hands high, be saddle broken, 
and could not be white or grey.  See Major F.W.W. Fane, “Public Notice,” Vegreville Observer, 12 August 
1914. 
53 Purchased by Major F.W.W. Fane and Captain Hardisty of the 19th Alberta Dragoons. 
54 “19th Alberta Dragoons Leave for the Front,” Vegreville Observer, 27 August 1914. 
55 War Diary, 19th Alberta Dragoons (19AD), 14-31 October 1914. 
56 Dawson was commissioned as Lieutenant in the 19th Alberta Dragoons in May 1912.  He embarked for 
France with the regiment in 1914, and served as a troop leader in 1916. 
57 GMA 19th Alberta Dragoons Fonds, Series 2, M-1961-vol.7, Scrapbook, 1914-1925, Personal 
Correspondence, Lieutenant Dawson, 8 September 1914. 
58 War Diary, 19AD, 1-30 November 1914. 
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us back now.59  From Dawson’s statements, it is clear that although the 19AD was 
designated as a mounted unit earlier than the regular cavalry regiments, less was expected 
of them.  Their mounted training at Valcartier was not intensive, but was appropriately 
focused on their Divisional Cavalry role.  However, it is important to note that the 
Permanent Force cavalry regiments would have been much more active than most at 
Valcartier while fulfilling their role as instructors and patrol workers.   
2nd Divisional Cavalry – 1st Hussars 
In September 1914, the Canadian government authorized the recruitment of the 
2nd Canadian Division for service in France.  Simultaneously, Hughes agreed to raise 
thirteen battalions of Canadian Mounted Rifles to be dispatched to Egypt.60  Thus the 7th 
Canadian Mounted Rifles (7th CMR) was formed on 7 November 1914.61  The new 
regiment began recruiting in January 1915.  “A” Squadron was recruited in London, 
Ontario, largely from members of the 1st Hussars. “B” Squadron was recruited in Sarnia, 
Windsor, and Amherstburg, and “C” Squadron was recruited in Toronto.  “A” and “B” 
Squadrons were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Elton ‘Ibbotson’ 
Leonard of the 1st Hussars.62   
Unlike the previously deployed cavalry regiments that embarked from Valcartier 
in 1914, the 7th CMR was trained in London, Ontario, before they were ordered to 
embark for the front.  The regiment moved into billets at London’s Queen’s Park on 29 
January 1915.  Daily training with physical drills and mounted parades began on 2 
                                                          
59 GMA 19th Alberta Dragoon Fonds, Series 2, M-1961-vol.7, Scrapbook, 1914-1925, Personal 
Correspondence, Lieutenant Dawson, 8 September 1914. 
60 However, none of these newly raised units were sent to the Middle East.  The majority were converted 
into infantry units and served on the Western Front. 
61 McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 28. 
62 McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 28. 
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February.63  Horses were issued from the remount depot, and others were donated by Sir 
Adam Beck.64  The 7th CMR was trained much more thoroughly than their counterparts at 
Valcartier, initially as Independent Cavalry instead of Divisional Cavalry.65  Leonard 
hired retired Sergeant-Major Jim Widgrey of the RCD to assist with training.66  George 
Stirrett67 explained that Leonard “paid Widgrey out of his own pocket,” and got the 
regiment ready for action in half the time it would have taken without his expertise.68  
Stirrett stated “Within a few weeks, ‘A’ and ‘B’ squadrons in London had progressed to 
the level of squadron tactical exercises and were able to conduct training schemes in 
cooperation with Infantry units stationed in the London area.”69    
From February to May, training continued at the London Armouries on a daily 
basis from 9:00am to 4:00pm.70  Training activities included including equitation, 
squadron drilling, troop drills, physical drills, mounted and dismounted exercises, 
parades, musketry training, and lectures.71  Some attention was also given to the standing 
orders issued to the RCD.72  Officers and NCOs were examined on their various 
                                                          
63 1st Hussars Museum and Archive (1HMA), Leonard Collection No. 0407501-05 IL. 7th Canadian 
Mounted Rifles Canadian Expeditionary Force Daily Orders, 26 January to 11 May 1915, No. 1, 26 
January to No. 17, 13 February 1915. 
64 A wealthy resident of London Ontario.  See McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 28. 
65 As they had not yet been designated as Divisional Cavalry. 
66 McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 28. 
67 Capitan George Stirrett joined the 1st Hussars in 1914 and remained with the Regiment throughout the 
Great War.  When the war began, Stirrett had little interest in joining the fight.  While visiting London to 
referee rugby match, he and four friends decided to visit the Armouries to inquire about the nature of the 
conflict.  There, they met Cuthbert Finnie McEwen, a member for the London rugby team and officer of the 
1st Hussars, Leonard’s second in command.  McEwen informed them that the Hussars were set to begin 
recruiting Cavalry troops within the next two weeks, and expected to fight as a mounted unit in Egypt.  
Stirrett and one of his friends decided to enrol in military school at the Armouries.  After completing the 
course, Stirrett joined the 1st Hussars as a Lieutenant.  By June 1915, Stirrett was a corporal in William 
‘Billy’ Bishop’s 2nd Troop.  His war memoirs were printed in 1974.  See DHH 74/633.  George Stirrett, A 
Soldier’s Story, 1914-1918, ed. R.B. McCarthy, 1974, i, 1-6. 
68 Stirrett, 5. 
69 Stirrett, 6. 
70 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 44, 17 March 1915.  
71 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 1, 26 January to No. 91, 11 May 1915. 
72 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 30, 1 March 1915.  
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responsibilities throughout training, according to the requirements outlined in Cavalry 
Training 1912.73  This provides a clear indication of thorough training according to the 
prescribed doctrines for Independent Cavalry.  
In keeping with hybrid cavalry doctrine and the Canadian mounted rifle tradition, 
the 7th CMR gave special attention to rifle training.  A special two-week musketry course 
began on 17 March.  Lectures on musketry became part of daily training on 29 March 
1915.74  Musketry training was devoted to aiming and firing instruction, proper positions, 
theoretical knowledge, range, target practice, and nomenclature.75  Attention was also 
given to the importance of coordinating firepower with mounted action. A machine gun 
section was organized under Major H.N. Abell, comprised of twenty-six members of the 
regiment.76   
On 29 March, Ibbotson Leonard met with Sam Hughes and General Hodgins in 
Ottawa to discuss the formation of the 2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron.77  Leonard used 
his influence to ensure that his regiment, the 1st Hussars, would be chosen for the job.  
Sure enough, on 30 March 1915, the 1st Hussars78 were selected to supply the Divisional 
Cavalry Squadron for the 2nd Canadian Division, and were relieved from their duties as 
“A” Squadron of the 7th CMR.79  Leonard’s list of personally selected officers was 
approved on 9 April.  On 13 April, a nominal roll of all 157 ranks was submitted to 
                                                          
73 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 36, 8 March 1915; 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 52, 26 March 1915.  
74 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 54, 29 March 1915. 
75 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 74, 21 April 1915. 
76 One sergeant, one corporal, fourteen privates, eight drivers, and two batmen.  7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 
20, 17 February 1915.  
77 1HMA Leonard Collection No. 04075-IL.  Ibbotson Leonard, 1915 Diary, 28-30 March. 
78 “A” Squadron of the 7th CMR was essentially the 1st Hussars. Major Clifford Reason was left to 
command the remaining troops of the 7th CMR. 
79 DHH Edwin Pye Fonds 74/672, Series VI, Box 17, Folder 6.  Organization of 7th Regiment, Canadian 
Mounted Rifles; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 13, File 2.  H.Q. 593-4-2, Letter from W.E. Hodgins, 
Acting Adjutant-General, to Canadian Militia to The Officer Commanding 1st Division, London Ont., Re: 
7th CMR, 30 March 1915; 7th CMR Daily Orders, No. 68, 14 April 1915. 
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Ottawa.80  Lieutenant Colonel Leonard was offered command of the Squadron, but would 
be demoted to the rank of Major.81  However, he met with Hughes in Chatham on 9 April 
and was assured he would retain his rank, a promise that was confirmed on 21 May.82   
With their new assignment confirmed, the 1st Hussars began to train in a style 
more suited to Divisional Cavalry after being designated as such.83  Sword exercises 
began on 16 April, along with advance guard, flank guard, and outpost training.  Mounted 
drills, sword exercises, and reconnaissance rides took place throughout April.84  By early 
May, the 1H began an intensive scouting, advance guard, and outpost training program.  
The regiment also got some experience with bivouacking and signalling towards the end 
of the month.85  These training exercises provide a clear indication of the role expected of 
the Divisional Cavalry.  Patrol work for the infantry would be their primary 
responsibilities, so training was no longer focused on Independent Cavalry tactics. 
Members of the 1st Hussars enrolled in various training classes between April and 
June.  For example, many members enrolled in the Royal School of Cavalry’s special 
officer course, held at the Stanley Barracks in Toronto beginning on 5 April.86  A course 
in equitation began on 12 April at Queen’s Park in London, taught by William A. 
Bishop87 of the 1st Hussars.88  Regular lectures were given on a variety of duties the 
Divisional Cavalry were expected to perform.  For example, Leonard gave a lecture on 
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outpost duties on 14 April.89  Training and regular classes continued until orders to 
embark for England finally came on 6 June 1915.90   
Setting Sail for England 
While at sea, the cavalry regiments were far from idle, and they experienced 
difficulties unique to their arm.  Caring for their mounts kept them much busier during 
their voyage than their counterparts in the infantry.  The Royal Canadian Dragoons left 
Valcartier and rode seventeen miles to Quebec City on 1 October 1914.  From there, they 
set sail for England on 3 October.91  Lieutenant R.S. Timmis and twenty-five NCOs of 
the RCD were assigned to load 620 horses on board a cattle ship, the R.M.S. Laconia.92  
Jones described the arduous process of loading each horse on board the ship in his diary: 
“Some job it truly was, I assure you.  One horse at a time was placed in a wooden cage 
and then hoisted with rope and tackle up and onto the deck.”93  This procedure was 
particularly hard on the horses.  Some had to be blindfolded to keep them calm.  Others 
required shackles to keep them still.94  One unfortunate animal was so terrified by the 
noise from the steam derrick,95 it bolted down the pier and into the water, dragging his 
handler along with him.  The handler survived the ordeal, but the unlucky horse drowned 
while in panic.96   
According to Timmis, the conditions on board the R.M.S. Laconia were filthy and 
cramped, and only oats were available for horse feed.  Many horses became infected with 
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ringworm from contaminated feed left on board the vessel.97  The eighteen-day voyage 
was spent exercising, cleaning, drilling, and practicing weapons training and signalling.98  
Jones was lucky enough to make the voyage aboard a passenger ship, the S.S. Laurentic.  
He stated “I was wise enough to know there would be work aboard [the R.M.S. Laconia] 
well beyond my ambition…so I immediately took sick and ‘faded away’ when it came to 
selecting the men to accompany the horses.  It was adventure I sought rather than 
work.”99  Even still, Jones described life aboard the S.S. Laurentic as “dreary,” and 
assured that a great cheer rose up from every ship at the first sight of land.100 
Lord Strathcona’s Horse left Quebec for Plymouth aboard the S.S. Bermudian on 
30 September 1914.  According to the ship’s log, light drilling took place each day as the 
cavalry crossed the Atlantic.  LSH woke each morning at 5:30am and lined up for roll 
call and exercises.  Drills began before breakfast at 7:00am.  A fire hose and pump were 
used for bathing.  The hose forced a “stream of cold sea-water through and from the hose 
with a force that would knock down an ordinary individual…they all jumped in to meet 
and fight the different streams of cold salt water.”101  After this exercise was complete, 
troops were given breakfast and resumed drilling.  Between 11:00am and noon, lectures 
were given.  After a 1:00pm lunch, drilling continued until 4:00pm.  Sporting activities 
took place between 4:00 and 6:00pm, and concerts took place every evening.102  Jack 
Tatlow103 remarked that much of his voyage later in 1915 was spent playing shuffleboard, 
although the recruits participated in two parades daily, boat drills, and a half an hour of 
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physical drilling.104  LSH arrived in Plymouth to a cheering crown of thousands on 14 
October 1914. They disembarked for Salisbury Plain on 16 October.105    
Although the 1st Hussars embarked for the front eight months later, they had a 
similar experience crossing the Atlantic.  Leonard’s unit of six Officers and 166 Other 
Ranks left London for Montreal on 8 June 1915, sailing for England on 9 June aboard the 
S.S. Caledonian with members of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.106  Drills began 
the following day.107  Lectures, sword drills, signalling, and light jogging around the deck 
were activities most commonly practiced during the voyage.108  However, as Stirrett 
explained, the cavalry’s primary responsibility during the voyage was to care for the 
horses.109  There were also some forms of entertainment for the troops.  Many passed 
time spotting whales and dolphins from the deck.110  Others indulged in other forms of 
recreation, as Leonard wrote: “Mother, you won’t like to hear that there is a wet canteen 
in board where the COs and men can get a pint of beer a day if they want it for 5 cents.  
There is no trouble however.  Life belts were issued to each man.”111   
Despite some enjoyable features, much of the 1st Hussars cross-Atlantic voyage 
was unpleasant.  Lodgings aboard the S.S. Caledonian were cramped.  Leonard wrote that 
there were “too many Officers for one sitting in the mess room, so the Juniors have to 
wait until the first table is finished.”112  The troops slept in hammocks, and the horses “in 
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well constructed and ventilated stalls.”113  However, Stirrett remarked that when weather 
was good during the voyage, men would spread piles of hay on the ground and sleep on 
the deck.  He stated “there were hammocks below, but the air was too foul to sleep 
there.”114  The 1st Hussars experienced some stormy weather on the high seas that 
resulted in several bouts of seasickness.115  Leonard stated, “I was glad to get on deck 
again don’t blame some of the men for being ill down on the horse deck…where the 
ventilation is not so good and there is a lot of motion.”116  Outbreaks of infection were 
also a concern.  When Sergeant Turnball came down with measles on 10 June, he was put 
in isolation in a bathroom.  Leonard was forced to cancel the afternoon drills for 10 June, 
as so many troops were unwell.117   
Their mounts also faired badly, as horses are notoriously poor sailors.118  Three 
horses were lost to pneumonia on 16 June.  Four others died on 17 June, one on 18 June, 
and a final two on 20 June.119  Many were in poor health before the voyage, as Leonard 
explained “Some [of the horses] should not have been reshipped, as they came through 
from Vancouver and the West with barely a week to recuperate at Montreal.”120  The 
horses that died were lifted out with a derrick and thrown overboard.121  However, these 
horses faired much better than those shipped from Canada to South Africa during the 
Boer War.  According to Steele’s 1900 diary, eighty of the 599 horses aboard the S.S. 
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Monterey died within the first nine days of the voyage.122   The loss of ten out of 578 
horses aboard the S.S. Caledonian was comparatively minimal.123 
The 1st Hussars voyage became all the more precarious as they approached 
England, where they came under threats from German submarines.  On 20 June, Leonard 
described passing a vessel at half speed with all the lights turned off.124  When the S.S. 
Caledonian passed through Cornwall’s Lizard Point125 on 21 June, Leonard received 
word that an escort had been sent to look for the vessel to ensure its safe passage into 
Plymouth. 126  All drills were cancelled, and troops were ordered to stay below the deck 
of the ship.  According to Leonard’s diary, the “Captain got several wireless in code 
saying that submarines were very active around the Lizard, so we had a very anxious 
night until we passed the Eddystone Light House127 a little after midnight.  The Captain 
felt very relieved.”128  As the S.S. Caledonian approached Plymouth, the ship was 
delayed again, as the protective escort was unable to locate the ship because its lights 
were off and they were in the midst of a heavy fog.129  After a total of thirteen days at sea, 
the Hussars disembarked by 1:00pm on 22 June and boarded their train to the Canadian 
Cavalry Depot in Canterbury by 4:00pm.130  
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Training at Shorncliffe 
The RCD arrived in Plymouth on 17 October 1914.  They joined LSH at Pond 
Farm Camp at Salisbury Plain the following day.  The voyage had been exceedingly hard 
on the horses, which arrived weakened, sick, and incredibly thin.  With their mounts unfit 
to ride, the RCD made its way to Pond Farm Camp on foot, and mounted training was 
delayed until 21 October when the horses recovered.  Unfortunately, it began to rain 
when they arrived at camp, and kept raining for the better part of three months.  As Jones 
described it, “it rained, and rained, and it kept on raining…the mud and the cold and 
misery of the three months passed at Salisbury Plain I shall never forget.”131  The 
facilities were poor, making cooking and bathing difficult.  Drying clothing and blankets 
became nearly impossible.  Many of the men fell ill under these conditions, some 
succumbing to spinal meningitis.  However, the horses suffered more than the men in 
these rainy conditions.  Jones explained that “the even less fortunate horses were kept at 
this time in the open, unsheltered from the storm, and at times obliged to stand to their 
knees in mud.”132  As the animals were constantly wet and muddy, many of their heels 
began to crack.  However, Jones asserted that despite these conditions, the Canadian 
Cavalry “lacked for nothing” in terms of equipment, food, and supplies.133   
The training program began into the winter months of 1914 despite cold, wet 
weather conditions, high winds, and frequent storms.  Divisional training and operational 
practices took place at Newfoundland Farm Camp beginning on 21 October, which were 
largely focused on basic equitation and musketry.134  On 9 November, the RCD and LSH 
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began a program of practicing long advances at various paces, indicative of cavalry’s 
expected mobility in action and during reconnaissance missions.  They also enrolled in 
various classes, including a week-long course at the Netheravon Cavalry School.135  
Mounted drills and parading continued through December, and the training program was 
expanded to include individual squadron training under their respective officers.136   
In December 1914, the War Office decided to form a Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
out of the two Permanent Force Canadian cavalry regiments in England.137  Training 
efforts improved in the new year when the CCB finally received a Commanding Officer.  
Despite Borden’s insistence that a Canadian commander lead the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, Lord Kitchener appointed British ex-Secretary of State For War Colonel J.E.B. 
Seely to command the CCB on 28 January 1915.138  According to Badsey, Seely was 
almost universally condemned throughout his tenure as the CCB’s commanding officer.  
Badsey argued that the CCB’s reputation improved after R.W. Patterson of the Fort Garry 
Horse finally replaced Seely in 1918.139  However, these harsh criticisms of Seely’s 
leadership were largely undeserved and likely a product of lingering resentment over the 
Curragh Incident. 
After Seely’s appointment, the CCB left Pond Farm Camp for slightly better 
conditions, billeting in the villages of Tilshead, Shrewton, Muddington, and 
Winterbourne Stokes.140   However, as Jones remarked, “We had left behind us mud and 
cold and found here in its place water, which was at times knee deep.”141  Because of 
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poor conditions and bad weather, training was still kept to a minimum through the worst 
of the winter months.  Light tactical and reconnaissance training began in January 1915, 
although it was far from intensive.142  The CCB finally started musketry training at the 
Bulford ranges on 18 February, however, it offered little in the way of excitement.143  
Jones described the Brigade’s frustration with inaction through the winter.  He stated that 
the CCB were “doomed to pass another month of inactivity and consequent 
disappointment” in this new location.144   
In March, the CCB moved to Maresfield Camp in Sussex, where intensive 
training finally began and lasted until May 1915.145  Mounted drills took place daily, 
along with intensive musketry training with Lee-Enfield rifles.  Seely instituted night 
training, as well as unit and formation training.146  The CCB also participated in trench 
digging exercises and regular reconnaissance training.  Regimental games took place in 
April 1915 at Maresfield, and included individual and section jumping, and mounted tugs 
of war.147   The variety of training exercises provides a good indication of the expected 
role of Cavalry on the Western Front.  While mounted drilling focused on tactical support 
of the Infantry, regular reconnaissance and patrol training was clearly fundamental part of 
Cavalry work.  The intensive focus on rifle training was consistent with Haig’s vision for 
a hybrid cavalry force capable of fighting mounted or dismounted.  The attention to 
trench digging suggests a recognition of the realities of trench warfare that had since 
materialized on the Western Front, and the ways in which they might impact mounted 
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rifle cavalry tactics and dismounted training.  The amount of attention to reserve work 
such as reconnaissance and trench digging was indicative of the expected role of cavalry 
– waiting in reserve for action while supplying labour drafts and patrols in various 
detachments until called into action. 
 The Canadian Cavalry Brigade continued with training until 29 April 1915.  On 
this date, Lord Kitchener approached Seely and requested that the CCB embark for the 
Western Front to fight temporarily as infantry, as the Canadian Expeditionary Force had 
suffered severe losses at Ypres in April 1915 and was facing a dire manpower 
shortage.148  Consequently, the CCB embarked for France on 4 May 1915 with no 
infantry training to prepare them for their tour in the trenches.149  What was promised to 
be a “few weeks”150 of dismounted action became eight months of fighting as an infantry 
brigade on the Western Front.151   
Although the CCB spent the remainder of 1915 fighting as infantry, 
reinforcements arriving in Shorncliffe who enlisted as members of the RCD or LSH were 
trained as mounted cavalry.  Upon arriving in England, new recruits began a six-week 
training program and then continued with regular cavalry training.152  In a July 1915 
letter to his mother, new LSH recruit Jack Tatlow described the nature of training in 
England: “I am working pretty hard these days.  Getting up at 5:30 a.m., stables from 6 to 
7:15, drill 9 to 11, stables 11 to 12, drill 1:30 to 4:00, stables from 4 to 5 and quite often 
work till 6.  At present am taking an equitation course.  I have the worst old plug you 
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ever saw to ride, but it can jump a bit.”153  Evenings were often spent at moving picture 
shows when tickets were available.154  By 10 August, the new LSH recruits were 
organized into four squadrons, and were training as an organized cavalry regiment.155  
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was clearly anticipating a return to mounted action, as 
new recruits were still trained much in the same way as the first CCB recruits who were 
sent to the front.   
Divisional Cavalry at Shorncliffe 
By December 1914, the 19th Alberta Dragoons had arrived at Sling Plantation 
Camp at Bulford, Salisbury Plain as the 1st Divisional Cavalry Squadron.156  Shortly 
thereafter, the 19AD was granted permission to move to Newfoundland Farm Camp, 
where mounted drills began despite the poor weather conditions.157  Training was heavily 
focused on reconnaissance patrolling, outpost duties, and dispatch riding. Some attention 
was given to proper navigation, as the Squadron learned the proper methods for reading 
aerial reconnaissance photographs and identifying enemy locations and targets.158   
On 4 January 1915, the 19AD received orders to move into the Bulford Barracks 
where there was more room and better living conditions.  Tactical exercises continued, 
with some attention given to combined operations with the infantry and cyclist battalions.  
Musketry training courses began on 18 January.159  Mounted practices, riding schools, 
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exercise rides, dismounted drills, riding schools, and sword training continued into early 
February 1915.160  According to a 29 January inspection report, the 19AD was well 
trained and very well mounted, and all members of the regiment were skilfully trained in 
Colt revolver shooting.  The report stated “Officers, NCOs and men and horses are a 
hardbitten tough looking lot, the latter are picking up well now that they are not standing 
in a quagmire and should soon be ready to go anywhere.”161  The 19AD embarked for 
France on 8 February 1915, arriving in Saint Nazaire on 11 February and went into billets 
in the Pradelles area on 15 February.  Mounted and dismounted training continued for 
two weeks, with continued focus on reconnaissance training and musketry.162     
The 1st Hussars got off to a later start as the 2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron, 
arriving in England on 22 June 1915.  However, they were much more thoroughly 
trained.  After disembarking, the 1st Hussars entrained for the Cavalry Headquarters at 
Canterbury.  They arrived at the Canadian Cavalry Depot on 22 June, and began 
dismounted training the following day.163  On 25 June, Leonard met with Sam Steele at 
Folkestone, and learned that the regiment would be sent to train at Shorncliffe with the 
2nd Canadian Division on 27 June.164  When the men of 1H joined the 2nd Canadian 
Division near Folkestone, they were issued British equipment, including Lee-Enfield 
rifles and swords, and 168 new horses.165  Stirrett explained that conditions were very 
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poor and uncomfortable at their camp in Digbate, as “the area was very heavy clay, and 
after every rain the horse lines became almost impassable.”166   
The 1st Hussars resumed regular training on 2 July.  Leonard created a weekly 
training syllabus for Divisional Cavalry training, which detailed the various exercises that 
were to be practiced each day.  In addition to regular mounted and dismounted drills, 
reconnaissance and bayonet fighting were the primary focus of training.167  The 1st 
Hussars were intensively trained in musketry and bayonet fighting.  Attention was also 
given to the conditions on the Western Front relative to Divisional Cavalry work, as 
Major Beattie gave a lecture on trench warfare on 2 July, and daily afternoon training was 
devoted to familiarizing the 1st Hussars with entrenchments and trench digging.168   
Divisional Cavalry schemes began in mid-July that were primarily focused on 
reconnaissance and communication.  For example, on 13 July, a practice cavalry scheme 
was organized wherein the 1st Hussars occupied an area of high ground and maintained 
communications via telegraph.  This same exercise was repeated the following week on 
20 July. Regular reconnaissance, night reconnaissance, and scouting schemes were also 
practiced for the duration of training.  Drafting reconnaissance reports was added to the 
syllabus in the third week of training, as each troop was sent to assess a specific area of 
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front and ride back with a fully drafted report. 169  The following day, a picketing 
simulation took place wherein the 1H embarked for Canterbury in full marching order 
equipped with full gear, forage, and rations.170  The final week of July was devoted to 
regular drills, and practice in establishing and maintaining lines of communication.171  
The 1st Hussars relocated to Otterpool Camp on 27 July, and continued with the same 
training programme through the beginning of August.172  
The men of the 1st Hussars spent the majority of August 1915 participating in 
tactical exercises with the 2nd Canadian Division to prepare for their expected role in 
battle.  For example, from 10 to 11 August, the Hussars supported the infantry in a 
brigade training scheme.  A hostile “brown” infantry force was to advance across the 
Great Stour at Wye and Willesborough.  An opposing “white” infantry force of equal 
strength and additional artillery were positioned at East Sandling.  The white force was 
ordered to seize and destroy the ordnance and supply depots in Eastwell Park, while the 
brown force was ordered to destroy the white force.  As the Divisional mounted troops, 
the 1st Hussars were to act as the advance guard and perform scouting for the white force.  
They reconnoitred the best route of advance for the infantry due to the difficulties 
associated with deploying across broken ground and wooded areas, and the need to 
prevent a surprise attack from an enemy force.  They made first contact with the enemy 
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during the advance, and seized ground of tactical importance upon which to deploy the 
main body and enable further advance.173 
A second tactical exercise held on 18 August gave a similar role to the Divisional 
Cavalry.  A German force was said to have invaded Great Britain between New Romney 
and Dungeness that the cyclist battalion and mounted forces were unable to defeat.  The 
1st Hussars were to proceed to Newchurch and send out patrols, keeping close 
observation of enemy movements.  When the enemy force moved, mounted troops were 
to meet and delay the enemy advance.174  A third tactical exercise took place on 20 
August, in which an enemy force was said to have landed with two infantry brigades, 
artillery, and mounted troops. The 1st Hussars took part in the exercise as the enemy’s 
mounted rifles, acting as advance guard for the enemy force and performed a flank attack 
during the advance. 175 
These simulated infantry battles provided practical training for the kinds of 
actions that the Divisional Cavalry units were expected to participate in while operating 
in open country.  The divisional mounted troops were expected to act as an advance 
guard, perform reconnaissance, support the infantry advance, and perform delaying 
actions.  Proper attention was given to the necessity of dismounted training, and no 
emphasis was placed on l’arme blanche tactics.  This training indicates that 1st Hussars 
were well prepared to fulfill the role expected of Divisional Cavalry. 
In addition to regular Divisional Cavalry training, Leonard ensured that all ranks 
of the 1st Hussars clearly understood their expected role on the battlefield by assigning 
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daily readings from Cavalry Training 1912 and Part I of Field Service Regulations 1912.  
Assigned passages detailed the responsibilities of Divisional mounted troops with 
particular emphasis on scouting, reconnaissance, drafting reports, ground and cover, 
dismounted action, and night operations.176   
As autumn approached, the 1st Hussars prepared to embark for the front with the 
2nd Canadian Division.  On 1 September, Leonard met with Hughes and Folger to discuss 
departure arrangements. On 16 September the men of the 1st Hussars left Otterpool Camp 
for Southampton and crossed the Channel, landing at Le Havre.  They proceeded to the 
Belgian town of Westoutre, south west of Ypres. 177    
Conclusion  
An examination of the recruitment and training of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
and the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisional Cavalry Squadrons revealed that the mounted arm 
was expected to play a practical and versatile role on the Western Front.  Just as it was 
before the Boer War, the primary responsibility of the mounted arm was reconnaissance.  
Patrol work, outpost duties, and traffic control were a fundamental part of expected 
activities, particularly for the Divisional Cavalry.  As a fighting force, cavalry was trained 
to adapt to circumstance, fighting as mounted rifles when necessary.  While cavalry 
charges were to be used to exploit the success of the infantry, they were only to be 
conducted in pursuit of the retreating enemy.  There was little need for a mass cavalry 
charge in 1915, so cavalrymen were expected to await an opportunity to advance, but also 
to carry on with their primary role as reconnaissance troops.  While in training and in 
                                                          
176 War Diary, 1H, March-July 1915, Appendix VII.  2nd Divisional Cavalry Syllabus of Training, Dibgate 
Camp, 5-10 July 1915. 
177 1HMA Leonard Collection No. IL 0407509.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 12 
September 1915; Leonard, 1915 Diary, 1-16 September 1915; War Diary, 1H, 16-17 September 1915; 
McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 34. 
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reserve, cavalrymen took on several other challenges unique to their arm.  All ranks were 
required to care for their horses over and above their own needs at all times.  Cavalry 
training could often be delayed by poor weather and ground conditions.  Sailing overseas 
with horses created difficulties that did not affect the infantry, or even the British 
Cavalry.  All Canadian Cavalry regiments were anxious for action, and were willing to go 
to the front dismounted if necessary.  While “waiting” behind the front lines, cavalry 
regiments were far from idle. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
The Western Front, 1915: 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Dismounted, May-December 1915; 
1st and 2nd Divisional Cavalry, 1915 
 
Introduction 
 
 None of the Canadian Cavalry regiments were able to participate in any battle as 
mounted cavalry on the Western Front in 1915.  Although the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
would see action, it was not the kind that was hoped for, as the Brigade spent the 
remainder of the year as infantry on the Western Front.  While the CCB was not fulfilling 
its intended cavalry role, the time spent as infantry is relevant to the experience of the 
CCB in the Great War.  The Brigade’s first eight months on the Western Front gave  
practical experience with dismounted action.  The men of the CCB also spent the 
majority of their time in rear areas and forming working parties that were more typical of 
the mounted arm.  Meanwhile, the 19th Alberta Dragoons and the 1st Hussars were not 
required to dismount and fight as infantry.  They were able to fulfill their Divisional 
Cavalry roles exactly as expected and according to prewar doctrine.  From their arrival on 
the Western Front through the remainder of 1915, these two Divisional Cavalry 
regiments were constantly conducting reconnaissance patrols and performing a variety of 
other duties in rear areas that required the mobility of the mounted arm and were vital to 
the success of the infantry in the front lines.  While they did not fight in any engagements 
as cavalry in 1915, the Divisional Cavalry duties carried out by the 19th Alberta Dragoons 
and the 1st Hussars in 1915 confirmed that the mounted arm still had a valuable role to 
play on the Western Front.  
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The Decision to Dismount 
When the 1st Canadian Division was sent to the front in February 1915, the CCB 
remained in Shorncliffe.  In the spring of 1915, French and British Forces prepared to 
launch the Artois Offensive.  The German army held a salient between Lens and Arras.  
The primary target of the French offensive was Vimy Ridge, a five-mile obstacle that 
stretched across the salient.  Meanwhile, the First British Army was ordered to attack to 
the north and south of Neuve Chapelle, break through the German lines, unite, and then 
advance 3000 yards to Aubers Ridge.  Thereafter, the advance would continue up the La 
Bassée-Lille road to the Haute Deûle Canal.  The new offensive required as many men as 
possible.  By the end of April, infantry reinforcements were urgently needed on the 
Western Front, and the CCB was called upon to reinforce the 1st Canadian Division as 
infantry due to the devastating losses incurred on the Ypres front.1   
After Kitchener requested that the CCB dismount in late April 1915, Seely met 
with the officers from each regiment of the CCB ask for their consent.  All agreed to 
dismount, and spoke to their regiments individually to break the news.2  Jones recalled 
that Colonel Nellis addressed the RCD on 2 May 1915, explaining the urgent need for 
infantry reinforcements at Ypres.  He asked if the Dragoons were willing to dismount and 
fight as infantry.  The request was met with great enthusiasm, as all were anxious to “get 
into action under any condition.”3  According to Nordheimer, Seely met with French to 
ensure the CCB would retain its cavalry designation, organization, and the preservation 
of their separate regimental identities.  After French guaranteed all of these conditions, 
infantry kit was quickly issued, and one day of infantry training preceded their departure 
                                                          
1 Nicholson, 93-102. 
2 Greenhous, 184-185. 
3 Jones, 36. 
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on 4 May.4  The 2nd King Edward’s Horse (KEH),5 a British Cavalry Regiment, became 
part of the CCB in the spring of 1915 and embarked dismounted with them, bringing the 
total strength of the Brigade to eighty-five Commissioned Officers and 1427 Other 
Ranks.6   
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade’s mounts remained at the Cavalry Depot with the 
Fort Garry Horse.7  Jones described the “heartbreak” the cavalrymen felt when leaving 
their horses behind.  He stated “we had already formed for this animal that unexplainable 
love that a man acquires for his faithful steed…I believe nearly every one of the men 
hugged and kissed their nags…A good cavalryman, I know, has a love for his horse 
beyond what one could imagine.”8  Sad though they were to leave their horses and fight 
as infantry, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was very enthusiastic about participating in 
action at the front.  
The CCB left Maresfield at 5:45pm on 4 May 1915.  The Brigade arrived in 
Folkestone at 9:30pm and embarked for France aboard the S.S. Onward.9  As Jones 
described it, “the boat was so small that we were packed in like sardines.”10  The CCB 
arrived at Boulogne at 11:45pm.11  Jones described the confusion felt on the first morning 
in France.  The men were woken early, and were marching within ten minutes.  They had 
                                                          
4 Royal Canadian Dragoons Museum and Archive (RCDMA), Nordheimer File.  Roy Nordheimer, 
“Reminiscences,” The Goat, August 1929. 
5 The 2nd King Edward’s Horse was raised privately by Sir John Norton-Griffiths in August 1918.  They 
were part of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade from April 1915 to January 1916.  DHH, Edwin Pye Fonds, 
74/672, Series VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, File 1.  Second King Edward’s Horse, An Overseas Corps. 
6 DHH, Edwin Pye Fonds, 74/672, Series VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, File 1.  Notes Regarding Seely’s 
Detachment, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 1st and 2nd C.M.R. Brigades, and Seely’s Force. 
7 Depot cavalry regiment meant to reinforce the CCB.  In January 1916, they became part of the CCB.  See 
Chapter 5. 
8 Jones, 36-37. 
9 Nicholson, 102. 
10 Jones, 37. 
11 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3987, Folder 11, File 5.  Memo to Camp Adjutant, St. Martins, 6 May 1915; War 
Diary, LSH, 4 May 1915. 
 87
no sense of where they were or where they were headed, or how near they were to the 
front lines.  They adapted to these conditions while carrying sixty-five pounds of infantry 
kit on their backs.  Jones stated, “Naturally we were tired after our march, but we were 
little concerned with this, for we were possessed with that spirit of adventure and 
expectation of action which we knew now confronted us in France.”12  Eventually they 
reached a rail crossing, and were soon crowded into small, filthy rail cars.  The boxcars 
were built to carry thirty-two men, although forty-one men were placed in each car with 
no room to sit down through an eight-hour journey.  Although the train stopped once for 
lunch, no one had an appetite for hard tack and bully beef.  The train arrived at its 
destination by 11:00pm, and the CCB marched another five kilometres to their billets in 
Outtersteene.13  According to Jones, enthusiasm began to fade after a long day in transit, 
and many began singing “Bring back, oh, bring back my horse to me” to the tune of ‘My 
Bonnie Lies Over the Ocean.’14 
Festubert, May 1915 
While the CCB resumed musketry and bayonet training at Outtersteene, the First 
British Army suffered terrible losses at the Battle of Aubers Ridge on 9 May 1915, a 
consequence of throwing massive amounts of unsupported infantry against immense 
German firepower.  The unsuccessful offensive was to be followed up by an assault at 
Festubert.  Haig employed a sixty-hour artillery barrage before the midnight infantry 
advance on 16 May.15  According to Nicholson, this was the first night attack that the 
British attempted during the Great War.  The German forces retreated, and a new British 
                                                          
12 Jones, 37. 
13 War Diary, LSH, 5-16 May 1915. 
14 Jones, 37-41. 
15 Nicholson, 95-97. 
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offensive began on 17 May, although it was ineffective.16  Further attempts at advance 
were made throughout the following days, but none were successful.17   
On 16 May, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade received orders to move into the 
trenches.  That night, the CCB marched twenty-one kilometres to Locon.  During the 
march, the men of the CCB heard the thunder of guns and saw occasional bursts of flame 
for the first time.  At dawn, they got their first look at the destructive effects of modern 
warfare.  Jones described his first impression of the Western Front in his diary: 
What we saw we shall never forget…a picture of utter desolation and 
ruin…Houses destroyed, furniture broken and scattered, the dead lying 
everywhere…the stench of decaying bodies and the blood was in our 
nostrils and has since remained there…For myself, I felt that I wanted to 
turn back and run, and to keep on running until I could be far away from 
the awful roar and din which I knew meant battle and death and 
suffering18   
 
The CCB arrived at billets in Locon at noon on 17 May, ready to move into the trenches 
at short notice.19   
Before dawn on 22 May, “A” Squadron and two troops of “C” Squadron of the 
LSH embarked for the front-line trenches at Festubert.   They incurred two casualties 
when taking over the trenches due to heavy German artillery fire.  The bombardment 
continued through the following day, until finally on 24 May, LSH supported an attack 
on the German K5 trenches.  Although the attack was successful, LSH incurred thirty-
five casualties due to heavy shellfire.  Thereafter, LSH were relieved by the RCD early 
on 25 May.20   
                                                          
16 3rd Canadian Brigade made a frontal assault along La Quinque Rue, through a breastwork and a well-
defended orchard.  See Nicholson, 98-99.  For map, see Appendix III. 
17 Nicholson, 95-102. 
18 Jones, 44-48. 
19 War Diary, RCD, 16-18 May 1915; Jones, 43-48. 
20 War Diary, LSH, 22-25 May 1915. 
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While traveling through Festubert late at night on 24 May, the RCD came under 
heavy artillery fire that persisted through the next morning.  One corporal was killed by a 
sniper, and eleven others were wounded.  On 25 May, the RCD arrived in the front lines 
and went into action.  The assault was scheduled to begin at 9:00pm in conjunction with 
an attack by the 47th Division to the north of the Givenchy-Chapelle St. Roch Road.  R.S. 
Timmis of the RCD “B” Squadron led a detachment of twenty troops armed with 200 
jam-tin bombs.21  “C” Squadron was ordered to follow as a bayonet party.  The RCD 
were to clear a southern breastwork to the north of the junction between the new and old 
German line, at position K5.  Thereafter, they were to advance and capture the L.8 sector 
of the German trench line.  They successfully cleared the breastwork, advancing 
approximately 300 yards to the northeast.  However, the RCD had not advanced far 
enough to capture the L.8 section and join with their British counterparts south of K5, 
and left this task to the 3rd Brigade.22   
Jones described his experience at Festubert as truly horrific.  He and the other 
members of the regiment were quickly exhausted, frustrated, and “fed up.”23  This was 
particularly true the following morning, when a member of the 5th Battalion lay wounded 
and crying for help in No Man’s Land.  According to Jones, five people had tried to 
rescue him, and a German sniper had killed each of them.  The wounded soldier remained 
stranded in No Man’s Land for four days and nights until Sergeant Walker Hollowell of 
                                                          
21 A home made double cylinder grenade composed of an inner can filled with explosives, and an outer can 
containing shrapnel fragments.  These grenades wee often made with the tins from soldiers jam rations.  
According to Greenhous, some of the jam tin bombs used in Timmis’s advance contained poison gas.  
According to Nicholson, this was the first time the use of gas weapons had been authorized by the BEF.  
However, Nicholson incorrectly stated that the Lord Strathcona’s Horse took part in this engagement.  It 
was in fact the Royal Canadian Dragoons.  See War Diary, LSH, 24-27 May 1915; War Diary, RCD, 24-27 
May 1915; Nicholson 103; Greenhous, 186-187. 
22 For map, see Appendix III.  War Diary, RCD, 25-27 May 1915; Greenhous, 186; Nicholson, 98-103. 
23 Jones, 56. 
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the RCD volunteered to rescue the soldier, and was shot through the abdomen.24  When 
Corporal John S. Pym of “A” Squadron attempted to rescue the fallen man, he was 
unable to lift the soldier on his own.  The solider was then retrieved with help from 
Corporal T.S. MacDonald and Private Sargood.  According to Jones, he wounded man 
died soon after he was rescued, and Pym received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.25   
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was sent back into reserve on 26 May, although 
their experience of life in the front lines followed them.  They proceeded to Givenchy, 
camping in a village two miles behind the front lines, until they were spotted by enemy 
reconnaissance.  The Brigade came under heavy shellfire, as did the civilian population 
that inhabited the town.  The CCB quickly withdrew, returning the following day to bury 
their dead.26  The following day, the entire CCB returned to billets in Longcornet.  
Fatigue parties were sent to the trenches to collect materials and supplies, and regular 
infantry drills continued.27   
The Canadian action at Festubert was a disappointment.  Over five separate days 
of offensive action, the 1st Canadian Division advanced approximately 600 yards across a 
one-mile front at the expense of 2,468 casualties, a substantial loss to a Division who had 
already lost half its strength at Ypres.  Nicholson argued that the 1st Division attempted to 
return to the front too quickly, a mere two weeks after leaving Ypres.  No time was taken 
to assimilate the inexperienced CCB.  The Brigade had not been trained as infantry and 
                                                          
24 According to Greenhous, Hollowell was shot through the thigh.  
25 Jones, 57-59; Greenhous, 186-188. 
26 An NCO of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, “A Warm Time,” 7 June 1915 in With the First Canadian 
Contingent: Published on Behalf of the Canadian Field Comforts Commission, ed. Mary Plummer 
(Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 1915), 103-104. 
27 War Diary, LSH, 24 May-1 June 1915. 
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had never experienced battle on the Western Front.  Inaccurate maps and highly effective 
German artillery were also significant factors in their defeat.28    
Although Festubert was a disappointment, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
experienced some individual successes in its first action on the Western Front.  For 
example, while the men of the RCD did not capture the German trench, they did manage 
to clear the area of snipers.  Incredibly, the RCD only incurred nineteen casualties during 
this engagement, one of whom was killed.  The CCB also managed to fight its first 
infantry battle with next to no infantry training.  This action was a tremendous 
accomplishment considering that it was conducted with no maps and no reconnaissance 
while the trench system was still in its infancy, unorganized and undefined.29  Given the 
lack of training and experience, the action of the CCB at Festubert was remarkable.   
The CCB spent the remainder of its time in the front line trenches assuming a 
defensive role, holding the trench line and supporting infantry offensives.  The CCB did 
not fight in any significant engagements, although one was planned for 15 June.  The 
RCD were ordered to advance after the 3rd Battalion failed to capture its objective after 
two frontal assaults on Givenchy’s Rue d’Ouvert.30  The offensive was to be launched 
from the same location as the previous two, although the objective was now more heavily 
guarded by German snipers and artillery.31  Fortunately, the offensive was postponed 
fifteen minuets before it was scheduled to begin, for which Seely expressed his immense 
relief.  He observed that subsequent waves of frontal assaults were often more disastrous 
                                                          
28 Nicholson, 102-104. 
29 War Diary, RCD, 25 May 1915; Greenhous, 186-188. 
30 Greenhous, 188-189. 
31 Greenhous, 188-189. 
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than the first.32  It seems regular troops did not understand why they had been held back, 
as Jones remarked, “We of the First Canadian Cavalry Brigade were held back.  Why, I 
don’t know.  But General Seely knew, and we trusted him.”33  However, RCD officers 
had a better understanding of the nature of the attack.  According to Nordheimer, the 
RCD would have been destroyed as a regiment if this “suicidal” assault had taken place.34   
On 25 September, the CCB supported the 2nd Canadian Division’s attack at Loos 
but did not fight in the engagement.35  The CCB was ordered to distract the enemy from 
the main offensive by simulating a gas attack on La Petite Douve Farm, lighting smoke 
sacks and smoke bombs and throwing them towards the enemy line.  On 24 September, 
the CCB prepared bags of straw soaked in coal oil36 for the offensive.  At 5:54am the 
next morning, the LSH, 2nd KEH, and several other battalions of the 2nd Canadian 
Division ignited the bags and threw them over the trench walls across a 10,000-yard 
front, creating a dense black smoke that covered the onset of an artillery and machine gun 
assault on the enemy lines.37  According to Nicholson, heavy winds kept these decoys 
from being effective enough to force the enemy into battle, but they did distract from the 
main offensive and provoked a German artillery barrage and gas alarm.  Unfortunately, 
while the decoy action kept the enemy forces from realizing exactly where the British 
offensive was being launched, the offensive itself was a failure.38  
                                                          
32 John Edward Bernard Seely, Adventure (London: W. Heinemann Ltd, 1932), 223. 
33 Jones, 77. 
34 RCDMA Nordheimer File.  Roy Nordheimer, “Reminiscences,” The Goat, August 1929. 
35 War Diary, 1H, September 1915, Appendix XIX.  2nd Canadian Division Order No. 3, 24 September 
1915. 
36 In the 2nd King Edward’s Horse War Diary, these bags of straw were referred to as “smoke sacks.”  See 
War Diary, 2nd King Edward’s Horse (KEH), 25 September 1915. 
37 War Diary, KEH, 25 September 1915; War Diary, LSH, 25 September 1915. 
38 The 1st Hussars were stationed at the front to participate in this action as cavalry.  See below.  Nicholson, 
121. 
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Working Parties, June-December 1915 
Although the CCB had been sent to the Western Front to fight as infantry, the 
Brigade spent the majority of its tour participating in standard rear-area activities typical 
of the mounted arm.  Much of the time was spent in working parties with the 1st Canadian 
Divisional Engineers beginning in June 1915.39  Squadrons from each regiment took turns 
in the trenches in regular rotations, often spending four days in the front lines, four days 
in support trenches, and then moved into reserve for four days.  For example, the CCB 
proceeded to Guincy on 9 June, where the RCD went into billets and “A” and “C” 
Squadrons of LSH were sent to reserve trenches, while “B” Squadron was sent to the 
dugouts and later formed a fatigue party.  They carried barbed wire and ammunition to 
the front lines, and helped an engineering party set up wire defences around block 
houses.40  The following day, “B” Squadron carried sand bags to the front line trenches.41   
The CCB continued this way for the remainder of 1915.  Squadrons were assigned 
to various tasks, filling in when and where they were needed until relieved.  Detachments 
from the CCB were often sent to form carrying parties, bringing ammunition and supplies 
such as wire and lumber to the front lines.  While in working parties, the Brigade was 
responsible for such duties as road repair, surveying front-line trenches, digging new 
trenches, setting up wire defences, establishing telephone communications, constructing 
new dug-outs and communication trenches, and connecting new fortifications with other 
trenches.  The CCB was also responsible for improving existing fortifications by 
widening trenches, cementing communication trenches, establishing marking posts, and 
constructing machine gun nests.  In October and November, the CCB helped to construct 
                                                          
39 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 11.  Routine Orders, 24 July 1915. 
40 War Diary, LSH, 9 June 1915. 
41 War Diary, LSH, 10 June 1915. 
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a drainage system in the trenches in the Kemmel area.  New and improved defences often 
took the name of the CCB regiments responsible for their construction, such as “Cavalry 
Trench” and “Strathcona Walk,” “Dragoon Alley,” “Nellis Walk,” and “KEH Terrace. ”42  
As Jones remarked, “Go anywhere in France you may where we as infantrymen have 
been, and you will find the handi-work of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade.”43  In total, the 
RCD and LSH and spent 189 days performing these duties in working parties between 
May and December 1915.44   
While working party duties were far from glamorous, they were just as important 
as fighting in the front lines.  Reserve activities seemed an appropriate fit for the CCB, as 
the Brigade had not been properly trained as infantry.  Similarly, cavalry often spent 
much of their time filling various roles while waiting in reserve, thus working party 
duties were well suited to their official role.  Reserve work also carried its own dangers, 
as the CCB typically remained only three kilometres from the trenches and frequently 
came under enemy fire.45  For example, LSH came under heavy shellfire in working 
parties on 21 June and suffered two casualties.46   
                                                          
42 Oxford University, Nuffield College Library (OxNCL).  Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section 
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The CCB did participate in other work typical of cavalry while at the front, 
though it was performed dismounted.  For example, traffic control work was added to the 
Brigade’s duties on 25 July.  The CCB was instructed to establish traffic control posts at 
Hyde Park Corner, where civilians and military personnel from outside the 1st Canadian 
Division required signed passes to cross through the area.  Horse-drawn vehicles were not 
permitted to pass beyond Hyde Park Corner, and motor vehicles were to pass at slow 
speeds.47  Similarly, dismounted reconnaissance patrols were frequently conducted while 
in the trenches and in reserve.48  Small sections were sent out as patrol and ration parties, 
while others were employed as at listening posts. 49  As Andrew Iarocci has argued, “The 
troops actively applied their scouting and reconnaissance skills to these minor incursions.  
It was the sort of work that suited cavalrymen.”50  
While occupying the front-line trenches, the CCB was most often employed as 
sentries as opposed to fighting infantrymen.51  Like cavalry outposts, sentries were 
required to constantly observe the front line, and immediately report unusual activity to 
their Section Commander.  Special attention was to be given to signs of enemy 
movement, such as digging, light signals, and especially gunfire.  At all times, every man 
was required to know how many men were in his trench, the names of significant local 
landmarks, the distance to the German trenches, and designated points in the enemy line.  
Within their own trench, they were required to know the locations of all listening posts, 
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48 Greenhous, 188-192; War Diary, LSH, 28 May-3 June 1915. 
49 War Diary, LSH, 1-15 August 1915. 
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ammunition reserves, and the gas alarm bell.  The CCB spent a total of 146 days in front-
line or reserve trenches.52  
Along with their infantry and working party duties, the CCB continued with 
training and lectures throughout 1915.  Tactical exercises were part of weekly training, 
along with bayonet and machine gun training.53  The CCB was also given special 
instructions on how to handle a poisonous gas attack.  Gas masks and a respirator were 
issued to each man, and were to be carried at all times.54  Special training courses were 
also available.  For example, members of the CCB were enrolled in Brigade Bombing 
School, as the nature of modern warfare had shown that “All troops, including cavalry 
acting dismounted, are at a grave disadvantage both in attack and defence unless they are 
skilled in the use of bombs and grenades.”55  Similarly, some members of the CCB were 
trained at a grenade school into October and November, as fighting experience continued 
to show that “every man should carry grenades and know how to use them.”56  In 
November, NCOs from the CCB began a training program devoted to musketry, machine 
gun use, and trench tactics.   Defending trench lines, attacking from entrenched positions, 
and attacking enemy trenches were focal points of the program.  Proper trench digging, 
sandbagging, and wiring were also included in instructions.57   
While at the Front, the CCB experienced the same living conditions as the 
infantry.  According to W.L. Falconer and F.W. Powell, trench life began to take its toll 
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on the CCB due to the constant presence of lice and irregular bathing.58  Jones described 
soldiers burning off body lice with candles.  He stated, “There has been no time during 
our stay in France, except when on leave, that we have been free of vermin.”59  Men often 
passed time in the trenches by conducting “lice races,” wherein parasites were raced 
along pieces of thread.60  Clothing infested with lice had to be disinfected with steam or 
boiled as soon as possible.  If these means were not available, clothing was to be taken 
outside the trenches, turned inside out, beaten clean, and then ironed.  A final option was 
the application of paraffin or petrol.61  Troops had to bathe as soon as possible after a tour 
in the trenches and change into clean clothing.62  While in billets, efforts were made to 
keep conditions as sanitary as possible.  Clean drinking water had to be acquired from 
water stations and boiled before it was drunk.  Other water supplies were often 
contaminated with sewage.63  Latrines had to be dug, while tins were used for urine and 
emptied into urine pits as soon as possible.  When leaving billets, the area had to be left 
completely clean, with all latrines filled in and papers burnt.64   
By late November, the weather turned cold and wet, making working conditions 
harsh and severe.  Men were given some days off to stay indoors and dry their clothing 
before returning to work.65  Because of the increasingly cool temperatures and wet 
weather, troops experienced worsening conditions in the trenches.  Extra flannel shirts 
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were issued in late November due to a shortage of woollen vests.66  The men of the CCB 
were encouraged to participate in light exercise when possible to maintain circulation, 
and extra socks had to be packed to keep feet as dry as possible.67   
 The Debate Over Re-Mounting 
By November 1915, all members of the CCB were deeply concerned with their 
mounted status and the preservation of their regimental identities.68  The Brigade made 
the best of its time fighting as infantry, but Jones explained “all the time our natural 
longing and ambition was to be mounted again.”69  The question of remounting had also 
become a matter of practical concern due to the different size and organization of cavalry 
regiments.  Although fighting dismounted, the CCB was still organized as a cavalry 
brigade, comprised of three regiments of three squadrons each.  1915 infantry brigades 
were divided into four battalions of four companies each, and each company was much 
stronger than a cavalry squadron.  According to a report from the 2nd Army, “The system 
is cumbersome and unsuitable, and leads to many difficulties when these [cavalry] 
Brigades are employed to take over any portion of the line from the infantry.”70  
Organizational differences forced entire infantry sections to be adjusted, headquarters to 
be changed, and telephone systems to be reorganized.  These problems were exacerbated 
by an increase to the number of dismounted Canadian cavalry regiments.  The 1st and 2nd 
Canadian Mounted Rifles (CMR)71 were placed under Seely’s command in October and 
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November 1915 respectively, forming an ad-hoc dismounted cavalry unit with the CCB 
known as “Seely’s Force.”  Consequently, it was highly recommended that these 
regiments be remounted or reorganized as infantry brigades as soon as possible.72 
The question of remounting began to attract the interest of higher authorities.  On 
17 November 1915, Seely received a message from Canadian Governor-General, the 
Duke of Connaught that read, “I ask you to give a personal message to the Canadian 
Cavalry from me, assuring them of my constant interest in them, and of my pride as a 
Soldier for the good work they have done, and my confidence in them that they will 
continue their good work whether mounted or dismounted.”73  Thereafter, rumours began 
to circulate that the Canadian Cavalry Brigade would be broken up and spread throughout 
the Canadian Division as infantry drafts.74   
Concerned for the future of his Brigade, Seely drafted a letter on 22 November, 
explaining that the CCB had volunteered to fight dismounted on the Western Front with 
the understanding that this measure would be temporary.  It was promised that the CCB 
would eventually be re-mounted, that each regiment would be kept together, and that the 
Brigade would have its original horses returned.  Seely wrote:  
Although most anxious to serve where they were wanted, the men were 
naturally most anxious that they should not be permanently separated from 
their horses…They have done everything they have been asked to do 
bravely…this would seem to be an added reason for the redeeming a 
particularly binding promise given to them on high Official authority.75 
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Seely explained that the members of the CCB had volunteered to fight dismounted in an 
“emergency situation,” but had now been absent from mounted training for eight months.  
He stated “the men long for their horses, they know that the British Regular Cavalry are 
still being trained as Cavalry, and they have a real dread that when the time comes for 
Cavalry to be used they will be told that they have been so long off their horses that they 
are not fit to be used with the Mounted Arm.”76  Seely requested that the CCB be 
remounted so that the men might resume their cavalry training between their tours in the 
trenches.77 
Seely’s request was both reasonable and accommodating, as he was only asking 
that what had been promised to the CCB be fulfilled.  The remainder of the British 
Cavalry regiments had retained their mounted status, and would soon prepare for action 
in 1916.  It was also significant that Seely only requested that his Brigade be remounted 
to resume cavalry training.  He made it clear that the men of the CCB were more than 
willing to keep taking their turn in the trenches, so long as they could have their horses 
back and continue training as cavalry for the time when cavalry was needed.78   
Nonetheless, the CCB was still called upon to defend the front lines on 5 
December 1915.79  However, on 7 December, Arthur Currie80 ordered Seely’s Force to 
withdraw from the trenches by 14 December, one week earlier than expected, stating that 
the 1st and 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles recently placed under Seely’s command had not 
been properly trained or disciplined before embarking for the Front.  Currie reported that 
at least thirty percent of the men in the 1st and 2nd CMR would arrive late for working 
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party duties, and did not perform adequately as infantrymen.  Currie believed the root of 
these problems to be their training as mounted rifles instead of infantry.  He 
recommended that the 1st and 2nd CMR be re-organized and trained “without confusion as 
an infantry organization,” or should be removed from operations on the Western Front 
entirely.81  Consequently, Seely’s Force was disbanded on 10 December, and the 1st and 
2nd CMR were sent to be trained as infantry and were later reorganized into the 8th 
Infantry Brigade.82  Meanwhile, the CCB remained under Seely’s command and spent the 
rest of 1915 carrying on with working party and patrol work, and participated in a raid on 
Messines Road.83   
After a year of minimal gains and horrible losses on the Western Front, Sir John 
French was dismissed from his post as Commander in Chief of the British Army on 15 
December.  Douglas Haig was appointed in his place.84  Haig immediately began 
planning a combined offensive with the French at the Somme for July 1916.  Resources 
were built up and armies expanded to prepare for the assault.  Although the existing 
cavalry divisions did not increase in size, Haig did envision a substantial role for the 
mounted arm at the Somme.  As a result, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was re-mounted 
in January 1916 in anticipation of the Somme offensive instead of being converted into 
infantry.   
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Divisional Cavalry in 1915 
Unlike their compatriots in the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, the 1st and 2nd 
Canadian Divisional Cavalry Regiments remained mounted throughout 1915.  As the 1st 
Divisional Cavalry Squadron, the men of the 19th Alberta Dragoons got off to a fast start 
in their intended role.  After arriving in France on 11 February, they received their first 
call to action on 21 February, supplying one officer and three other ranks as mounted 
guards at a refilling station for supply wagons for five days.  On 3 March, the 19AD left 
billets for active service to the village of Epinette Estaires.  Two days later, twelve 19AD 
patrols of one officer and four other ranks each were sent out to assess the ground 
conditions between the billeting section and the Canadian front.  Patrol work along area 
roads began on 9 March.85    
The 19AD was called to participate in an offensive within one month of arriving 
at the Front.  On 10 March, the First British Army launched an offensive at Neuve 
Chapelle with forty-eight battalions.86  Haig believed that this was an opportune time to 
attack, as the Germans had only three battalions guarding this location, with fewer than 
four battalions in reserve.87  Four Indian divisions were to advance to Aubers Ridge, 
while the 1st Canadian Division launched an artillery barrage, and waited to advance if 
the Indian divisions were successful.88  Haig believed that “Quickness of movement is 
therefore of first importance to enable us to forestall the enemy and thereby gain success 
without severe loss, ”89 and thus he foresaw a role for mounted cavalry.  As the divisional 
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mounted troops for the 1st Canadian Division, the 19AD was ordered to take up arms at 
7:30am and move to a rendezvous point to the south of Sailly to await orders.90   
According to Nicholson, the British offensive was a tremendous success, as the 
infantry opened a 1600-yard gap in the enemy line within twenty minutes, and cleared the 
village of Neuve Chapelle by 9:00am.  However, the infantry was forced to halt at this 
position and await orders from the British High Command before continuing to advance.  
Orders took hours to reach the front lines, as telephone and telegraph lines had been 
destroyed by enemy bombardments and the infantry had advanced beyond them.  These 
orders also had to be passed on to each division, delaying the action further.  Orders to 
continue did not arrive until 2:50pm.  Corps commanders continued to delay their actions 
even after receiving official orders, each waiting on the others in the hope of launching a 
simultaneous advance.  By the time this was possible, it was 5:30pm, and the enemy 
infantry had reinforced their lines.  Consequently, the 19AD waited in position until 
5:30pm but did not advance because delays and indecision resulted in the loss of 
opportunity.91   
Although the 19AD had no opportunity to advance in an offensive, the regiment 
was kept busy in its Divisional Cavalry role.  Patrol work and reconnaissance continued 
through the spring, and new duties were added as necessary.  For example, when the men 
of the 19AD moved to new billets near Brielen in Belgium on 20 April, they came in 
close proximity to the northern Ypres front.  They were required to serve as mounted 
escorts for the infantry during the coming offensive.  Because of the dangers of 
transporting troops to the front, infantry often had to be brought up at night, so cavalry 
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had to be able to reconnoitre the ground in daylight or in darkness.  On 20 April, the 
19AD sent mounted patrols to areas near the front, including a road by a pontoon bridge 
one mile north of Ypres.  On 22 April, the 19AD guided the 2nd Battalion to the front 
lines at 10:00pm.  Cavalry was of vital importance in this role, as infantry could easily 
get lost on the way to the trenches, particularly while advancing at night.  Guides were 
necessary who knew the way forward, were familiar with the terrain, and knew the safest 
routes, as the enemy was aware of many roads and pathways used to bring infantry and 
supplies to the front, and shelled them regularly.  Mounted reconnaissance was the most 
efficient way to collect information about these areas and to guide infantry to their 
position. 92    
Aside from conducting reconnaissance patrols through the St. Jean, Wieltje, 
Boesinghe, Elverdinghe, and Vlamertinghe areas, the 19AD was able to perform several 
other duties traditionally expected of the mounted arm at Ypres.  For example, Divisional 
cavalrymen were in charge of rounding up displaced soldiers, as infantry troops were 
frequently separated from their units during offensives, and sometimes needed assistance 
navigating their way back to their regiment.  Once found, 19AD patrols would guide 
stray infantry troops back to 1st and 2nd Brigade Headquarters in St. Jean.  Similarly, 
19AD detachments were continually sent out to guide reinforcements to the front lines.  
The regiment conducted traffic control in the Ypres-Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe areas 
as the infantry and artillery came to and from the front lines.  The regiment was also 
responsible for collecting information on area terrain and reporting on road conditions for 
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troop transport.93  The 19AD also sustained casualties conducting this work so close to 
the front lines, as one man and seven horses were wounded by shrapnel on 24 April.94   
After being relieved from their duties at Ypres on 3 May, the 19th Alberta 
Dragoons spent two weeks training in reserve.  On 16 May, the 19AD received orders to 
stand to at 9:00am as the 1st Canadian Division were going into action at Festubert.  
However, the infantry engagement was unsuccessful, and the 19AD was excused the 
following day.95  On 29 May, the regiment carried on in its Divisional Cavalry role, 
clearing the 1st Canadian Divisional area of scattered arms and burying the dead.96   
Divisional cavalry work carried on throughout the summer.  Daily and nightly 
reconnaissance patrols were sent out in the 1st Divisional area, and thorough 
reconnaissance of local roads was often required.  At different times, the 19AD was 
responsible for observing the enemy’s movements at night, and acted as escorts and 
trench guides.  Traffic control duties were carried out in detachments as needed.  For 
example, on 1 June, two troops of the 19AD were sent to work as traffic controllers 
during H.H. Asquith’s visit to the front.97  
Despite their daily role as reconnaissance patrollers, the 19AD still had spare 
detachments available to perform other reserve duties.  19AD troops formed their first 
working party on 8 July and helped to dig reserve trenches near Hill 63.  The regiment 
continued with working party duties for the remainder of the month while carrying on 
with their Corps Cavalry role in the 1st Divisional area.  The 19AD also conducted 
                                                          
93 War Diary, 19AD, 22 April-3 May 1915. 
94 War Diary, 19AD, 24 April 1915. 
95 Nicholson, 98-99. 
96 War Diary, 19AD, 4-31 May 1915. 
97 War Diary, 19AD, 4 May-31 August 1915. 
 106
regular mounted drills while taking on these extra duties to keep fit and ready to fight as 
cavalry whenever the opportunity should arise.98   
While regular patrol and reconnaissance work continued through August, working 
party duties took precedence over mounted work through much of August and 
September.  By October, the regiment focused again on mounted squadron training and 
did not form a working party again until mid-November.  Work on Hill 63 continued 
through December 1915, along with other minor detachment working party duties.  Like 
the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, the 19AD often performed working party duties with field 
companies of the Canadian Engineers.99 
The 1st Hussars had a similar experience on the Western Front in 1915 as the 2nd 
Divisional Cavalry, though they arrived at the front much later than the other Canadian 
Cavalry regiments.  The 1st Hussars arrived in billets on 20 September near Westoutre, 
Belgium, taking over for “B” Squadron of the Surrey Yeomanry Divisional Cavalry for 
the 28th Division.100  The 2nd Divisional Cyclists were also grouped together with the 2nd 
Divisional Cavalry as a body of “mounted troops.”  The change increased the number of 
men under Leonard’s command from 161 to 366.101  They settled comfortably into three 
farms very close to the front lines.102  All were quite pleased to finally be part of the 
action, as Leonard wrote to his mother: “We are all very well and in good spirits…[We] 
can hardly realize we are so close to ‘the show’ that we have been preparing for so 
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long.”103  According to Leonard, Ypres could be seen in the distance from the cavalry’s 
headquarters, close enough to feel frequent enemy barrages.  As Leonard described it, 
“Artillery fire rattles every window in this old house…it was a continual jiggle nearly all 
night.”104   
The 1st Hussars began Divisional Cavalry work immediately upon arriving at the 
front.  From 21 September until 1 October, the 1H reconnoitred and mapped the second 
and third line of General Headquarters (GHQ) trenches, as Divisional Cavalry was 
required to act as dispatch riders and escorts for the infantry.  These duties necessitated 
familiarity with the area terrain and thorough knowledge of the most strategic and safe 
routes to the front line that would limit the infantry’s visibility and exposure to enemy 
fire.105  The area survey required the participation of four troops, each consisting of one 
officer, six NCOs, two scouts, and a small number of privates.  Each troop was allotted a 
specific section of the front, and was required to produce sketch maps of their section and 
detail on the most strategic approach to the front line.  Sketches were to provide detailed 
information on the locations and conditions of the roads, and details on which sections 
were exposed to the enemy.  These sketches also had to include information on the 
location and availability of water, suitable locations for collecting points for infantry 
troops, brigade headquarters, battalion headquarters, field ambulance, machine gun 
emplacements, fortified points, and buildings available for storing supplies.   Reports 
were expected on the conditions of the trenches, wire entanglements, fields of fire, and 
the distance between front line and support trenches.  The survey took place both at night 
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and during the day to enable cavalry guides to find the best approaches to any point in 
these trench lines at any time and under any conditions.106  According to Leonard, each 
patrol returned late in the afternoon and officers compared notes.107   
The regiment soon discovered the importance of thoroughly reconnoitering a safe 
route to the front lines, as patrols came under close shellfire on their second day at the 
front.  Leonard stated, “We stopped at first but I suppose we will get used to it.”108  On 24 
September, the 1H came under artillery fire again, and was kept awake by a heavy 
artillery barrage all night.109  As Leonard described it, “Star shell[s] are going up 
constantly and rifle fire almost continuously, but [we are] perfectly safe if one keeps to 
certain marked routes under cover.”110 
In addition to the immediate start of their Divisional Cavalry role, the 1st Hussars 
received its first call to action within five days of arriving at the front in what was 
intended to be the first British mounted offensive of the Great War.111  After a long year 
of fighting filled with disappointments, an Allied offensive was planned at Loos for 25 
September 1915.  The French would launch an attack with seventeen divisions to the 
north of Arras, while Douglas Haig’s First Army112 would attack Loos with six divisions 
across a four-and-a-half-mile front between Lens and La Bassée.  Once the German line 
was broken, the British cavalry would advance to Haute Deûle Canal.113  As the 2nd 
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Canadian Divisional Cavalry, the 1st Hussars was to remain in reserve, ready to move to 
the front at one hour’s notice while the 2nd Canadian Division114 faked a gas attack La 
Petite Douve Farm.  Late in the afternoon, the 1H was told that the advance had been a 
success with few losses.  However, just as the 19AD had experienced at Neuve Chapelle 
in March, the order to advance was never issued, and the cavalry were sent back to their 
billets.115   
The British did make some substantial gains at Loos, including Hill 70 to the 
north of Lens.  However, French delayed sending reinforcements and the cavalry 
forward.  By the time the offensive was renewed, the Germans had reinforced and the 
British infantry were unsuccessful.116  The cavalry remained in reserve, or went to fight 
as infantry to support the attack.  In this instance, the delay to the cavalry attack was 
fortunate, as ground conditions were poor and British artillery support was lacking, thus 
enemy wire and deep defences had not been destroyed.  However, what happened at Loos 
and Neuve Chapelle would set the tone for cavalry operations through 1916.  The role of 
cavalry would depend upon the success of the infantry, and the decision to send the 
mounted force forward would rest with General Headquarters, which was too far from the 
front to make an informed and decisive decision in time to exploit the success of the 
infantry.  Orders for the cavalry to advance were always subject to communication 
problems.  Often, orders took too long to reach the mounted forces to be relevant, as 
enemy troops often had time to reinforce their positions before infantry gains could be 
exploited.117 
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While there was no opportunity to use cavalry in battle in 1915, the men of the 1st 
Hussars were kept busy in their Divisional Cavalry role for the remainder of the year.  
They were continuously engaged in mounted patrol work, trench mapping, assisting 
divisional engineers, classifying water supply, artillery reconnaissance, and stretcher 
bearing.118  Reconnaissance work and various other patrolling jobs continued through the 
remainder of the month.  On 27 September, Leonard and his second in command, Major 
Cuthbert Finnie McEwen, rode through Westouter to investigate a “suspicious light.”119  
Leonard continued his observation patrols through 29 September, spending the morning 
reconnoitering the defences of a strong hill with two officers,120 and spent the afternoon 
reviewing area maps and enemy positions, entering information on the German line 
wherever possible.121  On 30 September, Leonard rode to Ypres where he got his first 
look at the devastation caused by enemy artillery.  He wrote to his sister Alice that he was 
“almost heartbroken” by the devastation and destruction he saw in the historic town.   As 
he described it, “Beautiful buildings centuries old [have been] wantonly destroyed…[I] 
Saw one house with [the] front blown off…very old churches in ruins.  I tell you it is 
terrible to contemplate.”122   
On 4 October, the 1st Hussars took over as frontier guards at the Belgian-French 
border, along with ninety men from the cyclist battalion.123  Each Troop of the 1H rotated 
turns on frontier guard duty.  The regiment also took over patrol work for sections of the 
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GHQ second line trenches on 5 October.124  Reconnaissance rides began immediately 
examine the new area, and continued throughout the month to ensure road safety and 
familiarity with new sections of front.125  On 23 October, Leonard ordered general survey 
of the GHQ second and third line trenches.  Full reports were sent to the General Staff of 
the 2nd Canadian Division.126   
While in reserve, resting members participated in daily exercise rides from 
6:30am to 8:00am, and spent the remainder of their time keeping fit and caring for their 
horses.127  The 1st Hussars enjoyed very good weather until late October.  By the time the 
weather turned cold and rainy in November, all of the 1H horses were comfortably 
sheltered, and even had floors constructed in their stables from bricks reused from ruined 
villages to keep their feet from sticking and freezing in mud.128  However, ground 
conditions were still of concern in early November.  Care had to be taken to perform the 
daily exercise rides on roads that were not too slick with mud.129  As autumn progressed, 
the weather and ground conditions got steadily worse.  Mud covered many of the nearby 
roads, often coming up to the horse’s knees, as Leonard wrote to his father: “[I] got into 
one where I am sure the much was up to my horses belly, in fact I was afraid once or 
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twice that he would not get through it.”130  Although the whether turned terribly cold in 
late November, it froze the mud and made riding much easier.131   
Fortunately, the 1st Hussars lived in relative comfort compared to their comrades 
in the front-line trenches.  As Leonard wrote to his mother, “We are most comfortable 
here and are living fat off the land so to speak.”132  He noted that their meals were usually 
very good, consisting of soup, coffee, and nuts.133  All members of the regiment were 
able to take a hot bath and were issued clean underclothing once a week.134  Leonard 
explained that the men kept warm quite easily so long as they were able to stay dry.135  
Despite the mud and cold, Divisional Cavalry work continued.  Much of 
November was spent performing reconnaissance rides and surveying the area, and using 
the newly collected information to plot new maps.136  On 1 November, patrol rides were 
sent to survey and map the uncharted areas around the second and third line trenches for 
the Canadian Corps.  These rides continued over the next week until the maps and reports 
on area conditions were complete and submitted to headquarters.137  On 5 November, 
Leonard ordered road reconnaissance to evaluate which roads were unusable in wet 
weather.138  Information collected during these reconnaissance rides were used to draw 
new maps of the surrounding area, filling the gaps in existing records.  The 1st Hussars 
also began a survey of the wells available in the 2nd Canadian Division’s area, with 
                                                          
130 1HMA Leonard Collection No. 0407511 IL.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Father, 5 November 
1915. 
131 1HMA Leonard Collection No. 0407511 IL.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 28 
November 1915. 
132 Leonard to Mother, 11 October 1915. 
133 Leonard to Alice, 2 October 1915. 
134 Leonard to Father, 16 October 1915. 
135 Leonard to Mother, 28 November 1915. 
136 Leonard, 1915 Diary, 1-30 November 1915. 
137 War Diary, 1H, 1-10 November 1915. 
138 Leonard to Mother, 5 November 1915. 
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reports were completed and submitted on 25 November.  Reconnaissance rides took place 
regularly over six areas to determine the safety and conditions of infantry routes to the 
front lines.139   
Despite the value and necessity of Divisional Cavalry work, frontier guard duty 
and patrol work were dull through the winter months.  As Leonard described it, “Things 
are very quiet and the arrival of the mail bag about noon is the event of the day.”140  
However, the Divisional Cavalry’s work and their position at the front still continued to 
carry its own dangers.  For example, on 19 December, the 1H awoke to a terrific 
bombardment at 5:00am.  The Germans released a tremendous amount of gas at Ypres, 
and an eight-mile wind carried it to the cavalry’s downwind position.  As Leonard 
explained “While lying wondering what it was, [I] smelt the gas coming in the open 
window by my bed…Some men were quite sick at stomach and there was a rush for gas 
helmets.”141  The gas attack affected half of the cavalry regiment.142  Fortunately, no 
casualties were inflicted and the men of the 1H were able to go about their regular 
business for the remainder of the day.143 
Like the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, all members of the 1st Hussars were 
concerned with the preservation of their regimental identity in late 1915, as they were 
operating under the name of “2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron,” and were sometimes 
referred to as the 7th Canadian Mounted Rifles from which they were recruited.  On 2 
November, Leonard visited General Headquarters to request that the regiment be 
                                                          
139 1HMA Leonard Collection No. 0407511 IL.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 10 
November 1915; War Diary, 1H, 23-26 November 1915. 
140 1HMA Leonard Collection No. 0407511 IL.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 12 
November 1915. 
141 1HMA Leonard Collection No. 0407512 IL.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 19 
December 1915. 
142 War Diary, 1H, 19 December 1915. 
143 Leonard to Mother, 19 December 1915. 
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reassigned to their original militia identity and be renamed the Special Services 
Squadron, 1st Hussars.  As he explained to his father, “We are being continually mixed up 
with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the Mounted Rifle Brigades and are not 
particularly anxious to retain our identity with [the] 7th CMR which is now really 
defunct.”144  Leonard resolved to use his influence with Colonel Abbott to see that this 
was done.145  On 31 January 1916, the 2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron was officially re-
named the Special Services Squadron, 1st Hussars.146   
Conclusion 
Although serving their first eight months on the Western Front as infantry was not 
the intended role of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, it helped to familiarize the Brigade 
with the nature of trench warfare.  Despite the obvious limitations for cavalry, all ranks 
were still anxious to be remounted, and anticipated a return to mobility.  Meanwhile, all 
were willing to fight dismounted when necessary and serve where they were needed, a 
clear reflection of the versatility the mounted arm could offer.  Their experience as 
infantry on the Western Front would better prepare the Canadian Cavalry Brigade for 
what they would face as a mounted unit in 1916.  While there was no role for Canadian 
Cavalry in operations in 1915, the 19th Alberta Dragoons and the 1st Hussars were able to 
execute the responsibilities of Divisional Cavalry exactly as expected according to British 
cavalry doctrine.  Rear-area duties such as reconnaissance, escort duties, and traffic 
control were essential to operations at the front.  Cavalry was indispensable in this role 
because a mobile force could carry them out much more efficiently and effectively than 
                                                          
144 Leonard to Father, 5 November 1915, 1. 
145 Leonard to Father, 5 November 1915, 1.  
146 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3991, Folder 12, File 3.  Daily Orders No. 8, First Canadian Hussars, Special 
Service Squadron, 14 February 1916. 
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infantry.  Mounted troops were capable of covering longer distances and larger areas 
without exhausting men or resources.  The invaluable role played by the Canadian 
Divisional Cavalry regiments on the Western Front in 1915 provided a clear indication of 
what the mounted arm was still capable of despite the realities of modern warfare. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
Remounting, Reorganization, and The Somme, 1916 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade and Canadian Divisional Cavalry 
 
 
Introduction 
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was remounted in January 1916 in anticipation of 
a mass cavalry breakthrough at the Somme, scheduled to open on 1 July.1  Unfortunately, 
the mounted arm suffered another year of disappointments, as there were few 
opportunities to employ a mobile force on the stagnant Western Front in 1916.  
Consequently, the presence of cavalry at the Somme has only recently been properly 
addressed by David Kenyon and Stephen Badsey.2  The 2nd Indian Cavalry Division saw 
action at High Wood on 14 July, with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade among them.  
Although cavalry did not play a significant role in operations in 1916, the advance at 
High Wood demonstrated that the mounted arm was capable of operating on the Western 
Front without suffering heavy casualties or being slowed by impassable terrain.  
However, this was not their experience at the Somme in September 1916.  Both the CCB 
and the Canadian Divisional Cavalry Regiments were unable to advance at Flers-
Courcelette due to poor ground conditions, although the Divisional Cavalry still carried 
out effective reconnaissance. 
While cavalry was not tactically effective in 1916, the training and organization 
of the mounted arm revealed the first signs of a shift in operational thinking regarding the 
                                                          
1 The Battle of the Somme was planned by the British and French high commands during the winter of 
1915-1916.  It was intended to be a coordinated offensive led by the French.  However, the German attack 
on Verdun in February 1916 consumed French resources, leaving the British largely to their own devices at 
the Somme with some French support.  See Roy A. Prete, “Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study 
in Allied Military Planning,” The Journal of Military History, Volume 73, April 2009, 417-448.  
2 David Kenyon’s recent work has focused on the operational role of the Indian Cavalry at the Somme, and 
has dispelled many of the previous misconceptions about the cavalry’s inability to advance because they 
were stuck in mud.  See Kenyon, Indian Cavalry. 
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size and scope of cavalry action.  Although a large-scale cavalry breakthrough was 
planned for the Somme, it was becoming accepted that cavalry exploitation was more 
likely to take place on a smaller scale.  High Wood was the first engagement in which the 
CCB fought as cavalry on the Western Front, and it was also the first of several small 
cavalry actions that would take place through the remainder of the Great War.  Plans for 
the employment of cavalry on a smaller scale were beginning to be introduced in 1916. 
Organizational Changes 
Between December 1915 and throughout 1916, the British government debated 
the future use of cavalry on the Western Front.  Many advocated a reduction in the size of 
the mounted arm due to the limitations of trench warfare, and the strain that cavalry was 
seen to place on resources.3  Faced with this political pressure but determined to preserve 
the strength of the mounted arm, Haig divided the Cavalry Corps on 3 March 1916.  He 
attached one cavalry division to each of the four British Armies.4  As Badsey noted, Haig 
had to adapt cavalry tactics to fit with this organizational change, as it prevented all five 
Cavalry Divisions from fighting together to achieve the desired mass cavalry 
breakthrough.  Instead, mounted troops were to provide regional support for infantry 
operations, exploiting gaps quickly as soon as they opened on a smaller and more 
localized scale.5  Although Haig remained committed to his vision for a mass cavalry 
breakthrough throughout the Great War, these adjustments were better suited to 
conditions on the Western Front, as a mass cavalry breakthrough was highly unlikely 
given the circumstances in 1916. 
                                                          
3 However, as Badsey has made clear, these claims have been greatly exaggerated.  For example, of the 
1,248,323 horses and mules that the BEF purchased during the Great War, only 174,665 were riding horses.  
See Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 268-269. 
4 David Kenyon, Indian Cavalry, 38.  
5 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 268-271. 
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The Canadian Cavalry Brigade experienced its own organizational changes in the 
winter of 1916.  On 3 January, Seely addressed his troops at 12:30pm to inform them that 
they would be remounting.  This announcement was greeted with great enthusiasm, as 
most cavalrymen felt their value was wasted fighting as infantry or forming working 
parties.6  The CCB became part of the 1st Indian Cavalry Division on 26 January 1916.7  
Also in January 1916, the 2nd King Edward’s Horse left the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
and was replaced by the Fort Garry Horse8 from Winnipeg.  The members of the Royal 
Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona’s Horse were sorry to see the 2nd King Edward’s 
Horse leave the CCB, and expressed their appreciation for their work and their best 
wishes for the regiment in the future.9  However, all were happy to have a Canadian 
Cavalry regiment join them, particularly since the FGH had spent 1915 as a Depot 
Cavalry Regiment at Shorncliffe and had reinforced the CCB as needed. Meanwhile, the 
FGH had spent much of its time at the Cavalry Depot training as mounted cavalry and 
caring for the horses left behind by CCB.10   
The Canadian Divisional Cavalry regiments also faced organizational changes in 
1916.  The 19th Alberta Dragoons and the 1st Hussars carried on with training and 
                                                          
6 War Diary, LSH, 3 January 1916; Jones, 94-95. 
7 DHH, Edwin Pye Fonds, 74/672.  Series VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, File 1.  Notes Regarding Seely’s 
Detachment, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 1st and 2nd C.M.R. Brigades, and Seely’s Force. 
8  The Fort Garry Horse was the youngest and least experienced Canadian Cavalry Brigade regiment.  
Although they were founded in 1912 as the 34th Regiment of Cavalry, the Fort Garry Horse began the Great 
War as infantry.  They arrived at Valcartier on 10 August 1914 as the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the 6th 
Battalion.   They embarked for England aboard the S.S. Lapland on 6 October, arriving in Plymouth on 14 
October.  They proceeded to Salisbury Plain and arrived on 17 October.  However, in January 1915, the 6th 
Battalion was reorganized, and the FGH became a mounted unit once more.  They were reformed as a 
depot cavalry regiment meant to reinforce the CCB, and were placed under the leadership of Lieutenant 
Colonel Paterson.  See Fort Garry Horse Museum and Archive (FGHMA) J.M. Dunwoody Diary, 1 
January-1 May 1915; Lord Strathcona’s Horse Museum and Archive (LSHMA) Depot Historic Report, 
November 1914-February 1917; War Diary, Fort Garry Horse (FGH), 27 September 1914-1 March 1916. 
9 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3986, Folder 8, File 1.  Routine Orders No. 49, Departure of 2nd King Edward’s 
Horse, 15 January 1916. 
10 Marteinson & Service, 9-11. 
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Divisional Cavalry work until mid-May11 when the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisional Cavalry 
Squadrons were merged into a single unit that would serve as the Divisional Cavalry for 
the entire Canadian Expeditionary Force.12  The Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment 
(CCCR) was officially formed on 19 May 1916 at Abeele in Belgium under the command 
of Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Elmsley of the RCD.13  The 19th Alberta Dragoons became 
“A” Squadron of the Squadron of the CCCR, the 1st Hussars became “B” Squadron, and 
the 16th Light Horse14 became “C” Squadron.  Each squadron was divided into four 
troops and equipped with two Hotchkiss guns15 and one additional mounted machine 
gun.16  Although they had been amalgamated into a single force, all regiments retained 
their original militia identities and commanding officers, and all were allowed to wear 
their own regimental buttons, caps, and collar badges.17  As of 31 May 1916, the total 
strength of the CCCR numbered twenty officers and 479 other ranks.  Lieutenant Colonel 
                                                          
11 For example, the 1st Hussars surveyed the defences in the Scherpenburg area and mapped the defensive 
line.  They also reconnoitered and mapped The 2nd Army’s roads with full reports on road conditions by the 
end of January.  See Appendix V for graph of 19AD, 1H, and CCCR duties in 1916.  1HMA Leonard 
Collection No. 04076-IL.  Ibbotson Leonard, 1916 Diary, 1 January-10 May 1916; War Diary, 19AD, 1 
January-31 May 1916; War Diary, 1H, 1 January-20 May 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3991, Folder 12, 
File 3.  Daily Orders No. 20, First Canadian Hussars, Special Service Squadron, 14 May 1916; LAC RG9 
III C2 Vol. 3991, Folder 12, File 3.  Daily Orders No. 22, First Canadian Hussars, Special Service 
Squadron, 22 May 1916. 
12 Leonard, 1916 Diary, 5 May. 
13 War Diary, Canadian Light Horse (CLH), 12-31 May 1916; War Diary, CLH, May 1916, Appendix II.  
Canadian Corps A-29-59.  Orders from Lieutenant Colonel W.B. Anderson, 12 May 1916. 
14 The 16th Light Horse was the Divisional Cavalry Squadron for the 3rd Canadian Division.  The Regiment 
mobilized on 18 December 1915 and was recruited in Regina and surrounding areas in Saskatchewan.  The 
majority of recruits were selected from the 10th Canadian Mounted Rifles.  They embarked for England on 
22 January 1916, and arrived in France on 7 April.  They spent six weeks working as the 3rd Divisional 
Cavalry Squadron before the CCCR was formed on 19 May.  See DHH Edwin Pye Fonds, 74/672 Series 
VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, File 1.  3rd Canadian Divisional Cavalry, Service Squadron 16th Light Horse. 
15 Mobile machine gun designed for use with cavalry.  See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 3, File 15.  
Capt. H.M. Campbell, CLH, Lecture on the Tactical Use of the Hotchkiss Gun, 23 January 1918. 
16 Stirrett, 10. 
17 Lieutenant Colonel F.C. Jamieson retained command of the 19th Alberta Dragoons, Leonard retained 
command of the 1st Hussars, and Sandford Fleming Smith retained command of the 16th Light Horse.  
However, the 2nd Divisional Cyclists under Leonard’s command were separated from the cavalry 
reorganized into the Corps Cyclist Company on 14 May and placed under the command of Major 
McMillan of the RCD.  By 31 May, the Hussars total strength numbered 163. 
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Charles Turner Van Straubenzee of the RCD took command of the CCCR on 26 June in 
place of J.H. Elmsley.18   
Training for the Somme – Canadian Cavalry Brigade, January-June 1916 
The CCB arrived at Friaucourt for training on 26 January 1916.19  The men of the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade were finally reunited with their horses on 31 January, when 
250 of their old mounts arrived from England, and the remainder slowly arrived through 
February and March.20  According to Nordheimer, all were immensely grateful to have 
their horses back and to have left the trenches behind for the moment.21  Similarly, Jones 
remarked that all members of the CCB were thrilled to be remounted, and immediately 
set about trying to find their old horses from training in England.  He stated “If a boy 
found his old horse he was not long in applying to his commanding officer for the 
possession of his old friend, a request that was never refused.  I was not fortunate enough 
to find my old horse…and envied the men who did receive their old mounts.”22  Those 
who were unable to find their previous horse were allowed to select a new mount in order 
of seniority.  However, Jones acquired his new mount from a friend and fellow Royal 
Canadian Dragoon, Jack Hind.  Jones claimed that Hind became disenchanted with his 
                                                          
18 Leonard, 1916 Diary, 8 May-1 June 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 2, File 14.  CLH 963/1 
Memo from Ibbotson Leonard to Officer i/c Canadian War Records, 23 June 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 
3988, Folder 2, File 15.  C.LH. 994/1 Memo from Ibbotson Leonard to Camp Commandant, Canadian 
Corps, 28 June 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3991, Folder 12, File 3.  Daily Orders No. 22 (2), First 
Canadian Hussars, Special Service Squadron, 31 May 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 13, File 1.  
Nominal Roll: Officers of Divisional Mounted Troops; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 13, File 1.  
Services and Qualifications of Officers and Other Ranks on Headquarters Staff, CCCR; LAC RG9 III C2 
Vol. 3992, Folder 13, File 1.  Canadian Corps A-29-59, 12 May 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 
13, File 1.  Recommendations to Lt. Col. J.H. Elmsley, Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, 18 May 1916; 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 13, File 1.  Canadian Corps A-29-59, Camp Commandant, Canadian 
Corps Cavalry regiment, 26 May 1916; War Diary, CLH, 12-31 May 1916; War Diary, CLH, June 1916, 
Appendix I.  Canadian Corps A-29-59.  Orders from Lieutenant Colonel W.B. Anderson, 26 June 1916.  
19 War Diary, RCD, 6-26 January 1916. 
20 War Diary, LSH, 1-31 January 1916; Tatlow to Mother, 30 January-12 March 1916; Jones, 94. 
21 RCDMA Nordheimer File.  Roy Nordheimer, “Reminiscences,” The Goat, May 1930. 
22 Jones, 94-95. 
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chosen mare when she bolted through a village and threw him into a pond.  After Jones 
recovered the mare, he bonded with the animal instantly.  He happily traded his 
previously chosen mount to Hind, and named the mare ‘Springbuck,’ in honour of the 
RCD mascot,23 and her character.24    
Early cavalry training in the winter months was devoted to basic mounted drills 
and rear area duties.  Evening classes offered instruction for practical activities, such as 
trench crossing, evacuating wounded soldiers, re-supplying ammunition, and 
reconnaissance.  Riding skills such as jumping, mounted musketry, and swordsmanship 
were also taught.25  With the arrival of the FGH on 28 February, the CCB was fully 
reorganized, and intensive training for the Somme began.  Much of this time was devoted 
to practicing mounted patrolling and scouting, as well as mounted sword and mounted 
rifle drills.  Dismounted training and musketry practice were also an important part of 
regular drills.26  The CCB also spent some time in practice trenches to prepare for 
dismounted action if necessary.  Members of the CCB who were not previously trained in 
bombing were enrolled in bombing school to learn the proper use of hand grenades and 
jam tin bombs.27    
The importance of firepower was not overlooked at Friaucourt, as machine guns 
were tactically integrated into training exercises.28  This was part of a wider initiative to 
increase the amount of mobile firepower available to the cavalry.  In February 1916, all 
                                                          
23 A Springbok. 
24 Jones, 95-98. 
25 Greenhous, 196-197; Jones, 98-101. 
26 War Diary, LSH, 1 February-31 March 1916. 
27 Tatlow to Mother 8-20 January, 3 February 1916. 
FGHMA Irving Douglas, Diary, 28 February-31 March 1916; War Diary, FGH. 29 February-1 July 1916; 
Greenhous, 195-196. 
28 Tatlow to Mother, 3-7 February 1916; Greenhous, 195-196. 
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regimental machine gun sections29 were centralized into the Machine Gun Corps 
(Cavalry) (MGCC).  Thereafter, one Machine Gun Squadron30 from the MGCC was 
attached to each cavalry Brigade.31  Similarly, the Motor Machine Gun brigades that were 
established in late 191432 were attached to the Cavalry Divisions by March 1916.33  The 
number of Hotchkiss guns per regiment was also increased.  By 1 July, the 2nd Indian 
Cavalry Division34 was equipped with sixteen Hotchkiss guns in each regiment.  All 
machine guns were pack mounted and allowed the cavalry to retain their mobility.35  
Mounted troops were trained to fight mounted or dismounted as necessary and to employ 
the support of mobile modern firepower.36   
On 9 April, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade moved out of Friaucourt and into new 
billets in the Crécy area and experienced cavalry life on the march for the first time.37  
The Brigade rose at 5:00am every morning and advanced approximately twenty 
kilometres each day.  At mid-day, the march was halted so that the horses could be 
watered and fed.  Jones described the nightly ritual of cavalry on the move in his diary.  
After receiving the order to “Halt,” the Brigade dismounted and loosened their saddle 
girths.  Picket lines38 were set up and the horses were tethered to them.  The saddles were 
                                                          
29 Each regiment was equipped with four machine guns in 1915. 
30 Each Machine Gun Squadron was equipped with twelve machine guns. 
31 According to Kenyon, these mobile machine gun units were comprised of six sections, each equipped 
with two Vickers Machine Guns.  See Kenyon, British Cavalry, 33. 
32 Operating on the Western Front by spring 1915. 
33 Chris Baker “The MGC Motor Machine Gun Units of 1914-1918” The Long, Long Trail: The British 
Army of 1914-1918 http://www.1914-1918.net/mmg.htm; David Kenyon, Indian Cavalry, 44. 
34 The CCB became part of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division in June 1916. 
35 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 33. 
36 Jack Tatlow to Mother, 3-7 February 1916. 
37 War Diary, RCD, 9 April 1916. 
38 According to Jones, each man had a piece of picket line in his pack and heel pegs attached to their 
saddle.  Each picket line was sixty feet long and could hold thirty-two horses.  Jones 105-107; Marteinson 
& Service, 17.  
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removed and the horses watered, fed, and groomed.39  Only after this was accomplished 
could the men look after their own needs.  After eating, each man made camp for the 
night beside his horse, laying a waterproof sheet over the ground, using his saddle blanket 
for bed linen and “mother earth for a mattress and the sky for a roof.”40  As Jones 
explained, “Such, in a way, is the life, generally, of a cavalry unit.  Riding from point to 
point and when not really in action, constantly drilling and keeping fit.  It is a life of 
hardship from which some men sicken and die, while others apparently seem to thrive 
and be the better for it, and the same may be said to be quite equally true of the horses.”41 
On 9 May, General Hubert Gough42 began to hold regular divisional schemes to 
train the cavalry for the kinds of actions they were expected to fight in at the Somme.  
Haig insisted that Gough stress the importance of coordinating cavalry operations with 
infantry and artillery attacks.  Similarly, Haig ensured that the mounted arm was 
thoroughly trained in both mounted and dismounted tactics according to prewar cavalry 
doctrine.  Early tactical exercises included advancing on enemy positions as a mounted or 
dismounted force.43  According to Irving Douglas44 of the Fort Garry Horse, cavalry 
charges were practiced wherein troops would advance quickly to their objective, and 
often dismount to hold their position.  In most divisional schemes, the cavalry would 
carry out patrol work, advance guard and flank guard duties, and cross over a captured 
                                                          
39 Though there were increasing reports of sore backs for some of the horses during this march, none were 
so severe that the horse could not be ridden.  Often the problem was easily remedied by adding an extra 
saddle blanket.  See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 2, File 9.  LSH Reports on Pack Saddlery, 31 May 
1916. 
40 Jones, 110. 
41 Jones, 112. 
42 Haig appointed Gough to be ‘Temporary Inspector General of Cavalry Divisions’ to supervise training. 
43 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 34; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 268-271. 
44 Irving Douglas was a member of “A” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse.  He was killed in action on 3 
August 1916.  His diary and personal records are available at FGHMA. 
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enemy line and seize limited objectives.45  For example, on 23 May, the CCB participated 
in a divisional scheme in which reconnaissance took place, advance guards were sent out, 
and a small objective was captured with machine gun and artillery support.46  A similar 
offensive took place on 26 May in which the CCB advanced with support from machine 
gun sections and the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA).  The RCD advanced 
across the captured enemy line with support from two machine gun sections and seized 
Millencourt and the Millencourt-Caours road.  The FGH followed the RCD across the 
captured line with two machine gun sections and advanced west to seize Hill 87.  LSH 
served as the flank guard with support from two machine gun sections.47  On 27 May, the 
CCB practiced the same operation but served as the left flank guard for the 3rd Cavalry 
Division.48  On 28 May, the RCD and LSH served as standing observation patrollers, 
watching the approaches to their position.  The FGH remained in reserve, but were 
responsible for the local protection of the reserve infantry troops.49  Thus the majority of 
mounted training for the Somme was focused on reconnaissance, guard duties, and 
pursuit with full support from horse artillery and machine gun sections.50  Offensive drills 
were practiced at the divisional level, but attention was also given to cavalry advancing 
as a single brigade in anticipation of smaller operations, as would be seen at High Wood.    
During training, the issue of cavalry crossing the trenches efficiently during battle 
became a matter of some concern.  When Cavalry regiments practiced crossing a trench 
                                                          
45 Douglas, 23-29 May, 1916. 
46 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 3.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Tactical Exercise, 23 May, 
1916. 
47 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 3.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Operational Order No. 5, 26 
May 1916. 
48 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 3.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Tactical Exercise, 27 May 
1916. 
49 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 3.  Memo B/90, 28 May 1916. 
50 Douglas, 23-29 May, 1916. 
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system, they often used explosives to loosen the earth, and then tediously filled in the 
trench with shovels, compromising mobility.51  Consequently, some members of the Fort 
Garry Horse spent part of training designing a portable bridge for this purpose.52  The 
portable bridge was designed primarily for the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery to ease 
the transport of artillery and ammunition, but it was also hoped the same technology 
could be used to enable horses to easily cross trenches and other obstacles on the Western 
Front.  Two different models were designed for each purpose.  The RCHA model 
weighed approximately 550 pounds, and was built with two wheels so it could be easily 
transported by hooking the bridge behind an artillery wagon.  The cavalry model, or “Fort 
Garry Bridge” could be folded into quarters, packed, and mounted on a horse. The bridge 
itself was easily transportable, weighing between 150 and 202 pounds, and allowed 
cavalry to cross the trenches in single file.53  These bridges could be expanded to meet 
the width requirements of any obstacle up eighteen feet wide, and could hold weights of 
up to 2,300 pounds.  If necessary, two of the cavalry bridges could be placed side by side 
to allow artillery or divisional transports to cross the trenches.  Similarly, they could be 
placed in a line to bridge larger obstacles, such as shallow streams and rivers.  During 
testing, the bridge was repeatedly unpacked and put in place in forty-five seconds to one 
and a half minuets.54  Seely approved the design and concluded that the CCB should keep 
                                                          
51 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 34. 
52 The bridge was designed by the Fort Garry Horse and built by “B” Battery of the RCHA. 
53 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 2, File 9.  Note from “B” Battery, RCHA, 31 May 1916;  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 2, File 9.  Specifications of Fort Garry Horse Bridge, Appendix “A;”  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 2, File 9.  Specifications of Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Bridge, 
Appendix “B.” 
54 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 2, File 9.  Report from Fort Garry Horse to General Seely, 31 May 
1916. 
 126
these portable bridges with the brigade at all times.55  Both models were demonstrated to 
Haig on 3 June at Helfaut. Thereafter, the Fort Garry Horse was designated as a special 
“bridging unit,” and its squadrons were attached to various cavalry brigades going into 
action at the Somme.56   
Plans for Cavalry at the Somme 
Henry Rawlinson57 and Bernard Montgomery58 began devising a plan for the 
Fourth Army at the Somme in March 1916.59  However, disagreements between British 
commanders led to confused and often contradictory plans for the use of cavalry during 
the offensive.  Haig advocated the use of “breakthrough” tactics wherein the cavalry 
would advance through a gap created by the infantry to pursue the retreating enemy 
force.  He insisted that the cavalry be brought into action during the earliest possible 
stage of the battle, and should act in concert with the infantry and artillery. 60  However, 
Rawlinson advocated the use of less ambitions “bite-and-hold” tactics, using short 
advances to seize a smaller section of the enemy line, and holding it against a 
counteroffensive.  While perhaps more realistic, Rawlinson’s tactics were difficult to 
reconcile with Haig’s desire for a large-scale cavalry action.61  When Rawlinson unveiled 
his initial plan for the Somme offensive on 3 April 1916, Haig was highly critical of his 
proposal, claiming, “[Rawlinson’s] intention is merely to take the Enemy’s first and 
second system of trenches and ‘kill Germans.’”62  Haig insisted that Rawlinson devise a 
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more ambitious plan that called for a deeper advance and the seizure of tactically 
significant positions followed by cavalry pursuit.63  While he was compliant with Haig’s 
request, Rawlinson remained sceptical about the potential for a breakthrough and pursuit 
by the mounted arm.64 
On 25 June, a conference was held to define the expected role of cavalry at the 
Somme.  It was determined that the situation had become more favourable for a cavalry 
advance, as it was estimated that several German divisions had withdrawn from the 
Western Front.  Although the Somme was originally conceived as a joint Allied offensive 
under French leadership, French manpower and resources were consumed by the defence 
of Verdun.  When it became clear that the British Army would be the leading force at the 
Somme, the expected role of cavalry became greater.  The offensive was planned across a 
wider front and with an extended objective.  Once the German defences were broken, 
Rawlinson planned to send cavalry detachments forward to Bapaume, and then advance 
to the north, widening the gap in the German line with the support of other arms, rolling 
up the enemy line to the north of Aecre.65     
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade became part of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division in 
June 1916.66  The 1st and 3rd British Cavalry Divisions and the 2nd Indian Cavalry 
Division were placed at the disposal of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army for the coming 
offensive at the Somme.67  According to Operational Orders for 28 June, the cavalry 
would not be ordered to advance at the Somme until the infantry had successfully broken 
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through the German line and taken Martinpuich and Courcelette.68  Thereafter, the 19th 
and 49th divisions were to follow with three cavalry divisions through Courcelette and 
Martinpuich to Bapaume.69  The 2nd Indian Cavalry Division would advance to Bapaume, 
and the 1st British Cavalry Division would advance to Achiet Le Grand.70  The 3rd British 
Cavalry Division would remain in reserve to the east of Albert.71  As part of the 2nd 
Indian Cavalry Division, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was ordered to advance to 
Martinpuich, Le Sars and then to the south of Pozières.  After being sent forward, the first 
job assigned to the cavalry would be to protect the main body while it wheeled north to 
advance on Aecre.  They were to take up positions running north and south through 
Bapaume, from Les Boeufs to Behagnies.  Once in place, they were to send out 
reconnaissance patrols to Morval and establish contact with the French.  Thereafter, the 
cavalry would be relieved by reserve infantry and would continue north with the 
advancing infantry, protecting its right flank.72 
As Kenyon and Badsey have argued, Rawlinson’s plan for a broad frontal attack 
made a breakthrough in any location both unlikely and unpredictable, as the infantry was 
spread over a broad front and was not concentrated in the areas where the Cavalry 
Divisions were stationed.  Similarly, massing the entire cavalry force in one area and 
planning to send it forward as one unit was inconsistent with Rawlinson’s original plan 
for a bite-and-hold advance against smaller objectives.  Had Rawlinson dispersed his 
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three cavalry divisions across a wider front, he would have increased the mounted arm’s 
opportunity to exploit gaps if they opened in other locations.  It remains unclear whether 
this was a reflection of Rawlinson’s lack of faith in the cavalry, or his attempt to 
reconcile Haig’s desire for a large cavalry breakthrough with his own vision for the use 
of cavalry on the Western Front.  Nonetheless, Rawlinson placed severe restrictions on 
opportunities for a mounted advance at the Somme.73   
Somme – Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 1-13 July 1916 
 
The CCB joined the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division in billets at St. Riquier on 17 
June.74  Mounted and dismounted training continued until the night of 26 June, when the 
CCB moved to billets near Amiens between Daours and Querrieu.75  Rawlinson planned 
to keep the cavalry stationed at Querrieu during the offensive, approximately twelve 
miles from the front lines.  However, Haig insisted the cavalry be moved into a more 
practical position, so the 2nd Indian and 1st British Cavalry Divisions moved up to Buire-
sur-l’Ancre and Bresle on the night of 30 June, approximately five miles from the 
infantry starting position.76 
The British offensive began at 7:30am on 1 July 1916, “Z” Day.  The CCB were 
assembled near Buire, facing east.  If ordered to advance, the 2nd Indian Cavalry 
Division77 was to cooperate with the 19th Division, guarding the infantry’s right flank and 
keeping it connected to the 17th Division.  They were ordered to advance to the north east 
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of Méaulte.  Brigadier General C.L. Gregory’s Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade78 would 
advance first, followed by the CCB.79  One squadron of the RCD was to act as the 
advance guard for the brigade, and one squadron of the FGH would transport the portable 
bridges.80  The roads from Becordel were to be avoided during the advance, as they were 
too dangerous to use.  Four passages across the trenches in Sausage Valley had to be 
taken instead, so the portable bridges were needed.81 
Within one hour of the opening of the offensive, the infantry had made very 
limited progress.  By 11:30am, General Gough informed the cavalry troops that they 
would be held back until at least 2:30pm, as the portion of the advance that should have 
opened a gap for the cavalry had failed.82  At 12:15pm, Rawlinson recorded in his diary 
that it was very unlikely the cavalry would see action on 1 July.83  He ordered the cavalry 
to retire at 6:00pm.  The CCB was sent to bivouacs near Bussy-Lès-Daours.84   
The British Army suffered over 60,000 casualties on the opening day of the 
Somme.85  Although the men of the CCB understood that they were fortunate to have 
escaped the devastating effects of the battle, there was a strong sense of disappointment 
among the troops as they moved back into reserve.  Jones stated “We rode back that day 
with a feeling that we had failed to make good…we felt humiliated.”86  While X and III 
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Corps87 had failed to create a gap for the cavalry, XIII Corps did achieve a small 
breakthrough to the south that might have been exploited by cavalry if mounted troops 
had been stationed in this area.  However, the cavalry remained at Buire and Bresle, nine 
miles from the gap, with no previous reconnaissance of this line of advance.88  
Nonetheless, the opening of the Somme was so unsuccessful that any cavalry exploitation 
in these areas was unlikely to have yielded any positive results.       
After the opening day of the offensive, the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division remained 
in reserve awaiting a new opportunity to advance.  The CCB continued with exercise 
rides and mounted drills through 2 and 3 July, ready to move at three hour’s notice.89  
Thereafter, the CCB was employed in rear areas in working parties.  Squadrons were sent 
to dig and fortify trenches and dugouts, lay wire, fix roads and rail lines, and to bury the 
dead.  Detachments were also employed as stretcher-bearers beginning on 5 July.90   
On 7 July, The 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was ready to move up at two hour’s 
notice while still continuing with their reconnaissance and working party duties.91  
However, the order to advance never came, as the infantry continued to be unsuccessful.  
From 9 to 11 July, the CCB worked as stretcher-bearers and formed working parties, 
repairing roads92 and loading supplies on to lorries.93  Meanwhile, mounted 
reconnaissance patrols were sent out to establish cavalry tracks94 to the front lines in 
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anticipation of upcoming cavalry operations.  Members left in reserve were responsible 
for standing guard over prisoners of war (POWs), a job often given to cavalry.95 
Meanwhile, preparations for a cavalry breakthrough continued despite the 
situation at the front.   On 5 July, a memo was issued explaining that operations had been 
less successful than originally hoped, particularly on the left of the line.  Consequently, 
the expected cavalry operation would have to take place further south than anticipated.  
An infantry attack was planned at the Longueval-Bazentin-le-Petit line.  If successful, the 
2nd Indian Cavalry Division would advance through Flers, Le Sars, and Martinpuich, with 
the cavalry playing the same role as originally intended.  However, if a smaller gap 
opened, only one cavalry regiment might be required to advance and drive the remaining 
enemy forces out.96  Circumstances at the Somme and on the Western Front were 
beginning to impact plans for the employment of cavalry in operations, as the 
exploitation of small gaps in the enemy line was being considered.   
High Wood – Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 14 July 1916 
Haig and Rawlinson finally agreed to renew the offensive at 3:25am on 14 July to 
exploit XIII Corp’s success to the right of the British line.97  Four infantry divisions98 
were to attack the German line between Mametz Wood and Delville Wood, embarking 
from Montauban and advancing to the second line of German trenches at Ginchy- 
Pozières Ridge.99  If successful, they would then advance to Delville Wood, Longueval, 
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and Bazentin.  If the infantry breached the second enemy line, the 2nd Indian Cavalry 
Division would send an advance guard to High Wood, and then the remainder of the 
Division would follow, capture High Wood, and advance to Flers and Le Sars.100   
Rawlinson considered High Wood to be the most significant objective, as it was a 
“stepping stone to a further advance.”101  On 13 July, he issued a memorandum 
explaining that the 1st and 3rd British Cavalry Divisions were only to advance if ordered 
to by Rawlinson himself.  However, the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was to advance on 
the orders of GOC XIII Corps General Walter Norris Congreve102 as soon as the infantry 
were successful.103  Rawlinson saw a real opportunity for a combined arms offensive, as 
he relinquished control over one division of cavalry to make it possible. 
On 13 July, the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division left their bivouacs at Bussy for Buire 
and Ville-Sous-Corbie.  They were stationed approximately three miles closer to the front 
lines than the 1st and 3rd British Cavalry Divisions.104  The CCB arrived in Buire at 
1:45pm, and received orders to reconnoitre a safe route for the cavalry advance.105   
The infantry attack began at 3:25am on 14 July.  CCB were ordered to be saddled 
and ready to move by 6:45am.106  “B” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse was sent to form 
the advance guard “bridging section” for the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade during the 
advance. The remainder of the CCB left Ville-Sous-Corbie at 8:30am with the balance of 
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the FGH forming the advance guard for the Brigade.  The CCB advanced to the valley 
north east of Mametz and reconnoitered routes to the north between Caterpillar Valley 
and Mametz Wood.107  The Brigade remained in reserve for the entire day, enduring 
heavy artillery fire until 6:00pm.  Although the CCB survived with no casualties, two of 
its horses were killed.108  The CCB returned to Ville-Sous-Corbie at 8:00pm, and 
continued to endure heavy shelling throughout the night.109   
Meanwhile, the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade was sent to await orders at 
Montauban with “B” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse.110  Once the infantry were 
successful, the cavalry anticipated orders to advance to High Wood, and then to occupy 
the trenches to the east and west.111  The cavalry would have the support of a field troop 
of Royal Engineers, two armoured cars,112 a machine gun section, and a battery of horse 
artillery.113  The cavalry were in position and ready to advance by 9:30am.  By 10:00am, 
the infantry were successful on the left flank, opening a gap in the enemy line between 
Bazentin-le-Grand and High Wood.114  However, the battle for Longueval continued all 
day, with reports of possession or loss of the village arriving nearly every hour.  Thus 
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Congreve held the cavalry back and GOC XV Corps Lieutenant General Horne held the 
7th Infantry Division115 back until Longueval was finally secured.116  
Because of the prolonged struggle for Longueval, the infantry did not advance 
until 6:15pm with the support of the 7th Dragoon Guards, the 20th Deccan Horse, “B” 
Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse117 and a machine gun section.  The mounted troops 
were to advance to the northwest to Sabot Copse, then attack to the east of High Wood.118  
The cavalry embarked from Montauban at 6:00pm, and advanced two miles to Sabot 
Copse, where they joined the 91st Infantry Brigade.119  At 7:00pm, they began their 
advance with the 91st Brigade to the left moving toward High Wood, and the cavalry on 
the right in a column formation. “B” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse acted as the 
advance guard for the cavalry, leading the column with the portable bridges.120   
The cavalry advanced through a valley between the second and third German 
lines, where the advance was highly visible to enemy parties on a ridge to the rear that 
overlooked their position.  The mounted troops could also be seen by enemy troops that 
occupied Delville Wood and Longueval, as the village was still not fully captured.  The 
advancing cavalrymen quickly came under machine gun fire, but managed to continue 
their advance with limited casualties.121  According to Patterson, “B” Squadron of the 
Fort Garry Horse was “the first cavalry to come under fire and one Bridging Section 
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under Lieutenant Hooton, came under direct machine gun fire at the north end of 
Bazentin-Le-Petit Wood.”122  Enemy fire was countered by the machine gun section 
attached to the advancing cavalry.  The FGH and the 7th Dragoon Guards arrived at the 
eastern side of High Wood by 8:00pm, where they came upon a large number of enemy 
troops who were concealed in a cornfield riddled with shell holes.  The mounted troops 
successfully charged the enemy lines, scattering the enemy forces.  Thereafter, they 
dismounted and established a defensive line between High Wood and Longueval.123  The 
FGH dug a second line trench at Longueval and held it until the morning of 15 July when 
relieved.124 
Meanwhile, at 7:30pm, the Deccan Horse was sent to support the 9th Division’s 
attack on Longueval and Delville Wood, while the FGH and the 7th Dragoon Guards 
carried on to High Wood.  The Deccan Horse scattered enemy parties concealed in a 
cornfield, taking ten German prisoners.  At 9:30pm, they re-joined the 7th Dragoon 
Guards and the FGH, extending the defensive line between High Wood and 
Longueval.125    
Although the cavalry action of 14 July had little tactical significance, it 
demonstrated that mounted troops were able to advance on the Western Front without 
sustaining severe casualties.  Mounted troops were not mowed down by machine gun fire 
when crossing the front, in fact casualties were minimal.  According to Kenyon, the 7th 
Dragoon Guards had twenty-one men wounded and two killed.  The 20th Deccan Horse 
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had fifty-two wounded and three killed.  The Machine Gun Squadron had ten wounded 
and one killed.126  The Fort Garry Horse had only five men wounded.127  In total, sixty-
eight horses were killed.  These casualties were negligible to a force of approximately 
1,500 troops, particularly on the Western Front.128  Similarly, as Kenyon’s research has 
shown, this cavalry advance was not hindered by mud or impassable terrain.  Mobility 
was maintained because great care was taken to prepare cavalry tracks to the front lines, 
and “B” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse was dispatched specifically to bridge the 
trench lines during the advance if necessary.129  While the orders for the cavalry to 
advance to exploit the successes of the infantry came too late to be tactically effective, 
cavalry proved that it could still operate on the Western Front.   
The High Command was very encouraged by the cavalry’s action at High 
Wood.130  Haig visited XV Corps the following day to express his congratulations to the 
2nd Indian Cavalry Division on the “Well planned, carefully prepared and brilliantly 
carried out” operation.131  All were optimistic that the success of this small operation 
would mean future opportunities for mounted action on the Western Front.132   
As Badsey has argued, High Wood was the first of several small cavalry actions 
that would take place on the Western Front from 1916 through November 1918.  All of 
these engagements took place in a similar fashion – small detachments133 of mounted 
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cavalry charging at a gallop to an objective, then dismounting and holding the position 
with the support of mobile machine guns and artillery.134  While these tactics allowed 
cavalry to rush forward at great speed, the impact of these small actions was not 
substantial enough to be strategically significant in 1916. 
Meanwhile, plans for mounted action at the Somme continued.  On 15 July, 
intelligence reports indicated that the German forces were withdrawing from the front 
line trenches at the Somme.  The 7th Division was occupying High Wood, so orders were 
given to continue with the advance.  The 33rd Division was set to advance on Martinpuich 
at 9:00am.  The Ambala Cavalry Brigade135 was ordered to station one regiment to the 
east of Mametz Wood by 3:15am.  The remainder of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was 
ordered to stand too, ready to move at fifteen minuets notice after 6:00am.136  However, 
the Division was not ordered to advance and was released from its stand to orders at 
7:30pm.137   
On 16 July 1916, the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division spent the day in billets, ready to 
move at an hour and a half’s notice.138  On 17 July, the Fourth Army was told that the 
offensive would continue the following day, with XIII Corps targeting Guillemont-
Ginchy, XV Corps attacking the Switch Line from High Wood, and III Corps attacking in 
the Pozières area.139  The 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was told that if the next day’s 
infantry offensive was successful, the cavalry would advance, though likely slightly 
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farther west than originally planned.  Detachments from all regiments were ordered to 
reconnoitre two routes to the front, one through Mametz, the other parallel to Méaulte-
Fricourt to Rose Cottage, up Willow Avenue to the west of Mametz Wood.  
Reconnaissance troops were told to familiarize themselves with the terrain and 
surrounding countryside to scout the best routes for the cavalry advance, as trench work 
had just begun in this area.140   
The 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was to be ready to advance at fifteen minuets 
notice after 4:00am on 18 July.  The Ambala Cavalry Brigade was to send one regiment 
and four machine guns to the east of Mametz Wood.  The CCB would send one squadron 
equipped with portable bridges to advance with the Ambalas at 4:00am.141  However, at 
5:25pm on 17 July, these orders were postponed for twenty-four hours.142  On 18 July, 
orders were postponed indefinitely, and the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was sent back 
into reserve to the south of Querrieu on 23 July.143   
The CCB spent the next ten days in reserve, continuing with exercise rides and 
regular drills.144  On 3 August, the CCB was required to send working parties to the front 
lines in the Friaucourt area to dig trenches with XV Corps.145  The troops left behind 
were required to care for two or more horses each due to the absence of so many 
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troops.146  The FGH had twelve men wounded and four men killed while in working 
parties at the front, including Private Irving Douglas.147  On 8 August, the 2nd Indian 
Cavalry Division moved westwards, with the CCB billeting in the Neslette area.148  When 
the CCB arrived patrols were sent out to reconnoiter the area to find suitable training 
grounds.149  Mounted and dismounted training continued in reserve for the next four 
weeks to prepare the cavalry for its return to the Somme.150 
Preventing Future Delay 
After July 1916, efforts were made to identify the conditions that had delayed the 
cavalry.  On 24 August, Haig approved a report drafted by General Hubert Gough 
detailing the conditions under which cavalry should advance to prevent future delays to 
mounted action.151  The report set out to establish proper planning for the use of cavalry 
before defining the circumstances under which the cavalry should be sent forward.  It was 
made clear that the success of a rapid cavalry advance depended upon the swift and 
efficient collection of information, therefore knowledge of efficient routes across the 
trenches was necessary.152  It was understood that cavalry had to advance as quickly as 
possible, as opportunities to employ the mounted arm were fleeting.  The objective was 
“to get the cavalry in contact with those troops that are temporarily demoralized at a time 
when the enemy has lost or is moving the majority of his guns and before fresh troops 
and new guns can arrive.”153   
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However, before the cavalry could advance, they had to receive orders.  
Communication was the most significant delay to cavalry operations.  Thorough 
preparations had to be made for rapidly issuing and transmitting orders to advance to a 
clearly defined objective.  However, if communication lines were cut, the cavalry would 
face the same problem of delays and missed opportunities.  It was decided that the lead 
cavalry brigade for each cavalry division would send liaison officers to the advanced 
headquarters of the attacking infantry brigade to collect information and transmit it back 
to the cavalry waiting in reserve.  A system for communicating the situation at the front 
and any new orders to the divisional commander also had to be established to avoid 
missed opportunities.154   
The report addressed the more significant question of who ought to have the 
authority to send the cavalry forward during operations due to previous communication 
delays and the indecision to send the cavalry forward at High Wood.  It was feared that if 
the ultimate decision were left to the Army Commander or Corps Commander, the delays 
in communication would continue to make the cavalry miss its opportunity.  However, if 
the authority was given to the divisional commander, his perspective on the tactical 
situation could be too limited by his local position.155  Haig made his views on the 
devolution of authority clear in his 1907 work, Cavalry Studies, where he argued that 
“The General who is directing operations can alone decide when it is proper to fight: it is 
impossible that subordinates can have the necessary information to judge the propriety of 
movements ordered from headquarters.”156  Similarly, in Cavalry Training 1907, Haig 
affirmed that the Independent Cavalry force was to act under the direct orders of the 
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Commander-In-Chief, while Protective and Divisional Cavalry were to be under the 
direct orders of the commanding officer in charge of the force they were attached to.157   
However, by autumn 1916, it was clear that some localized authority was 
necessary due to communication difficulties, but also because of the nature of the 
Western Front.  The report was drafted with the understanding that a great front wide 
cavalry charge would not be possible under the present circumstances.  Any break in the 
enemy line would be small and would have to be exploited by the troops in the area, as 
seen at High Wood.  Therefore, the decision to send the cavalry forward had to be 
localized to the divisional commander.  It was decided that each cavalry division would 
be assigned to a specific section of front, and would determine the proper objective and 
direction of cavalry action for their area.  The decision to advance would be left to the 
divisional cavalry commander as favourable conditions materialized.158   
Unfortunately, the conclusions reached in this report were not reflected in future 
preparations.  Although Gough’s report was issued on 24 August with Haig’s full 
approval, the Cavalry Corps was re-established on 7 September under Lieutenant General 
Charles Kavanagh’s command.159  Haig hoped for a decisive breakthrough at the Somme 
in autumn 1916.  He proposed that the Fourth Army and Gough’s Reserve Army attack 
the German position at Morval and Le Sars.160  If the infantry could break the German 
line, “As strong as possible a force of cavalry, supported by other arms, will be passed 
through.”161  All five British cavalry divisions were sent to the front, organized as the re-
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established Cavalry Corps.162  Thus the command structure and organization of the 
mounted arm no longer reflected the continuing shift in tactical thinking, or the realities 
of the Western Front.  With the Cavalry Corps re-established, the decision to send the 
cavalry forward would rest with the GOC the Cavalry Corps, stationed too far from the 
front lines to issue fast orders.  Although cavalry had little chance of succeeding at the 
Somme, the centralized top-down command structure of the Cavalry Corps would cause 
significant delays to the mounted arm in 1917. 
Flers-Courcelette – Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 15-22 September 1916 
The Somme offensive was scheduled to reopen on 15 September at 6:20am.  Once 
the infantry secured the villages of Morval, Les Boeufs, Gueudecourt and Flers, the 
cavalry would be sent forward.163  The 1st Cavalry Division would move north of Leuze 
Wood, targeting Rocquigny-Barastre.  The troops of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division were 
ordered to advance east of Delville Wood, targeting Villers Au-Flos-Bancourt.  
Thereafter, they would advance west to Longueval and target Bapaume and the high 
ground to the north.  The Ambala Brigade was to form the advance guard, along with two 
troops of the FGH.  The remainder of the CCB was to move to the valley north of Des 
Trones Wood, and then into the valley to the east of Gueudecourt, prepared to take over 
the lines in the Riencourt area.164   
On 6 September, the CCB moved to billets at Hangest and Le Mesge, with one 
squadron from the RCD acting as the advance guard for the Brigade.165  On 14 
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September, the CCB moved to Dernancourt to bivouac for the night.166  Reconnaissance 
patrols were to be sent out early on 15 September to ensure safe passage from 
Dernancourt to Fricourt and Mametz.167  The CCB arrived in Mametz at 7:00am on 15 
September, in position and ready to attack when ordered, standing-to all day.168  
Although the infantry took Flers-Courcelette and Martinpuich, the vital strong points of 
Morval, Les Boeufs, and Gueudecourt remained in German hands.  The cavalry was held 
back, and the infantry renewed their efforts the following day.169   
If the cavalry was ordered to advance on 16 September, the 2nd Indian Cavalry 
Division was to join the line to the east of the 2nd British Cavalry Division.  The Ambala 
Brigade and the CCB sent out reconnaissance patrols before the operation.170  However, 
ground conditions were assessed and did not appear favourable for cavalry action.  The 
mounted arm was ordered to return to their bivouacs in Bussy-Lès-Daours at 5:30am on 
17 September.  According to Jones, the horses had not been unsaddled for nearly three 
days when the cavalry retired, and food and water had been very difficult to attain at the 
front.171 
While in their bivouacs from 21 to 23 September, the CCB remained ready to 
advance at two hour’s notice while the infantry continued their assault, but the cavalry 
was not called forward.172  Although Rawlinson renewed the offensive on 25 September, 
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all cavalry except for the 1st Indian Cavalry Division was sent back into reserve. One 
troop of the 1st Indian Cavalry division did advance on 26 September to secure 
Gueudecourt and establish defences to the northeast, but did not participate in any 
decisive action.173   
Plans for the use of cavalry at the Somme continued into autumn.  In late October, 
an offensive was planned with the objectives Walencourt, Pys, Irles, and Beauregard.  If 
successful, the 1st British Cavalry Division was to be sent through to Loupart Wood and 
Achiet Le Petit with the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division in support.174  The cavalry was 
called upon to reconnoitre a line of advance on 28 October, as routes from Querrieu to 
Albert had to be scouted.  The crossings over the Ancre River between Albert and Aveluy 
also required reconnaissance, along with routes from the Ancre to Courcelette.175  The 
cavalry carried out the appropriate reconnaissance and waited in reserve, but was once 
again disappointed.  Cavalry was not called into action due to limited infantry gains and 
unfavourable ground conditions.176 
On 1 November, the CCB was sent to their winter quarters to the west of the 
Friancourt-Allenry area, where mounted training and tactical exercises continued for the 
remainder of the winter.177  In late November, each brigade in the Cavalry Corps was 
ordered to provide a “pioneer battalion” for a few weeks of dismounted work.  The CCB 
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sent twenty-four Officers and 809 other ranks178 to fulfill the brigade’s obligations.  The 
CCB’s Pioneer Battalion entrained for Le Plateau on 12 December 1916, and arrived the 
following day.  CCB troops were attached to XV Corps under Major E.L. Caldwell, and 
spent the following two months building and repairing roads, digging and wiring 
trenches, burying the dead, and building huts and railway lines until 10 February 1917.  
The troops that remained in billets continued with training and were also charged with 
caring for the entire Brigade’s horses, though only half of the men remained.179 
Flers-Courcelette – Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, 15-22 September 1916 
Although the 19th Alberta Dragoons and the 1st Hussars participated in the same 
spring training camp as the regular cavalry regiments, the Canadian Corps and thus the 
CCCR were not called fight at the Somme until autumn.  After reorganization, the CCCR 
spent the summer in working parties with the Field Company of Engineers in the 
Vlamertinghe area, constructing a dam and a water supply pipeline.180   
The CCCR was relieved from their working party duties in late July 1916 to begin 
training for mounted action at the Somme in autumn 1916.181  Much of training was 
devoted to work traditionally expected of Divisional Cavalry, such as advance, rear, and 
flank guarding, patrol work, mapping, outpost duties, reconnaissance, and drafting and 
delivering reports.  Generally, the CCCR would act as guards for a body of infantry, and 
sections would practice recording messages, and carrying and delivering these reports as 
dispatch riders.  Other exercises included fire control, distance judging, target practice, 
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sword and bayonet drills, and seizing and occupying trenches.182  However, when 
training for a mounted advance in operations, the men of the CCCR were trained the 
same way as those of the CCB.  They practiced mounted and dismounted instruction and 
coordinating mounted actions with Hotchkiss gun support.183  Some attention was given 
to advancing in extended order through a barrage, capturing and holding tactical 
positions, and the proper defence of a village.  The cavalry practiced these manoeuvres in 
conjunction with a simulated infantry assault on 24 August.184  Thus the CCCR was 
expected to perform regular Divisional Cavalry work, but would also support an infantry 
offensive in the same way as regular cavalry – performing reconnaissance or guard 
duties, then advancing mounted to capture an objective and then dismounting to hold it. 
After the six-week training program was complete, the CCCR spent the first week 
of September traveling to new billets in the Contay area to await orders to embark for the 
Somme.185  When the CCCR arrived, exercise rides and mounted drills began 
immediately while regular mounted detachments were sent out on Divisional Cavalry 
duties.186  For example, there was a growing need for mounted traffic controllers with so 
many divisions arriving at the front.  Regular rotations of 100 men were sent to work as 
traffic controllers for one week at a time while regular reconnaissance and mounted 
police work carried on.187   
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Divisional Cavalry work at Contay was more dangerous than the CCCR had 
previously experienced.  Patrols were often sent out that rode within a half mile of the 
front lines.  According to Leonard “our reconnoitring patrols run into the enemy every 
night and a man gets run for his money so to speak and gets [a] chance to hit back 
himself.”188  This section of front was far less developed than the previous CCCR area.  
Although there were fewer trenches, the countryside was riddled with hills and valleys, 
which provided some measure of concealment from enemy view and cover from artillery 
fire.189   
When the Somme offensive reopened on 15 September, the Canadian Corps was 
to attack at Pozières, capture the German line and establish posts.190  The 2nd Canadian 
Division would attack at Courcelette, while the 3rd Canadian Division would attack 
Fabeck Graben.  III Corps’ objective was the enemy line at High Wood-Martinpuich, and 
the 15th Division would simultaneously attack the southern end of Martinpuich up to the 
“Sugar Factory.”191   
On 15 September, the CCCR was ordered to advance to the Brickfields area at 
4:15am, and arrived shortly after 6:00am.192  As per Gough’s 24 August instructions, 
Lieutenant Woodman two other ranks of the CCCR reported to the 2nd Canadian 
Divisional report centre at Tara Hill to act as liaison officers between the infantry and 
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cavalry during the operation.193  They were told that the 2nd Canadian Division would 
attack enemy line to the north of Courcelette and Pys-Grandcourt, and thereafter capture 
and destroy the enemy guns.194  Once sections of trench running east-west on the eastern 
edge of Courcelette were captured, the CCCR was to send two mounted squadrons 
forward to the north to exploit the infantry’s success.195   
On 15 September, the Canadian Infantry captured their initial objectives by 
7:30am.196  The CCCR moved into Tara Valley at 10:50am to await orders.197  In the 
early afternoon, the CCCR learned that the infantry had captured and secured 
Martinpuich, but were not ordered to advance.  At 3:30pm, Van Straubenzee and four 
officers rode to Martinpuich to reconnoitre a route for the cavalry to cross the trenches 
and proceed to the front lines.  Unfortunately, all routes that bypassed the trenches were 
found to be impassable for cavalry, as heavy shelling had destroyed the ground in the 
area.  Consequently, Van Straubenzee ordered a working party to form and fill in the 
trenches at Martinpuich.  However, an officer at 6th Avenue Trench ordered the working 
party to stop filling in the trenches.  The working party was then relocated to the southern 
end of Martinpuich.198   
By midnight, the CCCR had not received any new information on the state of the 
infantry’s advance.  Van Straubenzee planned to send the desired two cavalry squadrons 
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out at 2:00am on 16 September if word on the advance was received.  He sent an officer’s 
patrol under Lieutenant H.M. Campbell to the recently captured areas at Martinpuich, 
Courcelette, and Pys at 12:30am for information on road conditions and the situation at 
the front.199  Campbell reported that the roads were usable from Contalmaison to 
Martinpuich, but impassable for cavalry towards Courcelette.  The patrol had to proceed 
dismounted through this section due to the heavy rain that had made it impossible to 
cross communication trenches.  The dismounted patrol could not cross to the front line 
due to an ongoing artillery barrage.  Campbell concluded that mounted troops would have 
to bridge the communication trenches to get to the front, and returned to the CCCR at 
5:10am.200 
While Campbell’s patrol reconnoitered the front, Van Straubenzee received a 
telephone call from the 2nd Division at 1:00am explaining that the infantry still had to 
clear Courcelette, and the cavalry was to await further instructions.  Van Straubenzee 
moved the CCCR to Bécourt Wood to await new orders.  Meanwhile, the 2nd Canadian 
Division was ordered to consolidate the gains it had made near Courcelette and establish 
posts on 16 September.  The 3rd Canadian Division was to capture the enemy line at 
Zollern Graben to Fest Zollern and Mouquet Farm while the 1st Division would remain in 
reserve at Brickfields.201 
In anticipation of the cavalry advance, the Van Straubenzee sent Lieutenant Ferris 
to Courcelette at noon on 16 September to determine the status of the infantry advance 
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from the 22nd and 25th Battalions.  Ferris was to scout the best area for cavalry to cross 
the trench lines.  Upon arriving at Pozières, Ferris was forced to dismount and leave his 
horse behind before proceeding to Courcelette and Martinpuich due to poor ground 
conditions.  He reported that there was no place above the Pozières-Martinpuich line that 
was passable for cavalry.  However, Ferris was able to give some valuable information 
regarding the conditions at the front, as officers from the infantry battalion had no 
information on the German gun positions, and all other information on the German 
trenches was inconsistent.202  Although the Canadian Divisional Cavalry had no 
opportunity to advance, mounted reconnaissance patrols were still possible and provided 
valuable information.  
Reconnaissance missions continued throughout the day in an effort to find a 
suitable line of advance for the cavalry.  Lieutenant Colonels Van Straubenzee, Leonard, 
Smith, Lieutenant Dawson, and Major Haszard reconnoitred the south-western edge of 
Martinpuich to find a possible trench crossing for the cavalry at 2:30pm, but found the 
trenches would need to be bridged.  At 6:00pm, Van Straubenzee sent Leonard and 
Cockshutt to Martinpuich to reconnoitre the same route Campbell had navigated the 
previous day, but with the same result. 203   
The Canadian Corps continued their offensive with II and III Corps on 17 
September.204  The CCCR sent out three additional patrols, but without much success.205  
According to Harrison’s report, the ground to the south of Courcelette was too “shot up” 
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to be passable for cavalry.  While the ground to the east of the village was in fair 
condition, it was too exposed to the enemy line.  The patrol also came into contact with 
the enemy, as Harrison reported “About 30 yards from the sunken road, I saw one of the 
enemy appear above the parapet holding a rifle he shouted out something and another one 
appeared, I retired about 20 yards and took cover they fired two shots at us on the way, 
we waited there for some time but saw no further movement so came back the same road 
running south of the village.”206   
Once again, the CCCR patrols were unable to find a suitable path for a cavalry 
advance, but they were able to report valuable information on the German lines to the 2nd 
Canadian Division.  For example, Woodman’s patrol between noon and 2:30pm on 17 
September searched several dugouts and came in close contact with the German front 
lines and was able to report the enemy strength and position to the 2nd Canadian Division 
and the 15th Division.  Woodman reported “[We] went within about 50 yards of trench 
running east and west through M.26 central…Found a trench in front was occupied by 
about 100 Germans, fired on as we retired.”207  Woodman was also able to assess ground 
conditions in this area and concluded that while the terrain was indeed passable for 
cavalry, it still had to be cleared of the enemy and the trenches needed to be filled in or 
bridged.208   
Thiepval Ridge – Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, 25-28 September 1916 
With their mounted advance blocked by impassable terrain, the CCCR was sent to 
carry out stretcher-bearing and ammunition carrying duties for the Canadian Corps 
beginning on 25 September.  This dangerous and difficult work continued for the next 
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three days, with little rest for any party and the stretcher-bearers not returning to their 
own regiment until 28 September.209  Between 25 and 27 September, the CCCR incurred 
thirty-six casualties, with four men killed, and twelve severely wounded.  The regiment 
was hardest hit between 27 and 28 September, with forty men killed, twenty wounded, 
and three missing.  All officers reported that the men working as stretcher-bearers were 
extremely dedicated and self-sacrificing in their work, carrying on despite the dangers of 
heavy shell and machine gun fire.  Members of the CCCR received several awards for 
their work as stretcher-bearers and carriers at the Somme,210 along with letters of 
appreciation from Lieutenant J.H. Chipman, William H. Hart, Major L.F. Page.211  On 1 
October, General Arthur Currie wrote, “It is my opinion that in these battles none render 
greater service than the stretcher bearers.  The conditions under which they work, while 
                                                          
209 Captain Robinson and Lieutenants White and Greenlay and 120 other ranks formed “A” Party, and were 
sent to work as stretcher bearers with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.  “B” Party was comprised of 
Lieutenants Ferris, Woodman, and Robinson and 120 other ranks, and reported to the 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade for stretcher bearing.  “C” Party was formed to carry ammunition to the 1st Canadian Motor 
Machine Gun Brigade, and was comprised of 48 men under Lieutenant Hastings.  Pack horses were used to 
help carry ammunition with carrying parties.  The carrying parties brought over 60,000 rounds of 
ammunition to the front in forty-eight hours.  See Appendix V for breakdown of CCCR duties and 
casualties in September 1916. 
210 Six members of “A” Squadron received the Military Medal for Bravery in the Field.  Capitan G. 
Robinson and Lieutenants H.M. Campbell, D.N. Ferris, and G.L. Greenlay were awarded the Military 
Cross.  Sergeant R.R. Tooley and G.H. Stirrett received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.  Private G. 
Clark received a Bar to the Distinguished Conduct Medal.  Leonard was mentioned in Douglas Haig’s 
dispatches on 13 November 1916 for “gallant and distinguished services in the Field.”  See  
War Diary, CLH, 16 October 1916; 1HMA Leonard Collection No. 0407903 IL.  War Office Certificate, 1 
March 1919. 
211 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 1, File 5.  Message from Lieutenant J.H. Chipman, 15th Canadian 
Battalion, 48th Highlanders of Canada, 30 September 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 1, File 5.  
Message from Capitan Wm. H. Hart, M.O. 13th Battalion, 30 September 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, 
Folder 1, File 5.  Message from Major L.F. Page, 5th Canadian Battalion, 4 October 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 
Vol. 3988, Folder 2, File 21.  Reserve Army G.A. 19/3/3, Canadian Corps, 23 September 1916; LAC RG9 
III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 5.  Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, Resume of Operations, 23 
September -1 October 1916, 1-2; War Diary, CLH, 25-28 September 1916; War Diary, CLH, Appendix A.  
Report by Lieutenant Ferris, 28 September 1916; War Diary, CLH, Appendix B.  Report by Capitan 
Robinson, 28 September 1916; Stirrett, 12-13. 
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extremely difficult and dangerous lack the excitement which attends the troops in the 
attack.”212   
On 28 September, the CCCR would once again serve in its Divisional Cavalry 
role at the Somme.  Since 26 September, the Canadian Corps had been working to push 
the Germans back from the 6000-yard crest between Courcelette to Thiepval, and close a 
small gap that had opened between the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions.  The 1st Canadian 
Division attacked Regina Trench while the 2nd Canadian Division struck the German line 
to the north-east of Courcelette between 26 to 27 September.  The offensive was very 
successful, as the Canadians closed the gap in their line at Bapaume Road, approximately 
1500-yards to the north-west of Le Sars.213  At 8:25pm on 27 September, the CCCR was 
ordered to have one cavalry troop ready to advance down Bapaume Road for 
reconnaissance work in the morning upon receiving orders from the 2nd Canadian 
Division.  Lieutenant Campbell reported to the 2nd Canadian Division to receive orders 
and was told to advance through Sunken Road Valley and Maple Leaf Road to Gunpit 
Road214 before dawn.  Once in position, Campbell’s patrol was to send dispatch riders to 
the 28th Battalion in the trenches to be briefed on the situation at the front.  
Reconnaissance patrols were to be sent out to determine the exact location of the enemy 
forces.  The mounted patrols were to determine whether the Germans were holding the 
trenches in the area, or if they were instead located at Pys or Petit Miraumont.215 
                                                          
212 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 5.  A.W. Currie to Officer Commanding Canadian Cavalry 
Corps Regiment, 1 October 1916. 
213 Nicholson, 174-178. 
214 Beside Bapaume Road. 
215 See Appendix VI for map.  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 5.  Canadian Corps Cavalry 
Regiment, Resume of Operations, 23 September -1 October 1916, 2; War Diary, CLH, 27-28 September 
1916; War Diary, CLH, Appendix C.  Report by Lieutenant Campbell, 28 September 1916; Nicholson, 178.   
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Campbell embarked on this patrol with a party of five officers and eighteen other 
ranks.  The party arrived at Gunpit Road at 4:45am.  Campbell sent one patrol of two 
officers and ten other ranks to Hill 130.  At 6:00am, a second patrol of two officers and 
ten other ranks was sent to Dry Ditch Trenches.  Both patrols crossed the front line and 
followed Bapaume Road until they came under machine gun and sniper fire from Destre 
Mont Farm.  One man was killed, another wounded, and two horses were killed.  Both 
patrols returned to their starting point by 6:40am.216   
At 6:45am, Campbell sent a third patrol of two officers and nine other ranks down 
Bapaume Road, traveling east to bypass the South Practice Trenches, which were open to 
enemy fire.  They then turned north towards their objective, Hill 130.  En route, they 
reconnoitred the dugouts behind the South Practice Trenches.  Thereafter, they crossed 
Dyke Road and moved north across Regina Trench.  Here, they came under sniper and 
machine gun fire from the Le Sars area.  They returned to Gunpit Road at 7:40am.217   
A fourth patrol of two officers and nine other ranks embarked at 8:00am, passing 
west of the North Practice Trenches and advancing north across Regina Trench.  They 
came under sniper fire from a small wooded area.  One horse was shot crossing Regina 
Trench, and a second fell into the open trench.  Fortunately, both riders were unharmed.  
The patrol saw no German infantry on Hill 130, and returned to Gunpit Road by 
9:00am.218  A fifth and final patrol of two officers and four other ranks embarked for the 
Dry Ditch Trench area at 8:10am.  They verified reports of sniper fire from the Le Sars 
                                                          
216 War Diary, CLH, Appendix C.  Report by Lieutenant Campbell, 28 September 1916. 
217 War Diary, CLH, Appendix C.  Report by Lieutenant Campbell, 28 September 1916. 
218 War Diary, CLH, Appendix C.  Report by Lieutenant Campbell, 28 September 1916. 
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area, and returned to Gunpit Road at 9:50am.  Campbell’s patrol retuned to the regiment 
at 10:15am on 28 September having successfully completed their assignment. 219   
This mission was fitting demonstration of the value of divisional cavalry patrols 
during an offensive.  Mounted troops were able to advance through these areas quickly, 
and provide accurate assessments of the enemy positions with minimal losses.  According 
to Lieutenant White’s report, the men of the CCCR showed “exceptional gallantry on 
patrol, pushing forward under [machine gun] fire and snipers fire with great 
determination, always bringing in reliable information.”220  They had discovered the 
enemy at Betremont Farm and in the Le Sars Line.  Private Clarke captured an enemy 
officer who gave up the German position in the trench line, and reported that there were 
small enemy parties in “pits” in the front trenches. 221  This was the kind of mission that 
the Divisional Cavalry Squadrons had been trained to carry out in action at the front. 
Although the CCCR was ordered to support the renewed infantry assault on 
Regina Trench on 7 October, the Canadian Infantry was unsuccessful and the CCCR was 
sent back to reserve on 9 October.  Through the winter, the CCCR was attached to the 
172nd and 175th Tunnelling Companies at Neuville St. Vaast, digging tunnels under Vimy 
Ridge in anticipation of a spring offensive.  The CCCR took on these duties in rotations, 
with fifty percent of the working party relieved and replaced by other members of the 
CCCR once a week on Thursdays, giving each man two weeks on working party detail 
and two weeks in billets at Divon.  Meanwhile, the troops that remained at Divon 
                                                          
219 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 5.  Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, Resume of 
Operations, 23 September-1 October 1916, 2; War Diary, CLH, 28 September 1916; War Diary, CLH, 
Appendix C.  Report by Lieutenant Campbell, 28 September 1916. 
220 War Diary, CLH, Appendix C.  Report by Lieutenant White, 29 September 1916. 
221 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 5.  Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, Resume of 
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continued with mounted drills and exercises. Mounted work was also assigned to the 
Divisional Cavalry as needed.  For example, on 2 November, a detachment of twenty 
troops was sent to work as mounted police in Aubigny.  Similarly, a detachment of 
twenty was sent to work as a mounted observation party for the 3rd Canadian Division in 
early November.  Meanwhile, mounted training continued in anticipation of a greater role 
for cavalry in 1917.222 
The Debut of the Tank 
The battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September marked the introduction of tanks 
to the battlefield.  According to Anglesey, forty-nine Mark I model tanks were present at 
the Somme that day.  “Male” versions of the Mark I were equipped with two six-pound 
guns and four Hotchkiss machine guns, while the “Female” model was equipped with 
five Hotchkiss guns.  However, their slow rate of advance meant that the effect was 
limited, as the Mark I advanced at a maximum 3.7 miles per hour over solid roads, and 
less than half a mile per hour over uneven ground.  According to aerial reports on 
infantry attacks by the 23rd, 47th, and 50th Divisions at Eaucourt L’Abbaye, the tanks 
                                                          
222 See Appendix V for full breakdown of CCCR duties in 1916.  War Diary, CLH, 25 September-31 
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Machine Gun Brigade, 13 October 1916; War Diary, CLH, 15-19 October 1916; Appendix A & B, 
Operational Order No. 8, Canadian Corps Mounted Troops. 17 October 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, 
Folder 2, File 24.  Notice from General Byng, Corps Commander; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, 
File 5.  Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, Resume of Operations, 23 September -1 October 1916; LAC 
RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 8.  Operational Order No. 6, Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, 12 
October 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 8.  Operational Order No. 7, Canadian Corps 
Cavalry Regiment, 13 October 1916; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 5.  Operational Order No. 
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lagged too far behind the infantry to be effective.223  The new armoured vehicles were 
also hindered by mechanical failures.  According to Anglesey, seventeen of the forty-nine 
tanks broke down or got stuck in the mud on 15 September, and only thirteen were able 
to provide support for the infantry battle.224   
Beyond mechanical problems, there was no operational doctrine for the use of 
tanks in battle in 1916.  After Flers-Courcelette, the British High Command debated the 
most practical way to use these new vehicles.  Their advance behind the infantry was of 
little tactical use, as the slow-moving tank was too far behind to protect the advancing 
army.  However, placing the tanks ahead of the infantry advance would restrict the 
employment of the rolling artillery barrage,225 a deterrence particularly because aerial 
observation had revealed, “Troops advancing resolutely close up to an effective barrage 
can do so without difficulty and almost without loss.”226  In contrast, operational doctrine 
for cavalry was well established, but the vulnerability of the horse and limitations of a 
stagnant front line prevented effective cavalry action in 1916.  In the mean time, cavalry 
prepared for action much in the same way that tanks would in future wars.  They 
reconnoitered safe routes to the front lines and concentrated in rear areas, awaiting orders 
to advance.  While the tank would prove to be the way forward in future wars, they 
lacked the speed, manoeuvrability, and operational doctrine necessary to provide 
adequate support to the infantry in 1916.  In 1917, plans to use these new vehicles in 
conjunction with cavalry would begin to develop. 
                                                          
223 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 8.  Fourth Army No. G.S. 290, Secret Report on Operations 
on the 1st Inst. As Seen From the Air, 6 October 1916. 
224 Anglesey, Vol. VIII, 58-61. 
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226 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 8.  Fourth Army No. G.S. 290, Secret Report on Operations 
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Conclusion 
While the Canadian Cavalry regiments did not participate in any decisive or 
tactically significant battle at the Somme, the CCB action at High Wood indicated that 
cavalry had the potential to advance on the Western Front without being stopped by 
machine gun fire or blocked by mud, trenches, shell holes, and wire.  However, both the 
CCB and CCCR were held back by impassable terrain in September.  While the CCCR 
was able to carry out valuable reconnaissance at the Somme, there was no suitable 
ground for a mounted action. 
The mounted advance at High Wood was the first of several similar engagements 
that the cavalry would fight in the Great War.  Although Haig continued to plan mass 
cavalry breakthroughs at the Somme, the training, organization, and performance of the 
mounted arm in 1916 indicated that there was a growing recognition that cavalry would 
fight smaller engagements at the operational level.  Similarly, the realities of the Western 
Front and the delays caused to cavalry action meant that the existing cavalry command 
and communication structure had to be reconsidered.  The first steps were made in this 
direction in 1916, and would continue through 1917.   
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CHAPTER 6: 
Spring 1917 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade – Retreat to the Hindenburg Line, March 1917 
Canadian Light Horse – Vimy Ridge, April 1917 
 
Introduction 
The spring of 1917 was very eventful for all Canadian Cavalry regiments.  In 
March, open warfare returned to the Western Front during the German Retreat to the 
Hindenburg Line.  Historians such as John Terraine have argued that cavalry was 
ineffectual during the retreat, explaining “The astonishing spectacle was seen of cavalry 
trying to charge in crater-fields; the result, as one might suppose, was high mounds of 
dead horses, much wasted gallantry, and no progress worth mentioning.”1  However, an 
examination of the 5th Cavalry Division’s actions during the retreat paints a different 
picture entirely.  The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was able to pursue the retreating enemy 
force and participate in offensive mounted cavalry actions exactly as the arm was 
intended to for the first time on the Western Front, and did so with great success.  The 
CCB performed reconnaissance, attacked, captured, and held villages, and advanced with 
speed and determination.  Similarly, the Canadian capture of Vimy Ridge is always 
remembered as a defining moment in Canadian history, although the role of the Canadian 
Corps Cavalry Regiment2 is rarely given more than a footnote in modern sources.  For 
example, Michael Krawchuk’s recent work devoted only two pages to the Canadian 
Cavalry at Vimy Ridge, which was mostly a commentary on its limited use.3  When the 
cavalry was mentioned previously, it was only remembered tragically.  For example, 
                                                          
1 John Terraine, Douglas Haig, 289. 
2 By the time of Vimy Ridge, the CCCR had been renamed the Canadian Light Horse. 
3 Michael Krawchuk, The Battle of Vimy Ridge: Wall of Fire (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Ltd, 2009), 
319-320. 
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Alexander McKee provided an inconsistent account of the CCCR’s work at Vimy, 
describing a wasteful bloodbath that only proved the mounted arm’s obsolescence.4  
However, the CCCR was able to conduct valuable reconnaissance patrol work that 
provided important information to the advancing infantry at Vimy Ridge.  The Canadian 
Cavalry regiments were beginning to experience mounted success in the spring of 1917, 
fulfilling their traditional roles of pursuit and reconnaissance. 
Organizational Changes 
All Canadian Cavalry regiments endured some organizational changes over the 
winter of 1917.  General Charles Kavanagh was appointed commander of the Cavalry 
Corps, and the 1st and 2nd Indian Cavalry Divisions were renamed the 4th and 5th British 
Cavalry Divisions, respectively.5  Thus the CCB was now part of the 5th British Cavalry 
Division, still comprised of the same four Indian Cavalry regiments, two British 
regiments, and the three Canadian regiments of the CCB.6  While the change in name 
made no difference to the organizational makeup of the 5th Cavalry Division, the issue of 
Canadian troops remaining members of a partially Indian Cavalry Division became 
contentious in Canadian political circles, and debate over this question persisted 
throughout 1917.  On 3 February, the Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada 
George H. Perley requested that the Canadian Cavalry Brigade be placed in a “purely 
British”7 Cavalry Division, stating that the mixing of Canadian Cavalry troops with 
Indian troops “would not be acceptable to Canada and that it would meet with strong 
                                                          
4 Alexander McKee, Vimy Ridge (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1966), 170-176. 
5 TNA WO 95/574.  War Diary, Cavalry Corps, November 1916. Appendix L, Cav. Corps O.B. 1835 
24/11/16; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 275. 
6 DHH Edwin Pye Fonds 74/672, Series VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, File 1.  No. O.B./1814, G.H.Q Letter 
from L.E. Kiggell, C.G.S., 16 January 1917. 
7 DHH Edwin Pye Fonds 74/672, Series VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, File 1.  Letter from Walter Gow to War 
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opposition from the people of the Dominion.”8  Although disappointed, Haig agreed to 
comply with the request in July 1917.  However, Seely and all of the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade’s regimental and squadron commanders unanimously opposed the decision, and 
requested permission to remain a part of the 5th Cavalry Division, which “all ranks would 
much regret to leave.”9  On 6 August, GOC the Fort Garry Horse Lieutenant Colonel 
R.W. Paterson explained 
The feeling throughout all ranks is one of pride at forming part of the 5th 
Cavalry Division with which we all hope to remain until the end of the 
war.  Any transfer would be unpopular.  There is absolutely no feeling 
against working with the Indian troops and our relations with them have 
been most cordial.10   
 
Haig supported the CCB in this pronouncement, as the transfer of the CCB would 
force the disruption of two cavalry divisions.  Fortunately, the CCB was allowed 
to remain a part of the 5th Cavalry Division.11   
The CCCR was also subject to organizational changes in 1917.  These 
adjustments were better received.  The regiment was finally renamed the Canadian Light 
Horse (CLH) on 3 March 1917.  Leonard expressed the regiment’s relief at being 
renamed, explaining, “We have been given a name of our own at last as Canadian Corps 
Cavalry Regiment was after all a job and not a name.”12  The regiment also changed 
command, as Lieutenant Colonel Van Straubenzee left the CLH on 13 March to assume 
command of the Royal Canadian Dragoons.  Lieutenant Colonel Ibbotson Leonard was 
                                                          
8 DHH Edwin Pye Fonds 74/672, Series VIII, Box 27, Folder 30, File 1.  Letter from George H. Perley to 
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then appointed Commanding Officer of the CLH.13  According to Leonard, all were quite 
happy with this change in command, as Leonard felt that command of the CLH was his 
due and Van Straubenzee was anxious to return to his old regiment.14   
1917 Cavalry Doctrine 
The winter of 1916-17 saw a continued a shift in tactical thinking and cavalry 
training.  The previous winter had been devoted to both mounted and dismounted 
training, owing to the need for mounted troops to fight as infantry and take their turn in 
the trenches.  However, Haig firmly believed that cavalry should once again be trained 
for mobile warfare through the winter of 1916-1917.  He stated:  
Up to the present the Cavalry in France has played a dual role – trained as 
Cavalry but at the same time has had the shadow of trench warfare 
continually hanging over its head…attempts were made to have the 
Cavalry equally good for both these roles…a great deal of time and labour 
was devoted to fitting Cavalry to take its place in the trenches, and 
fighting equally well as infantry.  There is no doubt that this training has 
left its mark on the Cavalry…men have been away from their horses for 
long periods, and the characteristics of Cavalry…have sometimes been 
forgotten.15   
 
While Haig recognized that dismounted action in the trenches would still be necessary, he 
felt that cavalry troops had sufficient experience in this already from their time at the 
front.  He ordered that all winter training focus on mounted action and rapid movements, 
covering long distances quickly, fighting while mobile, and exploiting opportunities 
quickly and efficiently.16  The Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the Canadian Light Horse 
spent January through March 1917 taking part in exercise rides and mounted tactical 
                                                          
13 Leonard to Mother, 11 March 1917. 
14 Leonard to Mother, 11 March 1917. 
15 TNA WO 95/574.  War Diary, Cavalry Corps, September 1916.  Appendix H, Cav. Corps G.X. 41, 
Winter Training. 
16 TNA WO 95/574.  War Diary, Cavalry Corps, September 1916.  Appendix H, Cav. Corps G.X. 41, 
Winter Training; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 95-96; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 279. 
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exercises, as well as musketry and sword drills in anticipation of mounted action in 
1917.17 
The winter of 1916-1917 also saw continued changes to operational thinking 
when it came to the size and scope of a cavalry “breakthrough.”  The ultimate goal of a 
large-scale cavalry breakthrough as planned for the Somme in 1916 was scaled back.  
The more realistic goal of small cavalry breakthroughs to exploit local gaps in the enemy 
line were anticipated and planned for by both the regular Cavalry Corps and Divisional 
Cavalry.  Training exercises were to be carried out in conjunction with the infantry 
wherein the cavalry would quickly advance, capture local objectives, and give the 
acquisition over to supporting infantry troops.  However, this shift in tactical thinking 
was still developing in 1917, as the command structure and the organization of the 
mounted arm had still not been adjusted to properly accommodate these tactics.  The 
decision to send the cavalry forward still rested with the Cavalry Corps commander 
instead of the divisional cavalry commander or brigade or regimental officers at the 
front.18 
Delays to Cavalry Training 
Despite Haig’s more realistic goals and his desire for intensive mounted exercises, 
winter cavalry training was hindered by the demands of working party duties.  The CCB 
carried on with half the Brigade still working in a Pioneer Battalion until 10 February 
1917.19  These men were unable to participate in cavalry training for much of the winter.  
Those who remained in billets were left to care for their dismounted comrade’s horses 
                                                          
17 War Diary, FGH, 1 January-17 March 1917. 
18 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 96-97; Badsey Doctrine and Reform, 279. 
19 DHH 74/672 Edwin Pye Fonds, Series VII, Box 24, Folder 21, File 9.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
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during their absence, which limited the time they could devote to training.  The demands 
of the war meant that the British cavalry divisions were not as well trained in mobile 
warfare as Haig had hoped by the spring of 1917. 
Like their compatriots in the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, the Canadian Light 
Horse struggled to find adequate time to train amidst their various other responsibilities.  
The regiment was placed at the disposal of the First Army for much of the winter, and 
various detachments were sent to perform escort duties and traffic control work.20  
Tunnelling company duties continued at Neuville St. Vaast in two-week rotations.  The 
CLH sent two officers and 144 other ranks to participate from January to March, with 
fifty percent of the force relieved on a weekly basis.  In addition to these responsibilities, 
twenty members of the CLH were engaged in important work as reconnaissance 
observers21 with various Canadian infantry brigades during the winter months.22  Regular 
drilling took place while in billets in Divon, but intensive mounted training at the 
regimental level was not possible with so many troops away from camp, as the CLH had 
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to continually be reorganized to compensate for the absence of so many men.23  So little 
attention had been given to training that Leonard began to suspect the CLH would not be 
employed as cavalry during the upcoming spring campaign.  He stated “Our men are still 
doing front line work, although it seems about time we got them back to do a little 
training, evidently they have not very much thought of using us.”24  Indeed, the CLH was 
last able to train as a full unit at Contay in September 1916.25  Finally on 13 March, all 
CLH working parties were relieved from Neuville St. Vaast to begin intensive mounted 
training for the upcoming spring campaign.26   
Training was further delayed by the deteriorating health of the horses.  
Throughout the winter months, all British cavalry divisions suffered from poor forage 
supply.  Many horses had grown thin after the Somme and became worse when shipping 
disruptions from German submarine attacks caused a shortage of oats beginning in 
November 1916.  According to Anglesey, the horses had to do with a mere six pounds of 
oats per day instead of their official ration of twelve until April 1917.27  These problems 
continued throughout the winter and were exacerbated by the unusually cold weather, 
which lasted from November through April.28  An outbreak of mange in January 1917 
caused further debilitation to the horses.29  Even those not affected were forced to have 
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26 War Diary, CLH, March 1917, Appendix A.  Canadian Corps G. 196, 4 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 
Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  “A” Form Messages and Signals G. 346 Canadian Corps to Corps Mounted 
troops, 8 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse 719, Working 
Party Neuville St. Vaast, 9 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  W.P. 27, Canadian 
Light Horse, 12 March 1917. 
27 Anglesey, Vol. VIII, 66, 70. 
28 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 98-99. 
29 TNA WO 95/581.  War Diary, Cavalry Corps D.D.V.S., 6 January 1917. 
 167
their coats clipped in mid-Winter to prevent infection.  Leonard maintained that the 
horses faired so poorly during the spring campaigns because their coats had been clipped 
in severe cold when they were often expected to live in the open.  He noted that horses 
that had been out on patrol work at that time were not clipped, and appeared in much 
better condition by the spring than those who had suffered in the cold without their 
natural covering.30  All of these factors had a severe impact on the health of the horses, 
and resulted in heavier loss at the front in the spring of 1917. 
Retreat to the Hindenburg Line – Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 24-28 March 1917 
On 15 and 16 November 1916, the Allied Commanders met at Chantilly to 
determine their strategy for 1917.  It was decided that the Western Front would remain 
the principal theatre of operations, and that French and British forces would continue to 
attack between Lens and the Oise.31  All were inspired by French success in the latter 
stages of the Battle of Verdun, attributing their achievements to careful planning and 
training, surprise attacks, and General Robert Nivelle’s skilful use of creeping artillery 
barrages.32  Consequently, Nivelle replaced General Joseph Joffre as Commander in 
Chief of the French Armies on 13 December 1916.  Nivelle immediately began planning 
a mass assault known as the “Nivelle Offensive”33 on the Western Front designed to 
break the German line with shock tactics, for which he received British support.34   
                                                          
30 1HMA Leonard Collection, IL-0407705, Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 11 May 1917; 
War Diary, CLH, 8 May 1917; War Diary, CLH, April 1917, Remarks. 
31 Nicholson, 236. 
32 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3987, Folder 11, File 27.  G.S. 483 Headquarters 5th Cavalry Division 21 January 
1917.  Notes on a Visit of a Party of British Officers to Verdun, 5-8 January 1917. 
33 The Nivelle Offensive opened on 16 April 1917 and was disastrous.  The French Army advanced a mere 
four miles in one month and incurred approximately 134,000 casualties.  This horrendous loss was 
followed by Nivelle’s replacement by Henri-Philippe Petain on 15 May, and the mutiny of the French 
Army through June.  See Nicholson, 243-244.   
34 Nicholson, 236-239. 
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However, enemy forces had plans of their own for the spring of 1917.  In 
September 1916, the Germans began constructing a defensive line behind their front 
known as the “Hindenburg Line,” which ran from Arras to Soissons.  They voluntarily 
surrendered their front line position and retreated to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917, 
as it shortened their front by thirty miles and permitted them draw the Allies deeper into 
their defensive network while saving manpower.  It also allowed them to delay any 
Allied spring offensive, which gave time to resupply and to shore up reserves.  They 
hoped that unrestricted submarine warfare35 would take a toll on the Allies before they 
could begin a new campaign in the spring.36   
The German retreat began to the south of the line opposite General Rawlinson’s 
Fourth Army on 14 March 1917.  General Gough’s Fifth Army was stationed to the north 
of the Allied line, where the German retreat began on 17 March.  Although the retreating 
Germans were under explicit orders not to counter-attack, the Fourth and Fifth British 
Armies had to pursue the enemy with caution while closing the gap between the two 
armies, as their artillery and some machine guns remained within range.  The retreating 
Germans had also employed highly organized and well-armed rearguards, and used a 
series of delaying tactics to prevent a close pursuit of their retreat.  For example, they left 
strongly entrenched garrisons in each deserted village that had to be defeated and driven 
out.  They also set a series of traps to further delay the pursuit, and employed a ‘scorched 
                                                          
35 Beginning on 1 February 1917. 
36 See Appendix VII for map.  Nicholson, 241-252. 
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earth’ policy, destroying any resources of value and leaving devastation in their wake 
across a front nearly 100 miles long and twenty miles deep.37  
The Allies best hope of pursuing the retreating force quickly was with their most 
mobile arm, the cavalry.  When the German retreat began, the Cavalry Corps was still 
training in winter billets.  The 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were ordered to the front to 
support the Fifth38 and Fourth Armies respectively.39  The CCB and the Ambala Brigade 
were selected to participate in the action for the 5th Cavalry Division on the Fourth Army 
front.  The CCB left winter billets in Friaucourt on 19 March with LSH acting as the 
advance guard.40 
On 16 March, Haig established clear objectives for the cavalry pursuing the 
German retreat.  The British armies were to maintain pressure on the retreating enemy 
and their rearguards, taking advantage of local opportunities where possible but with 
minimal risk and loss.  Thereafter, an offensive was to take place at Arras-Vimy to break 
the enemy defences and flank the Hindenburg Line from the north towards Cambrai.41  
The orders to the mounted arm were fairly limiting but realistic, as cavalry was to pursue 
the enemy while sustaining minimal losses and attacking small objectives.   
                                                          
37 Cyril Falls, ed.  History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Military Operations: France and 
Belgium1917, Vol. 1, The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras (London: 
Macmillan, 1940), 162; Nicholson, 241-242. 
38 Although the Fifth Army had the least amount of distance to cover while pursuing the Germans, it had to 
advance as quickly as possible, as an offensive at Arras was planned for April.  However, this section of the 
German line was more heavily defended.  Consequently, the mounted troops of the 4th Cavalry Division 
mostly acted as reconnaissance patrollers and flank guards on this front, and had little to do in offensive 
action.  However, the 5th Cavalry Division (which included the CCB) had several opportunities for mounted 
action on the Fourth Army front to the south, as it had a broad front to cover, and fewer German defences 
to block mounted action.  See Kenyon, British Cavalry, 104. 
39 TNA WO 95/574.  War Diary, Cavalry Corps, 19 March 1917.  Appendix A, Cavalry Corps Operational 
Order No. 1.   
40 War Diary, FGH, 19-24 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 3.  5th Cavalry Division 
Operational Order No. 19, 19 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 8.  Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade Operational Order No. 15, 19 March 1917. 
41 TNA WO 158/223.  Third Army File.  G.H.Q. Letter O.A.D 337, 16 March 1917. 
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The CCB arrived at Le Mesnil at 9:00am on 24 March.42  The Fourth Army was 
positioned approximately five miles east of Bapaume, and only six miles away from the 
Hindenburg line.  The CCB was stationed at the northernmost portion of the Fourth 
Army’s line, between Bus and Longavesnes.43  The RCD relieved the 15th Corps Cavalry 
and was positioned the farthest to the north, serving with XIV Corps at Moislans.  The 
FGH relieved the XIV Corps Cavalry and served with XV Corps to the right, while LSH 
remained in reserve.44  Orders were in keeping with Haig’s instructions from 16 March.  
The CCB was to locate the position of the advancing enemy detachments, estimate the 
enemy’s defensive capabilities and strength, establish pickets to prevent the enemy from 
advancing, and to pursue the enemy retreat.45  Cavalry was expected to advance and 
observe the enemy and report their findings without taking any unnecessary risks.46 
The British Divisional Cavalry responsible for the area had already withdrawn 
due to heavy enemy shelling, and had lost touch with the retreating Germans.  
Consequently, the CCB began to advance immediately.  The RCD sent out 
reconnaissance patrols to Longavesnes, Liéramont, and Sorel.47  “A” Squadron advanced 
to Buire Wood and Aizecourt La Bas, pushing into Tincourt Wood by 6:00pm without 
encountering enemy resistance.  “B” Squadron held the line between Aizecourt and 
                                                          
42 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Narrative of Operations, Fort Garry Horse, Ytres and Bois 
de Valluart. 
43 The CCB would advance between Aizecourt Le Haut, Templeux, Longavesnes, Epehy, Honnecourt, Le 
Transloy, Barastre, Berincourt, and Havercourt.  See TNA WO 95/1152.  War Diary, 5th Cavalry Division, 
March 1917.  Appendix 98, 5th Cavalry Division Operational Order No. 23, 19 March 1917. 
44 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 8.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade Operational Order No. 19, 24 
March 1917. 
45 TNA WO 95/1152.  War Diary, 5th Cavalry Division, March 1917.  Appendix 98, 5th Cavalry Division 
Operational Order No. 23, 19 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 8.  Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade Operational Order No. 19, 24 March 1917. 
46 The Ambala Brigade was sent to the southern section to support the Fourth Army’s III and IV Corps.   
47 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 8.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade Operational Order No. 19, 24 
March 1917. 
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Nurlu, while “C” Squadron remained in reserve north west of St. Pierre.48  The FGH 
immediately began their advance to Equancourt, Flus, and Ytres, with particular attention 
to the Squancourt-Ytres line.49  “C” Squadron50 of the FGH advanced at 9:30am.  “C” 
Squadron occupied Étricourt, Quatre Vente Farm, and Léchelle without encountering any 
enemy opposition, and made contact with the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps 
(ANZAC) Infantry at Bertincourt and the RCD at Nurlu.  “A” Squadron51 of the FGH 
arrived at Étricourt to relieve “C” Squadron.  The troops of “A” Squadron held the village 
with little opposition until they reached the high ground to the east of Étricourt, where 
they lost two horses to machine gun fire.52   
“C” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse continued to advance and found the enemy 
at Bus and drove them back to Ytres.  They pursued them and came under enemy fire at 
the outskirts of the village.  After regrouping, “C” Squadron attacked Ytres at dusk.  The 
Germans held the village with eighty to ninety men, and had their machine guns 
positioned in ideal locations, behind concealed flanks and hidden from aerial 
reconnaissance and were “sufficient to stop mounted troops.”53  “C” Squadron of the 
FGH dismounted and fought a heated house-to-house engagement at Ytres, and finally 
drove the majority of the enemy forces from the village and into Valluart Wood to the 
                                                          
48 War Diary, RCD, 24 March 1917. 
49 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 3.  5th Cavalry Division Operational Order No. 24, 24 March 
1917. 
50 Under Major Wallace J. Sharpe 
51 Under Major Middlemast. 
52 War Diary, FGH, 24 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 2.  Operations at Monchy, 
Report by FGH 24-27 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Narrative of Operations, 
Fort Garry Horse, Ytres and Bois de Valluart. 
53 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 13.  Notes on Operations of Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 5th 
Cavalry Division, 24-28 March 1917. 
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south.  By nightfall on 24 March, Ytres was in the CCB’s hands,54 the first village 
captured by a British cavalry regiment since 1914.  The engagement only cost the FGH 
four horses and one severely wounded soldier.55 
On 25 March, the Germans still held Longavesnes, Liéramont, and Equancourt, 
and the eastern edge of Valluart Wood.  The British XV Corps was ordered to advance 
against the main line of enemy resistance at Liéramont, Nurlu, Equancourt, and 
Bertincourt, while III Corps attacked at Poeuilly, Bernes, Marquaix, and Longavesnes.  
The CCB was ordered to drive enemy rearguards from their positions with support from 
the 8th and 40th Infantry Divisions that would follow the cavalry and hold the ground 
gained by the CCB, allowing the mounted troops to continue their advance.56  Two 
machine gun sections were sent to reinforce the CCB, with one machine gun squadron 
advancing with each cavalry squadron.57   
Early in the day, the CCB sent out reconnaissance patrols.58  The FGH discovered 
eight 4-inch enemy guns near Neuville, enemy machine guns to the south of Ruyalcourt, 
and enemy infantry and machine gun nests entrenched at Equancourt and near Ytres.  
Lieutenant Mills’ patrol reached the edge of Equancourt but retreated in the face of 
enemy machine gun fire, which cost them two men and two horses.59  
                                                          
54 However, enemy snipers remained in the upper levels of some houses, and fired on the FGH throughout 
the night.  Similarly, the continued to shell the village from their position in Valluart Wood.  See LAC RG9 
III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Narrative of Operations, Fort Garry Horse, Ytres and Bois de Valluart. 
55 TNA WO 95/1152.  War Diary, 5th Cavalry Division, March 1917.  Appendix 102, Narrative of 
Operations of the 5th Cavalry Division between 24 and 27 March, 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 
3, File 2.  Operations at Monchy, Report by FGH 24-27 March 1917; War Diary, FGH, 24 March 1917.  
56 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 1.  XV Corps Operational Order No. 99, 25 March 1917. 
57 War Diary, FGH, 25 March 1917. 
58 The RCD spent much of the day patrolling the Sorel and Liéramont and Longavesnes areas.  One patrol 
from “A” Squadron was captured and taken prisoner in Tincourt wood, and a detachment skirmished with a 
party of twenty Germans at Aizecourt.  Meanwhile, LSH remained in reserve but sent reconnaissance 
patrols to Equancourt Wood and village.  See War Diary, RCD, 25 March 1917; War Diary, LSH, 25 
March 1917. 
59 War Diary, FGH, 25 March 1917. 
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At 3:30pm, “A” and “C” Squadrons of the FGH attacked 200 Germans in 
Vallulart Wood.  “C” Squadron embarked from the north of Ytres, and “A” Squadron 
from the south.  The mounted advance took place under covering machine gun fire and 
support from the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.  Upon their arrival at Valluart Wood, 
the FGH dismounted.  The enemy fought fiercely but were finally driven back to 
Vallulart Station into a wired trench.60  “B” Squadron of the FGH arrived to relieve “C” 
Squadron, and held Vallulart Wood and Station through the night under heavy shelling.61  
The engagement cost the FGH five wounded men and two killed, and six horses killed.62   
By 26 March, the Allies held the line between Marquaix, Tincourt Wood, 
Aizecourt Le Bas Nurli, Manancourt, and Ytres.  On 26 March, the cavalry was ordered 
to capture Liéramont63 and Equancourt while the 8th Divisional Corps Cavalry Regiment 
kept in contact with the CCB to assist with operations and hold ground until the infantry 
arrived.64  At noon, the commanding officers for each regiment of the CCB held a 
meeting to determine the best strategy for the capture of Equancourt.65  Orders were 
issued at 2:30pm to send two mounted squadrons forward to the south-eastern edge of the 
wooded area just outside the village at 6:00pm, clear it of the enemy garrison, and then 
advance to Equancourt.  One battery of the RCHA was to open fire on this section of the 
wood from the opposite side against the enemy’s left flank just before the advance, and 
                                                          
60 War Diary, FGH, 25 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Narrative of 
Operations, Fort Garry Horse, Ytres and Bois de Valluart. 
61 War Diary, FGH, 25 March 1917. 
62 War Diary, FGH, 25 March 1917. 
63 Late on 26 March, the CCB advanced Liéramont and occupied the village without meeting any enemy 
resistance. 
64 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 3.  8th Division Order No. 171, 26 March 1917; LAC RG9 III 
C2 Vol. 3895, Folder 6, File 3.  8th Division No. G.30/25, Instructions for the Employment of Corps 
Mounted Troops, 26 March 1917. 
65 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Report on Operations Carried out by Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, 26 March 1917. 
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then fire on Equancourt when cavalry entered the wood in a turning movement on the 
right flank.66  “A” Squadron of the FGH and “A” and “C” Squadrons of the LSH were in 
position by 5:30pm, and all reconnaissance patrols were complete by 6:00pm.67 
The RCHA and CCB machine gun squadrons opened fire on Equancourt from the 
north-west, while the FGH established firing posts to the west and north to distract the 
enemy from the main cavalry advance.68  “A” Squadron of LSH established a foothold in 
the wooded area to the south of the village by 6:30pm, and the remaining squadrons were 
sent forward.  “A” Squadron of the FGH advanced to the left while LSH took the 
village.69  When the CCB Squadrons came under enemy fire, they dismounted and swept 
through the village on foot, capturing it completely by 6:50pm. 70  “B” Squadron of LSH 
advanced to the village mounted at a gallop from the west at 6:50pm, clearing the area of 
remaining enemy resistance.71  Thereafter, “A” Squadron of the FGH occupied the high 
ground north of the village.72   Outposts were established in the evening with the help of 
the RCD. 73  The village was shelled continually throughout the night.74  Overnight, the 
CCB was relieved by the 2nd Lincolnshire Regiment.75  The engagement cost the LSH 
                                                          
66 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 13.  Notes on Operations of Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 5th 
Cavalry Division, 24-28 March 1917. 
67 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 15.  B/1658 Headquarters Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 5th 
Cavalry Division.  “A” Operation on 26 March 1917, 14 June 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, 
File 13.  Notes on Operations of Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 5th Cavalry Division, 24-28 March 1917. 
68 See Appendix VIII for illustration of this manoeuvre from Cavalry Training, 1912. 
69 War Diary, FGH, 26 March 1917. 
70 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 15.  B/1658 Headquarters Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 5th 
Cavalry Division.  “A” Operation on 26 March 1917, 14 June 1917. 
71 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 15.  B/1658 Headquarters Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 5th 
Cavalry Division.  “A” Operation on 26 March 1917, 14 June 1917. 
72 Meanwhile, the FGH supplied working parties from “B” Squadron to repair roads from Le Mesnil to the 
railway crossing at Ytres, and to lay wire at the front.  See War Diary, FGH, 26 March 1917. 
73 War Diary, LSH, 26 March 1917. 
74 War Diary, LSH, 26 March 1917. 
75 The RCD spent 26 March patrolling the line between Nurlu and Longavesnes.  Reconnaissance patrols 
revealed that Longavesnes was not strongly defended, so “B” Squadron was sent in to clear the village and 
occupied it until relieved by the infantry (see War Diary, RCD, 26 March 1917).  The Ambalas were also 
successful in the south, working in conjunction with three armoured cars at Roisel (for full details, see 
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one officer and four other ranks, three horses, and thirteen wounded.76  The FGH incurred 
only three casualties and had two horses killed.77  
The CCB attack Equancourt was a great success.  As one post-operative report 
stated, “The plan devised was carried out with clockwork precision.”78  As Kenyon has 
illustrated, this particular engagement went exactly as described in Cavalry Training 
1912, a small mounted charge supported by dismounted firepower from a flank position 
against a weakened retreating enemy.79  According to a post-operative report, “The 
success of the operation was mainly due to rapid mounted action, the Squadrons effecting 
a surprise by coming in on [the] enemy’s left rear, and by the good co-operation of 
artillery and machine guns which could fire up to the last second to support the attack.”80   
By 27 March, The CCB had captured Longavesnes, Liéramont, and Equancourt.  
XV Corps had advanced to Liéramont, and III Corps held Longavesnes, and were in 
contact with the ANZAC at Velu.  The Germans still held Villers-Faucon, Guyencourt-
Saulcourt, and Sorel, with posts established close to Longavesnes and Liéramont.  The 
CCB was ordered to capture the high ground between Longavesnes and Liéramont to the 
south of Villers-Faucon,81 which overlooked Saulcourt and Guyencourt. Thereafter, the 
CCB was to advance ahead of the infantry to Guyencourt-Saulcourt, clear the area of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Kenyon, British Cavalry, 105).  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Report on Operations 
Carried out by Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 26 March 1917. 
76 War Diary, LSH, 26 March 1917. 
77 Meanwhile, the FGH supplied working parties from “B” Squadron to repair roads from Le Mesnil to the 
railway crossing at Ytres, and to lay wire at the front.  See War Diary, FGH, 26 March 1917. 
78 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Report on Operations Carried out by Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, 26 March 1917. 
79 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 109.  See Appendix VIII for illustration of this manoeuvre from Cavalry 
Training, 1912. 
80 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 14.  Report on Operations Carried out by Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, 26 March 1917. 
81 The Ambalas made their advance to the right of the CCB against Villers-Faucon.  See LAC RG9 III C2 
Vol. 3985, Folder 6 File 8.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade Operational Order No. 20, 27 March 1917. 
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enemy troops, and continue their advance once the infantry arrived to hold the captured 
ground.82 
Once again, the commanding officers and brigade captains of the CCB met to 
strategize at 11:00am.  After Seely had personally reconnoitered the area, it was decided 
that the CCB would envelop the area from the north and south.  The FGH would move 
forward from the south of Liéramont, seizing the high ground and surrounding wooded 
areas, and then advance on Saulcourt.  LSH would advance on Guyencourt at a gallop 
from the north, performing a turning manoeuvre and pressing one troop into Chauffurs 
Wood to cut off any enemy retreat.  Orders for the attack were issued at 3:00pm, and the 
offensive was set to begin at 4:30pm.83 
In the early morning, reconnaissance patrols from the RCD had scouted the areas 
near Longavesnes and Liéramont.84  At 1:00pm, they encountered twenty enemy 
infantrymen advancing on them from a German outpost at Longavesnes.  Lieutenant 
Price ordered the RCD to charge the approaching infantry, who quickly scattered when 
faced with the cavalry charge.   Three enemy troops were killed and nine prisoners were 
captured.85  Two squadrons of the RCD were then ordered to take four machine guns and 
seize the high ground near Grebaussart Wood and Guyencourt at 4:30pm.86  Although the 
RCD incurred nine casualties, these engagements allowed machine guns and artillery to 
                                                          
82 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 1.  XV Corps Operational Order No. 100,  27 March 1917;  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6 File 8.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade Operational Order No. 20, 27 
March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 3.  5th Cavalry Division Operational Order No. 25, 
27 March 1917. 
83 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 13.  Notes on Operations of Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 5th 
Cavalry Division, 24-28 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 15.  B/1658 Headquarters 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 5th Cavalry Division.  “B” Operation on 27 March 1917, 14 June 1917. 
84 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 15.  B/1658 Headquarters Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 5th 
Cavalry Division.  “B” Operation on 27 March 1917, 14 June 1917. 
85 TNA WO 95/1083.  War Diary, CCB, 27 March 1917; Kenyon, 106. 
86 The 14th Corps Cavalry Regiment served as the RCD’s left flank guard during the advance.  LAC RG9 
III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6 File 8.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade Operational Order No. 20, 27 March 1917. 
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be placed in this area to provide covering fire for the CCB at Saulcourt and Guyencourt.87  
The RCHA stationed one battery one mile west of Liéramont, and another battery one 
mile south-west of Liéramont.  From these vantage points, they launched an artillery 
barrage on Saulcourt and Guyencourt before the cavalry advance.88 
The RCHA opened fire on the villages of Saulcourt and Guyencourt at 4:30pm, 
and continued until the cavalry moved forward.89  However, the cavalry advance was 
delayed due to a heavy snowstorm.90  Finally at 5:15pm, the FGH advanced, sending one 
troop forward as the advance guard with two machine guns firing on Saulcourt and 
Grebussart Wood.  Two troops captured Grebussart Wood, one captured Saulcourt Wood, 
and one captured Chauffurs Wood while the remaining three troops advanced north to 
Saulcourt.  “B” Squadron made a frontal assault on Saulcourt, and “C” Squadron attacked 
on the right.91  The FGH advanced to Saulcourt at a gallop in column formations, and 
cleared the village of enemy forces, although “C” Squadron was unable to cut off the 
enemy retreat to Epehy.  Outposts were established one mile east of Saulcourt and on the 
outskirts of the village.  The operation at Saulcourt cost the FGH six men wounded.92 
Meanwhile, “A” and “C” Squadrons of LSH advanced through a cemetery located 
on a ridge to the north west of Guyencourt.  The lead squadron advanced at a gallop in 
                                                          
87 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 15.  B/1658 Headquarters Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 5th 
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92 War Diary, FGH, 27 March 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 4, File 15.  B/1658 Headquarters 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 5th Cavalry Division.  “B” Operation on 27 March 1917, 14 June 1917. 
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extended order and attacked the enemy’s right flank under covering fire from the RCHA 
and machine gun posts located on a ridge west of the village.93  The second squadron 
turned in a wider motion, advancing on Guyencourt from the north-east under covering 
fire from a machine gun post on the northern edge of the village.  According to one 
report, LSH came under enemy fire and were forced to dismount because they had not 
given their advance guard scouts sufficient time to report enemy positions, and were 
fortunate to survive this action with minimal loss.94  The mounted force took cover in a 
valley and quickly dismounted, handing their horses over to handlers.95  Thereafter, LSH 
swept through the village dismounted to the enemy’s right and occupied the north-eastern 
corner of Guyencourt, having only one man killed, twelve wounded, and seven horses 
killed.96  During the advance, Lieutenant Frederick Morris Harvey single-handedly 
captured a machine gun nest in advance of the main assault.  Harvey shot an enemy 
gunner with his revolver and rushed the nest while the remaining gunners fled.  He 
received the Victoria Cross for his actions.97   
By 5:50pm, the German forces withdrew, having destroyed their ammunition 
dump before leaving Saulcourt.  The enemy fled to Epehy with the FGH in pursuit while 
the reserve squadrons and the RCD advanced to the west of Saulcourt.98  The engagement 
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File 13.  Notes on Operations of Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 5th Cavalry Division, 24-28 March 1917. 
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cost the CCB thirty-four casualties.  Information on enemy casualties is only available for 
27 March.99  According to official reports, the CCB captured two machine guns, twenty 
lances, and fifteen enemy prisoners.  One report confirmed twelve enemy troops had been 
killed in action, however, the FGH War Diary reported that between twenty and forty 
enemy troops had been confirmed killed.  It was noted that untold others were likely 
killed by heavy machine gun fire while retreating to Epehy.100 
Although it took the Allies until 5 April to drive the remaining Germans from 
their outposts and establish a new defensive line, the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were 
withdrawn on 28 March.101  It was necessary to allow the men and horses to recover, as 
they had been in action constantly for four days, and the horses had been in the open 
enduring severe weather since 18 March.102  However, all were in good spirits, as 
Brigadier General Archibald Home remarked after visiting the 5th Cavalry Division, 
“They were very cheerful and pleased as [they] had had quite a pretty little fight and were 
all the better for it.”103 
Assessing Success 
Despite the 5th Cavalry Division’s success, the mounted arm has been criticized 
for not launching a more intensive and vigorous pursuit of the retreating enemy.104  
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However, the mounted arm advanced much more aggressively than the original orders 
demanded.  Haig specified that the cavalry was only to pursue the retreating enemy while 
harassing their rearguards, taking advantage of local opportunities where possible but 
with minimal risk and loss.105  Reports stated that the limitations imposed on the cavalry 
prevented the mounted arm from pressing on and seizing high ground positions beyond 
these objectives.106  As Kenyon has argued, exhaustion also limited what the mounted 
arm was capable of achieving during this pursuit, as cavalry was not available in 
sufficient numbers to sustain a prolonged operation.  The 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions 
were sent to the front to relieve the Divisional Cavalry squadrons during the German 
retreat, not to increase the size of the cavalry force at the front.  There was no remaining 
cavalry force available to relieve the 4th and 5th Divisions, as the 1st 2nd and 3rd Divisions 
were being held in reserve for the impending Arras offensive.107  These rigorous cavalry 
actions were not sustainable over long periods of time without relief.108 
More significantly, the actions of the 5th Cavalry Division during the Retreat to 
the Hindenburg Line represent what the mounted arm was capable of when open warfare 
returned to the Western Front.  It has been argued that cavalry operations at the 
Hindenburg Line were of limited tactical significance, as the infantry might have 
performed a comparable operation with the same outcome.  However, cavalry was 
certainly more useful in this particular operation because of its superior mobility.  The 
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infantry could not have closed the gap between the Allied and enemy armies as quickly 
and with as few casualties as the mounted arm.  Speed, surprise, and determination were 
all cited as key factors in the success of these operations.109  The CCB was able to 
advance quickly, consolidate positions, pass off gains to the infantry, and continue to 
advance.  The cavalry was able to carry out operations exactly as expected by the 
doctrine laid out in Cavalry Training 1912, performing turning manoeuvres with great 
success as they did on 26 March, and using envelopment from the north and south at 
Guyencourt and Saulcourt on 27 March.110  Cavalry was able to advance across open 
ground in extended order, combine turning movements with frontal assaults under 
covering fire, and perform flanking manoeuvres against enemy machine guns to distract 
the enemy from the main advance.111  
Several factors made this success possible.  First, realistic expectations were set 
by the high command.  This was one of the few times that Haig established clear and 
attainable objectives for the cavalry, which undoubtedly contributed to mounted 
success.112  Second, unlike the cavalry operations of 1916, the cavalry did not miss 
opportunities from being held back to await orders.  Proper communication was 
maintained during these operations.  Supporting infantry units kept communication with 
the advancing cavalry, and telephones were used throughout the operation, as there had 
been no enemy artillery barrage to cut the lines.  Local commanders and brigade captains 
were also able to take some initiative, meeting to determine the most effective strategy 
and decided when to send the cavalry forward.  The mounted arm was not held back by 
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slow communications with the Cavalry Corps headquarters during this particular 
operation.113   
Proper attention to coordinating cavalry operations with artillery and machine gun 
support was a significant factor in the success of these operations.  Covering fire allowed 
the mounted arm to carry out mounted rifle operations, and also perform shock actions 
with outflanking manoeuvres.  It became clear that mounted troops could advance 
through enemy machine gun and artillery fire relatively unscathed, so long as the barrage 
was not terribly intense. 114  Reports noted that the shock of a cavalry charge undoubtedly 
impacted the effect of German machine guns, as their fire became “erratic” in the face of 
galloping cavalry.115  The CCB also managed to capture enemy machine guns and put 
them out of action.116  As a report by the Fort Garry Horse stated, “we proved to our 
satisfaction that mounted men handled with determination can always ‘down’ a machine 
gun which is not protected by wire.”117   
While these factors were all key to the success of the cavalry during the German 
retreat, the circumstances under which these actions took place must be taken into 
account.  The scattered enemy detachments formed flanks available for cavalry 
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exploitation, just as Henderson had anticipated in 1902 when addressing cavalry action in 
pursuit during trench warfare, stating: 
Antidotes [to trench warfare] exist, such as surprise, the sudden seizure of 
tactical points which have been left unoccupied, outflanking manoeuvres, 
and movements against the line of retreat.  Now the effect of each of these 
operations depends, broadly speaking, on rapidity and secrecy…the 
cavalry is the arm which best fulfils the required conditions.118 
 
However, while the retreating German forces employed effective rearguards that would 
open fire on the cavalry force at their heels, it must be remembered that the cavalry was 
pursuing an enemy that was instructed not to counter-attack.  German strategy allowed a 
return to open warfare on the Western Front by design, not because of defeat.   
Nonetheless, the mounted arm put fourth a tremendous effort in March 1917, and 
effectively demonstrated the value of mounted cavalry as a fighting force on the Western 
Front, and all were very encouraged about their potential for future use.119  As Falls 
stated in the British Official History, “The work done by the 5th Cavalry Division during 
the few days it was at the disposal of the Fourth Army was brilliant.”120  The success of 
the cavalry during the Retreat to the Hindenburg Line influenced cavalry doctrine and 
tactical thinking for the remainder of the year. 
Vimy Ridge – Canadian Light Horse, 9-14 April 1917 
While the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was fighting on the Western Front in March, 
the Canadian Light Horse was training for the impending spring campaign.  Haig 
launched his Northern Offensive, the Battle of Arras, on 9 April 1917 to divert German 
resources away from the French front during the coming Nivelle Offensive.  The British 
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Third Army was ordered to attack across an eight-mile front beside the Scarpe River.121  
The Canadian Corps would provide the British with a defensive flank by launching a 
synchronized four-division attack across the adjoining four-mile front between the Scarpe 
and Souchez Rivers at Vimy Ridge.122  According to Nicholson, Vimy was one of the 
most tactically significant places on the Western Front, as “the Ridge was the keystone of 
the defences linking the new Hindenburg system to the main German lines leading north 
from Hill 70 to the Belgian coast.”123  Vimy Ridge was also a significant observation 
point from which many key positions could be seen, including Lens to the north, Douai to 
the east, and Arras to the south.124 
GOC the Canadian Corps Julian Byng125 was assigned the task of capturing Vimy 
Ridge with all four Canadian Divisions and support from the 5th British Division on 19 
January 1917.  By 5 March, Byng had planned his 4000-yard advance in four stages.  The 
coordinated offensive was scheduled to begin at 5:30am on 9 April.  All four Canadian 
Divisions were to attack the enemy line between the Commandant’s House and Kennedy 
Crater.  Meanwhile, XVII Corps would attack the southern portion of Vimy Ridge, from 
the Commandant’s house to the Scarpe River at Athies.126  Each division would 
simultaneously send two brigades forward.  The first Canadian wave would advance 750 
yards and capture the “Black Line” of German forward defences in thirty-five minuets. 
At 6:45am, the Canadian Corps would advance to their second objective, the “Red Line” 
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that ran to the north and included La Folie Farm and Hill 145.  The Red Line was the 
final objective for the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions, which were expected to hold the far 
side of the Ridge by 7:05am.  At 9:35am, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions127 were to 
advance 1200 yards to the third objective represented by the “Blue Line,” which 
penetrated the second German line of defence and included Thelus, Hill 135, Bonval 
Wood and Count’s Wood.  Thereafter, 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions would advance to 
the final objective, the “Brown Line” through Farbus Wood and Bonval Wood.  If all 
went according to plan, Vimy Ridge would be in Canadian hands by 1:18pm.128   
Few plans had been made for cavalry support for the Canadians at Vimy Ridge 
beyond the reconnaissance patrols expected of the Canadian Light Horse.  It was thought 
that one division from the Cavalry Corps might advance through the Douai plain to 
capture rail and canal crossings for the Canadians if circumstances allowed.  The 1st 
British Cavalry Division was designated to support the Canadian assault on Vimy 
Ridge.129  However, orders to place the 1st Cavalry Division under General Henry 
Horne’s130 command were cancelled on 5 April, as Vimy Ridge was planned according to 
a strict timetable that all had to follow as precisely as possible.131  Consequently, it was 
not an operation considered suitable for cavalry, as the mounted arm was expected to be 
called forward as circumstances dictated.  However, a role was still designated for the 
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Canadian Divisional Cavalry.  “B” and “C” Squadrons of the CLH were expected to 
report to the front on 9 April to perform mounted reconnaissance patrols at Vimy Ridge, 
while all four troops of “A” Squadron were attached to each Canadian Division to work 
as reconnaissance patrollers, mounted police, dispatch riders, escorts, and traffic 
controllers.132  Leonard and Lieutenant Colonel Smith began reconnoitering proper routes 
of advance for the CLH to get to their forward area on 5 April.133    
Although they were ordered to embark for the front at 10:00am, the men of the 
CLH left their billets by 9:30am on 9 April with eleven officers and 200 other ranks from 
“B” and “C” Squadrons.134  They arrived at Corps headquarters at 11:45am and learned 
that the Canadian assault on Vimy Ridge had so far been successful and was proceeding 
on schedule.  Leonard was ordered to take his regiment to stand to at Alleux Wood and 
await orders to send a cavalry patrol to Willerval.135  The CLH arrived in the wood by 
11:55am.  As per operational orders, Leonard sent a troop of cavalry and a platoon of 
cyclists to follow the infantry and mark a safe route for the cavalry to advance with white 
tape.136  One patrol was sent to Thelus and Neuville St. Vaast, and a second to Arras 
Road.137   
                                                          
132 1st Troop of “A” Squadron served with the 1st Canadian Division, 2nd Troop with the 2nd Canadian 
Division, 3rd Troop with the 3rd Canadian Division, and 4th Troop with the 4th Canadian Division.  No 
further details are available on “A” Squadron’s experience at Vimy Ridge.  War Diary, CLH, April 1917, 
Appendix A1.  Report on Cavalry Patrols III Troop “A” Squadron Canadian Light Horse, 24 April 1917; 
War Diary, CLH, March 1917, Appendix B.  Operational Order No. 12, Canadian Light Horse, 25 March 
1917; War Diary, CLH, 25 March-9 April 1917; Nicholson, 258. 
133 War Diary, CLH, 5 April 1917. 
134 One liaison officer was attached to the 1st Canadian Division, and another to the 2nd Canadian Division 
to keep the CLH informed of the infantry’s progress.  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 1.  
Operational Order No. 103, Canadian Corps, 4 April 1917; War Diary, CLH, April 1917, Appendix A.  
Operational Order No. 12, Canadian Corps Mounted Troops, 6 April 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, 
Folder 5, File 7.  Operational Order No. 13, Canadian Corps Mounted Troops, 8 April 1917. 
135 See Appendix IX for map. 
136 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 6.  Resume of Operations, Canadian Light Horse, 9 to 16 
April Inclusive by Lieutenant Colonel Ibbotson Leonard, 16 April 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, 
 187
At 1:17pm, liaison officer Lieutenant H.M. Campbell138 reported that the 
Canadian infantry had reached their third objective.139  The artillery barrage was 
scheduled to lift at 1:30pm, and cavalry patrols were to be sent forward.140  Byng ordered 
Leonard to send patrols ahead of the Canadian Infantry to Willerval to determine the 
enemy’s position, and to occupy the village if they were able.141  Lieutenant King 
embarked for the west side of Farbus Wood via the Arras-Bethune Road through Thelus 
with two troops of “C” Squadron under Lieutenants Greenlay and Murray at 1:50pm.  
The remainder of the CLH stood to and off-saddled, awaiting a call to advance.142  
King’s party crossed Vimy Ridge and arrived in Farbus Wood by 4:07pm.143  King 
concentrated his troops in an abandoned German battery inside the wood.  One troop held 
this position, while the other was split into two patrols to approach Willerval from the 
north and south.144  Both patrols embarked for Willerval at 4:20pm.  Lieutenant Murray’s 
patrol advanced to the north of the village, traveling across the rail line at Farbus.  
Sergeant Smith’s patrol embarked for the south of Willerval.  Both patrols were 
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supported by covering fire from Hotchkiss guns positioned along the railway line to the 
south of Farbus, and covering fire from the 27th Infantry Battalion’s Lewis guns.145 
Upon entering Willerval, Murray’s northern patrol came under enemy fire almost 
immediately from buildings to the left of the patrol after crossing a railway.  Three horses 
were shot and killed.  The patrol pressed on to the crossroads at the centre of the village, 
and found ten German troops and one officer.  Murray ordered a cavalry charge, which 
forced the German troops to surrender, and three additional German prisoners were 
collected from the surrounding area.  The captured German officer informed Murray that 
a German machine gun nest was located to the north approximately one hundreds yards 
from the patrol’s position.  According to Sergeant Frank Madder’s report, “Just then we 
saw a machine gun coming into action in the centre of the road and it opened fire on 
us.”146  Murray ordered the patrol to mount and withdrawal.  When the troop returned to 
the crossroads, Lieutenant Murray and his horse were shot.  Madder dismounted and 
approached Murray.  Murray ordered Madder to leave him there and report their findings 
to King.  Madder led the patrol back to Farbus Wood, although four other cavalry troops 
were shot down en route to King’s position.  Eight members of the thirteen-man patrol 
returned to Farbus Wood.147   
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Sergeant Smith’s southern patrol advanced 300 yards along a road that ran 
parallel to the rail line before turning south towards Willerval.  Smith’s troops scouted a 
heavily defended enemy trench, and saw a large formation of enemy troops advancing in 
extended order, equipped with a machine gun.  They came within 100 yards of the enemy 
position when they came under fire from the village and the enemy trenches.  Smith 
ordered his patrol to withdraw, and had four men and six horses killed.  Smith reported 
that the remainder of his patrol “managed to crawl from shell hole to shell hole and made 
our way back.”148  Only two members of Smith’s six-man patrol returned to Farbus 
Wood.149  According to one report, “The sacrifice of this patrol occupied the Germans in 
the village and was largely responsible for the success of the other patrol in getting in on 
the north.”150  
Meanwhile, at 3:45pm, Lieutenant Campbell reported that the Germans were in 
full retreat, and the remainder of the CLH was to move on to Willerval if King reported 
conditions were suitable for cavalry action.  At 4:00pm, Leonard advanced to Farbus 
Wood with Lieutenants Cockshutt and Bernard, four Hotchkiss guns, and one troop of 
“C” Squadron to assess the situation.  Upon arriving at 5:15pm, Leonard found King’s 
patrol taking shelter from heavy enemy fire inside former German gun pits.  King 
reported that the roads towards Thelus were very bad, and that the horses were exhausted 
and in very bad shape, though the road beyond Thelus was intact and suitable for a 
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cavalry advance.151  However, “C” Squadron’s patrols had spotted German ammunition 
wagons traveling on the roads between Arleux and Acheville, and a four-wave German 
counterattack forming across a wide front just east of Willerval through the Mont Foret 
Quarries.  Under these circumstances, Leonard was forced to order the CLH to withdraw 
at 5:30pm.152   
 “C” Squadron returned to headquarters through an enemy artillery barrage.  The 
CLH arrived by 7:35pm, with approximately fifty percent of their mounts wounded.  At 
7:45pm, the 1st Canadian Division ordered the CLH to withdraw to Mont St. Eloy.153  
According to Leonard’s notes, “All reported in at new location [at 11:30pm].  The night 
was a hard one on the men and horses as all were in an open field and snow fell before 
morning.”154  Casualties reported by the CLH for 9 April were six killed, six wounded, 
and two missing.  Lieutenant T.H. Murray was listed as severely wounded and missing.  
The CLH also lost thirty-four horses.155   
Though these patrols were costly, they did have an effect on the enemy.  
According to Nicholson, German reports stated that “a strong force of English cavalry 
had broken through into Willerval,” and ordered a counterattack on the village.156  This 
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153 War Diary, CLH, April 1917, Appendix C, O.C.’s Report. 
154 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 6.  Army Book 153, Field Message Book.  Ibbotson Leonard, 
9 April 1917. 
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LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 6.  Army Book 153, Field Message Book.  Ibbotson Leonard, 10 
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was the four-wave German counterattack east of Willerval seen by the CLH patrols.  
Upon his return, Leonard was able to report the German counter attack to the 2nd 
Canadian Division, and give all information collected by the CLH patrols on the enemy’s 
movements and position.157  The CLH patrols were able to report that the enemy still held 
Willerval and were still firing machine guns from this location.158  Leonard159 felt that the 
CLH could have been much more effective if they had been ordered to advance to the 
forward area earlier in the day.  He stated in his report, “In my opinion, it would have 
been better to have been up sooner, say, 9:00am, as patrols might haven more 
advantageously pushed into Willerval immediately after the Infantry gained their 
objective, about 2:00pm.”160   
By 8:30pm on 9 April, all Canadian divisions and XVII Corps had successfully 
captured their objectives.  The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Canadian Divisions were ordered to 
consolidate their positions and then advance to Point du Jour and Maison de la Côte 
while the 4th Canadian Division captured and consolidated the “Red Line” position.161 
Leonard reported to the 1st Canadian Division at 11:00am on 10 April to receive orders.  
The 1st Canadian Division reported that Willerval was cleared of enemy troops, and the 
CLH were to send mounted patrols forward to the high ground surrounding the village to 
reconnoitre the enemy’s position.  Leonard ordered two troops of “B” Squadron under 
Major McEwen to advance to the 4th Canadian Battalion’s headquarters at Carre Wood.  
                                                          
157 War Diary, CLH, April 1917, Appendix C, O.C.’s Report. 
158 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 1.  Operational Order No. 107, Canadian Corps.  9 April 
1917. 
159 Leonard lost his brother Woodman, a member of the 3rd Canadian Artillery Brigade, 1st Canadian 
Division on 9 April 1917.  1HMA Leonard Collection 0407704-IL.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to 
Sisters, 20 April 1917. 
160 War Diary, CLH, April 1917, Appendix C, O.C.’s Report. 
161 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 1.  Operational Order No. 107, Canadian Corps.  9 April 
1917. 
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Two troops of “B” Squadron equipped with two Hotchkiss guns embarked from Mont St 
Eloy at 1:00pm on 10 April.162  They advanced to Battalion Headquarters in Carre Wood.  
They were ordered to send two patrols forward to reconnoiter high ground positions 
surrounding the village, and scout the entrenched positions to the west of the village.163  
McEwen’s patrol advanced to Willerval only to find that it had not been cleared of the 
enemy infantry, as the Germans still held a railway line.  “B” Squadron was forced to 
retire.164   
On 11 April, the CLH stood to at the old gun pits of the 10th Battery, 3rd Artillery 
Brigade ready to advance at thirty minutes notice to support the planned infantry advance 
along the Lens-Arras railway.  However, the CLH was not called forward as the offensive 
was delayed until the evening of 13 April to allow coordinated flanking manoeuvres.165  
The Canadian Light Horse took shelter in the former gun pits on 12 April while 
reconnaissance patrols under McEwen spent the remainder of the day scouting a better 
embarkation point than Farbus Wood, as their experience on 9 April proved it was a very 
exposed position.166  Meanwhile, the 4th Canadian Division captured the northern tip of 
Vimy Ridge, also called “The Pimple,” and the Lorette Spur in a snowstorm on 12 
April.167   
                                                          
162 War Diary, CLH, April 1917, Appendix, Wires “P” Canadian Light Horse to 1st Canadian Division, 
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By 13 April, the German troops had withdrawn to their Third Position along the 
Oppy-Méricourt Line towards Lens.  At 4:55pm, the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
occupied Willerval and the 1st Canadian Division ordered the CLH to advance to Farbus 
Wood at Posen House and stand to, ready to support the 8th Canadian Infantry at 
Willerval.  Two troops of “C” Squadron embarked for Farbus Wood at 5:45pm, and the 
remainder of the CLH followed at 6:00pm.168  Upon their arrival, Leonard and Lieutenant 
Campbell reported to Posen House to be briefed on the situation at the front.  At 6:15pm, 
the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade asked the 1st Canadian Division to send CLH patrols 
forward to occupy the Mont Foret Quarries and locate a heavy battery of enemy guns.169  
Leonard sent “No. 1 Patrol” under Sergeant Clear and four other ranks south of Willerval 
to determine whether the enemy held this portion of the line, and in what strength.  “No. 
2 Patrol” under Sergeant Phillips and four other ranks was sent to the north of Willerval 
to determine the enemy’s position and assess their strength.  No. 3 Patrol, comprised of 
the remainder of the troop under Lieutenant Bernard, was to take a Hotchkiss gun to 
destroy heavy enemy guns.  Finally, Leonard sent one troop forward to support the 
infantry at a sunken road in Farbus.170 All CLH patrols had embarked by 8:00pm.171   
All patrols were carried out smoothly.  At 8:35pm, the men of No. 1 Patrol 
reported that they had advanced to the enemy’s wire and determined their position.  They 
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cut the enemy’s telephone line before coming under sniper fire and retreating.172  At 
9:45pm, No. 2 Patrol reported that they advanced north of Willerval to Oppy Line, and 
discovered that the line was strongly held by enemy machine guns and infantry.  They 
dismounted and advanced in secret and discovered a gap in the enemy’s line.173  
Meanwhile, No. 3 Patrol reached and searched Mont Foret Quarries by 9:15pm, but could 
not locate the enemy guns.  They notified Leonard that they were forging ahead to 
reconnoitre a larger area.174 At 12:43am, they had reconnoitered the wider Mount Foret 
area but only found two empty gun pits, and returned to Farbus Wood at 1:00am 175  
 At 1:10am, “C” Squadron came under heavy enemy fire at Farbus Station and 
were forced to move back to the forward area.176  Thereafter, Leonard ordered King to 
move “C” Squadron to a safer location if possible and not to send out any more patrols 
until daybreak.177  King complied and sent word of his squadron’s new location at 
5:00am.178 Leonard planned to send a patrol to Arleux at dawn.179   
At 1:30am on 14 April, the CLH received word that the First Army had reached 
the Bailieul-Willerval-Vimy-Givenchy line.  However, the enemy still held the line to the 
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west of Aleux.  The 13th Canadian Corps was ordered to continue their advance at 
5:00am, with patrols sent out to determine the enemy’s position at Acheville.180   
The CLH were ordered to stand to in Farbus Wood, ready to advance in support of the 
infantry if called forward.181  At 5:50am, Leonard reported from the 8th Battalion’s 
headquarters in Farbus Wood that the infantry were set to attack between 7:00 and 
8:00am.  He ordered “B” and “C” Squadrons to be ready to advance to the railway 
crossing to support the infantry by 7:30am.182  At 11:45am, one troop of “B” Squadron 
under Lieutenant Wadge was sent to the sunken road in Farbus.  From this position, 
cavalry patrols were sent out to make contact with the 1st Canadian Division to the right 
and report on the progress of the advance, and to ensure that the right of the Canadian 
line was in touch with the British.  Although the patrols came under heavy fire and were 
forced to withdraw, they made contact with the 10th Battalion and were able to give a full 
report on an enemy battery in a sunken road.  They also gave information on the 
infantry’s progress from observation posts.183  Meanwhile, the CLH sent one NCO and 
ten other ranks to the 1st Canadian Divisional Signal Company at Maison Blanche to 
work as mounted dispatch riders for the 1st Canadian Division.184   
As the CLH had been in Farbus Wood from dawn until 4:50pm observing the 
operations, they were able to report the progress of the 2nd Canadian Brigade and the 10th 
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Canadian Battalion at Willerval, Arleux, and the Mont Foret Quarries.185  At 4:10pm, 
Colonel Kearsley ordered the CLH to withdraw to the rear area, as the need for patrol 
work had passed and water was incredibly scarce at the front.186  The remainder of the 
CLH withdrew to the rear areas at 4:50pm.187   
At 9:05am on 15 April, the CLH received orders to withdraw from the front and 
await orders.188  All squadrons except for the dispatch riders employed by the 1st 
Canadian Division withdrew to Camblain L’Abbé.189  The CLH spent 15 April caring for 
their weakened horses, who were suffering from exhaustion and exposure to the cold.190  
Burying parties were sent out at 9:00am to locate members of the CLH killed in action 
over the previous days.191  Although Leonard sent reconnaissance patrols forward to find 
a safe route to the front on 16 April, the CLH were ordered to return to reserve at 
1:30pm.192  On 17 April, “C” Squadron returned to Divon to resume cavalry training 
while “B” Squadron remained in billets at Camblain L’Abbé as a corps reserve, 
supporting the infantry by sending detachments to the front for mounted patrol work.193 
Assessment and Aftermath 
Although some patrols of the Canadian Light Horse suffered heavy casualties at 
Vimy Ridge, they were able to reconnoiter positions well ahead of the infantry advance 
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and report valuable information on the enemy’s strength and location.194  The remainder 
of the CEF showed appreciation for their work.  For example, Corps Commander P.B. 
Radcliffe congratulated “B” and “C” Squadrons of the CLH for their actions on 9 April.  
He wrote, “Both parties acted with very great dash and determination.  Their losses are 
regrettable but the value of the reconnaissance was very great and the enterprise reflects 
great credit on the Regiment.”195  Similarly, Major General W.D. Anderson of the First 
Army congratulated the patrol leaders for gathering valuable information, and 
commended Leonard for his foresight and initiative in planning his regiment’s lines of 
advance.196  Sergeant Thomas Smith received the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his 
actions at Vimy Ridge, and four others were awarded the Military Medal for their service 
with the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade at Vimy.197  The continued employment 
of the Canadian Light Horse at Vimy Ridge through 16 April proved the value of cavalry 
patrols, as mounted reconnaissance was used continually until the CLH withdrew from 
the front.  Reports continued to note that cavalry reconnaissance was far more accurate 
than aerial, infantry or tank reconnaissance.198 
In May 1917, all of the various detachments of the CLH were finally relieved199 
to resume intensive mounted training.200  Divisional cavalry training in late spring 1917 
gave a clear indication of an expected return to open warfare, as the CLH was trained in 
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the same style as the CCB in May 1917.201  Leonard spent the first weeks of May 
conducting tactical schemes that focused on attacking villages and woods mounted, 
holding these positions, and conducting patrol work.  All of these operations were carried 
out while cooperating with Hotchkiss gun cover.  Regular attention was given to 
musketry, sword drills, equitation, and dismounted action.202   
 Similarly, cavalry doctrine denoted an expected return to open warfare influenced 
by the success of the Cavalry Corps during the retreat to the Hindenburg Line in March 
1917.  There was a continued expectation that there would be few opportunities for a 
mass cavalry breakthrough, but the mounted arm would advance in pursuit by capturing a 
series of limited objectives.  For example, Corps Cavalry officers held a general 
conference on 21 May 1917, which Smith and McEwen of the CLH attended.  It was 
decided, “The old idea of [Corps Cavalry] working as independent cavalry here has been 
abandoned.  The work will be to go ahead of the infantry and seize tactical points and 
important positions and hold them until taken over by the infantry.  For this reason 
objectives given to cavalry now will be limited.”203  It was determined that divisional 
cavalry in battle would capture an objective and hold it in three lines.  The first line 
would be in a forward position and send out reconnaissance patrols.  The second would 
hold the line with Hotchkiss guns and outposts, taking cover when necessary but not 
digging in.  The third line would form a dug in line of resistance.  It was suggested that 
flanking attacks on enemy positions were often the most valuable.  The greatest emphasis 
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was placed on the importance of preparation for battle in the form of proper training, 
reconnaissance, clear orders, suitable cavalry tracks, and scouting and observation of 
cavalry action by commanding officers.204 
Conclusion 
The actions of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade in March 1917 provided a real 
indication that cavalry was capable of attacking with speed and surprise when a degree of 
open warfare returned to the battlefield.  Realistic objectives were set by the High 
Command, and local commanding officer and brigade captains were able to take some 
initiative to determine strategy instead of awaiting orders.  Similarly, the Canadian Light 
Horse was able to provide valuable mounted reconnaissance at Vimy Ridge.  They were 
able to reconnoiter and report on enemy positions in advance of the Canadian Infantry, 
and continued to conduct patrols throughout the week.  Both the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade and the Canadian Light Horse effectively supported significant campaigns in the 
spring of 1917 which proved that cavalry was still effective in their traditional roles of 
pursuit and reconnaissance, and were able to fulfill their intended role on the Western 
Front. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
The Battle of Cambrai, November 1917 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
Introduction 
 Although the Canadian Cavalry Brigade (CCB) had great success in March 1917, 
the end of the year proved difficult for the mounted arm at Cambrai.  Well established in 
historical memory as the first tank offensive, the November 1917 Battle of Cambrai was 
a short-lived success that became a costly failure.  While the offensive initially broke the 
German defences, it lost momentum and was carried on long after all hope of success had 
disappeared.  After the Battle of Cambrai, cavalry was written off as an antiquated and 
medieval arm that did nothing but sit behind the front lines, taking up road space that 
could be better used by supply trains.1  Historians have continued this condemnation.  For 
example, John Terraine partially blamed the cavalry for the success of the German 
counteroffensive, stating “Their complete failure gave the Germans the opportunity they 
needed to rally and regroup.”2  Similarly, A.J. Smithers largely ignored the role of 
cavalry at Cambrai, devoting only a few pages to condemning the “inaction”3 of the 
mounted arm.  However, Cambrai was a poorly planned campaign.  Objectives were 
unrealistic, the actions of the cavalry, infantry, and tank corps were not properly 
coordinated, and few preparations were made for an imminent enemy counter attack.4  As 
Kenyon has argued, the mounted arm was hamstrung by the failures of communication 
and command at Cambrai due to the complex top-down command structure.5  As T.T. 
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Pitman6 stated in 1923, “Of all the cavalry operations on the Western Front, none met 
with more criticism than the ‘action’ or as some say ‘inaction’ at the Battle of 
Cambrai…the result was censure by many, who neither knew the subject, nor the orders 
that were issued to the cavalry whom they condemned.”7   
Despite the tremendous success of the mounted arm in March 1917, the British 
High Command planned to dismount one of the five British Cavalry Divisions in May to 
reinforce the infantry due to a severe manpower shortage.8  However, Haig managed to 
delay this order, as dismounted cavalry still held a substantial portion of the front line.9  
Thereafter, Haig refused to comply, offering to dismount a few brigades but insisted the 
full Cavalry Corps be retained.  On 28 June 1917, Haig wrote “I hold strongly that as the 
war develops, a time will come, possibly at no very distant date, when the employment of 
cavalry in masses will not only be feasible, but urgently necessary.”10   
Before the opening of the Cambrai offensive, the CCB carried on with mounted 
training throughout the spring and summer of 1917, all the while sending detachments of 
working parties and dismounted men to the Somme from May until mid-July.11  
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Meanwhile, the remainder of the Brigade carried on with training in billets.  Dismounted 
detachments withdrew from the front by 14 July, returning to Croix and St. Martin Église 
to resume mounted training.  Exercises from April through November were highly 
influenced by the 5th Cavalry Division’s success in March 1917, and were consistent with 
Haig’s previous recommendations for attention to mounted training in 1917.12  The 
majority of training was spent in open country, practicing cross-country guard duties 
defending infantry against enemy rearguards, seizing high ground positions, and 
conducting reconnaissance patrols.  Much emphasis was placed on attacking small 
isolated positions, holding recently captured ground, and pursuing a defeated enemy.  
Intensive mounted training continued until early November in anticipation of the 
mounted arm’s action at Cambrai in late autumn 1917.13 
Planning the Cambrai Offensive  
According to Terraine, Haig believed that his best opportunity to defeat Germany 
was in Flanders.  However, the demands of coordinated offensives with the French at the 
Somme and Arras had consumed British resources. Haig’s opportunity finally came in 
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1917 due to difficulties in the French Army, such as the failure of the Nivelle Offensive, 
the French Army mutiny, and Petain’s subsequent appointment as Commander in Chief.  
Haig began to shift his forces to the north in the summer months, and launched the Third 
Ypres or “Passchendaele” offensive on 31 July 1917.14  
Although the five British Cavalry Divisions were transferred to the St. Pol area,15 
there was no opportunity to use the mounted arm on this wet muddy front.  Seely rode to 
Passchendaele to assess conditions and determine the feasibility of cavalry action.  He 
understood immediately that a mounted advance would not be possible due to heavy rain, 
deep mud, and continual shelling.  Seely added that the infantry commanders at 
Passchendaele “roared with laughter” when he told them the reason for his 
reconnaissance, as the infantry could barely advance through the muddy quagmire, never 
mind cavalry exploitation.16  The offensive itself was a disaster, as Haig’s attempt at 
breaking through the German line failed, and the British Army advanced only four and a 
half miles in four months.  The Canadian Expeditionary Force finally captured 
Passchendaele on 10 November.17  Passchendaele cost the British approximately 271,031 
casualties.18 
After the close of Passchendaele, Haig prepared to launch a long-awaited 
offensive at Cambrai, hoping for a quick and decisive victory to distract from the 
disasters of Ypres.  Haig had planned to attack Cambrai in April 1917 in support of the 
Nivelle Offensive, although the French campaign collapsed before the British plan could 
                                                          
14 Terraine, Douglas Haig, 249-250. 
15 Approximately forty miles south west of Ypres. 
16 Seely, 271. 
17 For details on the strategy of the Passchendaele campaign and the brief action of the King Edward’s 
Horse on 31 July, see Kenyon, British Cavalry, 157-161.  For full details on the Battle of Passchendaele, 
see Nicholson, 269-339. 
18 Travers, Command and Technology, 17.  
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be put into action.  However, plans for the offensive continued under GOC the Third 
Army Julian Byng,19 who hoped to coordinate an infantry assault with the newly 
established Tank Corps.  Although initial plans had been delayed by the Passchendaele 
campaign, Haig approved preparations for the Cambrai offensive on 13 October.  The 
offensive was scheduled to open on 20 November 1917.20    
The Cambrai offensive seemed unlikely to succeed before planning had even 
begun.  Launching a campaign so late in the year was a tactical error on Haig’s behalf, 
particularly after the long and exhausting Ypres campaign.  The operation proceeded 
despite a lack of manpower and no reserve, as British reinforcements had been sent to the 
Italian front in response to the Caporetto disaster.21  For their part, the Tank Corps 
seemed more interested in proving their capabilities than in the strategic importance of 
the operation.22  Indeed, Cambrai was chosen as the location for the offensive because 
capturing the ground between Canal du Nord23 and Canal de l’Escaut24 would threaten 
the western portion of the German line, but no less because the terrain in this particular 
area was solid and stable, suitable for a mass armoured assault.25   Most significantly, the 
justification for the Cambrai campaign had disappeared.  It was no longer necessary to 
take German pressure off the French Army, as the Nivelle offensive had ended six 
months earlier and the offensive season was all but over in late November.  Nonetheless, 
                                                          
19 Byng replaced Allenby as GOC the Third Army in June 1917. 
20 Nicholson, 333-334; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 162-163. 
21 A combined Austro-Hungarian and German force launched an incredibly successful surprise offensive 
against the Italian Army on the Isonzo Front on 24 October 1917.  The Austro-Hungarian and German 
forces easily broke the Italian line, and advanced twenty-five kilometres in one day.  For full details, see 
Mario Morselli, Caporetto 1917: Victory or Defeat (Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2001). 
22 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 163. 
23 At this time, Canal du Nord was still under construction and had no water running through it.  See 
Kenyon, British Cavalry, 165. 
24 Also called Canal St. Quentin. 
25 For map of the Cambrai area, see Appendix XI.  Nicholson, 333. 
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Haig insisted on launching the offensive hoping for a swift and decisive victory in order 
to win back favour in British political circles.  British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George was actively speaking out against Haig in the wake of the Passchendaele disaster, 
and others such as Lord Milner26 and Bonar Law27 quickly followed suit.28  As Travers 
stated, Haig “saw himself as locked in a struggle with Lloyd George for control over the 
direction of the war.”29  Haig launched a poorly planned campaign at Cambrai hoping to 
compensate for the failures of Ypres and redeem his own reputation.30   
Cambrai was to be the first battle in which tanks and cavalry were used in 
cooperation, and was the first large-scale use of tanks in battle.  Although Haig ordered 
Cavalry Corps Commander Charles Kavanagh to train the mounted arm to cooperate with 
tanks on 24 September 1917, no combined arms training between cavalry and tanks took 
place prior to the Cambrai offensive.  Furthermore, doctrine for the combined use of both 
cavalry and tanks in battle was still in its infancy.31  On the eve of the battle of Cambrai, 
Operational Orders explained “Tanks should be used as pivots for the cavalry.  They are 
really moving Machine Guns heavily armed, and though they have not the pace of 
Armoured Motors, they should be used on the same principal.”32  At Cambrai, the cavalry 
was expected to use its superior mobility to pass through the gap created by the tanks and 
infantry, surround each village or the flanks of enemy positions while the tanks 
performed a frontal assault.  It was understood that tanks were capable of advancing 
without being vulnerable to enemy fire, and could break through enemy wire.  However, 
                                                          
26 British Secretary of State for War. 
27 British Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
28 Travers, Command and Technology, 19. 
29 Travers, Command and Technology, 26. 
30 Nicholson, 333-335; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 162-163. 
31 Anglesey, Vol. VIII, 106; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 282. 
32 TNA WO 158/314.  GS 56, Third Army Scheme “GY,” Cavalry Corps HQ, 13 November 1917, 
Appendix C, Notes on the Use of Tanks with Cavalry. 
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it was also noted that tanks were incredibly slow moving and had a limited range of 
action, as their high rate of fuel consumption made them incapable of advancing long 
distances.33  As seen at the Somme and Ypres, tanks were incapable of easily advancing 
across broken or muddy ground, as they often got stuck and were still susceptible to 
breakdowns.  They were also too large to advance through narrow streets or heavily 
wooded areas.  Cavalry was expected to advance where tanks could not.34 
In contrast to the realistic objectives set for cavalry in March 1917, an incredibly 
ambitious plan was devised for the Battle of Cambrai.  The campaign was to take place 
on the “quadrilateral” ground between Canal du Nord, Canal de l’Escaut, and the Sensée 
River.  Five infantry divisions were to be sent forward on the first day, along with 476 
British tanks.  The British planned to take Cambrai and Bourlon Wood in a surprise 
attack, penetrating the German line with tanks and sending cavalry through the gap.  The 
success of the operation depended upon the speed of the advance, therefore cavalry had 
to be sent forward before the enemy could reinforce their position and counterattack.  
Because surprise was essential to the execution of the operation, no preliminary artillery 
barrage would precede the advance.  Rather, the artillery would open fire when the tanks 
began to move forward, leaving the tanks themselves responsible for destroying enemy 
wire entanglements.35   
                                                          
33 The Mark IV tanks employed at Cambrai advanced at a maximum of 4 miles per hour.  Their range of 
action was comparable to the 1918 tank Mark V, which could only be in action for two to three hours, and 
was only capable of advancing twenty miles before refuelling. 
34 TNA WO 158/298.  Second Army G.132, 12 June 1917; TNA WO 158/314.  GS 56, Third Army 
Scheme “GY,” Cavalry Corps HQ, 13 November 1917, Appendix C, Notes on the Use of Tanks with 
Cavalry. 
35 It was also hoped that minimal preliminary shelling would save the tanks from advancing across heavily 
beat up ground, thus preventing tanks from ditching.  Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 289; Kenyon, British 
Cavalry, 164-167. 
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According to the operational orders, the tanks were to advance to the Hindenburg 
Line between Canal du Nord to the west, and Canal l’Escaut to the east with the infantry 
divisions in close pursuit.  After the tanks broke through the German line, the infantry 
would capture the enemy line between Beaurevoir and Masnières and the l’Escaut Canal 
crossings at Marcoing and Masnières.  Four divisions of IV Corps under Lieutenant 
General Woollcombe would advance along Canal du Nord to the left, while three 
divisions of III Corps under Lieutenant General Pulteney were to advance along Canal de 
l’Escaut to the right.  One division from III Corps and three from V Corps would remain 
in reserve.36  After the first line of enemy defences was secured, III Corps was to capture 
the Canal du l’Escaut crossings at Masnières and Marcoing.  Then the cavalry would 
advance, pass through the gap at the Masnières-Beaurevior line, and cross the l’Escaut 
Canal.  From there, they would advance to Cambrai, and surround and isolate the city.  
The combined British force would capture Cambrai, Bourlon Wood,37 and the crossings 
over the Sensée River to the far north, thus dividing the German Army between 
Havrincourt and the Sensée River.  It was hoped that a successful breakthrough would 
bring a return to open warfare.38 
While all five British cavalry divisions were sent to the front to take part in the 
attack, only the 1st, 5th, and 2nd Cavalry Divisions were designated to take part in the 
opening day operation.  The 1st Cavalry Division was to isolate Cambrai from the west 
and north-west, while the 5th Cavalry Division was responsible for isolating Cambrai 
from the east, north-east, and north.  The mounted arm’s first objective was the high 
                                                          
36 TNA WO 158/314.  GS 56, Third Army Scheme “GY,” Cavalry Corps HQ, 13 November 1917; Kenyon, 
British Cavalry, 165-166. 
37 To be captured by IV Corps. 
38 See Appendix XI for map.  TNA WO 158/314.  GS 56, Third Army Scheme “GY,” Cavalry Corps HQ, 
13 November 1917, Appendix C, Notes on the Use of Tanks with Cavalry. 
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ground that ran from Niergnies to Cauroir, and the high ground above the crossing at 
Canal l’Escaut at Eswars and Morenchies.  Second, the cavalry would block all exits to 
Cambrai, and destroy all incoming rail crossings.  Thereafter, the 5th Cavalry Division 
would advance to the Sensée River and capture the crossings at Pallencourt and 
Aubencheul-au-Bac.  Finally, the cavalry was ordered to clear the quadrilateral. The CCB 
was to be the advance guard for the 5th Cavalry Division, with the Fort Garry Horse 
acting as the left flank guards, and Lord Strathcona’s Horse as the right.  The 2nd Cavalry 
Division would follow to the east in close pursuit, acting as flank guards for the main 
body of advancing cavalry.39 
Before the Cambrai offensive began, the British High Command had made some 
effort to solve the communication problems that had held the cavalry back since 1915.  
During the operation, communications were to be maintained through use of wireless 
devices, dispatch riders, aeroplane signals, flair, kite, or balloon signals, or carrier 
pigeons.  As soon as Marcoing was captured, cables were to be laid and an advanced 
report centre was to be established to allow for more efficient communications.  Aircraft 
were designated to carry messages from the Cavalry Corps Headquarters to the cavalry 
divisions at the front during the advance.40   
Cambrai, 20 November  1917 
The CCB received orders to embark for Cambrai on 8 November, and began 
moving south towards the front the following day.  The Brigade was in transit until 14 
                                                          
39 TNA WO 158/314.  GS 56, Third Army Scheme “GY,” Cavalry Corps HQ, 13 November 1917; 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 4, File 1.  Operational Order No. 48, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 19 
November 1917. 
40 Landing grounds were set up at Etricourt and were to communicate with the Cavalry Corps Headquarters 
at Fins via telephone.  See TNA WO 158/314.  GS 56, Third Army Scheme “GY,” Cavalry Corps HQ, 13 
November 1917, Appendix A, Instructions to No. 35 Squadron RFC. 
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November, and did not move to the forward concentration area to the north-east of Fins41 
with the 5th Cavalry Division until 11:00pm on 19 November.  The 5th Cavalry Division 
stood-to, ready to advance at two and a half hours notice.42  The mounted force was to 
embark from a cavalry track that ran from La Vacquerie to Masnières known as 
“Kavanagh Road.”43 
 The tanks and infantry began their advance at “Zero Hour,” 6:20am on 20 
November, and had great success reaching their objectives.  III Corps had reached the 
Hindenburg Defences by 11:30am, and formed a defensive line along Bonavis Ridge 
while the 29th Division advanced to the Marcoing and Masnières canal crossings.  The 1st 
Cavalry Division received orders to advance at 10:08am.  However, the cavalry was 
mistakenly informed that the village of Flesquières had been captured, and that the road 
was clear for the cavalry to advance.  In fact, the village remained in German hands.  
Consequently, the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division were forced to delay their advance.  
Woollcombe and Byng debated orders to send the cavalry through Flesquières instead of 
Marcoing.  As a result, the 1st Cavalry Division did not receive clear orders until 5:30pm.  
While the 4th Dragoon Guards had some success in Les Vallee Wood at La Folie 
Chateau, the 5th Dragoon Guards were delayed at Marcoing due to heavy enemy fire, as 
the Germans were still stationed on the eastern bank of the canal.44 
Members of the 5th Cavalry Division received orders to advance by 11:40am.  
They were ordered to encircle Cambrai from the east with the support of the 2nd and 4th 
                                                          
41 Approximately five miles behind the front line. 
42 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 7.  Operational Order No. 45, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 8 
November 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 4, File 1.  Operational Order No. 47, Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, 18 November 1917; War Diary, FGH, 1-19 November 1917. 
43 TNA WO 158/350.  S.1/10, CRE Cavalry Corps, 18 November 1917. 
44 See Appendix XI for map.  For full details on the 1st Cavalry Division’s experience on 20 November, see 
Kenyon, British Cavalry, 164-174; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 4, File 1.  B/1969/9, Headquarters 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 19 November 1917. 
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Cavalry Divisions.  The advance was split into two separate routes to enable the cavalry 
to cross the canal as quickly as possible.  The Secunderabad Brigade and the Ambala 
Brigade were to advance to the west via Marcoing with the support of the 4th Cavalry 
Brigade.45  Meanwhile, the CCB would advance east to the Masnières crossing with 
support from the 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades,46 and the Lucknow Brigade.47  However, 
splitting the advance made communication extremely difficult, as the CCB was cut off 
from the 5th Cavalry Division’s command.  This would prove detrimental to the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade as the day progressed. 48  
The Secunderabad Brigade reached Marcoing by 1:45pm, but was forced to 
dismount when it came under heavy fire on the adjacent side of the canal.  Meanwhile the 
7th Dragoon Guards advanced to Noyelles-sur-l’Escaut, and captured the village by 
3:00pm.  However, the Regiment was unable to cross the canal via the bridge at Noyelles 
due to heavy enemy fire from the opposite bank.  Thus the 1st Cavalry Division and the 
western portion of the 5th Cavalry Division’s advance had stalled on the east bank of the 
canal, leaving the CCB and supporting brigades from the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions to 
attempt to cross the canal at Masnières.49 
The CCB served as the advance guard for the eastern advance to Masnières.  The 
Brigade embarked from Fins at 11:40am, arriving at Les Rues Vertes by 1:40pm.  
Although the 88th Infantry Brigade and “F” Battalion of the Tank Corps had secured 
                                                          
45 Of the 2nd Cavalry Division.  The Marcoing group advanced under the 5th Cavalry Division’s 
Commanding Officer Major General Macandrew. 
46 Both of the 2nd Cavalry Division. 
47 Of the 4th Cavalry Division.  The Masnières group advanced under GOC the 2nd Cavalry Division Major 
General Greenly. 
48 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Report on Operations November 1917 by G.O.C. Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
23 November 1917; War Diary, FGH, 20 November 1917; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 177-178; Anglesey, 
Vol. VIII, 127-129. 
49 For full details on the Secunderabad Brigade and 7th Dragoon Guards action on 20 November, see 
Kenyon, British Cavalry, 176-177. 
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Masnières by noon, the retreating Germans had partially destroyed the iron girder bridge 
that spanned the canal during their retreat.  The bridge was still deemed suitable for 
cavalry to cross until 12:40pm, when “F” Battalion tank ‘Flying Fox II’ was sent across 
the bridge in an attempt to prevent the Germans from consolidating their position on the 
opposite bank of the canal.  The weight of the tank forced the bridge to collapse 
completely, and sent the tank plummeting into the canal.  However, Brigadier General 
Nelson50 mistakenly reported to Seely that the tanks had successfully crossed the canal, 
and that the bridge remained intact.  Consequently, Seely sent the FGH forward as the 
advance guard.51   
At 2:15pm, the FGH reached its objective only to find that contrary to the report 
given to Seely, the bridge had been destroyed.52  Major Philip Hammond of “F” Battalion 
Tank Corps saw the FGH arrive and later recorded his understanding of the cavalry 
approaching the bank of the canal, 
Then the most ludicrous thing happened, there was a great deal of 
clattering, galloping and shouting and a lot of our medieval horse soldiers 
came charging down the street; I yelled at them that the bridge was gone 
but they took no notice of me and went right up to it, one MG [machine 
gun] would have wiped out the lot, and then they turned about and with a 
very pious air trotted back the way they had come.53 
 
Although Hammond’s impression of the cavalry has often been quoted to illustrate the 
uselessness of the mounted arm at Cambrai, it did not reflect the circumstances under 
which the FGH arrived at the destroyed bridge, nor was it a true indication of the 
mounted arm’s capabilities.  Hammond also ignored the fact that it was the infantry and 
                                                          
50 GOC the 88th Infantry Brigade. 
51 See Appendix XI for map.  FGHMA War Diaries File.  Report on Operations November 1917 by G.O.C. 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 23 November 1917;  
War Diary, FGH, 20 November 1917; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 177-178; Anglesey, Vol. VIII, 127-129. 
52 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of the Fort Garry Horse Actions at the Battle of Cambrai 20 
November 1917 as reported by LCOL RW Paterson, 20 November 1917. 
53 Major Philip Hammond quoted in Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 290. 
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the Tank Corps itself that failed to fulfill their objective, namely the safe capture of the 
canal crossings that would enable the cavalry to continue their advance.54  As Seely 
stated, “Horses can cross almost anything, they can even swim broad rivers, as they have 
often done in war.  But the one thing that they cannot get over, unless they can bridge it, 
is a canal with perpendicular banks.  They can get in but they can’t get out.”55   
Similarly, historian A.J. Smithers later stated that the cavalry did “nothing” after 
discovering that the bridge had collapsed.56  However, a simple examination of the 
operational reports and narratives proved otherwise.  When the FGH arrived and found 
the bridge had been destroyed, Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Paterson immediately ordered 
Major Sharp to reconnoitre an alternate route across the canal.57  During Sharpe’s 
absence, Paterson discovered a footbridge approximately 1000 yards to the east of Les 
Rues Vertes.  Though Paterson observed the infantry crossing the bridge safely, the 
incredibly narrow bridge was unsuitable for mounted troops, as it was just wide enough 
to allow men to cross in single file.58   However, large pieces of timber were available 
that were approximately ten inches in width and twenty-four feet long.  Paterson ordered 
the construction of a temporary bridge from these materials to allow the cavalry to cross 
the canal.  Sixteen timbers were used to construct two bridges.  Each bridge was eight-
feet wide and spanned the twenty-foot width of the canal.  Civilians provided the 
necessary tools to build the bridge, such as ropes and axes, along with part of the labour 
                                                          
54 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 290; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 178-179. 
55 Seely, 273-274. 
56 Smithers, 116. 
57 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of the Fort Garry Horse Actions at the Battle of Cambrai 20 
November 1917 as reported by LCOL RW Paterson, 20 November 1917. 
58 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of the Fort Garry Horse Actions at the Battle of Cambrai 20 
November 1917 as reported by LCOL RW Paterson, 20 November 1917. 
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for its construction.59  The lock keeper gave the CCB the doors from the various rooms in 
his home for the top of the bridge, which provided a flat surface for horses to walk 
across.  According to Paterson, the bridge was constructed in approximately one hour and 
fifteen minutes while under enemy fire.60   
At 3:00pm, Paterson received word that the bridge was strong enough to send a 
mounted force across.  After testing the crossing with a single horse and rider, Paterson 
ordered Captain Duncan Campbell to lead led “B” Squadron of the FGH across the canal, 
and planned to follow with the remainder of the regiment.61  The troops of “B” Squadron 
completed their crossing in approximately seven minutes while under enemy fire.  
According to a later report by Captain Harcus Strachan of “B” Squadron, “Several men 
fell into the canal and a number were drowned.”62   
Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division had arrived at Les Rues Vertes at 
approximately 3:00pm to find that “B” Squadron of the FGH were out of contact with the 
5th Division.  As GOC the 5th Cavalry Division H.J.W. Macandrew was unreachable, 
GOC the 2nd Cavalry Division W.H. Greenly met with Seely to determine the best course 
of action.  It was decided that it was too late in the day to send more mounted troops 
forward, with a mere hour and half of daylight remaining.  The infantry had not reached 
their objective at the Masnières-Beaurevoir line, as was necessary to allow the cavalry to 
                                                          
59 The bridge was constructed by ten infantrymen, three cavalrymen, ten German prisoners, and seven 
French civilians.  Five infantrymen were killed during the bridge’s construction and three were wounded, 
along with three wounded civilians, and three wounded cavalrymen.  FGHMA World War I Collection, 
War Diaries File.  Report On Temporary Bridge At Masnières by W.K. Walker, 23 December 1917. 
60 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of the Fort Garry Horse Actions at the Battle of Cambrai 20 
November 1917 as reported by LCOL RW Paterson, 20 November 1917; FGHMA War Diaries File.  
Report On Temporary Bridge At Masnières by W.K. Walker, 23 December 1917; FGHMA War Diaries 
File.  Report on Operations November 1917 by G.O.C. Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 23 November 1917. 
61 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Report on Operations November 1917 by G.O.C. Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
23 November 1917; Harcus Strachan, “A Squadron on its Own,” The Cavalry Journal, Vol. XVIII 1927, 
241-242; Anglesey, Vol. VIII, 129-130. 
62 See Appendix XI for map.  Strachan, 244. 
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advance.63  According to Travers, the infantry did not reach this objective because “the 
leading battalion of the 29th Division stopped to drink beer at Marcoing and hence missed 
the canal crossing there.”64  Consequently, orders were sent to have “B” Squadron 
withdraw from the east bank of the canal and rejoin the remainder of the CCB.  Paterson 
himself had already crossed the bridge, but then received word from a dispatch rider that 
the FGH was to withdraw from the east bank.  Paterson sent the dispatch rider ahead to 
communicate these orders to “B” Squadron, however, the rider and Paterson himself were 
unable to catch up with “B” Squadron, which had advanced at a gallop.65  
 Meanwhile, the men of “B” Squadron proceeded with the advance on the 
opposite bank of the canal.  They were instructed to capture the enemy Corps 
Headquarters at Escaudoeuvres, and scout a new canal crossing between Eswars and 
Morenchies and report on whether bridges remained intact.66  The advance went 
smoothly and all were in high spirits until they reached the south west of Masnières.  
Here they came under heavy machine gun fire and were forced to advance to the north, 
where they cut a large hole in the enemy’s wire at Masnières-Beaurevoir to the south east 
of Rumilly.67  Campbell and two other ranks were killed by machine gun fire while 
passing through the wire.  Strachan assumed command of “B” Squadron and continued to 
lead the FGH through the wire in small sections.68  The advancing cavalry squadron drew 
                                                          
63 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Report on Operations November 1917 by G.O.C. Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
23 November 1917. 
64 Travers, Command and Technology, 23. 
65 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of the Fort Garry Horse Actions at the Battle of Cambrai 20 
November 1917 as reported by LCOL RW Paterson, 20 November 1917; FGHMA War Diaries File.  
Report On Temporary Bridge At Masnières by W.K. Walker, 23 December 1917. 
66 See Appendix XI for map.  FGHMA World War I Collection, War Diaries File.  Report on Operations 
November 1917 by G.O.C. Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 23 November 1917; Strachan, 241-242; Anglesey, 
Vol. VIII, 129-130. 
67 Strachan, 242. 
68 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of the Fort Garry Horse Actions at the Battle of Cambrai 20 
November 1917 as reported by Lt H Strachan, 20 November 1917. 
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heavy machine gun fire from German pillboxes outside Rumilly.  Thereafter, troops 
advanced in a column formation and encountered a German field gun battery, equipped 
with four 77mm guns.  The FGH charged the battery and killed or captured the entire 
crew.69  According to Strachan, “the capture of these guns had been a great help to those 
in the rear as the shell fire round the bridge had been caused by them.”70  However, “B” 
Squadron took incredibly heavy casualties themselves, and were reduced to a mere forty-
three troops of all ranks after the charge.71   
After regrouping, Strachan ordered “B” Squadron to press on in pursuit of the 
scattered and retreating enemy infantry.  The German infantry parties were retreating to 
gun-pits approximately 800-yards east of Rumilly.  However, the men of the FGH 
quickly came under heavy enemy machine gun fire during the pursuit, and were forced to 
take shelter in a sunken road approximately one kilometre east of Rumilly.  By nightfall, 
it became clear that no reinforcements were coming.  Strachan decided to send the 
remaining horses72 forward as decoys in order to allow the men to make their escape.  
They sent their mounts stampeding out of the sunken road to attract the attention of the 
enemy machine guns, while the men of the FGH ran back towards Masnières.73  
During their dismounted return, “B” Squadron suffered a further ten casualties as 
the area was heavily occupied by enemy troops.  Lieutenant Cowen was separated from 
the remainder of the squadron while leading a small dismounted charge against German 
                                                          
69 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 4.  B/2026, Report on Action of “B” Squadron, Fort Garry 
Horse, Operation of 20 November 1917, 19 December 1917. 
70 Strachan, 245. 
71 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Report on Operations November 1917 by G.O.C. Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
23 November 1917. 
72 According to Strachan, all but seven of the remaining horses were wounded. 
73 Strachan’s 1927 report stated that the stampeding of the horses was ineffective, as “The poor brutes had 
not even enough life left in them to run.  They just roamed off into the darkness, while we started back on 
foot.”  Strachan, 248. 
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infantry troops that took seven prisoners.  Cowen’s party was the first to cross the canal 
and return to the regiment at 3:00am, while the remainder of “B” Squadron arrived at 
5:00am.74  According to the War Diary, the Fort Garry Horse had a confirmed total of 
one officer and six men killed at Cambrai, and eighteen other ranks wounded.  However, 
fifty-four other ranks were listed as “wounded or missing.”  The FGH lost a total of 140 
horses between 20 and 21 November.75   
After the battle, Lieutenant Cowen76 was highly critical of Strachan’s decision to 
press on after the machine gunners surrendered, as many lives were unnecessarily lost in 
the continued advance.  Cowen maintained that he insisted “B” Squadron return to the 
Regiment after the costly cavalry charge, but Strachan was adamant that they carry on.77  
The immediate justification for Strachan’s continued advance remains unclear due to a 
discrepancy between his own accounts.  Strachan’s report dated 20 November 1917 
stated that “B” Squadron continued their advance in pursuit of the scattered and retreating 
infantry.78  However, a later article that Strachan wrote for the Cavalry Journal in 1927 
stated that “B” Squadron were trying to press on to Escaudoeuvres to carry out their 
original orders.79  However, Strachan made it quite clear that “B” Squadron spent the 
                                                          
74 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of the Fort Garry Horse Actions at the Battle of Cambrai 20 
November 1917 as reported by Lt H Strachan, 20 November 1917; Strachan, 250; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 
3999, Folder 3, File 4.  B/2026, Report on Action of “B” Squadron, Fort Garry Horse, Operation of 20 
November 1917, 19 December 1917. 
75 War Diary, FGH, 22 November 1917. 
76 See FGHMA War Diaries File.  Report on Operations November 1917 by G.O.C. Canadian Cavalry 
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entire advance80 believing that the remainder of the 5th Cavalry Division were right 
behind them and would soon follow up in support.81   
By nightfall on 20 November, the Third Army had advanced four miles and 
broken the Hindenburg Line at a cost of approximately 4000 casualties.  According to 
Nicholson, sixty-five tanks had been destroyed by enemy fire, while 114 had broken 
down.82  The entire Cavalry Corps was ordered to withdraw to Fins in the evening hours 
of 20 November.  However, Headquarters had lost communication with the 2nd Cavalry 
Division and the cavalry tracks had broken apart in the rain and mud, and the mounted 
troops at the front were ordered to spend the night in their current locations and continue 
their advance in the morning.83   
Dismounted Action and Waiting in Reserve, 21-29 November 
On 21 November, the cavalry was expected to carry out the same operation as 
planned for the previous day.  The infantry was set to attack the Masnières-Beaurevoir 
line and Rumilly at 11:00am.  Once the objective was captured, the cavalry would 
advance.  The RCD would act as the advance guard for the CCB with LSH acting as the 
right flank guard.  The FGH was to remain in reserve.84  The attack began on schedule, 
and the CCB received word that the infantry had captured their objective at 11:15am.  
However, the report was sent prematurely, as the infantry was now facing a German 
counterattack at the Les Rues Des Vignes spur and at Mont Plaisir Farm.  Enemy forces 
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continued to gather to the north east of Crevecourt, and heavy artillery fire began to the 
west of Masnières.  Consequently, GOC the 88th Infantry Brigade Nelson contacted Seely 
and informed him that mounted action would be impossible given the situation at the 
front.  Seely sent dispatch riders to General Officers Commanding the 2nd and 5th Cavalry 
Divisions to have the cavalry operation called off.85 
After mounted operations were cancelled, Seely dispatched the remainder of the 
CCB to reinforce the infantry.  The RCD sent patrols to the infantry and occupied a high-
ground position.  Meanwhile, one troop of LSH took two Hotchkiss guns to defend the 
lock bridge approximately 1,000 yards west of Masnières.  A detachment of four machine 
guns was sent to reinforce the infantry at Mon Plaisir Bridge, along with “B” Battery of 
the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA).  The remainder of the Brigade was 
stationed at “Sunken Road Valley.” 86    
At 4:00pm, the 5th Cavalry Division ordered the CCB to remain in their position 
and be ready to send mounted reinforcements to the infantry if necessary.  However, 
orders to move forward never came, and by 5:50am on 22 November, the 5th Cavalry 
Division was ordered to return to Fins.  The cavalry embarked at 7:30am, and had 
established headquarters at Equancourt by 1:00pm.87  Meanwhile, the 51st Infantry 
Division had reached its second objective, and the 1st Cavalry Division was sent to 
support IV Corp’s advance, and had some success supporting the armoured advance.88  
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The CCB returned to reserve on 22 November and spent a few days resting at 
Cappy and Bray. 89  Meanwhile, the infantry carried on at Cambrai without success.  
Although the Third Army captured Bourlon Wood by 23 November, it was retaken by 27 
November.  The Cambrai offensive was finally called off, as the Third Army had no 
reserve to maintain the momentum of the offensive. Consequently, the 5th Cavalry 
Division moved into reserve at Monchy-Lagache on 27 November.90 
German Counter-Attack, 30 November-1 December 
Despite warning signs that German reinforcements had begun to move in from 
Flanders, no preparations were made to defend British gains against an imminent enemy 
counterattack.91  As Nicholson stated, “From the second day onward the battle 
deteriorated into a race with German reinforcements.”92  Naturally, the German Second 
Army launched a counter attack at Cambrai against the salient at Metz-en-Couture west 
of Bourlon Wood on 30 November.93  When the attack began, the CCB was still stationed 
at Monchy-Lagache with the remainder of the 5th Cavalry Division in the midst of 
preparing to support a tank assault on Gauche Wood and Villers Guislain.94  At 8:30am, 
the CCB stood to at the north of a railway embankment when the 4th and 5th Cavalry 
Divisions were ordered to report to Villers Faucon95 immediately.96  While the German 
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attack had little success to the north, the enemy advanced three miles across a five-mile 
front to the south in just a few hours.  At 9:35am, VII Corps reported that the enemy had 
broken through at Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt, so Kavanagh recommended a 
mounted counterattack by the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions. The 5th Cavalry Division 
arrived at the 55th Infantry Division’s Headquarters in Villers Faucon at 12:15pm.  The 
5th Cavalry Division was ordered to defend the British line with the Third Army at the 
southern end of the German attack.97   
The 2nd Cavalry Division was sent forward to Gouzeaucourt at 11:00am, and 
successfully drove the enemy from much of the village and held it.98  At 1:10pm, the 5th 
Cavalry Division was ordered to advance to the north and attack the enemy flank between 
Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt, seizing Gonnelieu Ridge with the 4th Cavalry 
Division in support.99  The Ambala Brigade and the 8th Hussars were sent forward,100 but 
were held up by machine gun fire at Gouzeaucourt, and were forced to dismount west of 
Gauche Wood under heavy enemy fire.  Late in the afternoon, patrols were sent to 
Gonnelieu, however, the village was heavily defended by wire and machine guns and was 
unsuitable for a mounted attack.101   
At 3:00pm, LSH was ordered to send “A” Squadron to seize the road from 
Gauche Wood to Villers Guislain.  “B” Squadron was to capture the rail line to the north 
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of Chapel Crossing while “C” Squadron remained in reserve.102 At 4:00pm, the Ambala 
Brigade advanced to Gauche Wood but was repulsed by a counter attack, so the CCB 
moved up to attack Villers Guislain to the right of the wood.  The RCD was sent forward 
to hold the line at Vaucellette Farm, and had established a line to the east of the Farm by 
5:00pm.103  LSH held the line to the left, joining the line with the Ambala Brigade.  LSH 
sent patrols to contact the Ambalas, and located enemy troops equipped with machine 
guns at Chapel Crossing, and at the rail line to the north.  The CCB held these positions 
through the night and awaited orders to advance the following day.104  The RCD had six 
men wounded on 30 November, three horses killed and three wounded.105  The FGH had 
one man and two horses wounded.106   
On 1 December, the enemy held Raperue Ridge, Chapel Crossing, Villers 
Guislain, and Gauche Wood.  The British Army made ready to renew the offensive with a 
combined arms assault.  Mounted action was planned at a 1:15am in a meeting between 
the Tank Adjutant and representatives from the Canadian, Ambala, and Lucknow 
Brigades.  It was determined that 5th Cavalry Division would attack Gauche Wood and 
Villers Guislain in cooperation with fourteen tanks and the 4th Cavalry Division in 
support west of Peiziere.  The 1st Guard Brigade would attack the wood to the left of the 
line, and the Ambala Brigade to the right with the Secunderabad Brigade in support.  The 
CCB was to attack to the southernmost portion of the line.  LSH was to send two 
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squadrons forward to attack to the north of Vaucelette Farm, leaving one squadron to 
hold their current position.  The RCD would send one squadron forward to fill the gap 
between LSH and the Lucknow Brigade,107 which was to attack Villers Guislain to the 
right of the CCB.  Covering fire was to be provided by the CCB Machine Gun Squadron 
and the Royal Horse Artillery.  The Fort Garry Horse and two squadrons of the RCD 
would stand-to as a mounted reserve.108   
On the morning of 1 December, LSH sent three patrols forward when the British 
attack began at 5:00am.  One patrol was sent to follow tanks as they advanced to Gauche 
Wood, and sent dispatch riders to the CCB to inform them of the operation’s progress.  
Meanwhile, a degree of open warfare returned to portions of the battlefield as small 
parties from LSH worked to put local German machine guns out of action.  LSH was able 
to employ Hotchkiss guns against front-line enemy patrols, while the remainder of the 
Regiment encircled the enemy.  For example, a party of one officer and five other ranks 
advanced behind an enemy machine gun post under cover of Hotchkiss gun fire and 
captured six German gunners and one light machine gun.  Similarly, a patrol of one 
officer and four other ranks launched a surprise assault on a heavy machine gun nest.  
The patrol captured four enemy troops and put the machine gun out of action.109  “A” 
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Squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards at Noyelles had similar success employing 
Hotchkiss guns with mounted shock tactics on 30 November.110   
By 5:15am on 1 December, the tanks had not reached their embarkation point, 
and informed the 5th Cavalry Division that they would have to embark from without 
them.111  The Ambalas rushed Gauche Wood and took it easily by 8:30am.  However, the 
Mhow Brigade had charged Chapel Crossing but was unsuccessful. 112  The success of the 
2nd Lancers at Catelet Valley and the Ambala Brigade at Gauche Wood left a salient 
between the two positions at Chapel Crossing and the “Beet Factory,” both of which were 
still held by the enemy.  Kavanagh ordered the CCB to attack Chapel Crossing and the 
high ground between Gauche Wood and a railway junction at 3:00pm.  Simultaneously, 
the Lucknow Brigade would attack the Beet Factory with support from the now 
decimated Mhow Cavalry Brigade.113 
At 3:00pm, one troop from LSH “C” Squadron advanced on the railway 
embankment to the south of Chapel Crossing and prepared to launch an attack on an 
enemy trench.  After Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Docherty of LSH was killed, the 
remaining two troops of “C” Squadron were brought forward.  Heavy machine gun and 
rifle fire was concentrated on the German trenches, forcing between seventy and 100 
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enemy troops out of their position. “C” Squadron held the railway embankment and 
provided covering machine gun fire while the remainder of “C” Squadron advanced on 
Chapel Crossing.114   
At 3:15pm, “A” and “B” Squadrons of the LSH advanced to Morris Banks and 
Gun Lane and immediately came under heavy machine gun fire.  LSH had one officer 
killed, one wounded, and twenty other casualties.  Thereafter, Lieutenant Nicol and 
Major Goodday of “A” Squadron advanced to the eastern edge of Gauche Wood to 
reconnoitre their objective.  They found the enemy strongly entrenched and occupying 
three abandoned tanks.  It became clear that the planned offensive to the south was not 
developing as hoped.  Consequently, Goodday ordered “A” Squadron to advance 
dismounted and occupy a line of shell holes inside Gauche Wood.115  Meanwhile, 
Lieutenant May’s “B” Squadron advanced to the south of Morris Bank, meeting no 
resistance until they came upon enemy rifle pits.  They inflicted heavy fire on the enemy 
troops, and even threw the enemy’s own grenades back at them.  Four enemy troops 
surrendered while the rest fled or were killed, and LSH occupied the line and reported 
their position to Headquarters.  At 3:45pm, the FGH sent “A” Squadron forward to 
support “A” and “B” Squadron of the LSH, and “B” Squadron FGH to help LSH “C” 
Squadron at the rail embankment.116 
The CCB was successful in taking the railway embankment and Chapel Crossing, 
and had joined their line with the remainder of the 5th Cavalry Division in Gauche Wood.  
However, the Lucknow Brigade had no success at the Beet Factory, and was only able to 
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advance 100 yards before taking cover in trenches.  The Lucknow Brigade had also 
received no word of the CCB’s progress and could not properly coordinate an attack with 
them.117  The 4th Cavalry Division faired even worse at Villers Guislain, as the Armoured 
Corps had not arrived and Kavanagh ordered the assault to proceed anyway.  The 
coordinated cavalry and armoured attack was difficult to assemble, as the tanks were 
stationed far from the point of assembly and had not had time to reconnoitre a proper line 
of advance.118   They rolled blindly through unfamiliar terrain overnight in darkness.119  
Furthermore, artillery support was lacking, as only two Royal Horse Artillery batteries 
were available to support the attack on Gauche Wood, as the RCHA were sent to support 
the Lucknow Brigade.120  Although the 4th Division’s commanders understood that there 
was no hope of mounted success at Villers Guislain, they were forced to proceed at 
Kavanagh’s insistence.121  The division was mowed down by enemy machine gun fire, as 
circumstances were not at all favourable to a mounted attack.  As Colonel Maunsell 
stated, “The point of attempting a mounted attack under the circumstances seems 
incomprehensible.”122   
By nightfall, no reports had arrived and the CCB continued to hold their positions.  
Thereafter, the 17th Lancers and the 6th Cavalry Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division 
relieved the CCB at 10:30pm.123  The RCD had one officer and nine other ranks 
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wounded, ten horses killed, eleven wounded, and six missing.124  The FGH had four other 
ranks wounded and six horses wounded.125  On 3 December, the CCB began marching 
back to their camping area to the south east of Roisel.126 
Assessment and Aftermath 
The members of the Cavalry Corps were deeply disappointed with their 
performance at Cambrai.  They blamed themselves for lack of drive, determination, and 
“cavalry spirit,” though they were given a nearly impossible task that was poorly 
coordinated and carried out with no combined arms training.127  Although contemporary 
politicians, military leaders, and modern historians have been quick to blame the cavalry 
for missing a “golden opportunity” to exploit armoured success at Cambrai, this 
oversimplification ignores the realities that the mounted arm was forced to face on the 
battlefield.128  The participation of the cavalry was contingent upon other arms attaining a 
specific set of objectives.129  For example, the 5th Cavalry Division was told that it could 
not advance until the infantry reached the Masnières-Beaurevoir line on 20 November.  
Moreover, the cavalry was depending on the tanks and the infantry to capture the canal 
crossings in order to continue the advance.  Neither of these objectives were attained by 
other arms, and “B” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse still managed to cross the canal 
before the operation was cancelled.   
More significantly, although Cambrai was the first large-scale combined arms 
offensive, it was not properly coordinated.  As Kenyon has argued, the British command 
structure was far too top heavy and inefficient to be compatible with the relatively fast 
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moving shock action planned for Cambrai.  The cavalry could only be sent forward on 
the authority of the Cavalry Corps Commander Charles Kavanagh, and would only be 
ordered to advance according to reports on the infantry’s progress.  However, there was 
no means of direct communication between the cavalry and infantry, thus communication 
delays were a significant problem.130  The chain of command added a new level of 
complexity, as all orders to the mounted arm had to travel through III or IV Corps to the 
Cavalry Corps and back again.  Meanwhile, Kavanagh was stationed five miles away at 
Fins, too far from the front to make the swift and accurate decisions required of him.  As 
GOC the 1st Cavalry Division Major General R. Mullens stated,  
Opportunities for the employment of cavalry are of so fleeting a nature that 
the G.O.C. leading Cavalry Division and the G.O.C. leading Cavalry 
Brigade who are the individuals on the spot, should be held responsible for 
taking advantage of any opportunities which occur.  Time does not admit of 
sending the information back to the rear and for re-transmission to the 
front…the leading Cavalry Division should be given the plan and should be 
allowed to carry out the task allotted in the best way that offers.131 
 
Often, important decisions had to be made by commanders on the battlefield anyway, 
although they were all accountable to different headquarters as seen on 20 November in 
the meeting between Seely and Greenly, who were forced to recall the FGH with GOC 
the 5th Cavalry Division General Macandrew unreachable.132  The command structure 
was made all the more complicated for the CCB on 20 November, as it was advancing 
with support from the 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades, both of which were part of the 2nd 
Cavalry Division, and from the Lucknow Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division.  Thus the 
CCB was advancing with three brigades answerable to two different headquarters than its 
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own.  Furthermore, each of these divisions had been given a different set of objectives in 
the operational orders issued before the battle.  Had the CCB been placed under the full 
authority of III Corps and not been forced to await Kavanagh’s orders on 20 November, it 
might have advanced as much as two hours earlier, and may have made it across the 
Canal de l’Escaut as a full Brigade.  Ultimately, the outcome of the Cambrai offensive 
might have been quite different if the CCB was not hamstrung by the complexities of this 
chain of command.133   
 Furthermore, there was no effective way to use cavalry during the German 
counteroffensive.  Haig had originally intended for the cavalry to advance at Cambrai 
“With no wire and prepared defences to hamper them.”134  On 30 November, German 
infantry units advanced in small columns across wired trenches.  These conditions 
offered few opportunities for mounted action.  However, Kavanagh ordered mounted 
attacks despite the fact that these were not the sort of operations that cavalry was ever 
intended to participate in.  Kavanagh either incorrectly anticipated a return to open 
warfare, or believed that this was the mounted arm’s last chance to prove its worth on the 
Western Front.135   
The failure of the Cambrai offensive and the disappointments of 1917 brought 
about major changes to British strategy and military organization, as Cambrai was 
considered the cavalry’s best opportunity for success.  When no breakthrough took place 
and the BEF was once again facing a manpower shortage, the mounted arm was at once 
blamed for the failures of Cambrai, and targeted for reduction or disbandment.  In 
December 1917, Lloyd George argued that cavalry clearly had no place on the Western 
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Front, and supported Churchill’s plan to convert the mounted arm into an armoured 
corps, or else dispersing their numbers among the tank corps, the air service, and 
artillery.136  General Smuts suggested that the horses from the Cavalry Corps might be 
sold to the American Army.137 
Accordingly, the British High Command decided to reduce the amount of cavalry 
on the Western Front by disbanding the 4th and 5th British Cavalry Divisions in January 
1918.  All Indian Cavalry regiments were to remain mounted but were transferred to 
Egypt and Palestine, while all British cavalry regiments from these two divisions were to 
remain on the Western Front but be dismounted, including the CCB.138  The government 
of Canada requested that the CCB remain mounted, as they were the only Canadian 
cavalry unit at the front except for the Canadian Light Horse, and the loss of their 
mounted status was considered detrimental to cavalry in Canada.  Charles Kavanagh 
advocated for the CCB to remain mounted due to the Brigade’s excellent reputation and 
past contributions.139  Similarly, G.S. Harrington reminded the High Command that “the 
efficiency of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade had been repeatedly a matter of favourable 
report.”140  By 24 January, the British High Command agreed to comply with the 
Canadian government’s request and decided not to dismount the CCB, although the 
Brigade had not been officially placed in a cavalry division.141  On 13 March 1918, the 
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CCB, the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, Canadian Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron, 
Field Ambulance, and Mobile Veterinary Section all became part of the 3rd British 
Cavalry Division at Ennemain.142  The CCB was fortunate to retain their mounted status, 
as the four British Line cavalry regiments, three Household regiments, and two Corps 
cavalry regiments became cyclist or machine gun battalions.143  As a consequence of their 
perceived “failure” at Cambrai, the Cavalry Corps had been reduced by twenty regiments 
by March 1918, mere days before the mounted arm came into its own during the German 
Spring Offensive.144 
Conclusion  
Although the Fort Garry Horse’s advance across Canal de l’Escaut on 20 
November could hardly be considered a success, it made clear once again that cavalry 
was capable of advancing despite difficult terrain and enemy fire, and could capture 
German guns.  Had the cavalry advance proceeded on time and the command structure 
not delayed decisions, and the bridge crossings been properly captured and not destroyed, 
the cavalry may well have had an opportunity for spectacular success.  As Strachan 
assured in 1927, “Judging from what one single squadron did, what could five cavalry 
divisions have done?”145  
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Cambrai was not the dazzling success that Haig had hoped for.  However, infantry 
commanders, politicians, and historians have been quick to blame the cavalry for missing 
the opportunity to exploit the success of the Armoured Corps, and costing the British 
Army the battle.  However, Cambrai was a badly timed, poorly planned, uncoordinated 
offensive launched for political instead of strategic reasons.  The difficult and overly 
ambitious operation hardly offered cavalry an opportunity to prove its worth on the 
Western Front, as it was dependant on tanks and infantry to capture objectives before it 
could advance.  Often these objectives had not been attained, or else the Tank Corps did 
not arrive in time to take part in the offensive.  As Badsey stated, “The British could not 
know, at the time, that they were attempting what was to become in the course of the 
century one of the most notoriously difficult manoeuvres in warfare: trying to move an 
exploitation force as large as a division or larger rapidly through a slower moving force, 
against enemy opposition in the middle of a battle.”146  Ultimately, the Battle of Cambrai 
accomplished nothing in terms of gains on the Western Front.  However, the mass use of 
tanks in battle and combined arms offensives set the tone for future operations in 1918.147 
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CHAPTER 8: 
 
The Spring Offensive and Moreuil Wood, March-April 1918: 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1918 proved to be the most eventful year for the mounted arm on the Western 
Front.  The Cavalry finally came into its own as a degree of open warfare returned, 
beginning with the German Spring Offensive in March 1918.  The Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade participated in several actions between 21 March and 1 April, fighting mounted 
and dismounted, and also providing invaluable service as mounted reconnaissance 
patrollers.  During this campaign, the CCB participated in its most prominent action in 
popular memory, the Battle of Moreuil Wood on 30 March 1918, made famous because 
of a daring cavalry charge by Lord Strathcona’s Horse.  The CCB’s action was 
significant because it delayed the enemy force long enough to prevent a split in the Allied 
line between the French and British Armies that might have cost the Allies the war.  It 
also provides an example of a highly successful mounted delaying action on the Western 
Front.  The Cavalry Corps made a significant contribution to the maintenance of the 
Allied line during the German Spring Offensive because of its superior mobility.  Often 
acting as mounted rifles, the cavalry was able to arrive at the front quickly without 
exhausting troops or resources, and proved to be an effective fighting force on the 
Western Front.  Moreuil Wood provides yet another example of Cavalry performing 
exactly as expected according to prewar cavalry doctrine. 
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Operation Michael, 21-29 March 1918 
1917 had been a disastrous year for the Allies.  The British suffered through three 
devastating offensives that cost approximately 860,000 casualties.  The French 
experienced mutiny along with 590,000 casualties.1  The Italian Army suffered a horrible 
defeat at Caporetto and required French and British reinforcements, while the 
Macedonian campaign remained in a deadlock.2  Most significantly, the Germans were 
no longer fighting a war on two fronts.  Russia had pulled out of the war after the 
Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 and signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 
March 1918, freeing many German divisions from the eastern theatre.  First 
Quartermaster General of the German Army Erich Ludendorff sought to exploit the 
Allied disasters prior to the anticipated large influx of American troops on the Western 
Front in 1918.3  He devised a “Spring Offensive,” code named Kaiserschlacht, or “The 
Kaiser’s Battle,” designed to deliver a decisive blow to the Allied line.  The Spring 
Offensive opened with Operation Michael at Saint Quentin on 21 March 1918.4  
Numerically, the German Army had never been so superior to their French and 
British counterparts.  As Ludendorff stated, “the military situation was more favourable 
to us at New Year, 1918, that one could ever have expected.”5  The Germans were able to 
place 178 divisions on the Western Front, a force that outnumbered the Anglo-French 
forces by a ratio of three to two.6  Ludendorff designated seventy-six divisions to take 
part in Operation Michael, approximately one million troops with the support of nearly 
                                                          
1 Grodzinski, 3. 
2 Greenhous, 215. 
3 Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories, 1914-1918 (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1920), 539. 
4 Grodzinski & McNorgan, 251-252.  
5 Ludendorff, 537. 
6 Greenhous, Dragoon, 215. 
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7,000 artillery pieces.7  These divisions would attack across a seventy-mile front from 
Arras to La Fere.  North of the Somme, Ludendorff targeted the weaker points in the 
British line opposite Sir Julian Byng’s Third army and Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army.  
The German objective was to separate the British and French Armies, pushing the 
English back to the Channel, and the French to Paris.8   
While the Allies were expecting a German offensive in the spring of 1918, they 
were unsure which location the enemy would target.  While a breakthrough at Amiens 
would separate the French and British Armies and could potentially roll up the British 
line, a breakthrough to the north might cut the British Expeditionary Force off from the 
Channel.  Consequently, Haig transferred the bulk of British reserves to the northern and 
central portions of the line, dedicating forty divisions to the defence of eighty-four miles 
of front.9  Unfortunately, this left Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army stretched incredibly 
thin, dependant on a mere twelve infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions to defend 
the southern forty-two miles of the British line.10  Gough warned Haig that a German 
attack on the British lines was likely to come from the south given this weakness, and 
pointed out the lack of defences in the area, and to the poor condition of road and rail for 
re-supplying troops .  He requested an additional Royal Flying Corps (RFC) Scout 
Squadron, reserve materials, supplies, and reinforcements be sent to the Fifth Army to 
ensure its survival in the event of an attack. However, these requests went largely 
unfulfilled, and Gough was forced to look to his only reserve – the three remaining 
                                                          
7 Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive 
(London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1978), 72; Ludendorff, 589-591; Grodzinski & McNorgan, 252. 
8 See Appendix XII for locations.  Ludendorff, 590.   
9 Approximately two-thirds of the British Line. 
10 See Hubert Gough, “Appendix 11: General Sir Hubert Gough’s Letter to General Headquarters 
concerning Situation on Fifth Army Front, 1st February 1918” in History of the Great War: Military 
Operations, France and Belgium, 1918: Appendices (London: Macmillan and Co, 1935), 45-47; 
Greenhous, 215; Middlebrook, Kaiser’s Battle, 70-71; Grodzinski & McNorgan, 252-253. 
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cavalry divisions on the Western Front.  Thus the Cavalry Corps became fundamental to 
the survival of Gough’s army.  In March 1918, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was 
serving with Gough’s Fifth Army as part of the 3rd British Cavalry Division.11   
German guns opened fire on the Allied lines between Croisilles in the North and 
La Fere to the south at 4:00am on 21 March.12  The barrage of shells and gas bombarded 
the Allied lines for nearly five hours.13  Approximately one million German troops began 
to advance across the forty-mile front behind the creeping artillery barrage.14  The 3rd 
Cavalry Division was ordered to stand to at 9:00am on 21 March.   At 4:00pm, the 
Division was ordered to move south to Beaumont, where it bivouacked over night.  Due 
                                                          
11 See Appendix XII for positions.  Greenhous, 215.  As changes to the Cavalry Corps progressed between 
January and March 1918, all cavalry divisions took their turn as dismounted reserves in an effort to 
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continued with mounted training.  For example, detachments from the CCB went to the front lines on 25 
January. Two officers and thirty-one other ranks participated in a highly successful night raid on Lily 
Trench on 12 February, having only one man killed, three severely wounded, and eleven others wounded. 
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to the urgent need for reinforcements at the front, the 3rd Cavalry Division was split into a 
three-battalion dismounted brigade at 6:00am on 22 March, for which the CCB supplied 
one battalion of approximately 800 troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D.J. 
MacDonald of Lord Strathcona’s Horse.15   
The newly formed Canadian Dismounted Brigade was placed at the disposal of 
Brigadier General Sadlier Jackson’s 54th Infantry Brigade.  On March 23rd, the 
dismounted Canadian force covered the British 18th Division as troops crossed the Crozat 
Canal.16  They went into action at 8:30am with Major Timmis and the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons fighting at a railway embankment northwest of Mennesis, and LSH under 
Major J.G. Tatlow17 holding the high ground north of Faillouël under covering fire from 
two machine guns in Frieres Faillouël.  As Faillouël began to fall into enemy hands, LSH 
was reinforced by troops from the Fort Garry Horse, who took up a position to the west 
of the village with two machine guns.  They held the line and fell back to Genlis Wood 
until they were relieved.  Seely joined the dismounted force at Caillouel at 8:30am on 24 
March.  Thereafter, the dismounted force served as a reserve brigade for the 6th French 
Corps at Dampcourt en route to Noyon.18  The following day, the Brigade held the line at 
Mondescourt-la-Bretelle-Appilly, guarding a bridge crossing until ordered to withdraw to 
                                                          
15 700 troops from each of the 6th and 7th Brigades also formed dismounted detachments.  See OxNCL 
Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-1918.  MSS 
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R.W. Patterson, March 1918.   
16 Nicholson, 369; War Diary, FGH, 23 March 1918. 
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Soldier’s Letters,” March 1918.  Letter from JEB Seely to Mrs. Tatlow, April 1918. 
18 Nicholson, 369. 
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Carlepont at 1:30pm.  The troops of the dismounted force arrived at 6:00pm and were 
reunited with their horses, embarking for Les Cloyes at 8:30am on 26 March.19 
While the dismounted cavalry force fought just as effectively as the infantry, it 
lost a great deal of its mobility while dismounted.  Pack horses did not accompany the 
dismounted force, though they were necessary to carry equipment and machine guns.  
Communications were difficult to maintain with no mounted dispatch riders.  One report 
stated that “Mounted men must always be attached to a Dismounted Brigade for use as 
orderlies, patrol purposes, and a mounted reserve kept in hand for counter-attack or 
moving quickly to a threatened point even when the remainder of the units are acting 
dismounted.”20  Officer’s patrols were also required before sending a force into action.  
This work could be carried out much more easily while mounted.21  Cavalry lost its 
mobility and some of its effect when performing dismounted work.  
Meanwhile, the remainder of the CCB was sent to Varesnes on 22 March.  On 23 
March, the German forces broke through at Ham.  Mounted troops were needed to fill the 
gap in the Allied line.  At 9:50am, the 3rd Cavalry Division was ordered to send as many 
mounted troops to the front as possible.  A mounted detachment was formed from the 
remaining members of the 3rd Cavalry Division, for which the CCB supplied 200 
mounted troops under Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson.  An additional 150 troops from 
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both 6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades22 joined the new mounted force.  The 2nd Cavalry 
Division provided 250 additional troops for a total force of approximately 750 mounted 
troops.  No.13 Balloon Company provided eight Lewis machine guns, and artillery 
support was given by the Royal Horse Artillery.  The ad-hoc cavalry force was placed 
under the command of GOC the 3rd Cavalry Division General A. Harman, and was aptly 
named “Harman’s Detachment.”23   
The newly established cavalry force embarked for Ugny to fill the gap between 
the 14th and 18th Infantry Divisions on 23 March, but did not see action as the dismounted 
men from the 3rd Cavalry Division had already closed the gap.  Officers patrols were sent 
out to reconnoiter the situation at the front, a great help to III Corps who were “quite in 
the dark as regards the situation until reconnaissance by Officer’s patrols were carried 
out.”24   
At 6:00am on 24 March, Harman’s Detachment was ordered to support the 
infantry towards Cugny.  When the Detachment arrived, it discovered that the enemy had 
broken through at Villeselve.  The mounted force rushed forward and closed the gap, 
reforming the line from Beaumont to Eaucourt until reinforced.  The CCB held the line to 
the east of Villeselve, and was ordered to withdraw at noon.25  However, according to 
Stevenson’s report, “the Infantry, instead of taking up a line at Villeselve, kept on 
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retiring.”26  Thus Harman’s Detachment was forced to re-establish the line once more. It 
was reported that the enemy forces were massing in Cugny, and that Harman’s Force was 
to engage them “at all costs.”27  The CCB embarked for the south of the village with 
support from the 7th Brigade, and re-established the line from the north of Villeselve, 
through Beaumont to the north-west of Beaulieu.  Here the 6th Brigade took part in a 
successful cavalry charge on the German line at Collezy that destroyed three enemy 
machine guns.  The Germans scattered and ran in the face of the cavalry charge.  100 
German prisoners were captured, and between seventy and 100 enemy troops were killed 
in the action.28  However, the engagement cost the 6th Brigade seventy-three of its 150 
men.  The surviving members of the 6th Brigade rejoined the CCB at the north of 
Villeselve.  Harman’s Detachment held the line until 6:00pm when relieved by the 
French and retired to Muiraecourt.29 
Over the next two days, Harman’s Detachment was used to re-form Allied 
infantry lines between the Crozat Canal, the Oise, and the Canal du Nord.30  On 25 
March, R.W. Paterson led 800 dismounted troops from Harman’s Force in support of the 
French at Muiraecourt.  The dismounted force held the Allied line until the French took 
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up their new position at Catigny, and was remounted at Lagny.  Shortly after, Paterson 
was ordered to take a mounted force to clear the Noyon-Roye Road of enemy troops.  
Once this was accomplished, Paterson sent out mounted patrols to keep contact with the 
French from Noyon to Catigny.31  For example, Lieutenant Thomas C. Anderson of the 
FGH led a patrol of twenty after midnight to determine whether the enemy had crossed 
Noyon Canal and to verify the French army’s position.  Anderson’s patrol was able to 
report that the French were still holding the line at the canal.32   
On 26 March the CCB was ordered to clear Essarts Wood of enemy troops while 
keeping contact with GOC the 2nd Cavalry Division General T.T. Pitman.33  According to 
Anderson’s report,  
One of our advanced patrols ran into several of the enemy Infantry who 
were then endeavouring to surround a Chateau in the middle of the wood, 
from which they had been dislodged by Lieutenant Harvey of the LSH, 
and Captain Stratford [of the] FGH.  We immediately sent reinforcements 
up through the back of the woods to his assistance and they were 
successful in driving the enemy back and capturing two m.gs [machine 
guns] and killing eleven of the enemy, our losses being only one man 
killed and one slightly wounded.34   
 
Paterson contacted Harman who consented to send dismounted reinforcements to the 
wood with support from the French artillery.  The RCD advanced on the wood on the 
right flank, LSH in the middle, and the FGH on the left.  The advance began at 1:30pm 
and was successfully completed by 2:00pm, all units of the CCB having cleared the wood 
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and reached their rendezvous point at the sunken road.  They killed forty enemy troops 
and wounded several others.  The CCB suffered comparatively few casualties, including 
one officer and five other ranks killed, and seven other ranks wounded.  However, the 
Brigade was forced to withdraw during an enemy counter attack at 5:00pm.35  Paterson 
was awarded the Crois de Guerre by the French Army for his leadership on 26 March.36   
After clearing Essarts Wood of enemy troops, Harman’s Detachment spent 26 
March reinforcing various units as infantry and acting as mounted flank guards for 
Pitman’s troops where needed.  Harman’s force was disbanded by midnight on 26 March, 
and the CCB came back under Seely’s command on 27 March.37  The Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade had suffered severe casualties during the first week of the Spring Offensive, 
approximately 250 men for each of the three regiments acting mounted and dismounted 
at the front.  Consequently, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was operating with roughly 
half of its original strength by 29 March.38   
Besides mounted action, Harman’s force fulfilled an invaluable reconnaissance 
role for the duration of its time at the front from 23 to 26 March.  The Detachment kept 
four patrols based at Harman’s headquarters, each comprised of one officer and ten other 
ranks, which were sent out in constant daily rotations from dawn until dark.  Patrols 
                                                          
35 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative by Lieutenant Anderson, FGH.  Operations of the first mounted 
party from the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 23-30 March 1918; OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard 
Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/118.  Narrative by 
Lt.Col. Stevenson, March 22-27 1918. 
36 War Diary, FGH, 18 May 1918. 
37 However, Anderson and twelve other ranks of the Fort Garry Horse continued with patrol work at the 
front on 27 March, and were unable to rejoin the CCB for four days.  See FGHMA War Diaries File.  
Narrative by Lieutenant Anderson, FGH.  Operations of the first mounted party from the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade 23-30 March 1918; OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: 
Military Dossier, 1914-1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/118.  Narrative by Lt.Col. Stevenson, March 22-27 
1918; OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-
1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/105-106.  Narrative of Operations, 3rd Cavalry Division Detachment by 
Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Paterson, March 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 8.  Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, Narrative by Lt.-Col. R.W. Paterson, 20-27 March 1918. 
38 Grodzinski & McNorgan, 254. 
 242
reported on the enemy’s position, rate of advance, and the position of the Allied infantry, 
including the French troops.  Reports were drafted and sent in every two hours via 
dispatch riders.  It was noted that “These patrol leaders were able to visit advanced 
Company, Regimental, and Brigade Headquarters of Infantry or French units and send in 
a continuous stream of information of the situation on a front of five to seven miles, 
which proved invaluable to the higher command.”39  All reports helped to clarify the 
situation at the front and allowed commanders to determine the best course of action 
during a difficult campaign.  As the Machine Gun Squadron’s report stated, “The 
information was obtained under difficult conditions when little information could be 
given to the patrol leaders regarding the believed position of the enemy or of our own 
troops; and the reports were of great value at a time when the situation was, to say the 
least of it, obscure.”40  Although these mounted patrols kept close touch with the enemy 
and were actively pushed well ahead of the Allied line to properly reconnoiter the 
enemy’s position, they suffered no casualties.41   
Although the Battle of Moreuil Wood on 30 March has overshadowed the Cavalry 
Corps’ performance during the opening week of Operation Michael, the mounted and 
dismounted actions of 21 through 27 March exemplified the use and versatility that 
cavalry had to offer.  As Gough stated,  
Their mobility and their capacity to cross any country on horses, and 
therefore to get rapidly from place to place, made them far more powerful 
                                                          
39 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 15.  G/155, 3rd Cavalry Division.  Points Brought to notice 
during recent Operations, March 1918. 
40 See Appendix XIII for examples of RCD patrol reports from 23 March 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 
3984, Folder 5, File 15.  G/153, Machine Gun Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Division.  Work of Patrols with 
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41 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 15.  G/155, 3rd Cavalry Division.  Points Brought to notice 
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than their numbers would suggest…They were rushed from one position 
to another to fill a gap, and saved many a critical situation.  They fought 
mounted or dismounted as opportunity offered.42 
 
Several reports noted that above all else, the opening week of the Spring Offensive 
demonstrated the value of cavalry in open warfare, particularly in a reconnaissance and 
scouting role.43  According to one report, 
Cavalry or mounted men, must be available to keep Corps and Divisional 
Headquarters informed as to the situation, and to act as a mobile reserve 
ready to protect the flanks, or to hold important positions temporarily until 
they can be occupied by Infantry.  In addition, distant reconnaissance can 
only be carried out, and contact with hostile troops maintained, by 
Cavalry, as owing to weather and light conditions, aircraft can neither be 
relied upon to get, or maintain, information about the enemy, especially if 
the country is much intersected.44 
 
The Cavalry Corps achieved some of its greatest successes during Operation Michael, 
and optimism for future cavalry operations in open warfare continued to grow. 
Moreuil Wood, 30 March 1918 
 
Although the mounted arm provided valuable services during the first week of the 
Spring Offensive, Operation Michael was still an incredible German success.  
Ludendorff’s troops managed to advance twenty-five miles in just six days.45  By 28 
March, Ludendorff made ready to press the left wing of his offensive against Amiens in 
an effort to separate the French and British armies.  On 30 March, members of the 23rd 
Saxon Division had taken hold of a ridge that overlooked the Avre Valley and the village 
of Moreuil, twelve miles south east of Amiens, while the right flank of the French Army 
                                                          
42 Gough, quoted in Greenhous, Position, 42. 
43 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 10.  Enemy Divisions opposed to III Corps front between 21 
March and 2 April 1918. 
44 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 10.  Enemy Divisions opposed to III Corps front between 21 
March and 2 April 1918. 
45 See Appendix XIV for map illustrating the success of the German advance.  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, 
Folder 7, File 8.  Ia/47737, Translation of a German Document: Divisional Order for the Attack – Nr.1, 18 
March 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 10.  Enemy Divisions opposed to III Corps front 
between 21 March and 2 April 1918; Greenhous, Position, 41; Greenhous, 219. 
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remained unprotected and troops were ordered to pull back. The strength of the German 
position threatened to split the Allied line, as the British Army was forced back to the 
north of Rifle Wood, and the French to the south at Moreuil.46  Consequently, all 
available units were rushed to the front, as the separation of the French and British 
Armies might cost the Allies the war.  
At 7:00am on 30 March, GOC the 2nd Cavalry Division General Pitman received 
a phone call from XIX Corps informing him “Enemy reported in large wood northeast of 
Moreuil on right flank of 20th Division.  Cross River Avre at once and move southeast 
across the [River] Luce and clear up the whole situation in [the] wood and secure the line 
as far as Moreuil.”47  Moreuil Wood was a key position because of its proximity to 
Amiens, the junction between the French and British Armies and critical railhead.  The 
wood was also located on the right bank of the Avre River, which was of considerable 
strategic significance as it hugged the Paris-Amiens Railway.48  The northern flank of the 
Allied line proved to be the most crucial, as it guarded the road to Paris and all major 
communication lines.49  The wood also gave the enemy clear and direct observation of 
the whole valley leading up to Amiens.50 
The severely under-strength Canadian Cavalry Brigade was the closest unit to 
Moreuil Wood, stationed in Guyencourt Wood attached to the 2nd Cavalry Division.  
                                                          
46 See Appendix XIV for map. 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 14.  Appendix C, Action at Moreuil Wood on 30 March by 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade; Ludendorff, 599; Greenhous, Position, 41-42; Grodzinski & McNorgan, 254; 
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50 War Diary, RCD, March 1918, Appendix I.   
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Between 7:30 and 8:00am, Pitman informed Seely that the Germans had broken through 
the Allied line at Mézieres, and were advancing on Amiens.51  Pitman ordered Seely to 
embark across the Noye and Avre Rivers with the CCB and “engage and delay the 
enemy.”52  The CCB embarked for Moreuil Wood immediately via Reminencourt and 
Sencat Wood, crossing the Avre unopposed at Castel.  The Brigade came under heavy 
enemy machine gun fire when it arrived at the high ground to the north of Moreuil Wood 
at 9:00am.53  According to one report, “It was apparent that the retention of this wood by 
the enemy, giving them direct observation on the whole of the valley leading up to 
Amiens might be fatal to Amiens.”54  Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Connolly reported that 
Seely called a meeting between all regimental commanding officers, all of whom agreed 
to attack and take the wood.55   
Seely established headquarters at La Corne Wood, where he planned to expel the 
German troops from Moreuil Wood by first securing its north-eastern and south-eastern 
corners.  He deployed three squadrons of the Royal Canadian Dragoons and one machine 
gun section as the advance guard.  Captain Roy Nordheimer’s “A” Squadron was ordered 
to capture the north-west corner of the wood, while Captain Terence Newcomen’s “C” 
                                                          
51 General Bell-Smyth’s 3rd Cavalry Brigade was also close to the front, and received orders to cross the 
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Action of 2nd Cavalry Division (With Canadian Cavalry Brigade Attached) in front of Amiens, 30 March-1 
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54 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of Operations, Canadian Cavalry Brigade Capture of Bois-de-
Moreuil 30 March and Capture of Rifle Wood 1 April, 1918. 
55 LSHMA Records/Personnel Files (Biography).  Moreuil Wood, 30 March 1918 by Lieutenant Colonel 
C.E. Connolly, DSO. 
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Squadron would overtake the south-western face of the wood, and establish contact with 
the French in the village of Moreuil.56  Newcomen’s Squadron was to connect with Major 
Timmis’ “B” Squadron, that was ordered to gallop around the north-eastern corner of the 
wood and capture the far southern corner.57  Each cavalry squadron was composed of 
approximately 100 troops.  The CCB would face the remnants of at least four German 
infantry battalions of approximately 300 men each for a total of 1,200 enemy troops 
equipped with machine guns and artillery.58  
Nordheimer’s “A” Squadron embarked for the north-west corner of Moreuil 
Wood at a gallop and entered the wood mounted.  However, it was quickly forced out of 
the wood when it came under heavy machine gun fire from approximately 300 German 
troops of the 101st Grenadier Regiment.  The Squadron was forced to dismount before re-
entering the wood with bayonets fixed to their rifles, and Hotchkiss guns supporting each 
flank.  Hand to hand fighting quickly ensued.  Shortly thereafter, Nordheimer was killed 
in action.59  “A” Squadron continued the engagement under the leadership of Lieutenant 
Eric Cochran, and was able to drive the enemy out of this section of the wood and hold 
the position.60   
                                                          
56 War Diary, RCD, March 1918, Appendix I.   
57 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Narrative of Operations, Canadian Cavalry Brigade Capture of Bois-de-
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Meanwhile, Newcomen’s “C” Squadron managed to advance half way across the 
south-western face of the wood before it came under heavy machine gun fire from the 
122nd Fusilier Regiment61 with support from the 238th German Field Artillery Regiment 
stationed in the direction of Moreuil and Morisel.62  According to a German account,  
Suddenly a body of Canadian cavalry came riding down upon the left 
flank of the battalion, actually against No.7 Company, riding partly 
through and partly past the fringe of the wood.  There were some seventy 
horsemen, and it seems that they hardly expected to find our front line so 
close to the edge of the wood, and, in some measure hidden by the wisps 
of mist, they came on almost at a walk.  The Grenadiers were thus given 
time to open a well-aimed fire at short range and so drove back the enemy 
who suffered a severe loss.63 
 
The Squadron was forced to enter the wood and take cover behind a crest, and was 
unable to establish contact with the French in the village of Moreuil.  The FGH was 
dispatched to reinforce Newcomen’s effort.  “A” and “C” Squadrons of the FGH 
embarked along the south-western face of the wood and entered to support Newcomen’s 
Squadron, while FGH “B” Squadron and a machine gun section established themselves 
on the high ground west of Morisel to provide covering fire for the CCB inside the 
wood.64 
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Timmis’ RCD “B” Squadron was next to embark, proceeding to the southern 
corner via the northern face of the wood.  However, the Squadron came under heavy 
enemy fire during the advance and was forced to enter the wood long before reaching its 
objective.  Once inside, Timmis’ troops discovered enemy machine gun nests had been 
placed in the trees above.  The Squadron was forced to dismount due to heavy enemy fire 
and the thick brush undergrowth, which made the wood incredibly difficult for horses to 
traverse.65  According to later reports, the men of Timmis’ Squadron incurred such heavy 
casualties that they were forced to wheel to the left and withdraw.66  This was 
corroborated by the German account, which stated that Timmis’ patrol was successful in 
breaking through the front line of German troops while mounted until they encountered 
the German machine guns, and then were forced to dismount and scatter to the north-
west.67 
While the RCD had managed to establish a precarious foothold on two sides of 
Moreuil Wood, German reinforcements were still able to flood into the wood from the 
south.  Consequently, Seely deployed all of Lord Strathcona’s Horse to reinforce the 
troops in the wood.68  Squadrons “A” and “B” were placed under Lieutenant Colonel 
MacDonald’s command.  They were ordered to dismount and attack the northern face of 
the wood to support “A” and “B” Squadron of the RCD.  These Squadrons were 
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successful in driving the enemy out of the northern area of the wood by 11:00am despite 
incurring heavy casualties.69   
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Gordon Flowerdew’s “C” Squadron was to ordered to 
fulfill Timmis’ Squadron’s original objective.  They advanced to the southern corner via 
the northern face of the wood to cut off German reinforcements.70   Flowerdew’s 
Squadron advanced across the northern face of the wood without incident until arriving at 
the north-east corner.  After seeing that this edge of the wood was held by the enemy, 
Flowerdew sent one troop under Lieutenant Frederick Morris Harvey’s command to 
scout the occupied area.71  Approximately two hundred yards from the north-east corner, 
Harvey found five German troops looting a French transport wagon.  While the patrol 
handled the looters, Harvey spotted a large mass of German troops at the north-eastern 
edge of the wood.  He quickly rode to met Flowerdew, who was approaching with the 
remainder of “C” Squadron approximately 200 yards behind him.  Harvey briefed 
Flowerdew on the situation.  Flowerdew ordered Harvey to attack the German garrison 
with one dismounted troop and suggested that the Germans could be driven out of the 
wood, and then defeated by Flowerdew’s forces. 72  Flowerdew told Harvey, “Go ahead, 
and we will go around the end mounted, and catch them when they come out.”73     
Flowerdew led the remainder of the Squadron to higher ground to wait for the 
retreating Germans.  Once in position, Flowerdew’s troops spotted a group of 
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approximately 300 enemy troops approaching from the south that had been driven out of 
the wood by the RCD.74  These enemy troops were members of the 101st Grenadier 
Regiment and the 1st Battalion of 122nd Fusilier Regiment, and were reinforced by a 
machine gun company and an artillery battery equipped with six guns.75  Left with few 
options, Flowerdew quickly gave the order, “It’s a charge boys, it’s a charge!”76  The 
Squadron’s trumpeter Red Longley raised his trumpet to sound the charge, but instead 
became the first casualty of the engagement.77  Seventy-five Canadian Cavalrymen 
charged 300 yards in approximately thirty seconds, and crashed into the advancing 
German column with sabres drawn.  Their charge was answered with a hail of German 
bullets and artillery.78   
There are significant discrepancies between German and Canadian accounts of the 
charge.  All Allied and Canadian reports state that the Strathcona’s charged the German 
line, wheeled, and reformed to charge a second time.79  However, a German account by 
Captain Freiherr von Falkenstein of the 2nd Battalion, 101st Grenadiers stated,  
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Taking advantage of the serious condition of No. 6 Company, some 200 
horsemen, ranged in three lines, came charging down in a southerly 
direction, slightly enveloping the right of the front line of the battalion.  
Received by the fire of the heavy howitzer, by that of the machine-gun 
section, and by a shower of bombs, the attack was bloodily repulsed, the 
last rider falling dead from his saddle two hundred yards from the rifle 
muzzles of No. 8 Company, while several wounded horses remained on 
the field of action.80 
 
First-hand accounts offer little clarification except to say that the charge quickly became 
a confused encounter, as Albert Dale of “C” Squadron’s 4th Troop later recalled,  
There is not much I can tell of the actual charge, because everything 
happened with such speed and fury.  I have a hazy recollection of seeing 
Flowerdew and his horse falling as we swept by.  Everything seemed 
unreal – the shouting of men, the moans of the wounded, the pitiful crying 
of the wounded horses.  When I woke up I was pinned under my horse 
which was mercifully dead.81   
 
Although the true formation of the charge can never be known with certainty, 
Falkenstein’s account contains clear discrepancies.  For example, he stated that 200 men 
took part in Flowerdew’s charge, when in fact the charge was comprised of only seventy-
five men.  Furthermore, the men of Flowerdew’s Squadron were able to inflict casualties 
on the German troops with their swords, therefore the charge could not have collapsed 
completely prior to reaching the German line.  Finally, while nearly all were wounded, 
not every rider fell dead in the charge as Falkenstein suggested.  In fact, the surviving 
members of “C” Squadron fought their way back to the wood to join Harvey’s82 troop, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Rifle Wood 1 April, 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 15.  G/155, 3rd Cavalry Division.  
Points Brought to notice during recent Operations, March 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 
6.  G. 161/4, Memorandum ‘E’ Action of 2nd Cavalry Division (With Canadian Cavalry Brigade Attached) 
in front of Amiens, 30 March-1 April 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 14.  Action at 
Moreuil Wood on 30 March by Canadian Cavalry Brigade; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3 File 14.  
Memorandum ‘A’ Lessons drawn from the operations carried out by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cavalry Divisions 
from 21 March to 5 April 1918; War Diary, RCD, March 1918, Appendix I; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, 
33. 
80 Falkenstein, 609. 
81 Dale, as quoted in Williams, 208. 
82 Harvey was awarded the Military Cross for his efforts. 
 252
where they participated in a dismounted engagement that pushed the remaining German 
forces out of the north-east corner of Moreuil Wood, and put the remaining German field 
guns out of action.83  It was also clear that the charge did have some moral effect on the 
enemy.  According to the LSH War Diary, enemy resistance within the wood lessened as 
the Germans feared themselves surrounded due to the tremendous noise made by the 
cavalry charge.84  As Falkenstein stated, “There can be no doubt that a successful break 
through by the enemy cavalry would have caused the greatest confusion.”85   
Regardless of the formation, it is certain that very heavy casualties were inflicted 
on both sides.  One witness86 recalled seeing Flowerdew’s charge from a distance and 
believed it to be disastrous because of the incredible casualties, likening it to the Charge 
of the Light Brigade.87  According to Grodzinski and McNorgan, only one of the seventy-
five Strathcona’s who took part in the charge escaped without wounds.88  In total, twenty-
four Strathcona’s were killed outright, while a further fifteen would die from their 
wounds in the following weeks.  Flowerdew89 himself was shot in the chest and both 
thighs and was carried off the battlefield.  He died of his wounds the following day.90  In 
total, the Battle of Moreuil Wood cost the Canadian Cavalry Brigade a total of 303 
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casualties and approximately 800 horses.91  German statistics are less certain.  Seely 
estimated that seventy Germans were killed in the charge, while between 200 and 300 
others were killed by covering machine gun fire from “B” Squadron of the Fort Garry 
Horse and the Machine Gun Squadron stationed on the high ground west of Morisel. This 
covering fire likely kept Flowerdew’s squadron from incurring even heavier casualties.92   
By 11:00am, Moreuil Wood was consolidated and held by the CCB with the 
exception of the extreme southern corner.  As the Canadian Cavalry Brigade continued to 
hold the wood into the afternoon, they were reinforced by Bell-Smyth’s 3rd British 
Cavalry Brigade and an artillery battery.  According to all Canadian reports, the wood 
would have been impossible to hold without reinforcements.  The cavalry endured 
continuous enemy shelling and heavy fighting throughout the day to the south and eastern 
edges of Moreuil Wood.  Despite repeated enemy counter attacks, the CCB and the 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade managed to hold their position until the 8th Infantry Division finally 
relieved them at 9:30pm.93   
Rifle Wood, 1 April 1918 
 The CCB stood too in Senechat Wood through 31 March.   The Germans had 
resumed their offensive and captured Rifle Wood approximately one mile south-east of 
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Hangard.94  Rifle Wood was held by two German battalions, and gave the enemy troops 
direct observation of Amiens and the Paris Railway.  Consequently, the officers of the 2nd 
and 3rd Cavalry Divisions met at Rouvrel to determine strategy for a dismounted attack 
on Rifle Wood at 3:00am on 1 April.  Seely was to lead the CCB and the 4th and 5th 
Cavalry Brigades in the action, while Paterson took charge of the CCB at the brigade 
level.  It was decided that the wood should be attacked from the north and north-west 
under cover of artillery and machine gun fire.  A three-wave mounted rifle assault was 
planned, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade acting as the first wave, forming a flank from the 
northern edge of the wood to the river.  The 5th Cavalry Brigade would advance as the 
second wave, capturing the front edge of the wood.  Finally, the CCB would proceed as 
the third wave, advancing through the wood and clearing it of enemy troops.  XIX Corps 
arranged artillery support, and every brigade supplied a machine gun squadron for the 
operation.  Pitman insisted on a 9:00am start time to enable the cavalry to reconnoiter a 
proper route of advance in daylight.95 
 The newly assembled force rode to the wood at a trot to enable the men to reach 
their point of action without exhaustion.  When they reached their embarkation point, 
they dismounted and then sent their horses back to Senechat Wood with handlers.  The 
attack was preceded by an eight-minute artillery barrage from the RHA beginning at 
8:52am.  At 9:00am, the men of the 4th and 5th Brigades advanced and captured their 
objectives.  Thereafter, the CCB entered the wood and advanced to the southwest, 
reinforced by members of the 5th Brigade.  After entering the wood, the FGH advanced to 
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the left and LSH to the right, while the RCD advanced through the centre.  Paterson noted 
that the advance was difficult due to wet marshy ground conditions.  Nonetheless, the 
CCB managed to cut off the machine gun nests at the western edge of the wood from the 
main body of German defenders, and a large number of the enemy were forced to 
surrender.96  
 According to Paterson, once the enemy received word that the wood was nearly 
captured, they began an intensive artillery barrage that caused the majority of the cavalry 
force’s casualties.  Brigade headquarters at the northwest corner of the wood was gas 
shelled.  Paterson himself was gassed, along with Lieutenant Moss, Lieutenant Mills, and 
Captain Steeves.97  However, the cavalry force managed to hold the wood and defeat 
enemy counter attacks with Hotchkiss gun and artillery support.  By 11:00am the wood 
was secured.  The men of the CCB had been promised that if they captured the wood, 
they would be relieved at once,98 thus the 7th Dragoon Guards and the Inniskilling 
Dragoons arrived immediately, and the CCB and withdrew to Senechat Wood.99   
Like Moreuil Wood, Rifle Wood was secured at a substantial cost.  The CCB 
suffered 175 casualties out of its 476 participants.100  However, the dismounted cavalry 
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force managed to capture 121 prisoners, thirteen enemy machine guns, one French 
machine gun, and two Lewis Guns. 101  Exact German casualties were not known but 
were estimated to be extremely high, particularly due to covering artillery fire from the 
RHA.102  Seely estimated that they were at least as great as those taken by the dismounted 
cavalry.103 
Assessing Success  
 
After several failed attacks on Amiens, Ludendorff was finally forced to cancel 
Operation Michael on 5 April.  While the offensive was devastating to the Allies, the 
Cavalry Corps achieved some of its greatest successes during the fifteen-day battle.  The 
CCB and the Cavalry Corps received congratulatory messages from several parties for 
their actions, including Rawlinson, Kavanagh, Pitman, several brigade majors, and Prime 
Minister Borden.104  Particular praise was given to the CCB for Moreuil Wood because of 
the significance of the action, and the romance of Flowerdew’s charge.  As Pitman wrote, 
“The fighting qualities of the Canadians have been the admiration of us all.”105   
Although the Canadian Cavalry Brigade’s action at Moreuil Wood was only one 
of several small engagements that slowed and eventually stopped Operation Michael and 
cost the brigade dearly in terms of casualties, the significance of the battle was still 
considerable.  The greatest emphasis has been placed on Flowerdew’s charge, but the real 
                                                          
101 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 13.  Rifle Wood, Narrative by Lt.Col. R.W. Paterson, 1 April 
1918; War Diary, RCD, March 1918, Appendix I. 
102 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 15.  2nd Cavalry Division – Narrative of Operations, 1 April 
1918. 
103 OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-
1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/140-141.  Recapture of Rifle Wood by 4th, 5th, and Canadian Cavalry Brigades, 
1 April 1918. 
104 See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 1, File 17; OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, 
Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/166.  Prime Minister Robert 
Borden to J.E.B. Seely, 22 April 1918. 
105 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 1, File 17.  G.S. 5684 2nd Cavalry Division.  T. T. Pitman to JEB 
Seely, 3 April 1918. 
 257
significance of Moreuil Wood lies elsewhere.  The engagement was in essence a delaying 
action that slowed the enemy advance long enough for reinforcements and heavy artillery 
to arrive at the front to stop the Germans from crossing the Avre and moving towards 
Amiens.  The CCB forced the retreat of German reinforcements and stopped the German 
advance towards the village of Moreuil.  Without this action, the road to Amiens would 
have been opened to enemy forces, leaving the vital communication and rail centre 
vulnerable.  Had the Germans successfully captured Amiens, the French and British 
Armies would have been separated, and the Great War may have been lost, or continued 
for at least another year.106  As Ferdinand Foch107 wrote to Seely, “It was essential, at any 
cost, to ensure that the two armies were not separated…In large part thanks to your 
brigade, the situation – hopeless at the beginning of the battle – was restored.”108   
The action at Moreuil Wood also gave a good indication of the valuable role that 
cavalry could play on the Western Front.  The engagement demonstrated that the real 
value of cavalry lay in its ability to restore critical situations, as the superior mobility of 
the mounted arm allowed it to reach a decisive point of action quickly without exhausting 
men or resources.109  For example, when called upon to “engage and delay the enemy”110 
at Moreuil Wood, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was approximately seven miles from the 
wood, across two rivers and two railway lines.  The CCB delivered the attack within one 
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hour of embarking from this point.111  According to a report by the 2nd Cavalry Division, 
timing was critical in this particular operation.  The report estimated that an infantry unit 
deployed from the same embarkation point would have taken at least an hour to an hour 
and a half longer to reach and attack Moreuil Wood.  Examinations of intelligence 
reports, aerial reconnaissance photos, and reports from German prisoners of war who 
were captured at Moreuil Wood indicated that an extra hour would likely have given the 
Germans enough time to reinforce and strengthen their position inside the wood, which 
would have led to the failure of a British attack given the limited number of troops 
available.112  The mobility of the mounted advance was so effective that the CCB and 4th 
and 5th Cavalry Brigades advanced as mounted rifles to Rifle Wood on 1 April. 
Despite the CCB’s gallantry during the Spring Offensive, some criticisms have 
been made of the Brigade’s commanding officer.  For example, Kenyon has been critical 
of Seely’s command at Moreuil Wood, stating that Seely committed his troops to the 
battle too quickly without artillery or machine gun support.113  However, machine gun 
support was used throughout the operation by all regiments that were sent forward.  The 
availability of artillery support is much more difficult to assess due to conflicting reports.  
Seely stated in his memoir that two batteries of the RCHA were available and supporting 
the CCB at Moreuil Wood.114  This statement was cited and repeated by Anglesey, and 
presumably led to Kenyon’s interpretation.115  However, a close examination of primary 
sources revealed that Seely’s statement in his memoir was inaccurate.  The CCB did not 
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have artillery support attached at Moreuil Wood.  As Connelly’s report stated, the RCHA 
was unavailable, as all batteries had been engaged ten to twelve miles away since 21 
March.116  Similarly, in a report dated 30 March 1918 Seely himself stated that the 
operation was carried out without any artillery support.117  “D” Battery of the RHA was 
later stationed to the east of the wood equipped with six guns, but was attached to the 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade under the command of General Bell-Smyth.  Nonetheless, the artillery 
did come into action at Moreuil Wood by 9:30am, firing on selected points in the wood 
based on information supplied by the CCB, though maintaining communication during 
the engagement proved exceedingly difficult.118  Communication difficulties were largely 
a consequence of the urgency of the operation, as cavalry were sent to the front to close 
the gap as quickly as possible before a proper liaison with the covering artillery could be 
established.  According to one report, “The general opinion is that in many cases 
positions could have been held and also great losses inflicted on the enemy infantry had it 
been possible to get into communication with the artillery quickly.”119  However, the 
speed of this action was of such significance that Pitman did not issue any instructions to 
Seely beyond ordering him to advance as quickly as possible and to “engage and delay 
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the enemy.”120  As Pitman himself described it, “The situation was so obscure, and time 
such an important factor, that it was not considered possible to give any further 
details.”121   
Seely’s Departure from the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
After the CCB’s great successes in March 1918, the long anticipated move to 
replace J.E.B Seely as Commanding Officer of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade finally 
came to fruition in May 1918.  Despite the CCB’s excellent military record, Seely was 
almost universally condemned by his contemporaries in the Cavalry Corps and Canadian 
political circles.  Borden fiercely opposed his appointment by Lord Kitchener from the 
outset in 1915, as the Prime Minister believed there were Canadian commanders who 
were up to the task.122  British Cavalry commanders had an obvious bias against Seely 
after the 1914 Curragh Incident,123 and all were forced to work together in the same 
Cavalry Corps throughout the Great War.  Historians, including Anglesey, Badsey, and 
Kenyon, have perpetuated this bias.124  Consequently, there has never been a fair and 
balanced assessment of Seely’s career with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade that has given 
reasonable consideration to the existing prejudice that has always coloured attitudes 
towards him. 
The most commonly cited example of Seely’s “incompetence” could be found in 
Brigadier General Archibald Home’s diary.  In October 1916, Home stated,  
Yesterday went down to inspect part of the Canadian Bde under Seely.  The 
whole thing [is] a failure, the material is excellent but with such a Brigadier 
the thing is impossible.  We asked him to review the operations and he made 
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a speech which was useless from a military point of view.  He ought to go 
back to politics, that is his proper sphere.  Honest downrightness is what is 
wanted with soldiers, not fine phrasing and verbiage.125 
 
Within three weeks, Home met with Macandrew to discuss replacing Seely under the 
guise of having him recalled to politics,126 though nothing came of it.127  Similarly, in 
October 1916 Charles Kavanagh informed Haig that Seely ought to be replaced.  Haig 
responded by pointing out the obvious prejudices against Seely, stating “I told Kavanagh 
that he must only think of [Seely] as a Cavalry Brigadier in the Field responsible for the 
efficiency and handling of his Command and not as an M.P. [Member of Parliament] and 
ex-Secretary of State for War.”128   
Ironically, both Home and Kavanagh seem to have changed their opinions of Seely 
long before his replacement, though this is never mentioned in historical records.  Home 
noted a great improvement in the CCB by early December 1916.129  When Seely was 
replaced in May 1918, Home reacted with surprise, stating: “Just heard the Canadians are 
dispensing with Seely’s services and Paterson gets the Canadian Cav. Brigade – more 
graft!  These Canadians are awful politicians and intriguers.”130  Similarly, on 12 January 
1918, Kavanagh wrote to Seely because he was concerned that the CCB might be 
dismounted.  Kavanagh asserted, “[The Canadian Cavalry Brigade] have proved 
themselves such a fine fighting Brigade that they would be the greatest loss to the 
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Cavalry Corps and there is no Regular Brigade in the Corps that I would mind losing 
more.”131  However, the British legacy of resentment towards Seely did persist through 
1918, as Seely’s name did not appear in the dispatches for the action at Moreuil Wood 
despite his Brigade’s considerable accomplishments, though Pitman and Rawlinson’s 
names both appear.132 
By March 1918, Seely received word that he was about to be replaced by Paterson 
as Commanding Officer of the CCB.  The reason given was that it was preferable to keep 
Canadian regiments under Canadian commanders where qualified officers were available, 
and Paterson was now considered fit for the job.133  Seely responded by accepting the 
decision and agreeing that Paterson was very capable of stepping into the role.  However, 
he added, 
With regard to my own position, I cannot question the C in C’s decision 
since I am bound to assume that some fresh fact has arisen of which I know 
nothing rendering the change necessary.  But I feel bound to add this: In the 
last eleven months I have received telegrams or direct messages from the C 
in C himself, conveying his congratulations on the achievements of the 
Brigade in action, on no less than seven occasions…in the same period the 
C in C has sanctioned more than a hundred rewards for gallantry to officers 
and men of the Brigade…this remarkable and, I should think, unique record 
is due to the exceptional qualities of those under my command; but it is also 
true that if there had been any failure on any one of those seven occasions I 
should have received the blame.  Under these circumstances, to send me 
away just as though I had failed in my command seems to me harsh and 
unfair.134   
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When the High Command replied, they explained that this was not their intent, and that 
no new information had been brought forward.  It was insisted that the Commander in 
Chief simply had to uphold the established policy of using a Canadian commander for a 
Canadian brigade where available.135  However, Seely’s request to remain with his 
Brigade while they were engaged at the front doing dismounted work until early March 
was granted.  The High Command was unable to make the change before the onset of the 
German Spring Offensive.136 
It seemed that the CCB’s great success in March 1918 changed some 
contemporary opinions of Seely, as he received a letter dated 4 April 1918 that stated 
“The Commander-in-Chief has asked me to write and tell you that he has decided, with 
the concurrence of the Canadian Authorities, to retain you in command of the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade.”137  However, this reprieve was short-lived.  On 16 May, Seely was 
dismissed and stripped of his command.  Though Seely wrote in his memoir that he was 
“ordered home” because of a persistent cough he developed after inhaling poison gas at 
Rifle Wood, it appeared that the Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada still 
wanted Paterson to command the CCB.138  His dismissal notice read,  
The Commander in Chief wishes me to express his high appreciation of 
your service to the Army…Although it is no doubt desirable that Canadian 
Officers, as they become qualified, should be given command of Canadian 
formations, the Commander in Chief very much regrets the necessity of 
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replacing you in the appointment which you have held with such 
distinction.139  
   
Given the above statement and Home’s surprise regarding Seely’s dismissal, it seems 
likely that this was a Canadian decision.140  Seely departed on 21 May, deeply 
disappointed by the loss of his command.  He wished the Brigade well and thanked them 
for their years of service, but still did not reveal the exact circumstance of his dismissal, 
stating, “I am summoned to other duty, and therefore, to my infinite regret, must take 
leave of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade.”141  
 It appears that the plan to replace Seely was both long thought out and far 
reaching, even among members of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade.  In July 1918, Paterson 
received a personal letter from H.J.W. Macandrew, former GOC the 5th Cavalry Division, 
now stationed in Egypt with the 2nd Mounted Division.  Macandrew congratulated 
Paterson on the CCB’s success at Moreuil Wood and wrote “You have the Brigade at last 
I feel sure.  I wonder what our friend thinks of his advice in January to the Prime Minister 
that lots of troops could be spared from France for Palestine!”142  Though there is no 
written record that Seely gave this advice to Lloyd George, it seems unlikely that 
Macandrew could be referring to anyone else given the context of this statement, and the 
fact that the 5th Cavalry Division had embarked for the Eastern Front in January 1918 
while the CCB faced conversion into infantry on the Western Front.  From these 
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comments it became clear that Seely’s unpopularity extended beyond the High Command 
and had infiltrated the upper echelons of the CCB itself.   
 Despite his reputation among cavalry commanders and in some political circles, 
Seely’s best legacy was his obvious popularity among the rank and file of the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade itself.  The most revealing example of the majority of the CCB’s true 
feelings towards him can be found in a letter addressed to the former Commanding 
Officer from wounded members of the CCB convalescing in the Military Hospital at 
Woodcote Park in Epsom, Surrey, dated 5 June 1918.143  They wrote, 
A rumour, and what we sincerely hope is only a rumour, has reached us that 
you are about to relinquish your command of the Brigade and re-enter 
political life.  Under your command and guidance and inspired by your 
numerous examples of courage and gallantry the Brigade has accomplished 
many deeds which we all hope will make a glorious page in Canadian 
History, therefore we feel that if we are to lose you we are not only losing a 
distinguished General but an old friend who has endeared himself to the 
Canadians and who understands the ways of the Canadians as few others do.  
If however you are to leave us, you take with you the united goodwill and 
best wishes of the Boys under your Command and we are all determined 
that the Honor and Fame of the Brigade, which you have so firmly 
established shall be upheld to the end.144 
 
The letter was signed by seventy-five men of all ranks formally under Seely’s command 
from every regiment in the CCB, including the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery and the 
Machine Gun Squadron.145  Similarly, Connolly kept in touch with Seely after his 
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departure and updated him on the CCB’s progress for the remainder of the war.146  Seely 
responded by saying how dearly he wished to be with the Brigade, and planned to visit 
them at the front.147  Seely’s popularity among his troops extended beyond the war, as the 
surviving members of the CCB invited him to speak at their reunion at the Empire Club 
of Canada on 4 October 1920.148 
It is impossible to construct a fair assessment of Seely’s legacy without 
considering the incredible bias against him from both Canadian politicians and his 
colleagues in the Cavalry Corps.  It is entirely possible that Seely was not the best cavalry 
commander in the Cavalry Corps, or even the best man to lead the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade.  However, as Seely himself stated, the record of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
during his tenure demonstrates that Seely was at least capable of leading the CCB, and 
his obvious popularity among his troops proves that he did some things well.  Though 
Seely was no great military theorist, an examination of his personal records reveals a 
commander with sensible strategic reason and keen observation.149  Consequently, any 
contemporary commentary on Seely’s career with the CCB must always be viewed 
through the lens of the Curragh Incident. 
 
 
                                                          
146 OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-
1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/200.  Letter From C.E. Connolly to JEB Seely, 13 October 1918. 
147 OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-
1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/204.  Letter from JEB Seely to C.E. Connolly, 23 October 1918. 
148 OxNCL Papers of John Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-
1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/214.  Speech of Major-General the Rt. Hon. J.E.B. Seely, Empire Club of 
Canada, 4 October 1920. 
149 For example, on 24 January 1916, Seely wrote a memorandum denouncing attritional strategy, stating 
that small territorial gains were of no value as so great a cost.  He considered such devastating losses 
detrimental to ultimate victory.  He also emphasized the importance of artillery support, covering 
firepower, and proper coordination of all arms before making an advance.  See OxNCL Papers of John 
Edward Bernard Seely, Section IV. Military Papers: Military Dossier, 1914-1918.  MSS Mottistone 24/11-
21, Memorandum by J.E.B. Seely, 24 January 1916.    
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Conclusion 
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade played a decisive role during the German Spring 
Offensive and at Moreuil Wood on 30 March 1918 because of its superior mobility.  
During the two-week offensive, mounted troops participated in dozens of actions that 
contributed to the halt of the German advance.  They proved their ability to adapt to 
different circumstances, fighting mounted or dismounted where needed. Though cavalry 
had very limited uses in the trenches, cavalry became valuable when deadlock on the 
Western Front came undone, and mobile warfare was possible once again.  The CCB’s 
action at Moreuil Wood is a fitting example of that value.  The Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
was capable of making a substantial contribution to Allied victory because mobility 
remained its primary asset.   
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CHAPTER 9: 
The Hundred Days Offensive, August-November 1918 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
 
Introduction 
As the deadlock on the Western Front gradually came undone in 1918, cavalry 
continued to play a significant role in this theatre.  The Cavalry Corps was particularly 
valuable during the final “Hundred Days” of the Great War at Amiens and Le Cateau, as 
mobility was essential during the last months of action.  As with most cavalry actions on 
the Western Front, the role of the mounted arm during the final Hundred Days has not 
been given a fair assessment.  Historians such as Shane Schreiber have claimed that the 
mounted arm rode to “certain death” at Amiens due to heavy enemy machine gun and 
artillery fire.1  McWilliams and Steel argued that the cavalry failed at Amiens, and 
suggested that the tanks might have done better if not encumbered by the cavalry.2  
Similarly, the spectacular success of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade at Le Cateau on 9 
October has often been ignored or dismissed as a minor accomplishment that might have 
been achieved by the infantry at less cost.  As Kenyon has argued, this prevailing opinion 
is largely a consequence of the cavalry’s “failure” to achieve a “breakthrough” in 1918.3  
However, as has been demonstrated, a cavalry breakthrough was not the objective, as 
cavalry was meant to exploit success, not break the enemy line.  As orders for cavalry in 
open warfare make clear, cavalry was meant for “seizing tactical points, or pressing home 
a successful infantry attack on an exhausted enemy…cutting off enemy’s 
                                                          
1 Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the 
Great War (Westport CT: Praeger, 1997), 49. 
2 J. McWilliams & R. Steel, Amiens: Dawn of Victory (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2000), 196. 
3 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 256-257. 
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communications in open warfare.”4  In 1918, the primary role of cavalry was still 
reconnaissance and pursuit of the retreating enemy, only on a smaller and more localized 
scale than originally hoped in 1914.5  Cavalry was responsible for passing through the 
infantry line once objectives had been captured, and clearing the area of enemy troops 
while keeping pressure on the enemy retreat.  In pursuit, speed was of the utmost 
importance to keep the enemy from reforming and reinforcing their lines and launching a 
counterattack.  Cavalry was of vital importance in this particular role due to its superior 
mobility.  Mounted troops were able to advance quickly, charge and disperse the enemy, 
and could efficiently round up small enemy parties or speed up their retreat.  The Cavalry 
Corps was able to exploit the success of other arms and pursue the retreating enemy in 
the final Hundred Days of the Great War. 
April-July 1918 
 The CCB spent much of April in billets, recovering from Operation Michael and 
training reinforcements.  ‘Stand to’ orders were issued sporadically throughout May, but 
the Brigade was never called into action.  Intermittent working party and stretcher-bearer 
work took place in the Béhencourt and Reveille areas throughout May while mounted 
training continued.  Mounted patrol work began on 17 May, with small mounted parties 
of approximately ten troops and one officer sent out daily from dawn to dusk to keep 
contact between the front lines and infantry headquarters.6  Patrol work continued 
                                                          
4 See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 12.  Canadian Light Horse, Functions of Corps Mounted 
Troops, 8 January 1918. 
5 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 12.  Cavalry, 8 January 1918. 
6 War Diary, FGH, 1 April-31 May 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  3rd Cavalry 
Division, Operational Order No. 23, 5 April 1918. 
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regularly through June and July with various detachments standing to in support of 
infantry action.7   
In preparation for an impending Allied offensive, intensive mounted training 
began in June and continued through July with regular equitation drills and tactical 
schemes.  Training was partially focused on Divisional Cavalry work and was centred on 
the need for mobility and speed, and the necessity of proper reconnaissance and advance 
guard work.  For example, detailed instructions regarding reconnaissance were issued for 
use in training, as mounted troops were capable of advancing ahead of the infantry, 
gathering information quickly, and covering great distances much more efficiently.  
Similarly, new instructions were issued for flank guard duty to ensure adequate 
protection for advancing infantry columns and proper maintenance of communication.8  
Planning the Amiens Offensive, July-August 1918 
The Germans followed Operation Michael with a series of other offensives, 
though none compared to the great success they achieved in the spring of 1918.  The final 
German offensive took place on 15 July at the Marne, but was defeated by French and 
American troops and followed up by successful Allied counteroffensives.9  The Allied 
Commanders in Chief met near Melun on 24 July to determine an offensive strategy for 
the remainder of 1918.  Foch proposed an August offensive with a series of limited 
objectives, the first of which would drive the Germans back from the Paris-Chalons-
Toul-Avricourt railway, and a second at Amiens against the Montdidier-Moreuil salient 
that continued to threaten the Paris-Amiens railway.  The attack was to be carried out 
                                                          
7 LAC RG9 III 3985, Folder 7, File 1.  No. G 227 Headquarters, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 22 June 1917. 
8 War Diary, FGH, 1 June-31 July 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3998, Folder 2, File 3.  G 52/1 Flank 
Guards, 27 April 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3998, Folder 2, File 3.  G 52/2 Reconnaissance, 28 April 
1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3998, Folder 2, File 3.  G 52/3 3rd Cavalry Division, 29 April 1918; LAC RG9 
III C2 Vol. 3998, Folder 2, File 3.  G 52/5 Advance guards, 29 April 1918.  
9 For full details on spring and summer operations, see Nicholson, 374-385. 
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with full tank, aerial, and artillery support.  As seen at Cambrai, the Amiens offensive 
was planned as a surprise operation.  All movements to the forward areas were scheduled 
at night, and the assault was to be carried out under cover of a rolling artillery barrage 
instead of a lengthy preliminary bombardment.10   
Foch issued official orders for the offensive on 28 July with the objective of 
pushing the enemy out of the Amiens area and back toward Roye.  The operation was 
originally scheduled for 10 August, but was later moved up by two days to 8 August to 
maintain pressure on the German withdrawal from the Marne.  It would be carried out 
under Haig’s command by twenty-one infantry divisions, primarily comprised of the First 
French Army and Rawlinson’s Fourth British Army,11 including the Canadian Corps and 
the Cavalry Corps.  According to Nicholson, the opposing German force was quite 
outnumbered, having only fourteen infantry divisions in the area with limited support 
from other arms.12  
The Fourth Army’s objective was to take pressure off Amiens.  Rawlinson limited 
his advance to an attainable six miles across a ten-mile front to the “Old Amiens Defence 
Line.”13  While the French XXXI Corps advanced against the southernmost portion of the 
enemy line between the Amiens-Roye Road and the Avre Valley, the Fourth British 
Army was to attack the German line between Morlancourt and the Amiens-Roye Road.  
The British III Corps was to attack the northern most portion of the line, north of the 
Somme at Morlancourt with the 10th Tank Battalion attached, while the Australian Corps 
                                                          
10 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and Information, 6 
August 1918; Nicholson, 386-388; 391-393. 
11 Replaced Gough as CO of the Fifth Army on 28 March 1918, which was later renamed the Fourth Army.  
See Kenyon, British Cavalry, 243-245, Nicholson 388. 
12 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and Information, 6 
August 1918; Nicholson, 386-388; 391-393. 
13 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 245. 
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was to advance to their right14 with the 5th Tank Brigade and one brigade of the 1st British 
Cavalry Division attached.  The Canadian Corps, the 4th Tank Brigade and the remainder 
of the Cavalry Corps was to attack to the right15 of the Australians and left16 of the 
French between Amiens-Roye Road and Villers Bretonneux-Craulnes Railway.17  The 2nd 
Canadian Division would form the northern portion of the Canadian attack, their 
objective to capture and hold the “Blue Line.”  The 1st Canadian Division would provide 
the central effort and the 3rd Canadian Division the southern third with the “Red Line” 
their common objective.18 
The planned operation required speed and mobility, so the Cavalry Corps was 
included in Rawlinson’s plan with the 3rd Tank Brigade attached.  The 1st Cavalry 
Division19 was to advance with the 2nd Canadian Division, while the 3rd Cavalry Division 
and one battalion of “Whippet” tanks20 were responsible for following the 1st and 3rd 
Canadian Divisions to the Red Line, passing through the infantry, and then capturing and 
holding the “Outer Amiens Defence Line” or “Blue Dotted Line” to the north of Roye 
Road.21  The objective of the cavalry was not a “breakthrough,” but pursuit.  They were 
expected to closely follow attacking infantry and exploit their success by advancing 
                                                          
14 South of III Corps. 
15 South of the Australians. 
16 North of the French. 
17 The Canadian Corps was to operate in the same area of Amiens that the CCB had in March 1918.  Prior 
to the opening of the operation, the Canadian Corps requested that the 3rd Cavalry Division have their 
officers visit Canadian Brigade Commanders to give them what information they had on the area based on 
their experiences in the Spring of 1918.  See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3987, Folder 12, CR 2-A-1. 
G.177/2523-4, B.G., G.S. Canadian Corps to G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, 4 August 1918;  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3987, Folder 12, CR 2-A-1.  Memo from G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division to Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, 5 August 1918. 
18 See Appendix XVII for map. LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary 
Instructions and Information, 6 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 7.  Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, Operational Order No. 65, 7 August 1918; Nicholson, 394-398. 
19 Less the one brigade attached to the Australian Corps. 
20 See explanation below. 
21 See Appendix XVII for map. 
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beyond the infantry line to pursue the retreating enemy.  The cavalry would use their 
superior mobility to advance quickly and keep pressure on the enemy rear and flanks, 
preventing them from re-establishing their line once reinforced.  Finally, the cavalry was 
expected to clear the area of enemy troops by capturing a series of limited objectives and 
holding them until relieved by the infantry.22   
To achieve these objectives, the cavalry would have the assistance of a new kind 
of tank designed specifically for mobility, the “Whippet.”  While mobility was still 
considered to be the mounted arm’s primary asset, the main obstacles to exploitation and 
pursuit were enemy wire and firepower.  Covering fire from machine guns and horse 
artillery had been used to counteract this with success, but it was thought that a cavalry 
advance with the assistance of a more mobile armoured vehicle could be more effective 
still.  The Whippet was a lighter armoured vehicle considered to be “mechanical 
cavalry.”  They were slightly more mobile than heavy tanks, weighing sixteen tons and 
armed with four machine guns.  They were not designed to traverse trenches but to 
advance across open country without being vulnerable to enemy fire.23  It was hoped that 
Whippet support would allow the cavalry to maintain its mobility by providing 
substantial firepower from a protected and mobile vehicle that could traverse difficult 
terrain and enemy wire, and withstand enemy fire while advancing at a slightly faster 
speed than their heavier counterparts.   
                                                          
22 The 4th Canadian Division was to remain in reserve and relive the Cavalry once they captured the Blue 
Dotted Line. LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and 
Information, 6 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 7.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
Operational Order No. 65, 7 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 17.  GX. 444/10 
Cavalry Corps Notes on Recent Operations No. 5, Principles Governing the Action of Cavalry, 24 August 
1918; Nicholson, 394-398. 
23 According to a report, Whippets could not cross trenches.  See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988 Folder 4, File 
9.  G.1448/2, Notes and some lessons learned from the experience gained during the Operations 8 to 12 
August, on the Somme, 15 August 1918. 
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Whippets were capable of advancing at a maximum of eight miles per hour, 
averaging four and a half miles per hour across open country.  According to a report from 
III Corps, the average speed of the Mark V24 was approximately three to four miles per 
hour, though they could advance between six and nine miles per hour over flat solid 
ground.25  Though hardly faster than the Mark V, the real benefit of the Whippet was its 
substantially longer range of action, capable of advancing thirty-three to forty miles 
before running out of fuel.  Mark V tanks could only be in action for two to three hours, 
and were only capable of advancing twenty miles before refuelling.26   
The primary role of a Whippet tank regiment was to engage the enemy while 
leaving the cavalry free to advance quickly.  The tank regiment’s responsibilities were 
divided between three tank companies.27  One company was to be sent forward to protect 
cavalry scouts, while a second company would remain with the advance guard.  The third 
company was to advance in reserve, available to support mounted operations, reinforce 
the leading tank companies, and protect the cavalry’s flanks during the advance and keep 
contact with the Cavalry Division Commander.28  After the Whippets had attacked enemy 
strong points, the cavalry was to clear the area of enemy troops and send back 
                                                          
24 New model British tank with greater mobility than earlier models, and much more effective at traversing 
trenches without ditching. 
25 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 1.  3rd Cavalry Division G.S. 56/9, Reference III Corps, 25 
May 1918. 
26 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 1.  III Corps G.O.9854, Demonstration of French Infantry 
Attack with Mk.V Tanks, 25 May 1918.  However, it was noted that tank companies required a substantial 
reserve, as tank crews were subject to exhaustion after a days fighting and could not sustain a two-day 
operation.  Furthermore, armoured vehicles required time to resupply with petrol, oil, and grease before 
continuing operations.  See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988 Folder 4, File 9.  G.1448/2, Notes and some lessons 
learned from the experience gained during the Operations 8 to 12 August, on the Somme, 15 August 1918. 
27 Each Company was comprised of sixteen Whippet tanks. 
28 Whippets were to advance approximately 200 yards apart from each other, thus providing a total front 
coverage of 3200 yards per sixteen-tank company.  See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 1.  B/24 
Notes on Cavalry Working With Whippet Tanks, 6 August 1918. 
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prisoners.29  Maintaining communication between cavalry and Whippets was constantly 
stressed, as “The situation produced by the Whippet screen is fleeting and, unless the 
closest liaison exists, this screen will be of no value.”30  The advanced cavalry was 
responsible for maintaining communication between the advanced troops and the main 
body to ensure no opportunity was lost. 31   
Fortunately, the command structure had finally been simplified to accommodate 
the expected role of the mounted arm.  Each Cavalry Division remained under the 
command of its own GOC during these operations, thus the cavalry was no longer forced 
to await orders from infantry commanders or Cavalry Corps Headquarters before 
advancing.  Cavalry was finally able to advance on the authority of local commanders.32  
Furthermore, all tank battalions attached to the cavalry divisions were placed under the 
command of the divisional cavalry commander.33  Cavalry commanders were kept well 
forward during the advance to give appropriate and timely orders to avoid lost 
opportunities.  Similarly, cavalry brigade, division, and corps headquarters were moved 
forward as the cavalry advance to ensure close liaison with the advancing mounted 
troops.34   
 
                                                          
29 While the Whippet was designed for open warfare, Whippet Companies could not send back prisoners or 
clear trenches of the enemy. 
30 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 1.  B/24 Notes on Cavalry Working With Whippet Tanks, 6 
August 1918. 
31 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and Information, 6 
August 1918.  Appendix B, 1 Battalion Whippets Working with Division of Cavalry, 2 August 1918; 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 1.  B/24 Notes on Cavalry Working With Whippet Tanks, 6 
August 1918. 
32 Kenyon, British Cavalry, 246-247. 
33 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 1.  B/24 Notes on Cavalry Working With Whippet Tanks, 6 
August 1918. 
34 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 17.  G.X. 444/10 Cavalry Corps Notes on Recent Operations 
No. 5, Principles Governing the Action of Cavalry, 24 August 1918. 
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The communication structure with other arms was also adapted to suit the rapid 
advance of the cavalry.  Communication was to be maintained partially through the use 
of flare signals35 and dispatch riders so there was no exclusive reliance on telephone and 
wireless communication.36  Similarly, a system of visual signals was used to 
communicate with supporting aircraft, and aircraft reconnaissance employed with cavalry 
was expected to keep close communication with mounted contact patrols as “Cavalry 
tactics demand initiative on the part of subordinate leaders, and as in moving operations, 
advantage must be taken of every opening.”37   
 Unfortunately, the realistic objectives set by Rawlinson were extended a mere five 
days before the battle.  On 3 August, Haig and Foch met again to finalize plans for the 
coming offensive.  The two generals decided to extend the objectives of the Amiens 
offensive based on the Allies’ continued success at the Marne and a desire to put greater 
strain on German reserves.  Haig agreed to extend the British objectives to the capture of 
Roye, Chaulnes, and Ham.38  The Cavalry Corps was now responsible for reaching its 
original objective and then immediately advancing towards Roye-Chaulnes “with the 
least possible delay.”39  Haig and Foch took a once attainable set of objectives and 
extended them beyond realistic expectation.40 
 
                                                          
35 For example, Red was used to call for help, green to indicate the advance was progressing and the 
artillery should lift their fire, and white to indicate they had reached their objective.  See  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and Information, 6 
August 1918.  Appendix A, Code of Signals Between Infantry and Other Arms in Open Warfare. 
36 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 4000, Folder 7, File 1.  B/24 Notes on Cavalry Working With Whippet Tanks, 6 
August 1918. 
37 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 1, File 3.  Cavalry Corps G. 304 Notes on the Employment of 
Aircraft with Cavalry, 17 April 1918. 
38 Ham was located fifteen miles to the east and beyond the Somme-Canal du Nord line. 
39 TNA WO 95/437.  War Diary, Fourth Army, August-September 1918, G.H.Q. Operational Order 6 
August 1918. 
40 TNA WO 95/437.  War Diary, Fourth Army, August-September 1918, G.H.Q. Operational Order 6 
August 1918; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 247. 
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Amiens, 8-11 August 1918 
The rolling artillery barrage began at Zero Hour, 4:20am on 8 August.41  The 
CCB stood to west of Cachy by 5:30am.  The Brigade was to act as the advance guard for 
the 3rd Cavalry Division, and would advance with the support of two Whippet Tank 
Companies of sixteen tanks each, while the 6th Cavalry Brigade would advance with the 
support of one Whippet Company.  When the infantry arrived at the Green Line, the CCB 
was to pass through it and clear the enemy out of the Caix-Beaucourt-le Quesnel area 
before capturing the final objective at the Blue Dotted Line north of the Amiens-Roye 
Road. 42   
The CCB was ordered to form a two-regiment advance, with LSH on the right43 
and the RCD on the left, 44 each with a Whippet company attached.  The FGH and the 
remainder of the RCHA and Machine Gun Squadron were to follow the RCD across the 
front, keeping contact with the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade to the right and the 
7th Cavalry Brigade to the north.45  As the advance guard, the CCB was ordered to keep 
contact between the 1st and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions and to update the GOC on the 
situation at the front.  One Squadron of LSH was stationed at Brigade Headquarters at 
                                                          
41 Fort Garry Horse Museum and Archive (FGHMA), War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
Narrative of Operations, 8-11 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 11.  B/121 Narrative 
of Operations, Cavalry Corps, 8-12 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 7.  Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, Operational Order No. 65, 7 August 1918. 
42 See Appendix XVII for map.  The order of march was as follows: The Canadian Cavalry Brigade, One 
brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, the 6th Cavalry Brigade.  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 
3985, Folder 6, File 7.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Operational Order No. 65, 7 August 1918; LAC RG9 III 
C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and Information, 6 August 1918; 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 11.  B/121 Narrative of Operations, Cavalry Corps, 8-12 August 
1918; FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Narrative of Operations, 8-11 August 1918. 
43 South. 
44 North. 
45 See Appendix XVII for map.  The order of march was as follows: The Canadian Cavalry Brigade, One 
brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, the 6th Cavalry Brigade.  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 
3985, Folder 6, File 7.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Operational Order No. 65, 7 August 1918; LAC RG9 III 
C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and Information, 6 August 1918; 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 11.  B/121 Narrative of Operations, Cavalry Corps, 8-12 August 
1918; FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Narrative of Operations, 8-11 August 1918. 
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Cachy under Major Torrence to fulfill this role.  Meanwhile, the FGH was to send two 
patrols of one officer and eight men each to reconnoiter a crossing for both cavalry and 
Whippets over the Luce River from Démuin to Caix.46  Two officers patrols of the FGH 
under Lieutenants Anderson and Waite were selected for this duty.  They were stationed 
in River Valley near Hangard to follow the infantry and send reports back on the bridges 
between Démuin and Caix.47     
The Fourth Army telephoned the Cavalry Corps Headquarters at 6:00am to report 
that the attack was going well.  At 6:50am, the 3rd Cavalry Division’s patrols were able to 
report that the Canadian Infantry had captured Hangard Wood and Dodo Wood, and the 
Australians had reached Cerisy Valley.  At 7:45am, LSH was ordered to advance to 
Morgemont Wood under Lieutenant Colonel MacDonald’s command with “A” Battery of 
the RCHA and four machine guns attached.  Although the wood was still occupied by the 
enemy, LSH kept close contact with the 1st and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions while the 
remainder of the CCB moved up to meet LSH in a valley south-east of the wood at 
8:00am.  By 9:15am, the Canadian Infantry had captured the Green Line, and the troops 
of Lieutenant Anderson’s patrol reported that they had located two crossings over the 
Luce at Ignaucourt, both of which were suitable for cavalry, and one capable of 
supporting the Whippets.  They reported to the remainder of the 3rd Cavalry Division at 
Cachy, and the cavalry advanced to Ignaucourt via Aubercourt.48 
                                                          
46 If no crossing could be found for the tanks, the advancing body of cavalry and Whippets was to advance 
to the north of the river via Caix.   
47 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Narrative of Operations, 8-11 August 1918;  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 11.  B/121 Narrative of Operations, Cavalry Corps, 8-12 August 
1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 7.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Operational Order No. 65, 
7 August 1918. 
48 See Appendix XVII for map.  FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Narrative of 
Operations, 8-11 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 11.  B/121 Narrative of 
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As the enemy began to fall back, the advance patrols of LSH kept close contact 
with the infantry, following it across Ignaucourt Bridge.  As the remainder of the CCB 
arrived, LSH covered their advance across the bridge.  Once across, the CCB assembled 
with the Whippet tanks approximately 1000 yards south of Ignaucourt Bridge.  LSH 
advanced one-quarter of a mile ahead of the main body as the 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division approached their final objective at the Red Line.  At 10:25am, LSH advanced 
across the Red infantry Line with support from eight Whippet Tanks, arriving at the Roye 
Road at 10:35am.  Thereafter, LSH advanced to the east and cleared the valley to the 
south of Beaucourt of enemy forces, capturing forty-five prisoners and one enemy gun.   
Once the remainder of the CCB arrived and contact was established with Brutinel’s 
Independent Force,49 the LSH advance guard squadron moved up and encircled Fresnoy-
en-Chaussee, capturing an additional 125 prisoners at 10:55am.50  Meanwhile, “A” 
Battery of the RCHA was in position close to the Roye Road northeast of Mézieres, and 
small mounted parties of the CCB were sent out to clear the area of enemy troops.  They 
returned with seventy prisoners, and put several machine guns out of action.51 
The CCB had been highly successful with very few casualties due to the speed of 
the advance until it encountered strongly held wooded areas and villages.  For example, 
two troops of LSH advanced to Beaucourt Wood, located approximately 1,500 yards east 
of Beaucourt.  The wood itself was strongly held by the enemy, who were equipped with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Operations, Cavalry Corps, 8-12 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 11.  B/121 
Narrative of Operations, Cavalry Corps, 8-12 August 1918, Appendix B, 3rd Cavalry Division. 
49 This was an ad-hoc mobile column of motor machine guns, cyclists, and truck mounted trench mortars 
meant to advance along the Amiens-Roye Road to serve as a flank guard for the Canadian Corps.  By 
September 1918, the Canadian Light Horse became part of this force.  See Kenyon, British Cavalry, 266, 
for details on their action in August and Chapter 11 for later actions with the Canadian Light Horse. 
50 See Appendix XVII for map.  FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Narrative of 
Operations, 8-11 August 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 11.  B/121 Narrative of 
Operations, Cavalry Corps, 8-12 August 1918, Appendix B, 3rd Cavalry Division. 
51 FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Narrative of Operations, 8-11 August 1918. 
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several machine guns.  One Troop of LSH located the enemy line approximately 1000 
yards west of Le Quesnel, but took extremely heavy casualties during the advance and 
lost the majority of its horses.  The Whippet tanks advanced on the enemy position but 
took heavy fire from a German field gun that functioned as an anti-tank weapon, and 
were forced to retreat.  Consequently, the cavalry incurred heavier casualties still, 
particularly as the enemy artillery opened fire from the south and the infantry began to 
advance from the south-east.52     
Meanwhile, the RCD advanced to the left of LSH to the north of Beaucourt with 
the support of four machine guns, eight tanks, and 7th Cavalry Brigade in close pursuit.  
They were delayed in valley north of Beaucourt due to heavy enemy machine gun fire 
from the northeast of Beaucourt and the wood east of the village.  At 12:40pm, they 
received word that LSH was threatened from the rear on their left and right.  The RCD 
was ordered to advance to their first objective “at all costs” to give LSH left flank some 
protection.53  The RCD reached the objective and consolidated the position to the left of 
LSH, but suffered severe casualties when passing through the open ground outside of 
Beaucourt.  This was partially a consequence of poor tank support.  According to the 
CCB’s report, seven of the eight Whippet Tanks assigned to the RCD could not advance 
further than the valley to the north of Beaucourt, as they came under heavy artillery fire.  
The one that did manage to advance was put out of action west of the wooded area 
approximately 1000 yards north-east of Beaucourt.54   
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In the mean time, “A” Squadron of the FGH had embarked to support LSH.  The 
FGH entered Beaucourt and found the enemy occupying a church and a chateau.  “A” 
Squadron cleared the village, capturing twenty-five enemy troops, one machine gun, and 
the maps and documents of a Brigade Staff.  “B” Squadron of the FGH advanced to the 
eastern edge of Beaucourt, and sent one dismounted troop to support the RCD’s left.  The 
remainder of the cavalry reserve and the Machine Gun Squadron were stationed in the 
valley to the north of Beaucourt.55   
Heavy fighting continued for Beaucourt Wood throughout the afternoon.  At 
1:30pm, the enemy advanced on the RCD and “A” Squadron of the FGH.  The German 
forces were driven back with the assistance of Brutinel’s Independent Force, the RCHA, 
and machine gun support.  A party of enemy troops was defeated by the RCHA while 
entering the Beaucourt Wood, likely after being driven out of Cayeux Wood by the 7th 
Cavalry Brigade.  At 3:00pm, the 4th Canadian Infantry Division arrived and attacked the 
eastern portion of the wood, capturing the area and twenty-seven machine guns.56   
By 2:35pm, assistance from the 7th Cavalry Brigade allowed the 3rd Cavalry 
Division to capture its objective on the Blue Line except for the area east and south of Le 
Quesnel.  The 7th Cavalry Brigade had reached the Amiens Outer Defence Line to the 
CCB’s left by 2:30pm, though its advance was much too rapid to make use of the 
supporting Whippet tanks.  The 6th Cavalry Brigade held the line to the south of the 7th 
Brigade.  At 2:30pm, the 2nd Cavalry Division was ordered to advance to Caix to capture 
the high ground to the east, reinforcing the 3rd Cavalry Division’s left.  The CCB and 
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Brutinel’s Independent Force repelled two enemy counterattacks at Fresnoy, and waited 
for the French 322 Infantry Regiment to take possession of the newly captured line south 
of the Roye Road.  The CCB withdrew at 5:15pm once the infantry were in position.57 
The 3rd Cavalry Division was highly successful on 8 August.  It advanced seven 
miles and captured all of the original objectives set on 28 July by early afternoon on 8 
August.  However, extensive mounted patrol work revealed that German defences were 
too strong as reinforcements arrived at the front, thus the infantry of the Fourth Army and 
the Cavalry Corps fell short of their extended objective set on 3 August.58    
After securing the Old Amiens Defence Line on 8 August, the Allies pressed on 
to Roye-Chaulnes on 9 August with Cavalry Corps operating on the right flank to 
“support the advance ready to exploit any successes that may occur.”59  The 1st and 2nd 
Cavalry Divisions were sent forward while the 3rd Cavalry Division remained in reserve.  
The CCB did not see action on 9 August.  They spent the day in bivouacs at Cayeux 
Wood, salvaging equipment such as Hotchkiss guns and kit.  Although the Allied 
advance progressed an additional four miles on 9 August, the offensive had slowed down 
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considerably and lost momentum as enemy reinforcements arrived, and success was 
limited for the remainder of the operation.60   
By the morning of 10 August, the Canadian Corps had reached their objective 
along the Roye-Hattencourt-Hallu line.  The 3rd Cavalry Division was ordered to relieve 
the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions and sent out patrols at 5:00am covering the entire 
Canadian Corps front, from Roye Road to Villers Bretonneux-Chaulnes Railway.  The 
remainder of the Division stood to between Caix and Le Quesnel, moving forward at 
5:30am.  The 3rd Tank Brigade was ordered to send as many tanks as possible to support 
the 3rd Cavalry Division.61 
The Canadian Corps resumed their advance to Roye-Chaulnes at 9:30am with the 
Cavalry Corps in support.  The 6th Cavalry Brigade was sent forward at 11:30am as the 
Germans began to retreat, while patrols from the 6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades 
reconnoitered routes for a rapid cavalry advance.  By 2:15pm, cavalry patrols reported 
that the ground to the east of Meharicourt-Rouvroy-en-Santerre were impassable for 
cavalry and Whippet Tanks, and 6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades were unable to advance past 
abandoned enemy trenches surrounded by wire.62 
 At 2:30pm, the 32nd Infantry Division erroneously reported that the infantry had 
captured La Chavette, Parvillers, and Damery, and that the enemy was demoralized and 
retreating quickly.  Kavanagh ordered the 3rd Cavalry Division to advance and occupy the 
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high ground north of Roye, and the 2nd Cavalry Division to occupy Nesle, with the 1st 
Cavalry Division standing to north-west of Warvillers.  However, it was noted that 
reports of weakened enemy resistance and retreat were “absolutely inaccurate and 
untrue.”63  Home later noted that he felt the reports were overly optimistic and did not 
agree with Kavanagh’s order to send the cavalry forward.64 
 The CCB was dispatched to fulfill the 3rd Cavalry Division’s objective, capturing 
the high ground to the north and northwest of Roye.  The CCB advanced between 
Beaucourt and Warvillers, but troops were stopped on the Warvillers-Folies Road by an 
officer of the 6th Cavalry Brigade who informed them the road ahead was impassable, so 
the CCB was forced to embark along the Amiens-Roye Road at 3:30pm.  The FGH acted 
as the advance guard supported by four machine guns and “A” Battery of the RCHA.65   
Strachan’s “B” Squadron led the FGH along the new route of advance, sending 
out officer’s patrols to keep contact with the French to the right and the Canadian 
Infantry on the left.  All progressed smoothly until Strachan’s troops came under heavy 
machine gun fire from Damery and the wood to the south-west.  “B” Squadron was 
forced to move to the south of the road through a heavy barrage, and passed through the 
French Infantry line west of Andechy.  “B” Squadron managed to capture Andechy after 
riding through trenches and wire, incurring few casualties though the horses suffered 
badly.  However, the FGH captured forty-one enemy troops and one machine gun in 
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Andechy.  The village also proved to be a substantial enemy supply depot, as a dump was 
found that contained food, ammunition, and railway trucks. 66   
The cavalry’s success was followed up by the French 173rd Infantry Regiment.  
The French held Andechy while the CCB attempted to continue to advance.  However, 
heavy machine gun fire persisted from the wood to the north-east of the village and heavy 
shell fire from Roye.  One Squadron of LSH attempted to take the wood south of Roye 
Road but was driven back by heavy gas shelling.  “A” Squadron of the FGH moved up to 
support the engaged troops, holding the west of Andechy while the French held the 
central and eastern portions of the village.67 
 The CCB established advanced posts between Andechy and Villers Les Royes, 
but was unable to advance to Roye due to heavy enemy shellfire from the village, 
machine gun fire from the wooded area north east of Damery, and enemy fire from Hill 
100 on the Roye Road.  Three troops of the FGH “A” Squadron were ordered to take Hill 
100 south-west of Guyencourt with support from the 32nd Infantry Division to connect 
the left of the line.  The Squadron endured a difficult advance due to wire and trenches, 
and came under heavy artillery and machine gun fire on a sunken road between 
Lalambuse and Andechy.  The FGH was forced to embark down the Amiens-Roye Road 
at a gallop.  According to Stevenson’s report, the Squadron was nearly wiped out 
approximately 100 yards from its objective.68  The LSH Troop that followed under 
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Lieutenant Colonel MacDonald was also forced to withdraw.  The infantry attack by the 
32nd Division at Equerre Wood was also unsuccessful and took sixty percent casualties.  
The infantry consolidated their current position and could not advance any further, and 
the cavalry was ordered to halt by 5:30pm, and withdrew to the west of Beaufort at 
7:00pm.69   
The 3rd Cavalry Division returned to bivouacs on 11 August while the 1st and 2nd 
Cavalry Divisions moved back to the front, sending out patrols and standing to, awaiting 
orders to advance.  However, the infantry had made no progress by 12:30pm, and orders 
for the Cavalry Corps to prepare to withdraw were issued.70 
Assessing Success 
As the leading cavalry brigade most heavily engaged in mounted action at Amiens, 
the CCB sustained the heaviest casualties of any cavalry formation between 8 and 11 
August.71   The Brigade suffered a total of 245 casualties, including four officers and thirty 
men killed, seven officers and 164 other ranks wounded, and one officer and thirty-nine other 
ranks missing.72  According to all reports, it was the horses that suffered most severely at 
Amiens.  Anglesey estimated that the Cavalry Corps lost over 800 horses between 8 and 10 
August, while Edmonds estimated the total horses lost to be as high as 1,800.73 
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Despite sustaining heavy casualties, the Cavalry Corps was highly successful at 
Amiens, having attained all of the original objectives set by Rawlinson before 3 August.  
On 13 August, Canadian Corps Commander Lieutenant General Arthur Currie wrote that 
the first stage of the Battle of Amiens was one of the most successful operations yet seen 
on the Western Front.74  N.W. Rowell75 sent the CCB an individual message of 
congratulations on 18 August 1918.76  An examination of the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade’s role at Amiens in August 1918 revealed that the mounted arm was able to 
exploit the success of the infantry and pursue the retreating enemy.   Mounted success 
was possible partially because clear instructions were given to a well-positioned body of 
mounted troops that were no longer limited by a complex chain of command.  Local 
commanders were given the authority to order the cavalry to advance and exploit 
whatever opportunities arose.77   
As a partial consequence of the difficulty of cooperating with tanks, it was noted 
that better use had to be made of horse artillery and motor machine gun support, and that 
all cavalry detachments should be accompanied by both instead of simply relying on tank 
support and Hotchkiss guns.  In September, Home noted that Amiens proved that cavalry 
could pass through machine gun fire when advancing over open ground by quickly 
enveloping it from the flanks and rear.  When these actions are not possible, machine gun 
nests were to be attacked dismounted and put out of action.78  However, as cavalry 
advanced into open country, enemy fire consistently came from covered locations such as 
woods, villages, and houses, leaving cavalry vulnerable and hard pressed to put enemy 
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guns out of action.  Thus machine gun support was necessary to counteract enemy fire, 
form defensive flanks and pivots for the cavalry to manoeuvre from and retain mobility, 
consolidate captured ground, and to fire upon the retreating enemy.  It was made clear 
that in future operations, each cavalry commander was required to ensure adequate 
machine gun support before issuing orders to the cavalry.79 
The CCB might have suffered fewer casualties at Amiens if proper support had 
been coordinated between the mounted arm and the Whippet tanks.  While there were 
some effective actions between the cavalry and the Whippet tanks at Amiens, 
collaboration between the two mobile arms was largely unsuccessful.  As Anglesey put it, 
there was a good deal of “mutual recrimination” between the Cavalry Corps and the Tank 
Corps over the failures of cooperation.80  Most members of the Cavalry Corps felt that 
Amiens demonstrated that the Whippet tank had little support to offer the cavalry due to 
their limited reliability and slow rate of advance, as they simply could not keep up with 
the mounted arm.  Cavalrymen feared that future use of Whippets with cavalry would 
slow the mounted advance and result in lost opportunities.81  As a 1919 report noted, 
“Tanks to be of practical use with Cavalry must move faster than any type with which we 
have experience so far.”82   
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Conversely, contemporaries such as Major General J.F.C. Fuller and historians 
such as McWilliams and Steel have condemned the cavalry for reducing the effect of the 
tanks, claiming that Whippets should have been employed independently, as machine gun 
fire would halt the cavalry advance while the Whippets were capable of carrying on.83  
Even Anglesey has argued that Whippets could have been more effective on their own.84  
As has been demonstrated, the cavalry was often capable of sustaining their advance 
despite enemy fire.  In many cases, Whippets were put out of action by enemy fire while 
the cavalry carried on, as seen outside Beaucourt on 8 August in actions by both the RCD 
and LSH.  As Kenyon stated, tanks were frequently left behind precisely because the 
cavalry came under fire and were compelled to increase their rate of advance to escape.85  
For example, LSH sped through enemy fire outside of Beaucourt on 8 August to avoid 
heavy casualties.86  According to Kenyon, there were no instances of tanks continuing to 
advance while the cavalry was unable to move forward on 8 August.87   
Despite some insistence that the Whippet companies might have done better as an 
independent force, armoured vehicles had several limitations in 1918.  As their action 
with the CCB on 8 August showed, Whippets were less vulnerable to machine gun fire 
than cavalrymen, but they could not sustain artillery fire.  According to May and August 
1918 reports, all tanks still required covering fire from other arms, as even Mark V tanks 
remained vulnerable to artillery fire.  It was also noted that concentrated machine gun fire 
was capable of putting any tank out of action.88  Whippets were at greater risk than other 
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armoured vehicles, as they were armed only with machine guns and could not fight 
enemy tanks or easily defend themselves against antitank weapons.  Armoured vehicles 
also provided enemy gunners with a larger target, and lacked the cavalry’s mobility to 
escape enemy fire quickly.  As a report on the Mark V stated, “The enemy of the tank is 
the gun.”89 
1918 tanks were also hampered by limited manoeuvrability.  It was understood 
that all tanks were incapable of manoeuvring in confined spaces, such as woods and 
villages.  In fact, tanks were more vulnerable than cavalry in urban streets, as they were 
too large to manoeuvre in small areas, and “the proximity to the houses renders it easy for 
the enemy to work round behind them and bombard them with mortars, or bomb them 
from the upper stories of houses.”90  This was especially true of the Whippet, as they 
were not armed with heavy guns and were incapable of knocking down walls with 
artillery where necessary.  Tanks crews also had limited visibility within the vehicle, and 
an enemy force could move around them undetected in enclosed spaces.91  Finally, tanks 
could not perform their own reconnaissance due to poor visibility and difficult 
communication between vehicles with no radios.  They required the cooperation of other 
arms to be effective and could not operate independently.92 
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As Badsey has argued, the real obstacle to cooperation between tanks and cavalry 
was doctrinal.  Because the tank was a new weapon and combined arms operations were 
still in their infancy, tactics had not yet developed and there was no proper methodology 
for coordinating movements between two mobile arms with different rates of advance 
and different vulnerabilities.93  This was particularly evident in R.W. Paterson’s report on 
operations at Amiens.  Paterson remained hopeful that future cooperation between tanks 
and cavalry might be possible if attention was given to proper combined arms doctrine.  
He felt that Whippets could be very useful for neutralizing enemy fire from woods and 
villages while cavalry operated around the flanks, and recommended that the Whippets 
be sent well ahead of the cavalry to a forward concentration point instead of following 
the cavalry, as they were much too slow to keep pace with mounted troops.  Paterson 
believed that the Whippets might have done better at Amiens if the mounted arm and the 
tank companies had been given a chance to train together and devised a proper method of 
communicating instead of improvising manoeuvres and liaisons.94  As Badsey stated, 
“Amiens proved that, by using the right tactical doctrine and staffwork, horsed cavalry 
could be successfully integrated into the industrialized all-arms battles of the early 
twentieth century.”95  Unfortunately, no attention was given to solving this tactical 
dilemma; it was merely stated that the two arms were incompatible and incapable of 
working together.  The tank corps gave no consideration to the mounted arm when 
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developing future tactical doctrine, and no effort was made to establish a working 
relationship between the two arms.96   
Autumn 1918 
Despite the success of the mounted arm at Amiens in August 1918, the future of 
cavalry on the Western Front still remained precarious.  Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff Henry Wilson continued to advocate the dissolution of the Cavalry Corps.  On 24 
July, he issued a document that considered dismounting the 1st Cavalry Division, 
relegating the 2nd Cavalry Division to training inspectorate duties, and using the 3rd 
Cavalry Division as Divisional Cavalry, as mounted troops were greatly needed in the 
corps cavalry role in the final months of the Great War.97   While Haig and Kavanagh 
managed to prevent the worst of Wilson’s plan from being implemented, they consented 
to giving up the 2nd Cavalry Division to Divisional Cavalry duties, sending one brigade to 
each of the First, Third, and Fourth British Armies on 4 September.98  Thereafter, the 
Cavalry Corps had only two cavalry divisions left, the 1st and the 3rd.  Its numbers had 
been so greatly reduced at the operational level that it was not capable of playing a 
decisive role in many operations except at Le Cateau in October 1918, where it fought its 
last engagement. 
The Cavalry Corps did not see much action through the remainder of August and 
into September, as the enemy had not yet been pushed out of the trenches and beyond the 
Hindenburg line.  The CCB spent the remainder of August resting in bivouacs until 
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mounted training resumed in September.99  Cavalry Corps manoeuvres took place 
throughout September, and some officer detachments were sent to serve as “gallopers” or 
dispatch riders for different divisional headquarters at the front owing to the desperate 
need for Divisional Cavalry troops.  As substitute Divisional Cavalry, the CCB was 
engaged in reconnaissance patrol work, dispatch riding, mounted police work, and escort 
duties.100 
 Meanwhile, officer conferences were held to determine appropriate cavalry 
doctrine in anticipation of a return to open warfare in October.  It was understood that the 
role of cavalry in the final months of the war was still the pursuit of the enemy.  As such, 
the mounted arm’s primary responsibilities would be the defeat of enemy rearguards, 
attacking the enemy rear lines and flanks, and exploiting any gaps that may open in the 
enemy line.  Consequently, tactical exercises focused on the cavalry passing through the 
infantry and advancing across a wide front, capturing and holding objectives with full 
artillery and machine gun support, much as was done at Amiens in August 1918.101 
 On 29 September, the Allied forces finally breached the Hindenburg line, the last 
remaining German stronghold.  German supporting trench systems were broken by 5 
October.  The enemy had retreated to the “Hermann Position” that ran from Valenciennes 
to Le Cateau opposite the Third and Fourth British Armies.  Haig’s plan to drive the 
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B/95/1, Remarks by the Commander in Chief on the Cavalry Exercise held on 17 September 1918, 24 
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German Army back beyond the trenches was finally viable, and the mounted arm was 
ordered to advance to the forward area.  After passing through the Fourth Army, the role 
of the cavalry was again the pursuit of the enemy, operating on their flanks and rear 
opposite the First and Third army in close cooperation with the infantry.  The Cavalry 
Corps was ordered to advance down Roman Road towards Le Cateau and secure the 
railway junction at Busigny, located six miles from the infantry’s line, and cut enemy 
communications at Valenciennes.102   
 The 1st Cavalry Division would lead the engagement while in contact with the 
American Corps and XIII Corps.  Its objective was the high ground west and south-west 
of Le Cateau.  The 3rd Cavalry Division was to follow in close support, sending troops to 
the high ground to the east and south of Busigny and north-west of Maretz, protecting the 
1st Cavalry Division’s flanks and rear.103  The 7th Cavalry Brigade was to follow the 1st 
Cavalry Brigade and capture Busigny.  The CCB was ordered to advance behind the 2nd 
Cavalry Brigade and seize the high ground to the northwest of Maretz.104  The FGH was 
to serve as the advance guard for the CCB with four machine guns attached.  The FGH 
was responsible for keeping the CCB in touch with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade.  Once the 2nd 
Cavalry Brigade passed Maretz, the FGH was to inform the remainder of the CCB and 
then send reconnaissance patrols to the Troisvillers-Montigy Line.  Meanwhile, the RCD 
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Canadian Cavalry Brigade Operation Order No.81, 7 October 1918. 
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would advance between Serain and Élincourt, seize the enemy line, and send a 
reconnaissance patrol to contact the Third Army.  The RCHA was to be stationed near 
Avelu where LSH remained in reserve.105 
Le Cateau, 8-10 October 1918 
 “Z” Day was set for 8 October, and “Zero Hour” 6:00am.106  Although the Allied 
infantry advance was successful on 8 October, the retreating Germans employed effective 
and organized rearguards.  The 1st Cavalry Division was unable to advance due to 
extremely heavy enemy fire from strongly defended positions.  While the RCD advanced 
as the left flank guard on 8 October, they did not see action and took several casualties 
from enemy shellfire and hostile aircraft.  The CCB was ordered to return to bivouacs at 
Bellicourt at 4:45pm.  The attack was scheduled to resume on 9 October with the 3rd 
Cavalry Division leading the operation.107 
The Fourth Army continued to push forward at 5:20am on 9 October.  XIII Corps 
prepared to capture Élincourt-Aveluy-Maretz, and then would press on to Eaurois-
Honnechy.  XI Corps was to advance to Fresnoy and Bohain, and the American II Corps 
final objective was Busigny and Becquigny.108  The 3rd Cavalry Division was ordered to 
carry out the 1st Cavalry Division’s objective from the previous day.  A conference was 
held at Divisional Headquarters at 4:00am on 9 October to determine the best strategy for 
                                                          
105 The order of march was as follows: The FGH followed by the Brigade Headquarters and Signal Troop, 
the RCD and four machine guns, one Squadron of the LSH. The RCHA, the Machine Gun Squadron less 
eight guns, one Field Troop, and the LSH less one Squadron.  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 6, File 7.  
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the cavalry advance.  The 7th Cavalry Brigade was to lead the advance, passing through 
the infantry along the Estrées-Le Cateau road and capture the ridge to the west of Le 
Cateau beside the Cambrai-Le Cateau road.  The 6th Cavalry Brigade would act as the 
right flank guard, and one regiment of the CCB would form the left flank guard while the 
remainder of the CCB remained in reserve.109   
 The advance began at 5:20am and was highly successful.  The infantry captured 
Maretz by 8:45am, and the 3rd Cavalry Division was ordered to advance.  However, the 
7th Cavalry Brigade had been ordered to keep in close touch with the advancing infantry, 
and had sent various patrols forward with XIII Corps and the American II Corps.110  
Consequently, the 7th Cavalry Brigade remained in scattered patrols along the front lines 
when the order for the cavalry advance was issued, thus the 6th Cavalry Brigade and the 
CCB were both sent forward through the infantry line with the objective of capturing the 
high ground from Le Cateau to Neuvilly, establishing a flank from Neuvilly-
Rambeurieux Farm-Toisvilles.111   
The CCB formed the northern portion of the advance as the left flank guard, and 
was once again the first brigade in action.  The FGH acted as the advance guard with four 
machine guns and “A” Battery of the RCHA attached.  LSH followed with four machine 
guns attached.  The rest of the Brigade remained in support, advancing north of Maretz-
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Le Cateau road.  The FGH began to advance through the Fourth Army infantry line at the 
Clary-Maretz Road at 9:30am, moving along the north side of Roman Road while LSH 
advanced along the Clary-Berty- Toisvilles line, dispatching reconnaissance patrols to 
Montigny-Inchy-Neuvilly.112   
The FGH discovered enemy infantry to the east of Maretz Wood and was delayed 
by heavy machine gun fire from Gattigny Wood.  The four machine guns attached to the 
FGH and “A” Battery of the RCHA were used against the enemy position until 11:00am 
when the FGH was sent into action with the support of the South African Infantry.  One 
troop of Lieutenant Dunwoody’s “B” Squadron launched a frontal assault on Gattigny 
Wood under covering fire, while Major Middlemast’s “A” Squadron charged the wood in 
a flanking movement to west.  Half of Dunwoody’s frontal assault troop became 
casualties, including Dunwoody himself who was thrown from his horse and wounded 
through the left thigh.113  However, the action drove the Germans from this section of the 
wood, as the enemy abandoned their position in the face of the cavalry charge.  The 
western flanking charge by “A” Squadron was highly successful and cleared the wood of 
enemy troops, many of whom were killed with cavalry swords.  Approximately 200 
enemy prisoners were captured, along with forty machine guns and various artillery 
pieces.114  The FGH continued to advance once the South African Infantry Brigade 
moved up to hold the wood.  FGH patrols were sent to the south-east of Bertry, where the 
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enemy was retreating.  “A” Squadron was sent forward in a cavalry charge, and captured 
several prisoners and machine guns at Cavaire, though the Squadron took several 
casualties, including Major Middlemast.  “B” Squadron continued their advance and 
captured Maurois.115 
Meanwhile, LSH passed through the infantry line at 9:55am.  Troops of the LSH 
saw that enemy rearguards occupied the high ground northeast of Clary, and were taking 
cover in Mont-aux-Villes Wood.  “B” Squadron was dispatched to clear the enemy from 
the high ground, and charged 1500 yards across open ground under covering machine 
gun fire.  The enemy surrendered in the face of the cavalry charge, and the LSH passed 
off its gains to the supporting infantry.  At 11:00am, Major Devey’s Troop was ordered 
to capture Mont-aux-Villes Wood, but enemy fire from Montigny stopped Devey’s 
advance.  One troop under Lieutenant Bowdens charged the wood, dismounted, and 
opened fire on the enemy, who retreated to the north.  The remainder of the Squadron 
occupied the factory farm on the Bertry-Clary road and eastern edge of the wood.  
Shortly thereafter, LSH reconnaissance patrols revealed that the enemy held a line of rifle 
pits east of the road.  LSH charged the rifle pits under covering machine gun fire, 
capturing the position easily despite enemy machine gun and artillery fire.  LSH took 
forty-three prisoners and several machine guns from this position.116   
At 12:30pm, the infantry was delayed by heavy machine gun fire and did not 
intend to advance any further.  However, the cavalry planned to press on with the 
advance.  General Harman called a conference between Kavanagh, R.W. Paterson, and E. 
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116 See Appendix XIX for map.  FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade Narrative of 
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Paterson117 to determine the best strategy for capturing Maurois and Honnechy, 
objectives that were originally set for the infantry.118  It was decided that at 2:00pm, the 
6th Cavalry Brigade would encircle Honnechy and capture the high ground between that 
village and Reumont.  The CCB would capture Maurois by encircling the village from 
the north and then connecting with the 6th Cavalry Brigade between Maurois and 
Reumont.119  However, when R.W. Paterson arrived to give orders to the FGH, he 
discovered that they had already captured Maurois and had secured the line along the 
Maurois-Bertry Road as the infantry moved up to hold the village.120     
At 1:00pm, the CCB received word that the 6th Cavalry Brigade was unable to 
advance to Le Cateau as they had come under heavy enemy shelling and were forced to 
take cover behind the Busigny-Maretz Road.  Similarly, “A” Squadron of the FGH was 
under heavy enemy fire at Maurois-Bertry, so R.W. Paterson dispatched the CCB reserve 
to continue the cavalry advance to Reumont, the next objective on Roman Road.  “C” 
Squadron of the RCD under Major Newcomen was ordered to swing wide to the left and 
capture the high ground north of Reumont, while “B” and “C” Squadrons of the FGH 
made a smaller turn and entered Reumont from the north-west.  LSH would act as flank 
guards, advancing from Bertry to capture Troisvilles.  The RCHA and all available 
machine guns covered the CCB advance from the valley 1000 yards west of Maurois.121   
                                                          
117 GOC the 6th Cavalry Brigade. 
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 “C” Squadron of the RCD captured the high ground east of the Reumont at 
3:30pm, cutting off the enemy retreat into the village.   One patrol under Sergeant 
William R. Jones captured an enemy nest of three guns and thirty troops.122  Jones’ patrol 
occupied a position south-east of Reumont while “B” and “C” Squadrons of the FGH 
formed a defensive flank to the right, assembling in the valley at the northern edge of 
Reumont.  “B” Squadron advanced along Roman Road and employed Hotchkiss gun fire 
against the western edge of Reumont, while “C” Squadron was ordered to advance 
around Reumont and encircle the village.  “C” Squadron came under heavy enemy fire 
from the southern edge of Troisvilles, so the advanced troop swung to the north and 
charged an enemy party.  According to the FGH report, all enemy troops surrendered 
before they were reached by the charging cavalry troops.  Forty-two prisoners and six 
machine guns were captured.  “C” Squadron continued to advance and captured the 
village dismounted, flushing the enemy out while “B” Squadron held the high ground.  
Meanwhile, LSH had captured Le Fayt at 3:55pm and entered the eastern edge of 
Toisvilles.123   
At 4:00pm, the CCB was in line from Reumont to Troisvilles when word came 
that the Germans were retreating across the Inchy-LeCateau road.  The RCHA was 
moved to a forward position and opened fire on the area, and the 6th Cavalry Brigade was 
ordered to advance.124  However, the 6th Brigade was holding the line south of Reumont, 
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so the task fell to the CCB with the 7th Cavalry Brigade in support.125  The RCD was 
ordered to capture the final objective between Montay and Rambourlieux Farm while the 
LSH held the line from Rambeurlieux Farm to Toisvilles, establishing outposts along 
Inchy Road from Toisvilles to Neuvilly.  “A” and “B” Squadrons of the RCD advanced 
to the high ground at Reumont at 4:30pm.  They arrived at 5:00pm and advanced to the 
high ground at Rambourlieux Farm, capturing the objective at a gallop by 5:30pm.  The 
CCB held its position through the night despite enemy fire from the opposite ridge and 
the valley at Le Cateau.126    
The 7th Cavalry Brigade relieved the CCB on 10 October.  The 7th Cavalry 
Brigade attempted to carry on the advance, but the enemy had consolidated their position 
and enemy fire was much too heavy.  Consequently, Kavanagh ordered the Cavalry 
Corps to retire.127  Casualties at Le Cateau were relatively light. The CCB had two 
officers and twenty-eight other ranks killed, ten officers and 121 other ranks wounded, 
and seventeen missing.  The CCB also had 109 horses killed, forty wounded, and twenty-
two missing.128   
 In the fifth volume of the 1918 British Official History, Edmonds stated that 
though the mounted arm was successful at Le Cateau, “the cavalry had done nothing that 
                                                          
125 TNA WO 95/1142.  War Diary, 3rd Cavalry Division, October 1918.  3rd Cavalry Division Narrative of 
Operations 8-11 October 1918; FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade Narrative of 
Operations 8-10 October by R.W. Paterson; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 275. 
126 See Appendix XIX for map.  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 22.  Narrative of Operations, 
Royal Canadian Dragoons, 9 October 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 21.  Narrative of 
Operations, Fort Garry Horse, 9 October 1918; FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
Narrative of Operations 8-10 October by R.W. Paterson. 
127 The enemy position was so strong that the Fourth Army took one week to resume their attack with 
adequate artillery support.  See Kenyon, British Cavalry, 276;  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 
22.  Narrative of Operations, Royal Canadian Dragoons, 9 October 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3984, 
Folder 5, File 21.  Narrative of Operations, Fort Garry Horse, 9 October 1918; FGHMA War Diaries File.  
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Narrative of Operations 8-10 October by R.W. Paterson. 
128 See Appendix XX for full breakdown of CCB Casualties.  FGHMA War Diaries File.  Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade Narrative of Operations 8-10 October by R.W. Paterson. 
 302
the infantry, with artillery support and cyclists, could not have done for itself at less 
cost.”129  However, an examination of the battle narratives proved that the CCB and the 
3rd Cavalry Division were able to pursue the enemy with far greater speed and efficiency.  
As Kenyon has argued, the infantry had advanced a mere four miles between 8 and 9 
October.  On 9 October, the CCB advanced eight miles from the infantry line across a 
three-mile front, captured over 400 prisoners and 100 machine guns, along with several 
pieces of enemy artillery.  Meanwhile, the infantry offensive lost momentum by 9:30am 
due to exhaustion and heavy enemy fire.130  In contrast, the mounted arm was able to 
advance quickly without exhausting men or resources.  As seen at Gattigny Wood, the 
FGH managed to press on and capture the position while the infantry was delayed by 
enemy fire outside of Maretz Wood.  By early afternoon, the mounted arm was capturing 
objectives that were originally set for the infantry at Maurois and Honnechy while the 
infantry could not advance any further.  Most significantly, the speed of the cavalry 
advance prevented the retreating enemy from destroying at least six French villages as 
they passed.131  The CCB also performed several mounted charges that resulted in enemy 
surrender.  As Paterson stated, the CCB’s achievement on 9 October was “one of the 
finest in the history of the British Cavalry.”132   
 Although some minor Cavalry Corps attacks took place in the final weeks of the 
conflict, Le Cateau was the CCB’s final engagement of the Great War.  The Brigade 
spent the remaining weeks drilling in billets and serving at the front as patrollers and 
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reconnaissance troops.  When the Armistice was announced at 11:00am on 11 November, 
the CCB was in billets at Péronnes, and began the march east on 16 November.133  From 
the Armistice through the spring of 1919, the Cavalry Corps was responsible for 
reconnaissance of topography, and also formed composite cavalry brigades and remained 
ready for action in case any enemy resistance was met.134  The CCB did not enter 
Germany, they ended their march in Lustin, Belgium, and finally embarked for home 
from Escarbotin to Le Havre, France, in the spring of 1919.135   
Conclusion 
The Cavalry Corps was most successful in 1918, as open warfare had finally allowed the 
mounted arm to use its mobility to fulfill its intended role in pursuing the enemy.  
Though too few in number to be truly decisive at the operational level through the final 
Hundred Days of the Great War, the mobility of the Cavalry Corps enabled it to keep 
pressure on the enemy retreat and prevent the formation of a defensive line, scattering 
enemy troops before reinforcements arrived.  The CCB cleared areas of enemy troops, 
and captured prisoners, guns, and artillery without exhausting men or resources during 
their rapid advance.  At Amiens, the Cavalry Corps captured all of the objectives that 
were set when the offensive was originally planned.  Similarly, the CCB was highly 
successful at Le Cateau, performing several mounted charges and capturing a series of 
limited objectives.  With support from machine guns and artillery, the cavalry was able to 
do what the exhausted infantry could not while pursuing the enemy.  While mechanized 
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134 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 1, File 12.  B/359, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 30 January 1919;  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3983, Folder 1, File 12.  B/359/1, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 3 February 1919; 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3987, Folder 11, File 23.  Topographical Reconnaissance Reports by Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, 11 February-6 March 1919; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3998, Folder 1, File 18.  Instructions 
and Orders for Demobilization, 28 February-9 March 1919. 
135 War Diary, FGH, 16 November 1918-30 April 1919. 
 304
warfare proved to be the way forward in future wars, tanks were too slow and unreliable 
to support the infantry with the manoeuvrability that was required of them in 1918.  As 
Amiens showed, Whippets had the potential to be excellent weapons for eliminating 
enemy machine guns, but they were too vulnerable to enemy artillery and were not 
mobile enough to keep pace with the cavalry.  More significantly, there was no existing 
doctrine for coordinating mobile combined arms operations, nor for employing armoured 
vehicles.  There was still a place for cavalry on the Western Front at the operational level 
in 1918 due to its superior mobility. 
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CHAPTER 10: 
The Hundred Days Offensive, August-November 1918 
Canadian Light Horse 
 
Introduction 
Like their compatriots in the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 1918 was the most 
eventful year for the Canadian Light Horse, particularly during the final “Hundred Days” 
of the Great War.  The role of Divisional Cavalry continued to be vital in 1918, so much 
so that the 2nd British Cavalry Division was reassigned to Divisional Cavalry work on 4 
September with Haig and Kavanagh’s consent.  Despite his 1917 insistence on 
dismounting the majority of the Divisional Cavalry in October 1917, even Henry Wilson 
was forced to admit that the need for Divisional Cavalry was paramount by July 1918 
because its mobility was vital for reconnaissance, dispatch riding, traffic control, and 
escort duties.1   As Major T. Preston2 stated, “Some people might think that army cavalry 
was a luxury, but in September 1918, divisional cavalry was clearly a necessity.”3   
Also like their counterparts in the CCB, the most significant role for the CLH in 
1918 was pursuit of the retreating enemy.  However, Divisional Cavalry troops 
performed different duties in pursuit than the Independent Cavalry in the Cavalry Corps.  
Instead, the CLH acted as an advanced reconnaissance screen that scouted a safe line of 
advance for the infantry when mobility returned to the Western Front in the final months 
of the Great War.4  The CLH’s primary responsibility was protecting the advancing 
infantry by scouting the enemy’s position and reporting their location and strength, along 
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with the conditions of roads, ground, availability of bridges, the occupation of villages, 
and the location of water sources.  Throughout operations, the CLH kept contact between 
the advancing Allied infantry and the retreating enemy force.5   According to 1918 
doctrine for Divisional Cavalry in 1918,  “The Corps Mounted Troops should be like the 
dog to a blind man.”6  The CLH fulfilled this protective role in 1918. 
Training and Detachments, May 1917-July 1918 
The high demand for Divisional Cavalry in 1918 stood in stark contrast to the 
CLH experience during the previous year.  After Vimy Ridge, the remainder of 1917 
passed quietly for the CLH.  Much of the summer and autumn was spent training the new 
recruits.  According to Leonard, most new troops were “very slack as far as the standard 
of the CLH now goes.”7  The CLH fought dismounted with the Canadian Motor Machine 
Gun Brigade (CMMGB) at Hill 70 in August 1917, and continued to serve in various 
detachments while the remainder of the Regiment carried on with daily mounted training 
and drills.8  Regimental sports and horse shows were held throughout the summer 
months.9  Working party responsibilities resumed in late July and continued through 
December.10  For example, on 25 October the CLH11 supplied two parties of two officers 
                                                          
5 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 12.  Canadian Light Horse, Functions of Corps Mounted 
Troops, 8 January 1918. 
6 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 12.  Canadian Light Horse, Functions of Corps Mounted 
Troops, 8 January 1918. 
7 1HMA Leonard Collection.  IL-0407709. Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 2 September 
1917. 
8 McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 43. 
9 For full details, see War Diary, CLH, 1 June-31 August 1917; 1HMA Leonard Collection.  IL-0407706, 
Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 7 June 1917; 1HMA Leonard Collection.  IL-0407709. 
Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 2 September 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 14, 
File 3.  Mounted Sports, Canadian Light Horse, 1 June 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 14, File 3.  
H.C.-10 Canadian Corps Horse Show, 8 June 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 14, File 3.  
Canadian Corps Entries From Canadian Corps For First Army Horse Show, 25 June 1917; LAC RG9 III 
C2 Vol. 3992, Folder 14, File 3.  Field Day Sports, 2 July 1917. 
10 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 14, 23 July 
1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 23, 30 
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and eighty-four other ranks and two officers and 100 other ranks, respectively, to carry 
ammunition to the CMMGB at Passchendaele.12  In November, one officer and eight 
other ranks from “B” Squadron and one officer and thirteen other ranks from “C” 
Squadron were sent to work at observation posts at Valmertinghe for the Intelligence 
Branch of the 2nd ANZAC at Ypres.13  The CLH returned to winter billets in Divon on 20 
November.14 
 The CLH spent the early months of 1918 in Divon, continuing with regular 
exercise rides and daily lectures on divisional cavalry duties, including typography, 
observation, reconnaissance, patrol work, advance, rear, and flank guard duties, and the 
capture of villages.15  Working party duties continued through the winter to help prepare 
defences in the Lens area for the expected German spring offensive.16  The CLH was 
only able to perform one tactical scheme in March 1918,17 as regimental training was 
again hindered by different detachment duties.  For example, various observation parties 
                                                                                                                                                                             
August 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 
26, 10 October 1917; 1HMA Leonard Collection.  IL-0407707.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to 
Mother, 28 July 1917; War Diary, CLH, 1-30 September 1917. 
11 Each Squadron supplied equal numbers of troops for these carrying parties.  For example, on 26 October 
“A” Squadron supplied thirty-four troops, and “B” and “C” Squadron supplied thirty-three troops each.  
See LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 31, 26 
October 1917. 
12 War Diary, CLH, 1-31 October 1917; Appendix, Canadian Light Horse Operational Order 30, 23 
October 1917. 
13 For full details on the working parties and various duties performed by the CLH in October 1917, see 
Appendix XXI.  CLH observers were trained to spot enemy train and transport movements towards the 
front, locate enemy positions, and estimate their strength and armaments, including sniper positions and 
machine gun placements.  These duties continued through March 1918.  See War Diary, CLH, March 1918, 
Appendix A.  War Diary Reports from Observation Party, weeks ending 16 March, 23 March, and 30 
March 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 
28, 17 October 1917; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 3, File 12.  Observation and Intelligence, 26 
December 1917. 
14 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 33, 16 
November 1917. 
15 War Diary, CLH, 1 January-31 March 1918; War Diary, CLH, January 1918, Appendix A.  Proposed 
Lectures, Canadian Light Horse, 28 January 1918. 
16 McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 44. 
17 In which they acted as contact patrols, keeping contact between advanced troops and the main body and 
acting as dispatch riders to headquarters.  See War Diary, CLH, March 1918, Appendix.  Canadian Light 
Horse Tactical Scheme No. 11, Contact Patrols, 17 March 1918. 
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continued to be sent to the front18 in greater strength throughout March 1918 in 
anticipation of the coming German offensive.19  Similarly, the CLH Hotchkiss Gun 
Battery was detached to support the 4th Canadian Division from 25 to 31 March during 
the German Spring Offensive.20  The remainder of the CLH left Divon for Camblain 
L’Abbé on 30 March, sending a working party of fifty men to the front the following day.  
Meanwhile, working parties of between fifty and 162 all ranks continued to work with 
the tunnelling companies in rotation beginning on 13 March.21   
The remainder of the CLH was stationed at Vimy Ridge in anticipation on the 
German Spring Offensive, although no attack was made there in the spring of 1918.22  
However, Operation Michael brought great demand for Divisional Cavalry troops due to the 
urgent need for escorts and reconnaissance.  “A” Squadron was attached to the 1st Canadian 
Division for Divisional Cavalry work at Fosseaux on 29 March.  “A” Squadron was 
responsible for divisional observation post duties and reconnaissance, including advanced 
divisional reconnaissance from Warlus to the front lines.  The Squadron also served as 
mounted escorts for the infantry, and mapped the divisional area, reporting on the conditions 
of routes to the front lines.23  One additional troop was sent to serve with the 2nd Canadian 
Division in the same capacity from 9 to 25 April.24 
                                                          
18 The CLH had supplied the majority of the Canadian Corps Observation Posts since October 1917, with 
weekly rotations in varying strengths, from one officer and ten other ranks to one officer and thirty other 
ranks.  Men were also supplied for the Topographical Section in March 1918.  See War Diary, CLH, March 
1918, Appendix E.  Commanding Officer’s Remarks on War Diary for the Month of March, 1918. 
19 War Diary, CLH, March 1918, Appendix A.  War Diary Reports from Observation Party, weeks ending 
16 March, 23 March, and 30 March 1918. 
20 War Diary, CLH, March 1918, Appendix C.  War Diary Reports from Hotchkiss Gun Battery, 25-31 
March 1918.  
21 See Appendix XXII for distribution of the CLH on 31 March 1918.  War Diary, CLH, March 1918, 
Appendix B.  War Diary Reports, Working Party Attached 1st Canadian Tunn.Co’y, 20 March 1918.  
22 Stirrett, 21. 
23 War Diary, CLH, April 1918, Appendix B1. War Diary From “A” Squadron, Canadian Light Horse, 
Attached to 1st Canadian Division. 
24 War Diary, CLH, April 1918, Appendix B5. War Diary Reports from Lieut. Stevens, Attached with one 
Troop to 2nd Cdn Division, 9-18 April 1918.  Leonard was incredibly frustrated with detached duties.  By 
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Meanwhile, “B” and “C” Squadrons were sent to serve as reconnaissance 
patrollers, observers, and traffic controllers when called upon, often coming under enemy 
shelling while carrying out various duties.25  For example, “C” Squadron participated in 
traffic control duties on 14 April when civilians were evacuated from Les Brebis and 
Mazingarbe.26  A detachment was sent to work as back line patrollers from 17 to 23 April 
to assist with an incredible amount of traffic between Mazingarbe and Aire.  Detachments 
were also required to function in a mounted police role, keeping unauthorized personnel 
from entering the war zone.27   
At this time, CLH troops were working twelve to fourteen hour days, patrolling 
an area of sixty square miles.28  The regiment was thanked for its services at every turn.  
For example, GOC the 1st Canadian Division Archibald Cameron Macdonell29 wrote to 
Leonard to thank “A” Squadron for their “timely, efficient, and extremely helpful service 
in the recent crisis…I got nothing but good accounts of them on every side.  Their 
reconnaissance maps was [sic] a good helpful piece of work.”30 
Despite the value of their work and the fulfillment of their long desire for action, 
the men of the CLH had little opportunity for regular training at the regimental level with 
so many troops scattered across the front.31  This was exacerbated by the Divisional 
Cavalry work that continued into May.  It was thought that a German attack might 
                                                                                                                                                                             
August, he stated that if the Regiment was not reunited he would request a new position, and he applied for 
an extended Canadian leave shortly after.  See 1HMA Leonard Collection.  IL-0407808. Personal 
Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 26 August 1918 and Leonard to Alice, 29 August 1918. 
25 1HMA Leonard Collection.  IL-0407804. Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 14 April 1918. 
26 War Diary, CLH, April 1918, Appendix B2. War Diary Reports, 14 April 1918. 
27 War Diary, CLH, April 1918, Appendix B6. War Diary Reports from Back Line Patrol, 17-23 April 
1918. 
28 War Diary, CLH, April 1918, Appendix B6, War Diary Reports from Back Line Patrol, 17-23 April 
1918. 
29 Former GOC Lord Strathcona’s Horse. 
30 War Diary, CLH, April 1918, Appendix C4, War Diary Reports. 
31 See Appendix XXII For distribution of CLH at the end of each month between March and July 1918. 
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develop on the First Army front, so the CLH sent detachments to the front on 12 May to 
serve as dispatch riders and reconnaissance patrollers.32  Other observation detachments 
were sent to work with the Canadian Corps Topographical Section.33  The remainder of 
the Regiment continued with mounted training when possible through the spring, much 
of which was dedicated to musketry and equitation with the limited force available.34  
The Canadian Corps was finally relieved from the front lines in the Lens-Arras area in 
May, moving into reserve for training.35  Consequently, the CLH was finally relieved of 
its major detachment duties in late May to train for anticipated mounted action.36  
Regular training and tactical schemes took place through June and July, although 
detachment duties continued.  The CLH carried on in this way until ordered to report to 
the front to serve as Divisional Cavalry for the Canadian Corps during the Amiens 
offensive, scheduled to open on 8 August 1918.37 
Divisional Cavalry Work at Amiens, August-September 1918 
When Foch issued finalized orders for the offensive at Amiens on 28 July, the 
Canadian Corps was designated to take part in the battle.  The Canadians were ordered to 
take their position in the Allied line between the Australian and French Armies before the 
                                                          
32 One troop of “A” Squadron was sent to the 1st Canadian Division (south), one troop of “B” Squadron was 
sent to the 3rd Canadian Division (north), and one troop of “C” Squadron was sent to the 4th Canadian 
Division (centre).  LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order 
No. 45, 12 May 1918; War Diary, CLH, May 1918, Appendix C1.  Reconnaissance Reports – Northern, 
Centre, and Southern Corps Areas. 
33 War Diary, CLH, May 1918, Appendix C2.  War Diary Reports, Observation Detail Canadian Light 
Horse Attached to the Canadian Corps Topographical Section. 
34 Some attention was given to advanced, rear, and flank guard training in May.  By 24 May, the CLH 
practiced occupying positions and sending out advanced patrols.  Horses were trained to jump over 
trenches when during this time.  See War Diary, May 1918, Appendix A1. Canadian Light Horse Tactical 
Scheme No. 14, 10 May 1918; War Diary, May 1918, Appendix A4. Canadian Light Horse Tactical 
Scheme No. 15, 24 May 1918; War Diary, CLH, April, Appendix A1-8.  Canadian Light Horse Syllabus of 
Training, April-May 1918; 1HMA Leonard Collection.  IL-0407804. Personal Correspondence, Leonard to 
Mother, 14 April 1918. 
35 Nicholson, 382-383. 
36 Stirrett, 21. 
37 See Appendix XXII for distribution of CLH at the end of each month between March and July 1918. 
War Diary, CLH, 1-30 June 1918. 
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offensive opened on 8 August.38  The Canadian Corps left the Lens-Arras area39 for the 
concentration point southwest of Amiens on 30 July.  Moving the entire Canadian Corps 
from one end of the Western Front to another and then up to the front lines without 
revealing intentions to the enemy was incredibly difficult.  To keep the operation secret, 
all moves took place at night.  Roads were dark, narrow, and terribly congested, as the 
Australian Corps shared the same route to the front lines.  This problem was made worse 
by the limitations of wheeled vehicles, which could only travel on the Amiens-Roye 
Road and the Amiens-St. Quentin Road.  Communication was also a substantial problem, 
as all wireless communication was prohibited until Zero Hour on 8 August in case of 
enemy interception.40  All of these factors made Divisional Cavalry indispensable to the 
Canadian Corps for traffic control and dispatch riding in early August 1918. 
The CLH left billets at 10:00pm on 31 July and began a 100-mile march to Amiens.41  
The CLH advanced each night between 10:00pm and 3:00am to maintain the secrecy of the 
operation.42  On 3 August, CLH detachments were assigned to each Canadian Division for 
Divisional Cavalry work.  “C” Squadron sent two troops to serve with the 1st Canadian 
Division, and two troops to the 2nd Canadian Division.  “B” Squadron sent two troops to the 
3rd Canadian Division, and two troops to the 4th Canadian Division.  “A” Squadron was to 
report to the Assistant Provost Marshal (APM) at Dury at 10:00am on 4 August to be 
employed as dispatch riders and traffic controllers.43   
                                                          
38 For full details on the planning of the Amiens offensive and the role assigned to the Canadian Corps, see 
Chapter 9. 
39 The Canadian Corps had just arrived back at the front on 15 July since being relieved in early May 1918.  
See Nicholson, 383-385. 
40 Nicholson, 377, 386-391. 
41 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 50, 31 July 
1918; 1HMA Leonard Collection IL-0407808.  Personal Correspondence, Leonard to Mother, 5 August 
1918. 
42 War Diary, CLH, 1-8 August 1918. 
43 See Appendix XXIII for full chart of duties and attachments of “A” Squadron in August 1918.   
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“A” Squadron was engaged most significantly before the operation opened on 8 
August, as traffic was incredibly heavy each night while troops and supplies arrived at 
the front.  “A” Squadron arrived at Dury at 10:30am on 4 August.  The forward area was 
divided into six sectors for traffic control, with traffic officers from each Canadian 
Division in charge of each area.  “A” Squadron sent one troop to each of the first three 
sectors, located across the Villers Breteneaux-Genelles-Domart Road.44  All three sectors 
were placed under the command of H.M. Dawson, Commanding Officer of “A” 
Squadron.  Traffic control and patrol work was carried out overnight and guards and 
escorts were supplied during the day.  Traffic was heaviest on 6 August, as Boves and 
Cagny were the only two places for the Canadian Corps to move to the front, and each 
village had only a single one-way bridge for troops to cross.  Boves also had a one-way 
viaduct that troops had to navigate en route to the front.  According to Dawson’s report, 
sixty-five tanks had to get through Boves alone, and advanced at approximately one mile 
per hour.  French heavy artillery also had to make its way through the village before 
7:00am on 7 August.45     
The Amiens offensive opened with great success on 8 August.  The Canadian 
Corps advanced nearly eight miles on the opening day of the offensive at a cost of fewer 
than 4000 casualties.46  As the Allied advance continued, the three troops of CLH “A” 
Squadron carried on with Divisional Cavalry work.  On 9 August, “A” Squadron moved 
forward to Marcelcave and continued with traffic control and patrol work in the 2nd 
                                                                                                                                                                             
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 2, File 16.  Canadian Corps G.94/26-2, 2 August 1918; LAC RG9 III 
C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 51, 3 August 1918. 
44 1st Troop assigned to Sector 1, 2nd Troop to Sector 2, and 3rd Troop to Sector 3.   
45 War Diary, CLH, August 1918, Appendix B2. Reports from Detachments – Canadian Light Horse, “A” 
Squadron – Attached A.P.M. Cdn Corps, 4-22 August 1918 by H.M. Dawson. 
46 Nicholson, 407.  For full details on the Canadian advance on 8 August, see Nicholson, 398-408. 
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Canadian Divisional area.47  On 10 August, the Squadron carried out traffic control and 
dispatch riding duties between a railway and the Amiens-Roye road through Marcelcave-
Ignacourt-Maison Blanche to the north, and Gentelles Wood-Aubercourt to the south.  
Sections from each troop were assigned to perform escort duties, guiding German 
prisoners of war from the advanced area to Boyes.  Meanwhile, 4th Troop was sent to 
Corps Signals for dispatch riding duties beginning on 7 August, and carried messages to 
each Canadian Division.48  The Canadian Corps continued to advance at Amiens through 
19 August before moving back to Arras.  The transfer of the Canadian Corps again 
required the mobile traffic control and dispatch riding of Divisional Cavalry, thus “A” 
Squadron was employed in these same detachments through 1 September.49 
 “B” and “C” Squadrons of the CLH served in much the same capacity with the 
Canadian Corps until 1 September, dividing their time largely between dispatch riding 
and traffic control, and sent various detachments to fulfill other roles where needed.50  
Some members were engaged in active reconnaissance patrol work while on dispatch 
detail.  For example, at 6:00am on 8 August, George Stirrett of “B” Squadron was 
ordered to take a patrol forward through the 3rd Canadian Divisional Area to determine 
whether the three bridges in this section had been destroyed, and thereafter deliver the 
information to the advancing 3rd Canadian Division.  At 9:00am, the 3rd Canadian 
                                                          
47 See Appendix XVII for map.  War Diary, CLH, August 1918, Appendix B2. Reports from Detachments 
– Canadian Light Horse, “A” Squadron – Attached A.P.M. Cdn Corps, 4-22 August 1918 by H.M. 
Dawson. 
48 See Appendix XVII for map.   
49 War Diary, CLH, August 1918, Appendix B2. Reports from Detachments – Canadian Light Horse, “A” 
Squadron – Attached A.P.M. Cdn Corps, 4-22 August 1918 by H.M. Dawson; War Diary, CLH, September 
1918, Appendix A1. War Diary Report – Canadian Light Horse; War Diary, CLH, September 1918, 
Appendix C1.  Report – “B” Squadron, Canadian Light Horse, Attached 4th Canadian Division and “C” 
Squadron, Attached 1st Canadian Division, 1-6 September 1918. 
50 See Appendix XXIII for full chart of duties and attachments for CLH “B” and “C” Squadrons in August 
1918. 
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Division had advanced past their objective and were out of touch with Divisional 
Headquarters, so Stirrett’s Troop was ordered to advance and establish contact with the 
advancing Division.  Stirrett’s Troop was successful and reported back to headquarters 
with the location and status of the 3rd Canadian Division’s advance, and also captured 
several prisoners of war.51   
Stirrett’s troop and several others carried out similar missions through the coming 
days.  For example, on the afternoon of 9 August, a patrol of five members of “B” 
Squadron under Lieutenant F. Taylor participated in what Livesay called a “brilliant 
exploit.”52  After delivering a message from the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade to the 5th 
Canadian Mounted Rifles at Bouchoir, Taylor’s patrol came upon a six-wagon German 
ammunition convoy.  The 5th CMR detailed one tank and one infantry platoon to assist 
Taylor’s patrol with capturing the convoy.  Taylor and his four troops charged to the 
trenches and dismounted, and pursued the advancing German convoy through the trench 
system.  They continued their pursuit with no support, as the 5th CMR detachment had 
been recalled due to an imminent French artillery barrage on Arvillers.  The five-man 
troop rushed the German convoy, killing between twelve and fifteen53 enemy troops and 
capturing the remaining twenty and their supply wagons.  Unfortunately, the successful 
party came under enemy machine gun fire while transporting the wagons.  Taylor was 
                                                          
51 See Appendix XVII for map.  Stirrett, 22; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 46; War Diary, CLH, August 
1918, Appendix B3. Reports from Detachments – Canadian Light Horse, “B” Squadron – Attached 3rd & 
4th Cdn Div., 5-31 August 1918 by H.J. Woodman and C.F. McEwen; War Diary, CLH, August 1918, 
Appendix B4. Reports from Detachments – Canadian Light Horse, “C” Squadron – Attached 1st Cdn. Div., 
4-12 August 1918 by D.N. Ferris; War Diary, CLH, August 1918, Appendix B5. Reports from 
Detachments – Canadian Light Horse, “C” Squadron – Attached 2nd Cdn. Div., 4-28 August by H.N. 
Campbell; War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix A1.  War Diary Report – Canadian Light Horse; 
War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix C1.  Report – “B” Squadron, Canadian Light Horse, Attached 
4th Canadian Division and “C” Squadron, Attached 1st Canadian Division, 1-6 September 1918. 
52 J.F.B. Livesay, Canada’s Hundred Days: With the Canadian Corps from Amiens to Mons, 8 August-11 
November 1918 (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1919), 74. 
53 Taylor’s estimate given in War Diary report. 
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forced to shoot the lead horses and abandon the wagons, retreating back into the trenches 
with his surviving troops and returning to the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade via the 
Amiens-Roye Road.  Taylor, Sergeant Clarence Duncan, Trooper Athol Dudgeon, and 
three horses survived the assault.  Troopers Lionel Grisdale, Alexander Hastie, and three 
of their horses were killed.  Fortunately, the surviving party managed to return with all 
twenty POW’s.  Taylor received the Distinguished Service Order for his efforts.54 
Despite the gallantry of Taylor’s patrol, the employment of Divisional Cavalry 
troops in engagements that the infantry could carry out55 was discouraged at this time, as 
so few Divisional Cavalry troops were available and demand continued to grow for their 
services.  The issue was discussed in a conference at Canadian Corps Headquarters on 30 
August 1918.  It was noted that,  
The proper employment of Divisional Mounted Troops requires careful 
attention.  The disregard of the principles of their employment has been 
very noticeable.  The mounted men attached to divisions are primarily 
intended for reconnaissance and dispatch riding; but in many cases far too 
much has been required of them by Divisional Commanders, and they 
have been employed in fighting where their work would have been done 
as well by the infantry.56   
 
Similarly, when “A” Squadron CLH sent one troop to each Canadian Division for corps 
cavalry work57 on 26 September, each division was told that mounted dispatch riders 
were “to be kept for really urgent tactical messages which cannot be sent by any other 
                                                          
54 See Appendix XVII for map.  Accounts of Taylor’s action are inconsistent.  Stirrett noted that Leonard 
had instructed him to interview each of the surviving members of Taylor’s troop to determine if decorations 
should be awarded.  According to Stirrett, each man “told a different story, as if they had not all been at the 
same place at the same time.” Stirrett, 24.  War Diary, CLH, August 1918, Appendix B3. Reports from 
Detachments – Canadian Light Horse, “B” Squadron – Attached 3rd & 4th Cdn Div., 5-31 August 1918 by 
H.J. Woodman and C.F. McEwen; 1HMA Leonard Collection IL-0407808.  Personal Correspondence, 
Leonard to Mother, 12 August 1918; Stirrett, 23-24; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 47; Livesay, 74. 
55 As was the case with Taylor’s patrol, as the 5th CMR was intended to carry out the operation. 
56 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3999, Folder 3, File 17.  First Army No.1888 (G) Lessons From Recent Fighting 
Referred to by the Army Commander at Conference Held at Canadian Corps Headquarters, 30 August 
1918. 
57 They were responsible for traffic control, escorting prisoners of war, and dispatch riding.   
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means,” as divisional cavalry troops were in such high demand at the front.58  Divisional 
Cavalry was of such importance and available in such few number that every effort was 
made to ensure their preservation.   
Brutinel’s Independent Force at Arras and Canal du Nord, September 1918 
Just as the CCB and Cavalry Corps had difficulties in combined arms action with 
Whippet tanks in 1918, the CLH had little success as part of a combined arms mobile 
force.  As early as January 1918, it was thought that “The combination of Cavalry, 
Cyclists, and Machine Guns is ideal for all conditions and with Hotchkiss Guns and 
Lewis Guns gives a very high power which can be quickly concentrated where wanted.”59  
On 8 August at Amiens, an ad-hoc mobile column of the Canadian Motor Machine Gun 
Brigades, one Canadian Cyclist Battalion, one section of 6” Newton mortars, and a 
Hotchkiss detachment from the CLH was placed under the command of Brigadier 
General Raymond Brutinel60 and given a special mission.61  “Brutinel’s Independent 
Force” was to pass through the 3rd Canadian Division and form a flank for the 3rd Cavalry 
Division to the south, securing the line at Roye Road between the Red and Blue Lines.  
Thereafter, they were to act as a “mobile column” along the Amiens-Roye Road, keeping 
contact between French and Canadian troops, maintaining a link between the advanced 
cavalry and the infantry, and exploiting the Cavalry Corps success where possible.62  
                                                          
58 War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix A4.  Canadian Corps G.528/3-53, Employment of Corps 
Mobile Troops, 19 September 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse 
Operational Order No. 57, 25 September 1918. 
59 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 12.  Canadian Light Horse, Functions of Corps Mounted 
Troops, 8 January 1918. 
60 GOC the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, and previous GOC the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade. 
61 See Appendix XXIII for full listing of CLH Hotchkiss Gun detachment location and actions with 
Brutinel’s Independent Force.  Leonard was given command of the Hotchkiss Detachment.  LAC RG9 III 
C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 53, 8 August 1918. 
62 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3985, Folder 7, File 8-A.  GX.200/3, Preliminary Instructions and Information, 6 
August 1918; McNorgan, Iwuy, 206. 
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Although the CLH Hotchkiss guns did not see action with Brutinel’s Independent Force 
at Amiens, the armoured vehicles successfully maintained communication between the 
French and Canadian forces while supporting the engagement by capturing prisoners and 
some enemy machine gun nests.63 
As Kenyon and McNorgan have noted, the original incarnation of Brutinel’s 
Independent force at Amiens in August 1918 was limited by the availability and 
accessibility of roads, as their wheeled vehicles were not all-terrain capable.64  While 
cyclists were slightly more versatile and could cross open country, they did so at the 
expense of their rider’s energies.  Brutinel believed that the addition of cavalry would add 
the versatility and flexibility that his combined arms force required.  Thus the 10th Royal 
Hussars and two Troops from each CLH Squadron65 and their remaining Hotchkiss 
sections became part of Brutinel’s Independent Force, now called Brutinel’s Brigade, on 
1 September 1918.66  The mounted troops joined the mobile column in the Arras area the 
following day.67  Major Dawson took command of the CLH section, while Captain 
Woodman kept command of the Hotchkiss section.68   
By 11 August, German defences had gained strength at Amiens and the Allied 
operation slowed.  After some delay, a surprise offensive was planned at Arras to push 
the enemy east of the Somme.  Thus the Canadian corps began to travel back to Arras on 
                                                          
63 See Appendix XVII for map.  McNorgan, Iwuy, 206. 
64 McNorgan, Iwuy, 206; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 266. 
65 For a total of six troops, half the CLH force. 
66 The CLH would continue to send various detachments to Brutinel’s Brigade for the remainder of the 
Great War. 
67 The force was now comprised of six troops of the CLH, one regiment of the Royal Hussars, one section 
of the Canadian Field Artillery (CFA), two light armoured cars, and ten motorcyclists. 
68 War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix A1.  War Diary Report – Canadian Light Horse;  
War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix A1.  Operational Order No. 55, 1 September 1918. 
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19 August and advanced south of the Scarpe towards Canal du Nord69 between 26 and 30 
August.  On 29 August, Brutinel’s Brigade captured Bench Farm and Victoria Corpse, 
and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion established along the Scarpe.   The remainder 
of the Canadian Corps occupied the Fresnes-Rouvroy trench line and made ready to push 
against the “backbone of the enemy’s resistance,”70 the Drocourt-Quéant (D-Q) Line,71 
one mile west of Cagnicourt on 2 September.72   
 The offensive was to take place under General Currie’s command.  The Canadian 
Corps was ordered to attack the D-Q Line and then press on to capture the crossings over 
Canal du Nord between Sains-lez-Marquion and Palluel.  After crossing the canal, the 
Canadians would consolidate their gains by capturing the high ground beyond the canal, 
providing a line from which to advance on Cambrai.  The 1st Canadian Division was to 
attack on the right, the 4th Canadian Division in the middle, and 4th British Division to the 
left.  Currie planned to have the Canadian Corps attack the Arras-Cambrai road and roll 
up the German line from north to south.  The offensive was planned in four stages.  First, 
troops would advance and capture the D-Q support trenches west of Cagnicourt marked 
as the Red Line.  Thereafter, the advance would continue to the Green Line, 
approximately 1200 yards west of the Canal du Nord.  From there, the Canadian Corps 
would capture the high ground east of the canal.  Six Mark V tank companies were 
assigned to support the offensive, along with Brutinel’s Brigade.73  
                                                          
69 At this time, Canal du Nord was still under construction and had no water running through it.  Gerald 
W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the 
First World War (Ottawa: Roger Duhamel, Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962), 435. 
70 Nicholson, 433. 
71 Comprised of a well-organized support line, concrete shelters, and well-defended machine gun posts 
located on high sloping ground. 
72 Nicholson, 422-435. 
73 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 10.  Canadian Independent Force, 1 September 1918; 
Nicholson, 433-435. 
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 Once the infantry captured the Red Line, Brutinel’s Brigade was to advance down 
the Arras-Cambrai Road as quickly as possible and capture the bridges across the Canal 
du Nord at Marquion, establishing a bridgehead and advancing to capture the Green line 
beside Cambrai Road.  If successful, Brutinel’s Brigade was to advance to Cambrai once 
the infantry arrived to take control of the bridgehead.  The 10th Royal Hussars would lead 
the advance, followed by the CLH and the remainder of the “Leading Group,”74 
responsible for capturing the bridges.75 
 On 2 September, the cavalry troops of Brutinel’s Brigade advanced to the forward 
area at 8:00am.  The 10th Royal Hussars sent patrols to the Cambrai-Arras road to assess 
the infantry’s progress.  The 1st Canadian Division had made good progress in the south, 
capturing their Red Line objectives at 8:00am, thus the Leading Group of Brutinel’s 
Brigade moved forward.76  However, heavy enemy machine gun fire kept it from 
advancing past the cross roads at L’Esperance, and seven of its eight armoured cars were 
put out of action.  The CLH came under fire from enemy artillery batteries located 
approximately half a mile from its location and the mounted troops were forced to retreat 
three times.  The “Second Group”77 advanced to support the cavalry, and planned an 
attack on a crossroads, cemetery, and the village of Cagnicourt to give the mounted force 
an opportunity to advance into open country.  If successful, one squadron from each the 
10th Royal Hussars and the CLH would continue to advance under covering artillery fire 
                                                          
74 Comprised of the 10th Royal Hussars, Canadian Light Horse, one section of the CFA, six heavy armoured 
cars, two light armoured cars, and ten motorcyclists used for dispatch riding. 
75 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 10.  Canadian Independent Force, 1 September 1918;  
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Leading Group Operational Order No. 1, 1 September 1918. 
76 However, the Canadian Corps came under heavy enemy artillery fire east of the D-Q Line, and did not 
capture the Buissy Switch in front of Cagnicourt until 11:00pm, and the Canadian Corps fell short of its 
objectives for 2 September. 
77 Comprised of four armoured cars, the Canadian Cyclist Battalion, five motor machine gun batteries, 
twenty motorcyclists, one section of the CFA, and two sections of medium trench mortars.   
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and with support from the 6th Motor Machine Gun Squadron, the CLH Hotchkiss gun 
detachment, and armoured cars advancing along the Arras-Cambrai Road.  
Unfortunately, the Second Group was unsuccessful, and the cavalry was ordered to 
withdraw at 5:00pm, and saw no further action at Arras.  The battle ended in Canadian 
victory on 5 September.78 
 Despite their best efforts, the men of the CLH were not able to advance at Arras 
largely because they were still limited by the material realities of trench warfare.  
According to a report, “It was absolutely impossible for the cavalry to move off the road 
in this sector owing to the immense quantity of wiring and deep trenches.”79  The 
wheeled vehicles of Brutinel’s Brigade were hindered by the same conditions, as seen 
above with seven of eight armoured cars put out of action by enemy fire.  According to 
McNorgan, the vehicles of the CMMGB were capable of advancing at twenty-five miles 
per hour on flat roads, but could not advance cross-country, as their engines were not 
powerful enough and their tires had no traction.80  As seen with the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, little mobile action was possible between August and September until the 
heaviest German defences were breached at the Hindenburg Line and the mounted arm 
could once again advance through open country.   
After returning to billets on 5 September, the six CLH troops that worked with 
Brutinel’s Brigade continued with regular training until the High Command was ready to 
push towards the formidable Hindenburg Line, launching an attack on Canal du Nord, 
Bourlon Wood, and Cambrai in late September 1918.81  Currie planned a two-phase 
                                                          
78 War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix A1.  War Diary Report – Canadian Light Horse. 
79 War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix A1.  War Diary Report – Canadian Light Horse. 
80 McNorgan, Iwuy, 206. 
81 LAC RG9 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 56, 5 September 1918; 
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offensive that would send the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions to attack the canal crossings, 
Bourlon Wood, and the high ground near Pilgrim’s Rest and La Maison Neuve.  In the 
second phase, the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions would continue to advance to the north 
with support from the 3rd Canadian Division and the 11th British Division, capturing the 
bridges over Canal de l’Escaut and consolidating their position along the high ground 
overlooking the Sensée Valley between Canal de l’Escaut and Canal du Nord.82   
Phase one of the offensive was set to open on 27 September.  The first objective, 
the Marquion Defence Line, was marked as the “Red Line,” the second objectives of 
Marquion, Bourlon Village, and the western edge of Bourlon Wood the “Green Line.”  
The “Blue Line” was located 2000 yards to the east and included the capture of the 
remainder of Bourlon Wood, and extended the line to Fontaine-Notre-Dame, which 
provided the Canadian Corps with a base for the capture of Cambrai.83 
 “B” and “C” Squadrons of the CLH were once again attached to Brutinel’s 
Brigade.84  Mounted troops were to be used in the initial phase of the offensive to 
reinforce the machine gun barrage, and were then expected to act as operational cavalry.  
The CLH was ordered to cross the Canal de l’Escaut near Cambrai and pass through the 
infantry line, advancing to seize points of tactical significance, holding them until 
relieved by the infantry.  Specifically, the CLH was to advance along the Cambrai-Iwuy-
Valenciennes Road, securing bridge crossings over the canal between Cambrai and 
Sensée at Faubourg de Selles, d’Aire, and Eswars.  Once “absolutely open warfare” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
War Diary, CLH, 5-19 September 1918; Nicholson, 441-442. 
82 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 10.  Brutinel’s Brigade M.G. G.21/437, B.W. Instructions No. 
1, 25 September 1918. 
83 Nicholson, 443. 
84 “A” Squadron was employed as divisional cavalry, with one troop serving with each Canadian Division.  
See previous subheading. 
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returned to the front, Brutinel’s Brigade would act as “Protective Mounted Troops,” in 
various advanced, rear, and flank guard roles.85 
The CLH concentrated in Chérisy at 9:30pm on the eve of the offensive. The 
battle began at 5:20am on 27 September.  The CLH embarked for their forward position 
at 10:30am, crossing the Canal du Nord and joining the remainder of Brutinel’s Brigade 
east of Sins-les-Marquin in Baralle Wood.  Brutinel’s Brigade stood to in various sections 
of the front lines through 2 October, though there was no opportunity for mobile warfare 
amidst perpetual enemy shelling and frequent counterattacks.86  According to Nicholson, 
the infantry endured several days of hard fighting with minimal gains and heavy 
casualties, and there was no opportunity to send Brutinel’s force forward into open 
mobile warfare.87 
Although they did not participate in any actions, the CLH was able to serve in a 
Divisional Cavalry role.  Various reconnaissance patrols were sent out daily despite 
heavy enemy shelling.  According to Stirrett’s account, “Each day we made hazardous 
recces [reconnaissance] in order to keep closely in touch with the front line situation and 
have lines of advance clear of wire and suitable for forward cavalry action.”88  Stirrett 
was awarded the Military Cross for his Troop’s reconnaissance on 26 September north of 
Sailly and 1 October east of Tilloy.  The CLH endured heavy casualties from enemy fire, 
including two men killed.89  
                                                          
85 War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix A4.  Canadian Corps G.528/3-53, Employment of Corps 
Mobile Troops, 19 September 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse 
Operational Order No. 57, 25 September 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 10.  Brutinel’s 
Brigade M.G. G.21/437, B.W. Instructions No. 1, 25 September 1918. 
86 War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix E1.  Report for War Diary, Casualties, Canadian Light 
Horse. 
87 For full details on the infantry battle, see Nicholson, 445-456. 
88 Stirrett, 25. 
89 See Appendix XXIV for list of CLH casualties from 28 to 30 September.   
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 On 5 October, Leonard received a thank you message from Brutinel for the good 
work of the CLH with the Independent Force: “the behaviour of your officers and men 
has been excellent and the patient and good humoured way in which they waited and 
looked for a chance to engage the enemy is very much to their credit…[I] hope that you 
will soon have the good gallop you are all craving for.”90 
Escaudoeuvres and Iwuy, 9-10 October 1918 
Although the Canadian Corps saw little action through the first week of October, 
the CLH remained dug in at the front lines at Maison Neuve and Hayencourt with 
Brutinel’s Brigade, conducting daily reconnaissance and awaiting an opportunity to 
advance.  Orders to capture Cambrai were finally issued on 6 October after the Third 
Army captured the bridge across Canal de l’Escaut south of Cambrai.  The operation was 
planned for 8 October in two phases.  First, the Third Army’s XVII Corps would capture 
the Niergnies-Awoingt Ridge south east of Cambrai with artillery support from the 
Canadian Corps.  After this was accomplished, the 2nd Canadian Division would advance 
and capture the crossings over Canal de l’Escaut between Morenchies and Ramillies, and 
then advance to the high ground south and south east of Escaudoeuvres, connecting their 
right flank with XVII Corps east of Cambrai.  The 3rd Canadian Division would support 
the 2nd Canadian Division’s effort, clearing the enemy out of the Railway Embankment 
                                                                                                                                                                             
War Diary, CLH, 26 September-2 October 1918; War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix E1.  Report 
for War Diary, Casualties, Canadian Light Horse; War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix D2-D11.  
Messages between Brutinel’s Brigade and Canadian Light Horse, 26 September-3 October 1918; LAC RG9 
III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 10.  Brutinel’s Brigade M.G. G.21/437, B.W. Instructions No. 1, 25 
September 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order 
No. 57, 25 September 1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse 
Operational Order No. 58, 26 September 1918; Stirrett, 25; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 49. 
90 War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix D12.  Message from R. Brutinel to Colonel Leonard, 5 
October 1918. 
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and Slag Heap, establishing bridgeheads in Cambrai.  Brutinel’s Brigade was ordered to 
stand too, prepared to exploit any infantry success.91   
 Despite a valiant effort, XVII Corps fell short of their objective on 8 October.  At 
5:00pm, the 2nd Canadian Division was ordered to advance to the canal crossings 
overnight even if Awoingt had not been captured.  At 1:30am on 9 October, the 2nd 
Canadian Division launched a surprise attack on Escaudoeuvres, and captured the 
bridgehead in the village and the 27th Battalion captured Ramillies.  By mid-morning, 
these positions and Blécourt, Batingy, and Cuvillers were in Canadian hands while the 4th 
and 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles entered Cambrai, which was largely deserted.  
According to Nicholson, the attack was successful because the enemy was in the midst of 
a large-scale withdrawal to the newly fortified “Hermann Position” that ran from 
Valenciennes to Le Cateau opposite the Third and Fourth British Armies.92 
Early morning air reconnaissance on 9 October revealed that the enemy had 
withdrawn between the Sensée and l’Escaut Canals.  The 2nd Canadian Division made a 
rapid advance forward and Brutinel’s Brigade was finally called into action, as its 
mobility was required to pursue the retreating enemy.  The CLH was ordered to cross 
L’Escaut Canal at Escaudoeuvres and capture limited objectives on the high ground 
northwest of Naves and Selle, occupying the ridge in front of the 5th Brigade’s position.93  
Thereafter, the CLH was to advance and secure a second high ground position.  Major 
Cuthbert McEwen’s “B” Squadron was ordered to lead the operation.  “B” Squadron was 
reinforced by two troops from “A” Squadron, three from “C” Squadron, and four 
                                                          
91 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 6.  Brutinel’s Brigade Operational Order No.3, 7 October 
1918; LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 59, 6 
October 1918; War Diary, CLH, 2-8 October 1918; Nicholson, 456. 
92 Nicholson, 457-458. 
93 See Appendix XXV for map. 
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Hotchkiss guns.  Liaison officers were sent to forward infantry brigades to assess the 
situation and report back.94 
“B” Squadron reported to the 25th Battalion’s Headquarters at 11:30am and began 
to advance at 11:45am with support from three Hotchkiss gun crews from “A” Squadron.  
Lieutenant George Stirrett’s 2nd Troop led the advance, their objective to occupy the 
ridgeline on the east bank of the canal, then send a patrol past the railway.  The right 
patrol came under fire as they approached the railway line.  The left flank patrol had a 
similar experience as they crossed the embankment.  When the first troops were shot 
down, Sergeant Edmond Pendrick charged the wire that protected the enemy machine 
gun, killing the two-man crew and putting the gun out of action.  Consequently, his patrol 
was able to post a Hotchkiss gun on each flank.95 
 At noon, McEwen sent Lieutenant Harold Osmond’s 4th Troop “B” Squadron to 
clear the area on Stirrett’s right flank.  Osmond divided his Troop in half to allow them to 
approach from the left and the right.  Both groups charged towards their objectives, but 
barbed wire and enemy machine gun fire forced them to dismount.  Stirrett sent word that 
it might be possible for 4th Troop to outflank the machine gun nests.  McEwen ordered 
Lieutenant Gerry Berteau’s 1st Troop “B” Squadron to carry out the attack, and if 
successful, advance to the south.  1st Troop embarked at 12:30pm but was held up by wire 
and machine gun fire.  After falling back to Stirrett’s left flank, the men of 1st Troop 
dismounted and attempted a flanking movement, but were forced back by heavy fire.96    
                                                          
94 McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 49-50; Nicholson, 458. 
95 See Appendix XXV for map.  War Diary, October 1918, Appendix D1.  Report on “B” Squadron 
Operation, 9 October 1918; Stirrett, 25; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 50; Nicholson, 458. 
96 See Appendix XXV for map.  War Diary, October 1918, Appendix D1.  Report on “B” Squadron 
Operation, 9 October 1918; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 50. 
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McEwen arrived to assess the situation and saw that a line of wire and strong 
enemy machine gun posts extended across the entire area, and could only be captured by 
a costly dismounted attack.  Reconnaissance from Trooper Ernest Clements revealed that 
the central enemy nest contained ten machine guns against which “B” Squadron had no 
protection.  Consequently, McEwen ordered Troop leaders to hold their current positions 
until reinforced.  At 3:00pm, one Troop of “C” Squadron arrived to assist “B” Squadron.  
Unfortunately, German troops launched a counterattack at 3:30pm against the railway 
embankment previously lost to Stirrett’s troop.  3rd Troop’s Hotchkiss section arrived to 
reinforce Stirrett’s Troop against the German counter attack, although no further advance 
could be made.  The CLH was relieved by the 25th Battalion at 7:30pm. 97    
Although the CLH fell short of its objectives, “B” Squadron managed to advance 
2,500 yards across a 4,000-yard front, and held its gains for six and a half hours under 
heavy enemy fire with no support from the remainder of Brutinel’s Brigade.  Flank 
protection was given from the Hotchkiss detachments, and gunners were able to 
neutralize enemy fire and allow “B” Squadron to hold their position.98  “B” Squadron 
captured two machine guns and inflicted at least twenty enemy casualties while 
sustaining only eleven casualties themselves.99  Individual acts of gallantry also took 
place throughout the day.  For example, Major McEwen rode to the assistance of 
Lieutenant W.L. Field of 40 Squadron, Royal Air Force (RAF), whose plane had been 
shot down and crashed in the vicinity of “B” Squadron.  When approaching the wrecked 
aircraft, the McEwen passed within twenty yards of two German machine gun nests and 
                                                          
97 See Appendix XXV for map.  War Diary, October 1918, Appendix D1.  Report on “B” Squadron 
Operation, 9 October 1918; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 50; Nicholson, 458. 
98 War Diary, October 1918, Appendix D1.  Report on “B” Squadron Operation, 9 October 1918. 
99 On 9 October, the CLH had one NCO killed, nine other ranks wounded, and one missing.  Ten horses 
had been killed, and fifteen wounded.  War Diary, October 1918, Appendix D1.  Report on “B” Squadron 
Operation, 9 October 1918; Stirrett, 25. 
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his horse was shot down.  He reached the aircraft on foot but discovered the aircraft was 
empty.  However, it was noted that had Lieutenant Field been inside the aircraft, 
McEwen would undoubtedly have saved Field’s life.100   
On 10 October, Brutinel’s Brigade was ordered to support the infantry assault on 
Naves, and to reconnoiter the crossings over the Erclin River, capturing a bridge before 
the enemy could destroy it.  The next objective was a ridgeline east of the village, the 
Iwuy Spur.  The top of the ridge was home to a sunken road that joined two villages, 
Iwuy to the north, and Rieux-en-Cambrésis to the south.101  Although the infantry 
captured Naves, the 2nd CMMGB and a platoon of cyclists were delayed by machine gun 
fire, which allowed the enemy to destroy the bridge at Erclin and strand the wheeled 
vehicles of Brutinel’s Brigade.  While attempting to repair the bridge, Brutinel’s Brigade 
came under heavy shell fire and were forced to abandon the effort.  The Brigade 
employed covering fire from Vickers machine guns to allow the cyclists to cross a 
shallow section of river on foot, leaving their bicycles behind.  The cyclists managed to 
secure the eastern end of the Spur, but were held up by machine gun fire at the ridge.  
Meanwhile, the shallow river remained an obstacle to the remainder of the wheeled 
vehicles of Brutinel’s Brigade, so the CLH was ordered to advance to carry out the 
second phase of the attack, securing a hill east of Iwuy.102   
After receiving word that the 19th Battalion would attack the western portion of 
the sunken road on the Iwuy Spur at 2:00pm, Leonard called “A” and “C” Squadrons 
forward.  He ordered them to advance to the sunken road while the infantry attack 
                                                          
100 War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix E0.  Major R. Compston, Officer Commanding No.40 
Squadron RAF to Canadian Light Horse, 12 October 1918; 1HMA Leonard Collection 0407810IL.  Lt-Col. 
Ibbotson Leonard, Canadian Light Horse B.E.F. In France, 19-27 October 1918. 
101 See Appendix XXV for map.  McNorgan, Iwuy, 212-213. 
102 See Appendix XXV for map.  War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix D4.  Report by Ibbotson 
Leonard, 17 October 1918; McNorgan, Iwuy, 212-217. 
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distracted the enemy, and then press on to capture the hill behind the village.  “C” 
Squadron would lead the expedition on the right flank, followed closely by “A” Squadron 
on the left, with “B” Squadron waiting in reserve.103 
Lieutenant Richard Hocken’s 1st Troop “C” Squadron advanced at 2:15pm, 
moving round Naves at a gallop to the Erclin River, which ran parallel to the ridge.  
When crossing the shallow river, the men of 1st Troop came under enemy fire.  They 
proceeded to charge up the slope to the sunken road under heavy fire from four enemy 
machine guns.  Hocken was killed in the charge, and three others were wounded.  Only 
one horse survived without wounds.  The remaining troops pressed on, although, seven 
were cut down by machine gun fire when they reached their objective.  Trooper Stewart 
Thornton spared the 1st Troop from further casualties by charging the machine gun nest 
alone, capturing the position.  Dismounted troops continued to their objective under the 
covering fire of Lance Corporal Robert Hill’s Hotchkiss section.  They met with an 
infantry party from the 19th Battalion at the ridgeline.104   
Ten minutes behind 1st Troop, “C” Squadron commander Lieutenant Fred 
Matheson advanced with two additional Troops.  These too encountered artillery fire 
when crossing the river, which killed three men and wounded three others before they 
reached the sunken road.  A further ten minutes behind, “A” Squadron advanced to 
reinforce “C” Squadron’s right flank.  According to “A” Squadron’s report, the advance 
came under fire from fifteen enemy machine guns positioned on the outskirts of Iwuy and 
from the high ground ridge itself.  The men of “A” Squadron advanced at a gallop to the 
                                                          
103 See Appendix XXV for map.  McNorgan, Iwuy, 218-219; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 51. 
104 See Appendix XXV for map.  War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix D2.  Report of “C” Squadron 
CLH Operations 10 October 1918; War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix D4.  Report by Ibbotson 
Leonard, 17 October 1918; McNorgan, Iwuy, 218-220; McNorgan, Gallant Hussars, 51. 
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sunken road, having nearly every horse shot out from under them.  They brought their 
Hotchkiss guns into action when they arrived at the sunken road, neutralizing enemy fire.  
Though they incurred heavier casualties than “C” Squadron when advancing up the slope, 
the troops of “A” Squadron managed to join the 19th Battalion and consolidate their 
position on the ridge.105  
The troops of the CLH held their gains on the ridgeline throughout the afternoon, 
but were unable to advance to their ultimate objective, the hill east of Iwuy.106  “B” 
Squadron was held back under Leonard’s orders, as too many men and horses had 
already been shot down while charging the slope.  As George Hambley recalled, “it was a 
miracle indeed that anyone of us came out at all as such a mad adventure was never seen 
before.”107  Just as the previous day, it was the horses that suffered the worst casualties.  
The CLH had five men killed and seventeen wounded, but had sixty-six horses killed and 
five wounded.108  The CLH was finally reinforced by the armoured vehicles of Brutinel’s 
Brigade at 5:00pm after the bridge was repaired.  The CLH position on the ridgeline was 
later turned over to the infantry at night while the cavalry withdrew back across the 
Erclin under cover of darkness.109   
 Although the CLH fell short of its objective, this action enabled the infantry to 
advance with minimal casualties, as enemy guns were put out of action.  According to 
Leonard’s report, at least forty known casualties were inflicted on the enemy from the 
                                                          
105 See Appendix XXV for map.  War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix D2.  Report of “C” Squadron 
CLH Operations 10 October 1918; War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix D3.  Report of “A” 
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CLH Hotchkiss guns.110  As “C” Squadron’s report made clear, the CLH was not 
successful as a mounted force in this engagement because the use of mounted troops was 
tactically inappropriate in these circumstances.111  The CLH was ordered to advance 
because it was the only mobile force available that was capable of crossing the river 
without a bridge.  The remainder of Brutinel’s Brigade did not arrive to support the CLH 
until 5:00pm when the bridges were finally repaired.  Furthermore, the CLH made its 
advance while enemy troops still held Iwuy, which would have prevented the mounted 
arm from approaching its objective beyond the village.112 
 The Canadian Corps was relieved by the 49th British Division on 11 October after 
a final drive to capture Iwuy, Avesmes-le-Sec, and Lieu St. Armand. After a day’s hard 
fighting, the 2nd Canadian Division finally consolidated its position on the Iwuy Spur, 
although the enemy remained along the Selle.113  Brutinel’s Brigade stood to all day on 
11 October ready to exploit any success, though there was no opportunity to send the 
cavalry forward. After withdrawing to billets, the CLH spent the week recovering from 
operations at Iwuy.114  On 12 October, the CLH added another squadron to its ranks, as 
six officers, 150 other ranks, and 164 horses from the Royal North West Mounted Police 
became “D” Squadron.115   
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Divisional Cavalry in Pursuit, October-November 1918 
In the second week of October, the German Army was in full retreat while the 
Canadian Corps changed places with XXII Corps and moved north of the Scarpe to the 
Senee Canal to advance on Douai and Valenciennes.116  To increase the speed of their 
pursuit, the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions were each given a Squadron of the CLH to 
allow the infantry to keep contact with the retreating enemy.117  “B” Squadron was 
attached to the 1st Canadian Division and “C” Squadron attached to the 4th Canadian 
Division.118  By 21 October, all four Troops of “A” Squadron were sent to the front for 
dispatch riding duties, with one Troop attached to each Canadian Division.119   
While in pursuit, the CLH advanced one mile ahead of the infantry and was 
responsible for screening the infantry from enemy rearguards, reconnoitering a safe route 
of advance while keeping close liaison with the enemy.  Each Troop would reconnoiter a 
section of front approximately one mile wide and report the enemy’s strength and 
positions.  According to the information gathered by the cavalry, it was determined 
whether these locations should be avoided, picketed, or attacked given their apparent 
strength.120  Advanced patrols were also responsible for dispatch riding and for 
reconnoitering roads and bridges through the Allied line of advance, sending reports back 
on their availability suitability for use.121   
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According to Stirrett, the CLH was the first to arrive in at least twenty villages 
while acting as a screen for the infantry.122  This allowed the infantry to advance securely 
and much more quickly than it could have without mounted troops.  For example, on 18 
October, patrols from “B” Squadron reconnoitered the village of Montigny and Montigny 
Wood ahead of the 1st and 4th Battalions.  Sergeant Lawson’s patrol scouted the wood 
while Sergeant Lucas’ troops reconnoitered the area around the village.  These patrols 
found the wood and south-eastern areas were clear, but located a heavy machine gun 
stationed on the high ground north west of Montigny.  Lieutenant Cockshutt’s mounted 
patrol entered the village itself at a gallop, locating thirty enemy troops and three 
machine gun posts.  “B” Squadron was able to report the enemy’s position and strength 
within Montigny, and guide the infantry along a safe route to launch an attack on the 
village from the east and south.123  Similarly, “C” Squadron reconnoitered the village of 
Monchecourt on 18 October and entered each house in the village to ensure it was clear 
of enemy machine gun nests before the infantry advanced to the village.124   
While carrying out these missions, the men of the CLH incurred few casualties 
because their rapid mobility enabled them to escape enemy fire quickly, as seen with the 
CCB in 1918.  As Stirrett stated, though his troop had three men wounded on 18 October, 
“an infantry attack would have lost a hundred.”125  The advanced cavalry screen was also 
useful for maintaining the Canadian line during the advance.  For example, “B” 
Squadron’s patrols discovered a mile-wide gap between the 1st and 3rd Brigades on 19 
                                                          
122 Stirrett, 28. 
123 War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix D5.  “B” Squadron Daily Report for War Diary, 18 October 
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124 War Diary, CLH, October 1918, Appendix D9.  Report on the Operation of 3rd Troop “C” Squadron 
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October, and alerted brigade commanders.  Major McEwen’s patrol helped to coordinate 
the line, and the gap was closed by 4:00pm.126   
 Contact patrol work and dispatch riding continued through to the Armistice on 11 
November 1918.  “D” Squadron sent one troop to each Canadian Division to serve as 
dispatch riders on 23 October, relieving the current CLH troops serving in this function at 
the front already.127  “A” Squadron was attached to the 4th Canadian Division from 28 
October through 6 November, and was joined by “C” Squadron by 3 November as the 
Canadian Corps continued to advance through Valenciennes.  Both “A” and “C” 
Squadrons were then combined into one mounted reconnaissance squadron and attached 
to the 2nd Canadian Division128 along with two cyclist companies, two armoured car 
sections, and two Motor Machine Gun batteries from 7 through 11 November as the 
Canadians advanced to Mons.129   
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128 After they relieved the 4th Canadian Division.  
129 LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 5, File 9.  Canadian Light Horse Operational Order No. 62, 23 
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Initially130 mounted troops were responsible for dispatch riding between the 
forward observation post and the advanced 10th Brigade Headquarters, and maintained 
communication between headquarters and the advancing infantry.  By 3 November, 
pursuit of the enemy was again necessary as the Germans were in full retreat to the north-
east of Marly.  The CLH was once again responsible for defending the infantry against 
enemy rearguards, conducting reconnaissance and patrol work in advance of the infantry, 
keeping close contact with the enemy, reporting on their strength and positions, and 
reconnoitering river crossings and reporting on road conditions.  The CLH was also able 
to participate in some of the actions.  For example, Sergeant Clarke’s Troop was able to 
assist the left company of the 102nd Battalion in taking Quiévrechain on 6 November.  
Later that morning, Lieutenant Campbell’s patrol assisted with the capture of Baisieux.131 
When the Canadian pursuit resumed on 7 November,132 two squadrons of the 
CLH and two batteries of the CMMGB and one company of cyclists served as the 
advance guard for the infantry.  While the wheeled vehicles of Brutinel’s Brigade were 
forced to restrict their line of advance to the Mons-Valenciennes Road, the CLH was 
responsible for reconnoitering high-ground positions and sending patrols cross-country to 
determine enemy locations and to report on the availability of river crossings and road 
conditions.  Where road conditions were poor and bridges destroyed, the wheeled 
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132 With the 2nd Canadian Division advancing on the right and the 3rd Canadian Division on the left. 
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vehicles of Brutinel’s Brigade were again unable to advance, as seen at Quarouble-
Rombier on 7 November where cavalry patrols reported that the bridges were blown and 
the roads impassable for motor vehicles.  The cavalry carried on while a six-hour delay 
held the vehicles back until engineers could repair the roads and bridge the river.  
Wheeled vehicles were still incapable of advancing with the speed and manoeuvrability 
required of them in pursuit of the retreating enemy.133  
Merely five days before the armistice, Ibbotson Leonard resigned from his 
command of the CLH on 6 November, having been granted a three-month leave of 
absence that he had applied for from the High Command.  He expressed his regret at 
leaving the regiment when they seemed so close to the war’s end, citing a need to attend 
to personal business affairs that could no longer be put off.  He thanked all ranks for their 
hard work and support throughout the Great War.  Lieutenant Colonel Sanford Smith 
took command of the CLH when Leonard took his leave of the Regiment.134 
After the Armistice, all detachments of Brutinel’s Brigade rejoined their 
regiments on 12 November.  However, the CLH remained a part of Brutinel’s Brigade 
through December 1918 while the Canadian Corps was attached to the 2nd Army for the 
advance to the Rhine.135  As the Canadian Corps prepared to march to Mons on 16 
November, Brutinel’s Brigade advanced ahead of the infantry and arrived on 15 
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November, with the CLH leading the way.136  The CLH was the first Allied regiment to 
enter the village, which had been under enemy occupation for fifty-two months.137  
Thereafter, the post-war march to the Rhine was led by the 2nd Canadian Division on the 
right, and the 1st Canadian Division on the left, followed by the 3rd and 4th Canadian 
Divisions on the left and right, respectively.138  The CLH continued to act as the advance 
guard for the 2nd Canadian Division in December.  The men of the CLH were the first 
Canadian troops to cross the Rhine, with Lieutenant F.A. Taylor of “B” Squadron leading 
the guard of honour over the river at Bonn on 13 December.139  
After crossing the Rhine, the Allies began to occupy the bridgehead between Mainz, 
Koblenz, and Cologne as the Germans withdrew to the east bank of the Rhine.140  The CLH 
celebrated Christmas 1918 at the Rhein Hotel in Godesburg, where they remained through 
January 1919.141  After Christmas, a detachment of six officers and fifty-four other ranks 
were sent to work organizing the repatriation of prisoners of war in Wahn, providing traffic 
control and escort services.142  On 2 February, the CLH entrained at Mehlem and arrived 
back in France in billets at Marches Les Dames.  The horses of the CLH were sold to Belgian 
authorities on 12 and 13 February, and the remainder of the Regiment demobilized at Le 
Havre on 14 February.  The men awaited orders to embark for England, which finally came 
on 2 March 1919.143   
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Assessment 
 
Though the CLH had little success as operational cavalry in 1918, it provided 
invaluable services as Divisional Cavalry, particularly when acting as a screen to the 
infantry in pursuit of the enemy.  The CLH received many messages of thanks for their 
hard work at the front in the final weeks of the war.  For example, J.M. Ross of the 10th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade wrote that the men of “A” Squadron were “extremely useful 
to us, and the troopers carried out all that was asked of them in a splendid manner, 
although in many cases they had serious difficulties to overcome.”144  Similarly, Major 
General David Watson of the 4th Canadian Division wrote, “the cavalry acting as patrols 
have kept us constantly in touch with the Enemy, carrying out this hazardous work with 
great skill and complete satisfaction.”145 
According to Leonard, all members of the CLH enjoyed their experience in 
pursuit of the enemy infantry.  Visiting the front on 19 October, he wrote, “Met some of 
our men who have had the time of their lives working in front of our infantry, 
reconnoitering villages and woods and clearing out small machine gun nests and so 
saving the infantry deploying.”146  When he departed from the regiment, Leonard stated 
“I feel that the last three months to some extent compensates us for the constant working 
parties at Ypres, the Somme, Vimy and Passchendaele, when trench warfare prevented 
our being used in our proper role.”147   
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Although the CLH provided an important service as Divisional Cavalry in the 
final months of the Great War, it was much less successful in operations as a 
consequence of its inclusion in Brutinel’s Brigade.  Although Brutinel’s Brigade was a 
combined arms force, its only effort at combined arms action with the cavalry was the 
unsuccessful advance at Arras in early September.  As per Brutinel’s instructions, cavalry 
was added to this formation in September 1918 because they were capable of advancing 
across difficult terrain and unbridged rivers where wheeled vehicles could not.  The 
Brigade itself was not intended to provide support to the cavalry, and the weapons of the 
Motor Machine Guns were never used to counteract and neutralize enemy fire and allow 
the CLH to advance.  Thus the tactical principle behind including the CLH in this body 
was flawed from the outset.  As previous experience and prewar cavalry doctrine had 
shown, machine gun and artillery support were crucial to cavalry’s success.148  As part of 
Brutinel’s Brigade, the CLH was not given the support it required, but was forced to 
advance where wheeled vehicles could not regardless of circumstance.  For example, on 
10 October at Iwuy, the CLH was sent to capture an unattainable objective in a situation 
inappropriate to cavalry because the wheeled vehicles of Brutinel’s Brigade could not 
advance across the unbridged Erclin River.  The CLH advanced only with the support of 
its own Hotchkiss sections, as the remainder Brutinel’s Brigade did not arrive to support 
the cavalry until 5:00pm after the bridge was repaired.  Brutinel’s “combined arms force” 
did not offer any support to the cavalry; it was the cavalry that offered it versatility.   
While the CLH had little operational success as part of Brutinel’s Brigade, its 
inclusion in this force proved the necessity of cavalry on the Western Front.  Because 
wheeled vehicles were tied to roads, the service that they could provide to the infantry 
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was severely limited.  This became very apparent to cavalry commanders in October 
1918, as Smith and Leonard borrowed an armoured Ford car from one of the Motor 
Machine Gun Brigades to visit CLH detachments at the front.  As most roads had been 
destroyed and bridges blown up, they had difficulty locating the cavalry in a motor 
vehicle, as the mounted arm had maintained its cross-country mobility and had advanced 
more than ten miles since nightfall on 17 October.  Leonard and Smith’s progress was so 
slow that they were unable to visit the officers of the CLH by nightfall on 19 October.  
Poor road conditions also caused them much difficulty after dark.  Leonard reported that 
he and Smith “had difficulty getting back, as we had pushed our Ford ahead of everything 
on wheels and with blown roads and the dark, quite a job pulling out… The Huns have 
made it difficult for our transport to keep up and the country is low and covered with 
ditches full of water.”149  This provides a clear indication that cavalry was still absolutely 
necessary in pursuit of the enemy in 1918.  Mounted troops were capable of maintaining 
a high degree of mobility, and could advance where motorized and wheeled vehicles 
could not.  The cross-country mobility and versatility of the CLH enabled the Canadian 
Infantry to advance safely and maintain contact with the retreating German force.  
Conclusion 
Although the CLH did not experience the same operational success as the CCB, it 
provided a service that was no less valuable as Divisional Cavalry.  Mounted patrol work, 
dispatch riding, escort duties, and traffic control were of vital importance, particularly in 
the final months of the war.  Divisional Cavalry proved equally useful in pursuit of the 
enemy, as mounted troops were the only force mobile enough to carry out effective 
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reconnaissance and keep contact between headquarters and the advancing infantry.  The 
CLH fulfilled its assigned role as Divisional Cavalry despite the conditions on the 
Western Front, and provided an invaluable service to the Canadian Corps, particularly 
during the final Hundred Days of the Great War. 
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CHAPTER 11: 
Conclusion and The Future of Cavalry 
 
From the outset, three primary questions were to be addressed regarding Canadian 
Cavalry on the Western Front.   
1. What was the intended role of cavalry on the Western Front?   
Cavalry was intended to act as a force of exploitation and protection.  Its primary 
responsibilities were always considered to be reconnaissance, shock, and pursuit.  In 
operations, cavalry was only intended to perform l’arme blanche shock actions against 
enemy cavalry.  Otherwise, it was intended to carry out pursuit and delay, using mobility 
to the best advantage.  Cavalry was armed with both the rifle and the sword, and was 
capable of fighting mounted or dismounted when necessary.  Cavalry action was to be 
carried out with adequate support from horse artillery and machine guns, and was 
precluded against entrenchments. 
2. How was Cavalry employed on the Western Front? 
Cavalry was employed as both a protective and exploitation force on the Western 
Front.  The mounted arm carried out protective duties in action by conducting 
reconnaissance and acting as an advanced screen for the infantry, and performed various 
protective and navigation functions in rear areas.  As a force of exploitation, cavalry 
advanced in pursuit of the enemy and performed delaying actions.  Cavalry was also 
employed in combined arms operations with armoured vehicles and motor machine guns, 
and was supported by firepower from machine guns and artillery in action.  When these 
duties were not required (or were not required by a large cavalry force), the mounted arm 
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supplied drafts of labour or served as stretcher-bearers when necessary.  Canadian 
Cavalry also fought as infantry on rare occasions to compensate for manpower shortages.   
3. Was Cavalry able to fulfill its intended role on the Western Front? 
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the Canadian Light Horse fulfilled the 
intended role of cavalry on the Western Front as force of exploitation and protection.  
Much of the criticism of the mounted arm on the Western Front has been based on the 
fact that cavalry could not employ shock tactics against entrenchments.  While this was 
absolutely the case, it is never mentioned that it was understood long before the Great 
War that cavalry action was impossible against entrenchments and unbroken infantry.  
The inability to employ the mounted charge against entrenchments did not indicate that 
cavalry was obsolete or made no contribution on the Western Front.1  As has been 
demonstrated, shock tactics were far from the only role assigned to cavalry, and action as 
an arm of exploitation did not necessarily mean action in a mounted charge.  Despite the 
limitations of trench warfare, cavalry was still able to ride to a decisive point of action 
quickly and fight mounted or dismounted as necessary, perform reconnaissance, and 
advance in pursuit when employed appropriately and according to doctrine.  Cavalry 
provided invaluable services as a force of exploitation and protection, and contributed to 
actions at the front and in rear areas.  Any assessment of the role of cavalry necessitates 
an examination of what the mounted arm was able to accomplish in a campaign, not in 
the employment of a single tactic.   
Even on the Western Front, the role of cavalry did not fundamentally change 
between 1914 and 1918.  In the prewar years, cavalry was defined as an arm of 
exploitation and protection.  As an exploitation force, the principal roles of cavalry were 
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shock, delay, and pursuit.2  In their protective role, cavalry was responsible for 
reconnaissance, advanced, rear, and flank guard duties, outpost work, escort duties, and 
traffic control at the front and in rear areas.  As described in Field Service Regulations 
1909, “Without mounted troops…the other arms are hampered by ignorance of the 
enemy’s movements, cannot move in security, and are unable to reap effectually the 
fruits of victory.”3  Independent and Protective Cavalry were intended to carry out these 
functions when needed as part of a separate Cavalry Corps, while Divisional Cavalry was 
to be attached to the infantry and would offer support in operations, but was largely 
responsible for performing reconnaissance and any duties that required mobility in rear 
areas.4   Modern firepower was also integrated into cavalry doctrine and fostered the 
creation of a versatile hybrid cavalry force capable of fighting mounted or dismounted 
according to circumstance with machine gun and artillery support. 
In 1918, the role of cavalry was still understood to be protection and exploitation.   
The mounted arm was still responsible for exploiting the infantry’s success, passing 
through the infantry line after a successful attack to pursue the retreating enemy, 
advancing on their rear and flanks, preventing them from re-establishing their line once 
reinforced.5  As orders for cavalry in open warfare in 1918 made clear, cavalry was 
meant for “seizing tactical points, or pressing home a successful infantry attack on an 
exhausted enemy.”6  This role required thorough cavalry reconnaissance and proper 
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communication, with cavalry commanders keeping well forward during the advance to 
give appropriate and timely orders to avoid lost opportunities.7   
The expected role of cavalry did not change throughout the Great War because 
cavalry was able to fulfill its intended role on the Western Front.  While there were 
limited opportunities for mounted action in operations in 1915 and 1916, Canadian 
Divisional Cavalry regiments were still able to carry out their expected responsibilities 
according to doctrine.  Mounted troops proved indispensable in rear areas for carrying out 
regular duties such as reconnaissance, escort work, and traffic control.  These duties were 
absolutely essential to operations at the front.  For instance, the importance of traffic 
control was described by the Quartermaster General of the Second British Army Major 
General A.A. Chichester: “The success of operations depends largely on the 
uninterrupted passage of ammunition to the front, and of ambulances and empty vehicles 
to the rear.”8    
In operations, cavalry was capable of carrying out pursuit and delay when 
mobility was possible on the Western Front.  Beginning in March 1917, the CCB was 
able to advance in pursuit of the retreating German Army as the enemy fell back to the 
Hindenburg Line.  The CCB performed reconnaissance, harassed enemy rearguards, and 
captured a series of limited objectives as expected according to prewar doctrine.  
Canadian Cavalry had even greater success in 1918 when open warfare was possible.  
During the German Spring Offensive in March 1918, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
fought mounted or dismounted whenever necessary and carried out mounted 
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reconnaissance.  At Moreuil Wood, the CCB was able to perform a delaying action that 
helped to prevent the separation of the French and British armies at Amiens.9  The CCB 
was able to pursue the retreating enemy force during the final Hundred Days of the Great 
War, while the CLH was able to act in a similar fashion as an advanced screen for the 
Canadian Infantry.  Cavalry was able to seize and hold limited objectives, scout enemy 
positions and report on their location, strength, and armament, assess road conditions, and 
report on the availability of bridges and water sources.   
Mobility was considered to be cavalry’s greatest asset both before and after the 
Great War.  According to prewar doctrine, the mobility of cavalry was required for 
patrolling long distances, acting as a screen for the advancing infantry, keeping contact 
with a retreating enemy force, and performing delaying actions. Mobility was also 
required for the duties expected of cavalry in rear areas.10  As Field Service Regulations 
1909 explained, “[The] Ability to move rapidly and to cover long distances in a 
comparatively short time gives cavalry power to obtain information and to combine 
attack and surprise to the best advantage.”11  During the Great War, mobility was always 
cited as the primary reason for the value of mounted operations in reconnaissance, 
pursuit, and delay.  For example, the mobility of the CCB allowed the cavalry to arrive at 
the front in time to delay the enemy advance at Moreuil Wood.12  Similarly, CLH 
reconnaissance patrols were sufficiently mobile to advance ahead of the infantry at Vimy 
Ridge and during the final Hundred Days of the Great War.  Cavalry proved to be the 
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only force mobile enough to maintain constant contact between the advancing infantry 
and the retreating enemy, as their cross-country mobility allowed them to advance where 
wheeled vehicles could not.   
While the expected role of cavalry and value of their mobility remained the same 
on the Western Front, what did change was the expectation of the size and scope of 
cavalry operations.  Small cavalry charges and various other mounted engagements took 
place throughout the Great War, but there was no mass cavalry “breakthrough” on the 
Western Front.  In 1916, the first indications of a change to the expected scale of cavalry 
action were evident.  It was beginning to be understood that a mass breakthrough would 
be possible, and smaller and more localized exploitation began to be anticipated and 
planned for.  High Wood was the first of several small engagements that the mounted arm 
would fight on the Western Front.  In 1918, the primary role of cavalry was still 
reconnaissance and pursuit of the retreating enemy, only on a smaller and more localized 
scale than originally hoped in 1914.13 
It has often been argued that cavalry did nothing but wait in reserve on the 
Western Front to await a chance for action.  However, the role of cavalry necessitated 
waiting in reserve for the appropriate time for action.  As a force of protection and 
exploitation, cavalry action was subject to circumstance.14  Although cavalry spent more 
time in rear areas awaiting appropriate opportunities to advance than had previously been 
experienced due to the nature of the Western Front, cavalry still carried out the same 
responsibilities in rear areas that it had always been assigned, and was far from idle at 
any time.  The mounted arm was expected to carry on with protective duties or perform 
                                                          
13 LAC RG9 III Box 3988, Folder 4, File 12.  Cavalry, 8 January 1918. 
14 Field Service Regulations, 1909, 152. 
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rear area work, or form working parties until mounted action was possible.  The time 
spent in rear area reconnaissance and traffic control was not unique to the Great War, as 
the employment of an exploitation force would always be contingent upon circumstance 
and tactical relevance.  Modern reconnaissance organizations are still employed in this 
fashion.  When employed appropriately, cavalry was able to function exactly as expected 
on the Western Front. 
The Fate of the Horses 
 
As has been demonstrated, horse technology was far from obsolete in 1918.  The 
British Expeditionary Force employed over 368,000 horses on the Western Front by 
1917, a number that remained consistent through the remainder of the war.15   The vast 
majority of these animals were not cavalry horses, but were responsible for transporting 
divisional supplies, ammunition, and artillery to the front from advanced depots because 
the muddy uneven terrain of the Western Front was impassable for most vehicles.  Horse 
transport was also used to assist stretcher-bearers encumbered by mud to pull ambulances 
and sledges in the front lines.  The British Army was particularly dependent on horse 
mobility during the final Hundred Days of the war, as there was no more efficient or 
mobile means of transporting supplies to the rapidly advancing army across a muddy 
shell-shocked front.16  As Singleton argued, “Without horses, the British army would 
have disintegrated.”17  
However, when the war came to an end, the animals that had been so 
indispensable on the Western Front were suddenly unnecessary.  On 11 November 1918, 
The Canadian Expeditionary Force employed approximately 24,000 horses and mules in 
                                                          
15 Anglesey, Vol. VIII, 288-289; Kenyon, British Cavalry, 9. 
16 Singleton, 178, 190-191, 195. 
17 Singleton, 193. 
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France, and had a further 2,000 at the Remount Depot in England.  The Imperial 
Authorities informed the CEF that they would not be allowed to repatriate these animals 
to Canada, and would have to sell them at auction in Europe.18  Negotiations were opened 
with Allied European governments to find a buyer.  The Belgian government agreed to 
buy the Canadian horses and mules at a price of forty pounds per animal, payable to the 
Canadian government over a period of ten years.  Belgian authorities planned to use these 
horses to help re-establish their nation’s agricultural base in the post war period.  Two-
thirds of the Canadian horses that remained in England were sold at auction for an 
average price of forty-three pounds each.19   
Although the Canadian horses could not be brought home, they were lucky to 
have such a happy end to their tour of the Western Front.  While over 100,000 horses of 
the British Army were brought home to England and auctioned off, approximately 45,000 
surviving British horses were sold to French butchers.  The remainder were sold to 
farmers on the continent.   However, most of the British horses employed on the Western 
Front still had a better retirement than those employed in the Eastern theatre, many of 
whom were sold to Egyptians and put to hard work on farms, in transportation, and in 
stone quarries.20  According to Marcus Wilson, the Egyptians were notoriously cruel to 
horses, and some members of the New Zealand Cavalry regiments chose to shoot their 
mounts instead of trusting them to the care of the Egyptian buyers.21 
 
                                                          
18 Iarocci, 63-64. 
19 Ministry Overseas Military Forces of Canada, Report of the Ministry Overseas Military Forces of 
Canada 1918 (London: Ministry Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919), 461-462;  
Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, The return of the troops: A plain account of the 
demobilization of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1920), 47. 
20 Singleton, 201. 
21 Marcus Wilson, The Good Steed: The Experience of New Zealand’s Military Horse during the Anglo-
Boer War and World War One (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008). 
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Cavalry after the Great War 
The question of what to do with the horses extended to the cavalry itself.  Many 
advocated the retention of cavalry in the post-war period, while others argued in favour 
of mechanizing the mounted arm.  Debate persisted because there were obvious 
limitations to both horses and tanks.  While horses provided essential mobility, they were 
more vulnerable than armoured vehicles.  Conversely, while mechanized forces would 
have great success in future wars, they were incapable of fully supporting the infantry 
with the speed and manoeuvrability required of them in the Great War.  Furthermore, 
tanks were still vulnerable to enemy fire and provided a slower target for enemy guns.  
Despite some effort to combine the use of horse cavalry and tanks, doctrine was not 
established for proper coordination between tanks and cavalry.  As a 1919 report noted, 
“Tanks to be of practical use with Cavalry must move faster than any type with which we 
have experience so far.”22   
  In the post-war period, American and British generals and theorists made the 
most passionate arguments in favour of retaining mounted cavalry.  Several American 
theorists argued that cavalry had made a substantial contribution to the Great War, and 
that no other means of conveyance could completely replace the horse on the 
battlefield.23  For example, renowned American General George S. Patton wrote several 
articles for The Cavalry Journal throughout the interwar period that insisted on the 
retention of cavalry for its mobility and value in reconnaissance.24  On mechanization, 
                                                          
22 LAC RG9 III Box 3987, Folder 11, File 6.  B/366 Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Report on Effective 
Employment of Cavalry in the Future, Appendix C, Tank Corps with a Cavalry Division, 3 February 1919. 
23 See J.M. Wainwright, ed. Studies of the Use of Cavalry During the World War (Fort Riley, KS: US 
Cavalry School, 1933); Fenton Stratton Jacobs, Cavalry Combat (Fort Riley, KS: US Cavalry School, 
1937); Anon., Tactics and Techniques of Cavalry, 8th ed (Harrisburg PA: Military Service Publishing, 
1937); Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 52-53. 
24 See George S. Patton, “Armored Cars With Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1924; 
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Patton wrote in capital letters, “THERE IS NO TANK AVAILABLE FOR ISSUE IN 
THIS COUNTRY WHICH CAN KEEP UP WITH ANY UNIT OF CAVALRY.”25  
Patton believed that mounted cavalry should be employed with armoured vehicles in 
future wars, as cavalry was still capable of advancing where vehicles could not.  He 
stated,  
When the two types are combined we have nothing complicated to distract 
us, since both possess identical tactical and strategic characteristics, the 
relative advantage being the ability to shift from one to the other according 
to the nature of the terrain in which the actions occur.26   
 
Significantly, American Generals Patton, John P. Lucas, and Lucian K. Truscott all 
requested that mounted troops be dispatched to Africa, Sicily, and Italy during the 
Second World War to perform reconnaissance and dispatch riding, as they were more 
mobile than the armoured corps and capable of advancing where vehicles could not.27  
Haig and other British theorists echoed American arguments for the retention of 
mounted cavalry.  Many felt that the success of cavalry on the Eastern Front and the 
mobility that cavalry offered on the Western Front proved that cavalry still had a role to 
play in future wars.28  Like their American counterparts, British cavalry advocates were 
quick to point out the limitations of armoured vehicles.  Even advocates of mechanization 
such as H.V.S. Charrington of the 12th Royal Lancers argued that some mounted troops 
should still be retained to compensate for the inflexibility and unreliability of armoured 
vehicles, stressing critical disadvantages to reliance on a wholly mechanized force.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
George S. Patton, “The 1929 Cavalry Division Manoeuvres,” The Cavalry Journal, 1930; 
George S. Patton, “Mechanized Forces,” The Cavalry Journal, September-October 1933. 
25 George S. Patton, “Armored Cars With Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1924, 13. 
26 George S. Patton, “Mechanized Forces,” The Cavalry Journal, September-October 1933, 127; 
27 John K. Herr and Edward Wallace, The True Story of the U.S. Cavalry, 1775-1942 (New York: Bonanza, 
1953), 257-259; Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 61. 
28 See Douglas Haig, forward to History of the 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-1918 J.B. Bickerstaff (London: 
Baynard Press, c.1920); R.M.P. Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account of the Cavalry 
Operations in Palestine and Syria, 1917-1918 (London: Constable, 1921); Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 54. 
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Charrington argued that “mounted troops are the only mobile arm which can be relied 
upon to operate in almost any nature of country at any hour and in any weather, to search 
ground thoroughly, question inhabitants, take prisoners, and examine documents.”29  
Similarly, Major A.R. Mulliner of the 8th Hussars maintained that cavalry was still 
vital for reconnaissance due to the limitations of aerial reconnaissance.30  Throughout the 
Great War, it was understood that advent of the airplane did not make cavalry 
reconnaissance obsolete, as aircraft were incapable of properly searching enclosed areas, 
such as villages and wooded areas.  For example, an April 1918 report stated, “No 
tactical or topographical air reconnaissance can possibly do away with the necessity of 
Cavalry Patrols and ground scouts.”31  The two forms of reconnaissance provided mutual 
assistance to each other and were best used in combination.32  As Mulliner argued in a 
1927 article for The Cavalry Journal, “if an aircraft report that they have flown over a 
locality – village or wood and have seen no signs of the enemy it does not, in the least, 
follow that no enemy is present in these places; nor can aircraft obtain identifications or 
distinguish easily friend from foe.”33   
Ironically, it was the American and British cavalry arms that were almost fully 
mechanized prior to the Second World War.  In Great Britain, this came largely as a 
consequence of the expense of keeping mounted cavalry, and the 1927 summer cavalry 
manoeuvres in which unsupported cavalry was asked to fight against armoured vehicles.  
Haig rightly deemed this contest unfair and misleading, as unsupported mounted troops 
                                                          
29 H.V.S. Charrington, “Where Cavalry Stands Today Part III – Conclusion” The Cavalry Journal, July 
1927, 422. 
30 A.R. Mulliner, “Cavalry Still an Essential Arm” The Cavalry Journal, October 1927. 
31 LAC RG9 III Box 3983, Folder 1, File 3.  Cavalry Corps G. 304 Notes on the Employment of Aircraft 
with Cavalry, 17 April 1918. 
32 LAC RG9 III Box 3983, Folder 1, File 3.  Cavalry Corps G. 304 Notes on the Employment of Aircraft 
with Cavalry, 17 April 1918. 
33 A.R. Mulliner, “Cavalry Still an Essential Arm” The Cavalry Journal, October 1927. 
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would never be called into action to face an armoured brigade.34  Regardless, the road to 
full mechanization of the British cavalry began in 1928.35  Thereafter, the mounted arm 
was largely written out of Great War histories until the twenty-first century.  Cavalry 
generals were stigmatized as tactical reactionaries and conservatives, resistant to change 
and innovation, ignorant of the realities of the modern battlefield.   
Despite the fact that military intellect and a belief in the tactical value of cavalry 
are often considered mutually exclusive, mounted cavalry continues to exist.  As Gervase 
Phillips has shown, cavalry remained a part of many modern armies throughout the 
twentieth century because of its mobility.  During the Second World War, the Soviet 
Union sent thirty mounted cavalry divisions to the front in 1941 and the German Army 
employed eight cavalry divisions, only three fewer than they had employed in the Great 
War.  Cavalry was also employed throughout the latter half of the twentieth century in 
areas where there are no roads.  For example, mounted troops were employed by the 
Portuguese in Africa between 1961 and 1974.  In the twenty-first century, cavalry was 
used for reconnaissance patrols and transport by the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards in the 
mountainous country of Kosovo in 2000.  In addition to offering flexibility and mobility, 
cavalry is still being put to operational use in the twenty first century, as a United States  
(US)-supported cavalry charge of 300 horses took place in Afghanistan in November 
2001.36  Mounted troops have also been employed by US Forces in Afghanistan in 
difficult terrain where vehicles cannot travel.37  According to Robert Young Pelton,  
                                                          
34 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 56. 
35 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 56. 
36 See Doug Stanton, Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of US Soldiers Who Rode to 
Victory in Afghanistan (Prince Frederick, MD: Recorded Books, 2009); Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 73-74. 
37 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 71-74. 
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When the [U.S. Special Forces] landed they had no idea they were about 
to be moved around on horseback… But they could see why they were 
using horses, because the initial battles with the Taliban were against a 
mechanized force that controlled the roads. The U.S. forces moved to the 
other side of a large chasm in the Dar-i-suf valley on horseback, and the 
Taliban could not chase them using vehicles, but our troops were free to 
attack the Taliban anytime they wanted to. So horses are actually an ideal 
way to get around there.38 
 
What cavalry had to offer in the Great War it still offers today – mobility.39 
The role of the Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918 
demonstrates that the mounted arm still had many things to contribute to modern warfare.  
While the employment of the mounted charge was not always possible or tactically 
relevant, cavalry played many other significant roles on the modern battlefield as 
intended and expected according to prewar doctrine.  The inability to employ a single 
tactic does not prove the obsolescence of the entire cavalry arm.  When employed 
according to doctrine, cavalry was tactically effective as an exploitation and protective 
force.  When mobility was possible, cavalry was able to act as an exploitation force, 
pursuing the retreating enemy and participating in delaying actions.  At the front and in 
rear areas, the mobility of horsed cavalry proved invaluable and unmatched.  The 
contribution of cavalry was substantial because mobility was the primary asset of the 
mounted arm.  Even on the Western Front, Canadian Cavalry managed to “Smile, and 
Carry On.”40  
 
                                                          
38 Robert Young Pelton, “Afghan War Eyewitness on Warlords, Future, More,” National Geographic, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/02/0215_020215_peltoninterview.html; 
39 Phillips, Scapegoat Arm, 73-74. 
40 Jones, 129. 
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Appendix I: 
Regular Cavalry Recruitment at Valcartier, 1914; 
Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
 
Place of Birth RCD RCD% LSH LSH% TOTAL Total %
England 285 48.04 219 48.04 504 48.04
Canada 161 28.31 136 28.31 297 28.31
Scotland 45 8.78 47 8.78 92 8.78
Ireland 37 6.77 34 6.77 71 6.77
Other 33 8.1 52 8.1 85 8.1
TOTAL 561 100 488 100 1,049 100
          
Previous Experience RCD RCD% LSH LSH% TOTAL Total %
Royal Canadian Dragoons 57 10.16 1 0.2 58 5.53
Lord Strathcona's Horse* 1 0.18 59 12.08 60 5.72
South Africa 14 2.5 1 0.2 15 1.43
Mounted Police 3 0.53 5 1.02 8 0.76
British Yeomanry 10 1.78 12 2.5 22 2.1
Other  189 33.7 329 67.4 518 49.38
Total With Experience 274 48.85 407 83.4 681 64.92
Total With No Experience 287 51.15 81 16.6 368 35.08
         
Previous Experience RCD CO CO % NCO NCO% OR OR% 
Canadian Cavalry 14 48.28 25 30.49 71 15.78
British Cavalry 1 3.45 13 15.85 47 10.44
Total in Regiment 29 5.17 82 14.62 450 80.21
              
Previous Experience LSH* CO CO % NCO NCO% OR OR% 
Canadian Cavalry N/A N/A 52 59.09 100 26.88
British Cavalry N/A N/A 9 10.23 35 9.4
Total in Regiment 28 5.74 88 18.03 372 76.23
 
RCD = Royal Canadian Dragoons  CO = Commissioned Officer             OR = Other Ranks 
LSH = Lord Strathcona’s Horse  NCO = Non Commissioned Officer            
 
*Note that the LSH Nominal Roll did not include any information on the previous enlistment of all 28 
CO’s.  It is probable that the majority were existing members of the LSH, but their previous experience was 
not disclosed and thus not included in these statistics. 
 
Source: Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary Force: Royal Canadian 
Dragoons: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 
1915; Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary Force: Lord Strathcona’s 
Horse: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915. 
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Appendix II: 
19th Alberta Dragoons Recruitment, 1914 
 
Place of Birth 19AD % 
England 74 41.8
Canada 43 24.3
Scotland 18 10.17
Ireland 16 9.04
Other 26 14.69
TOTAL 177 100
      
Previous Experience 19AD % 
19th Alberta Dragoons 80 45.2
South Africa 0 0
Mounted Police 4 2.26
British Yeomanry 3 1.7
Other  63 35.59
Total With Experience 150 84.75
Total With No Experience 27 15.25
 
Previous Experience  CO CO % NCO NCO% OR OR% 
Canadian Cavalry 7 77.77 16 55.17 66 47.48
British Cavalry 0 0 4 13.79 8 5.75
Total in Regiment 9 5.08 29 16.38 139 78.54
 
19AD = 19th Alberta Dragoons  CO = Commissioned Officer              
OR = Other Ranks    NCO = Non Commissioned Officer 
 
Source: Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, Canadian Expeditionary Force: Lord Strathcona’s 
Horse: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915. 
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Appendix III: Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Festubert, May 1915 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.                      Source: Nicholson, 98. 
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Appendix IV: 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Dismounted Duties, 1915 
 
LSH 1915                   
May W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent   7 5   18 
Casualties   96       
June W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 7 10 7   20 
Casualties   1       
July W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 18 20 20 3 11 
Casualties 8 3       
August W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 14 11 10   20 
Casualties   10       
September W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 21 11 7   20 
Casualties 1 3       
October W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 3 8 8   23 
Casualties   5 2     
November W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 12 4 1   26 
Casualties           
December  W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 12 6     25 
Casualties           
TOTAL W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 87 77 58 3 163 
Casualties 9 118 3     
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Appendix IV Continued 
 
 RCD 1915          
May W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent   5 1   20 
Casualties   32       
June W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 12 10 5   20 
Casualties   23       
July W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 11 22 10 3 9 
Casualties   24       
August W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 15 9 5 1 19 
Casualties 3       1 
September W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 19 10 10 2 19 
Casualties 1 9       
October W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 7 2     29 
Casualties           
November W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 11 6     24 
Casualties 1         
December  W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 27 5   3 26 
Casualties           
TOTAL W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 102 69 31 9 166 
Casualties 5 88     1 
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Appendix IV Continued 
 
 
LSH & RCD Total May-December 1915                     *Excludes KEH 
TOTAL W.P. Trenches Recce Traffic Ctrl Billets/Res 
Days Spent 189 146 89 12 329 
Casualties 14 206 3   1 
 
 
LSH = Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
RCD = Royal Canadian Dragoons 
KEH = 2nd King Edward’s Horse 
 
W.P. = Working Party 
Recce = Reconnaissance 
Res = Reserve 
 
Source: 
 
War Diary, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, May-December 1915; 
War Diary, Royal Canadian Dragoons, May-December 1915. 
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Appendix V: Divisional Cavalry Duties, 1916 
19AD 1916                   
January W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 17     2 1     3 18 
Casualties                   
February W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 16     14 2   5   16 
Casualties 2                 
March W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 12     8 1       15 
Casualties                   
April W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 1     4 2     7 20 
Casualties                   
May* W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 6     7       7 10 
Casualties                   
TOTAL W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 52     35 6     17 79 
Casualties 2                 
 
1H 1916                   
January W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent       8 1 5   8 15 
Casualties                   
February W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent       4 1   3 2 16 
Casualties                   
March W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent       8 1 3 1 6 16 
Casualties                   
April W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent       7 9 3 8 5 11 
Casualties                   
May* W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent       5 10 6 4   4 
Casualties                   
TOTAL W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent       32 22 12 16 21 62 
Casualties                   
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Appendix V Continued 
CCCR 1916                 
May** W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent               10   
Casualties                   
June W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 28               15 
Casualties                   
July W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 23             1 8 
Casualties                   
August W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent           2     28 
Casualties                   
September W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 6 4 6 20 16 21 5 5 11 
Casualties 9 48 27 2           
October W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 20   7 11         13 
Casualties 2   2             
November W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 30     20     22   30 
Casualties                   
December W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 31               31 
Casualties                   
TOTAL W.P. STR CAR Recce ESC T.C. M.P. M.O. TRA 
Days Spent 138 4 13 51 16 23 27 16 136 
Casualties 11 48 29             
 
*The 19AD War Diary continued through the end of May 1916, whereas the 1H War Diary stopped on 10 
May 1916 
**Begins on 12 May 1916 
 
19AD = 19th Albert Dragoons 1H = 1st Hussars  CCCR = Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment 
 
W.P. = Working Parties  STR = Stretcher Bearing  CAR = Carrying Parties 
Recce = Reconnaissance  ESC = Escort Duties  T.C. = Traffic Control 
M.P. = Mounted Police  M.O. = Mounted Orderlies TRA = Training 
 
Source:  War Diary, 19th Alberta Dragoons, January-May 1916;  
War Diary, 1st Hussars, January-May, 1916; 
War Diary, Canadian Light Horse, May-December 1916. 
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Appendix VI: The Somme, 1916 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.                       
Source: “The Battle of the Somme,” Wikipedia. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_the_Somme_1916_map.png 
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Appendix VII: German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line, March 1917 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter  
Source: Chris Baker “The German retreat to the Hindenburg Line.”  The Long, Long Trail: The British   
Army of 1914-1918.  http://www.1914-1918.net/bat17.htm 
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Appendix VIII: Mounted Attack with Hotchkiss Support 
 
Diagram from Cavalry Training 1912 
 
 
 
 
Hotchkiss guns operate on the flanks of the mounted attack while the mounted force 
moves away from their supporting guns against the enemy’s opposite flank. 
 
Source: Cavalry Training, 1912 (London: HMSO, 1912), 270.   
 *Also used in Kenyon, 109.  
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Appendix IX: Canadian Light Horse, Vimy Ridge, April 1917 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.                    Source: Nicholson, 262. 
 366
Appendix X:  
Canadian Light Horse Casualties: 
Vimy Ridge, April 1917 
 
Officers       
Date Killed Wounded Missing 
08-Apr   2   
09-Apr   1   
10-16 Apr       
        
Other Ranks     
Date Killed Wounded Missing 
08-Apr   2   
09-Apr 6 6 2
10-16 Apr       
        
Horses       
Killed Wounded Died Evac. 
31 20 7 7
 
 
Source: War Diary, CLH, 17 April 1917; 
LAC RG9 III C2 Vol. 3988, Folder 4, File 6.  Army Book 153, Field Message 
Book.  Ibbotson Leonard, 10 April 1917 
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Appendix XI: Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Cambrai, November-December 1917 
 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.           Source: Anglesey, 118, Nicholson 334 
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Appendix XII: Operation Michael, Army Dispositions, March 1918 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.   
Source: Middlebrook Kaiser’s Battle. 
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Appendix XIII 
 
Patrol Reports - Royal Canadian Dragoons - Lt. E. Price 23 March 1918 
Dispatched Returned Distance Report 
Berlancourt Berlancourt 2.5 miles Golancourt is not in enemy hands. Infantry are dug in  
3:00pm 3:25pm   in front of Golancourt but do not know if our infantry 
      are in front of them. 
        
Berlancourt Berlancourt 4 miles Muille-Villette is not in the hands of the enemy but is being 
3:45pm 4:10pm   heavily shelled by him.  A few of our infantry in 
      Muille-Villette but not in touch with enemy. 
        
Berlancourt Berlancourt 4 miles Muille-Villette being heavily shelled - a few gas shells 
4:15pm 5:20pm   among them.  Our infantry have been in touch with enemy 
      about Q.1.c. central where captured a M.G. Enemy M.G. 
      reported about Q.1.d.3.8 E.A. active, flying low 
Berlancourt Berlancourt 4 miles Our infantry have all retired from Muille-Villette and  
6:50pm 7:30pm   our furthest advanced troops on HAM road are now at N. 
      edge of Golancourt.  Enemy have not yet entered Muille- 
      Villette but are just outside it.  About 75 of our men have 
      just withdrawn from Brouchy and are lying in field  
      extended just E. of Wood. 
      Q.14.d. Am now retiring to Golancourt 
 
 
Source: LAC RG9 III Box 3984, Folder 5, File 15.  G/153, Machine Gun Squadron, 3rd 
Cavalry Division.  Work of Patrols with Harman’s Force on 23 March 1918. 
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Appendix XIV: German Gains, 21 March-5 April 1918 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.   
Source: Grodzinski & McNorgan, 253. 
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Appendix XV: Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Moreuil Wood, 30 March 1918 
 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.   
Source: Grodzinski & McNorgan, 258. 
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Appendix XVI:  
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Casualties: 
Moreuil Wood 30 March 1918; 
Rifle Wood 1 April 1918 
 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Casualties, Moreuil Wood, 30 March 1918   
Unit         Killed      Wounded       Missing        Gassed TOTAL
  Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R   
RCD 1 19 4 48   22     94
LSH   37 9 111         157
FGH   1 1 36   3     41
MGS   2   8         10
7CFA       1         1
TOTAL 1 59 14 204   25     303
 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Casualties, Rifle Wood, 1 April 1918     
Unit         Killed       Wounded       Missing        Gassed TOTAL
  Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R   
RCD     1 20         21
LSH 1 11 2 44   11     69
FGH   8 3 58   1 2 1 73
MGS 1     5         6
7CFA     1 5         6
TOTAL 2 19 7 132   12 2 1 175
 
RCD = Royal Canadian Dragoons  
LSH = Lord Strathcona’s Horse  
FGH = Fort Garry Horse   
MGS = Machine Gun Squadron 
7CFA = 7th Canadian Field Ambulance 
Other R = Other Ranks   
 
 
 
Source: LAC RG9 III Box 3983, Folder 1, File 8.  List of Casualties Sustained by 
Brigade in Action, 30 March and 1 April 1918; 
LAC RG9 III Box 3983, Folder 1, File 8.  No. G.44/1 Headquarters Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, 22 April 1918. 
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Appendix XVII:  
Canadian Cavalry Brigade and Canadian Light Horse, Amiens, August 1918 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.                    Source: Nicholson, 418.
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Appendix XVIII: 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Casualties: 
Amiens, 8-10 August 1918 
 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Casualties, Amiens, 8-10 August 1918 
Unit         Killed      Wounded       Missing TOTAL 
  Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R   
RCD 2 12 2 49   6 71 
LSH 1 10 3 45   15 74 
FGH 1 2 2 38 1 17 61 
MGS   4   17   1 22 
RCHA   2   12     14 
SIGTrp       1     1 
CCFA       1     1 
MVSec       1     1 
TOTAL 4 30 7 164 1 39 245 
 
RCD = Royal Canadian Dragoons  
LSH = Lord Strathcona’s Horse  
FGH = Fort Garry Horse 
MGS = Machine Gun Squadron 
RCHA = Royal Canadian Horse Artillery   
SIGTrp = Signal Troop 
CCFA = Canadian Corps Field Ambulance 
MVSec = Mobile Veterinary Section 
Other R = Other Ranks   
 
Source: FGHMA, WWI Collection, War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
Narrative of Operations 8-10 August by R.W. Paterson. 
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Appendix XIX: Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Le Cateau, October 1918 
 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.                    Source: Nicholson, 463.
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Appendix XX: 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Casualties: 
Le Cateau, 9-10 October 1918 
 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade Casualties, Le Cateau, 9-10 October 1918 
Unit         Killed      Wounded       Missing TOTAL 
  Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R   
RCD 1 1 1 5   15 23
LSH 1 9 2 42     54
FGH   14 4 54     72
MGS   2 2 13   2 19
RCHA     1 4     5
HQ & SIG   2   3     5
TOTAL 2 28 10 121   17 178
 
 
CCB Horse Casualties 
9-10 October 1918 
Killed Wounded Missing TOTAL
109 40 22 171 
 
CCB = Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
RCD = Royal Canadian Dragoons  
LSH = Lord Strathcona’s Horse  
FGH = Fort Garry Horse 
MGS = Machine Gun Squadron 
RCHA = Royal Canadian Horse Artillery   
HQ & SIG = Brigade Headquarters and Signal Troop 
Other R = Other Ranks  
 
Source: FGHMA, WWI Collection, War Diaries File.  Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
Narrative of Operations 9-10 October by R.W. Paterson. 
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Appendix XXI: 
 
Canadian Light Horse Distribution, October 1917 
 
Distribution of Canadian Light Horse, 31 October 1917 
Nature of Duty Officers Other R Horses 
M.O. 1st Canadian Division   2 2 
M.O. 2nd Canadian Division   1   
Canadian Supply Column   2   
GHQ Small Arms School   1   
First Army School 1 2   
"I" Branch Anzac Corps 1 10   
Railhead Supply Officer   15   
Area Commandant   3 8 
APM 4th Canadian Division 1 1   
CCHA - Carrying 2 99   
1st CMMG Bgd - Carrying 2 73   
APM Canadian Corps 4 47   
School of Farriery   1   
Field Ambulance 1 12   
Leave 1 17   
TOTAL Detached 13 286 11 
TOTAL Available 21 239 490 
 
Source: War Diary, CLH, October 1917, Appendix 2.  Canadian Light Horse 
Distribution, 31 October 1917. 
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Appendix XXII: 
 
Canadian Light Horse Distribution, March-July 1918 
 
Distribution of Canadian Light Horse, 31 March 1918   
Nature of Duty Officers Other R Horses 
"A" Squ CLH att. 1st Cdn Div as M.O. 8 105 113 
M.O. to GOC 1st Cdn Division   2 2 
M.O. to GOC 2nd Cdn Division   1 1 
Canadian Corps Supply Column   2   
CE Canadian Corps   1   
APM Canadian Corps 1 2 3 
Chief Engineer (Working Party) 1 50   
School of Farriery, 1st Army   1   
Special Patrol, 3rd Divisional Artillery   5   
Cdn Corps HQ (Hotchkiss)   1   
P.M. 1st Army (B.L.P)   12 12 
Hotchkiss Gun Battery 3 65   
Observers, Cdn Corps 1 24   
Field Ambulance 2 5   
Leave   4   
TOTAL Detached 16 280 131 
TOTAL Available 18 256 379 
 
Distribution of Canadian Light Horse, 28 April 1918   
Nature of Duty Officers Other R Horses 
M.O. to GOC 1st Cdn Division   2 2 
M.O. to GOC 2nd Cdn Division   1 1 
Canadian Corps Supply Column   2   
Chief Engineer, Cdn Corps   1   
APM Canadian Corps 1 2 3 
School of Farriery, 1st Army   1   
HQ 2nd Canadian Division 1 19 18 
Observers, Cdn Corps 1 24   
P.M. 1st Army (B.L.P)   12 12 
Hospital 2 8   
TOTAL Detached 5 72 36 
TOTAL Available 29 456 472 
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Appendix XXII Continued 
 
Distribution of Canadian Light Horse, 2 June 1918   
Nature of Duty Officers Other R Horses 
M.O. to GOC 1st Cdn Division   2 2 
M.O. to GOC 2nd Cdn Division   1 1 
Canadian Corps Supply Column   2   
Chief Engineer, Cdn Corps   1   
APM Canadian Corps   1   
Town Major, Divon   3   
Observers, Cdn Corps 1 22   
P.M. 1st Army (B.L.P)   12 12 
Area Commandant, Camblan L'Abbe     1 
Corps Tramways, Lens Junction      1 
Hospital   7   
TOTAL Detached 1 51 17 
TOTAL Available 29 468 473 
 
Distribution of Canadian Light Horse, 30 June 1918   
Nature of Duty Officers Other R Horses 
M.O. to GOC 1st Cdn Division   2 2 
M.O. to GOC 2nd Cdn Division   1 1 
Canadian Corps Supply Column   2   
APM Canadian Corps   1   
Town Major, Divon   3   
Observers, Cdn Corps 1     
P.M. 1st Army (B.L.P)   12 12 
Corps Tramways, Lens Junction      1 
Camp Commandant Canadian Corps 1 4 5 
Provost Aubin St. Vaast   1 2 
Gen. Armstrong Boyval   4 8 
Training Camp, Pernes   1   
Field Ambulance    1   
Leave 5 13   
TOTAL Detached 7 45 31 
TOTAL Available 24 444 497 
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Appendix XXII Continued 
 
Distribution of Canadian Light Horse, 3 August 1918   
Nature of Duty Officers Other R Horses 
M.O. to GOC 1st Cdn Division   2 2 
M.O. to GOC 2nd Cdn Division   1 1 
Canadian Corps Supply Column   2 2 
APM Canadian Corps   1   
Town Major, Divon   3   
Observers, Cdn Corps 1     
P.M. 1st Army (B.L.P)   12 12 
Corps Tramways, Lens Junction      1 
Provost Aubin St. Vaast   1 2 
1st Army Rest Camp   6   
1st Canadian Infantry Brigade 1 2 3 
1st Army School   1   
Field Ambulance    6   
Leave 4 2   
2nd Canadian Division 2 51 48 
3rd Canadian Division 3 40 45 
TOTAL Detached 11 130 116 
TOTAL Available 19 351 376 
 
Source:  
 
War Diary, CLH, March 1918, Appendix D.  Canadian Light Horse Distribution, 31 
March 1918; 
War Diary, CLH, April 1918, Appendix C3.  Canadian Light Horse Distribution, 28 April 
1918; 
War Diary, CLH, June 1918, Appendix D1.  Canadian Light Horse Distribution, 2 June 
1918; 
War Diary, CLH, June 1918, Appendix CI.  Canadian Light Horse Distribution, 30 June 
1918; 
War Diary, CLH, August 1918, Appendix CI.  Canadian Light Horse Distribution, 3 
August 1918.
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Appendix XXIII: 
 
Dispositions of the Canadian Light Horse, “A” “B” and “C” Squadrons & 
Hotchkiss Detachment  
Attached to the Canadian Corps at Amiens, 4-29 August 1918 
 
 
 
CLH "A" Squadron - Assistant Provost Marshal (APM), 4-22 August 1918 
Troop Attached To Duties 
1st Sector 1   Traffic Control in Forward Area 
2nd Sector 2 Traffic Control in Forward Area 
3rd Sector 3  Traffic Control in Forward Area 
4th Corps Signals Dispatch Riding 
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Appendix XXIII Continued 
 
CLH "B" Squadron - 3rd Canadian Division, 5-8 August 
Troop Attached To Duties 
1st  3rd Canadian Division APM  Traffic Control 
2nd  3rd Canadian Division Signals Dispatch Riding 
Detachments     
4 OR 7th Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 CO, 4 OR 3rd Canadian Division Headquarters Patrol & Orderly Work 
CLH "B" Squadron - 3rd Canadian Division, 9-18 August 
Troop Attached To Duties 
1st  8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding from Brigade to Battalion 
Detachments     
15 OR 3rd Canadian Division Signals Dispatch Riding 
1 CO 6 OR 3rd Canadian Division Headquarters Dispatch Riding & Patrol Work 
2 CO 20 OR 3rd Canadian Division APM  Escort Duties (For Prisoners of War) 
CLH "B" Squadron - 3rd Canadian Division, 19-29 August 1918 
Troop Attached To Duties 
1st  3rd Canadian Division Guides & Traffic Control during moves 
2nd  3rd Canadian Division Guides & Traffic Control during moves 
Detachments     
CO & 15 OR 3rd Canadian Division APM  Escort Duties (For Prisoners of War) 
CO & 15 OR 3rd Canadian Division Headquarters Dispatch Riding & Orderly Work 
CLH "B" Squadron - 4th Canadian Division, 5-13 August 1918 
Troop Attached To Duties 
3rd 4th Canadian Division APM Traffic Control, Dispatch Riding, Escorting POW's
4th  4th Canadian Division Signals Dispatch Riding 
Detachments     
1 NCO 5 OR 10th Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 NCO 5 OR 11th Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 NCO 5 OR 12th Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 NCO 10 OR 4th Canadian Division Headquarters Dispatch Riding 
1 Mtd Orderly 4th Canadian Division Headquarters Traffic Control 
CLH "B" Squadron - 4th Canadian Division, 14-27 August 1918 
Troop Attached To Duties 
3rd Quarter Master General Salvaging Equipment & Ammunition 
4th  Quarter Master General Salvaging Equipment & Ammunition 
Detachments     
20 OR 4th Canadian Division Signals Dispatch Riding 
2 OR 4th Canadian Division Artillery Dispatch Riding 
1 NCO 5 OR 10th Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 NCO 5 OR 11th Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 NCO 5 OR 12th Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 NCO 6 OR 4th Canadian Division APM Traffic Control & Dispatch Riding 
2 OR 4th Canadian Division Headquarters Dispatch Riding 
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Appendix XXIII Continued 
 
CLH "C" Squadron - 1st Canadian Division, 5-12 August 1918 
Troop Attached To Duties 
1st 1st Canadian Division Signals Dispatch Riding for Signals & 32nd Division 
2nd 1st Canadian Division APM Traffic Control & Escort Duties (For POW's) 
Detachments     
1 CO & 2 OR 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 CO & 6 OR 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
1 CO & 2 OR 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
2 CO & 9 OR 1st Canadian Division Headquarters Dispatch Riding 
CLH "C" Squadron - 2nd Canadian Division, 5-28 August 1918 
Troop Attached To Duties 
3rd 2nd Canadian Division Signals Dispatch Riding 
4th 2nd Canadian Division APM Traffic Control & Escort Duties (For POW's) 
Detachments     
2 OR 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
2 OR 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
2 OR 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade Dispatch Riding 
2 OR 4th Canadian Artillery Brigade Dispatch Riding 
2 OR 5th Canadian Artillery Brigade Dispatch Riding 
2 OR 6th Canadian Artillery Brigade Dispatch Riding 
 
CLH Hotchkiss Detachment - Brutinel's Independent Force, 8-20 August 1918 
Date Location Action 
08-Aug Roye Road to Maison-Blanche Stood to, not called into action 
09-Aug Road near Beaucourt No action, formed defensive screen S.of Arvillers 
10-Aug Domart Re-Shoed Horses 
11-Aug Wood near Caix Rest 
12-13-Aug Wood near Caix Training 
14-Aug Behind French Front on Roye Road Stood to, no opportunity for action 
15-19-Aug Camp at Caix None 
20-Aug Return to CLH  Relieved 
 
CLH = Canadian Light Horse 
CO = Commissioned Officer 
NCO = Non Commissioned Officer 
OR = Other Ranks 
APM = Assistant Provost Marshall 
POW = Prisoners of War 
 
Source: War Diary, Canadian Light Horse, 4-29 August 1918 
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Appendix XXIV 
 
Canadian Light Horse Casualties: Canal du Nord, 28-30 September 1918   
Date         Killed        Wounded          Injured        Gassed TOTAL
  Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R Officers Other R   
28-Sep-18   1 3 10         14
29-Sep-18     1         2 3
30-Sep-18   1 1 1   2   1 6
TOTAL   2 5 11   2   3 23
 
Source: War Diary, CLH, September 1918, Appendix E1.  Report for War Diary, 
Casualties, Canadian Light Horse. 
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Appendix XXV: 
Canadian Light Horse, Escaudoeuvres and Iwuy, October 1918 
 
 
 
Map drawn by Karen Van Kerkoerle for S. Potter, © S. Potter.          Source: McNorgan, Iwuy, 219.  
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